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My dissertation examines the transformation of China from a pre-modern 
cosmopolitan empire into a modern multiethnic sovereign state between the 
seventeenth and twentieth centuries. I explore, in particular, Qing China’s changing 
relations with Chosŏn Korea over that period, which both reflected and contributed to 
shifts in the nature of the Chinese polity. It aims to explore the unique trajectory of 
China’s changes within the context of international relations in East Asia and the 
world from the early seventeenth century onward. It reconstructs the narrative of Qing 
China’s Zongfan (tributary) relations with Chosŏn Korea (1392–1910) by 
re-evaluating conventional scholarly appraisals of the following four questions: (1) 
when the Qing (1636/1644–1912) first identified itself with “China”—the Central 
Kingdom, or Zhongguo—in the Chinese world; (2) how Qing China built an imperial 
enterprise and governed its expansive Eurasian empire in a multiethnic and 
multicultural context; (3) whether the China-centric Zongfan system was thoroughly 
replaced by the treaty port system; and (4) whether China exercised imperialism in 
Central Asia in the eighteenth century and in Chosŏn Korea in the late nineteenth 
century. The dissertation offers new explanations of these issues by using rich Chinese, 
Manchu, Korean, Japanese, and English historical archives. 
First, I argue that the Manchu regime had gained a political identity as “China” 
by claiming centrality in the Chinese world already in the 1630s. I further argue that 
the Manchu regime strengthened this “China” identity through its intensive practice of 
the Zongfan arrangement with Chosŏn Korea from 1637 to 1643, a time before the 
Manchus crossed the Great Wall to conquer the Ming’s territories and march westward. 
This pre-1644 redefinition of the Manchu regime in light of its Zongfan relations with 
Chosŏn, against the time-honored Chinese orthodox and politico-cultural background 
of the civilized–barbarian distinction, helped lay the foundation for it later to position 
itself as the exclusive civilized center of the Chinese world. 
Second, I demonstrate that as the Qing built a gigantic Eurasian empire and a 
China-centric cosmopolitan order in the eighteenth century, it used its Zongfan 
relationship with Chosŏn as a yardstick for managing its external relations with other 
political entities. I term the Qing–Chosŏn relationship the “Chosŏn Model” because of 
its prototypical status. Through this model, the Qing accomplished its prolonged 
process of institutionalizing its self-identification as the civilized Central Kingdom 
and “Heavenly Dynasty,” on the one hand, and its identification of Chosŏn as well as 
other subordinate countries of the Qing as “countries of barbarians.” This dual 
institutionalization demonstrates that the Qing and Chosŏn legitimated each other 
through the transformation of their relations, and on this basis acquired mutually 
constitutive political identities in the China-centric world framework. Viewed from 
this perspective, the Chinese empire under the Qing manifested itself in two different 
dimensions, which could explain the transformations of both China and its subordinate 
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countries in the late imperial and modern times. 
Third, I put forward a new analytical framework for understanding the 
unprecedented changes of the Zongfan system in the late nineteenth century, when 
both Qing China and Chosŏn Korea were introduced to the treaty port system and 
international law, which, imported from the West, regarded the two as coequal 
sovereign states. I argue that the Zongfan system at the time consisted in two 
co-existing and correlative dual diplomatic systems, including what I term the “outer 
dual system” and the “inner dual system.” The two systems related Qing China, its 
“outer fan,” and Western powers in different yet similar relationships of reciprocity. 
This new analytical framework also demonstrates that the Qing did not exercise 
imperialism in Korea in the late nineteenth century. Meanwhile, I point out that the 
Zongfan system was only partly destroyed by the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895. 
Rather, this system persisted in an altered form, crossing the 1911 and 1949 divides, 
into the contemporary era. The historical legacies bequeathed by the Chinese empire 
under the Qing have been acting as a vehicle for China’s transformation into a 
multiethnic modern sovereign state and for China’s maintenance of political 
legitimacy and unification within the post-1949 Chinese state. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Revisiting the “Chinese Empire” through the Lens of Sino–Korean Zongfan 
Relations under the Qing 
On May 23, 1618, a band of furious Bohemian Protestants threw two Catholic royal 
governors out of the window of Hradčin castle in Prague to show their discontent over 
the policies of Ferdinand of Styria, the king of Bohemia appointed by the emperor of the 
Holy Roman Empire. This incident, known as the Defenestration of Prague, marked the 
beginning of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe.1 Sixteen days before the Bohemians 
revolted, Nurhaci, the khan of the Houjin founded by the Manchus in 1616 in Manchuria, 
rebelled against the ruling regime of the Chinese empire—the Great Ming (1368–
1644)—and started their own thirty years’ war, with the Ming. Both Europe and China 
were undergoing epoch-making transformations of their own worlds. When the two wars 
ended in the 1640s, a new principle of international relations came into being with the 
demise of the Holy Roman Empire and began permeating into political entities in Europe. 
In China, the Manchu-ruled Great Qing (1636/1644–1912) vigorously replaced the Ming 
and embraced the Chinese conventional framework of international relations based on 
Chinese cosmopolitanism to reinvent the Chinese empire. 
Just as the war spread quickly from Bohemia to other countries in Europe, the war 
between the Houjin and the Ming spread rapidly from Manchuria to Chosŏn Korea. Since 
the 1390s, Chosŏn (1392–1910) had maintained a Zongfan (a.k.a. tributary) relationship 
with the Ming for more than two centuries. In the bilateral framework, Chosŏn served as 
a loyal subordinate to the Ming and its king as a faithful subject to the Chinese emperor 
                                               
1 See, for example, Mitchell B. Garrett, European History, 1500–1815, 241-243; S. H. Steinberg, The 
‘Thirty Years War’ and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600–1660, 36; Josef. V. Polišenský, War and 
Society in Europe, 1618–1648, 55-57. 
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who claimed to be the “Son of Heaven” (Ch. tianzi). Twenty years before Nurhaci 
revolted, Chosŏn was rescued by the Ming from an aggressive Japanese invasion, an 
event which made the country even more committed to the Ming. In 1619 Chosŏn sent 
forces to Manchuria to help the Ming attack the Manchus, but its involvement led to two 
fierce Manchu invasions in 1627 and 1636. In early 1637, the Manchus forced Chosŏn to 
accept terms of submission, through which the Manchu regime, with a new reign-title of 
the Great Qing since 1636, officially established a Zongfan relationship with Chosŏn that 
would last for 258 years, until 1895 when this relationship was violently terminated by 
the Sino–Japanese War. The establishment of the Zongfan relationship between the two 
regimes was a watershed event in the history of the Qing’s prodigious enterprise of 
remaking the Chinese world since the 1630s. 
Although the Manchus did not cross the Great Wall to take over Beijing until 
1644, the Manchu regime strategically initiated its contest with the Ming for the 
legitimate status of being the Central Kingdom by employing the shared politico-cultural 
discourse embedded in the Zongfan norms at least from the 1630s, rather than from 1644 
as scholars have commonly believed. In the bilateral Zongfan framework after 1637, the 
Qing, who had been treated both by Chosŏn and the Ming as benighted “barbarians” (yi), 
replaced the Ming as the “Central Kingdom”—China, or Zhongguo in Chinese2—which 
was the sine qua non for its new identification as “civilized.” Simultaneously, Chosŏn, 
long identifying itself as the civilized “Little China” (Ch. xiao Zhonghua; K. so Junghwa) 
in the Ming-centric Zongfan world, was gradually converted by the Qing into a 
prototypical “outer subordinate”—waifan (outer fan) or shuguo (subordinate country) in 
                                               
2 The three terms of “China,” “the Central Kingdom,” and “Zhongguo” are interchangeable in this 
dissertation. 
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Chinese—thus falling into the category of “barbarians” on the periphery of the new 
Central Kingdom. This reverse hierarchical framework was a revolutionary 
transformation, allowing the Qing to position itself within the pedigree of the Central 
Kingdom against the long-lasting historical and politico-cultural background of the 
“civilized–barbarian distinction” (Ch. huayi zhi bian; K. hwa-i ŭi chai). By entering the 
pantheon of the Central Kingdom, the Qing began seeking the “orthodox legitimacy” (Ch. 
mingfen, or zhengtong; K. myŏngbun; J. meibun, i.e., name and status, the universal 
ideological, moral, and ethnical rationale behind the legitimate status of a political entity 
in the Chinese world) in order to support, consolidate, and display its new identity as the 
exclusive civilized center of “all-under-Heaven” (Ch. tianxia) and the unique agency of 
the “Mandate of Heaven” (Ch. tianming).  
In practice, the Zongfan arrangement and the Qing’s new identity were 
substantiated by the intensive contacts between the Qing and Chosŏn from 1637 to 1643, 
from which the Qing developed a mature model for managing its relations with its newly 
conquered political entities. We term this model the “Chosŏn Model” (Ch. Chaoxian 
shili),3 a pattern by which a country or a political entity could follow Chosŏn into the 
Qing-centric Zongfan system primarily by receiving imperial investitures and norms from 
the Qing, adopting the reign-title of the Qing to count dates, and sending emissaries and 
tribute to the Qing. The rationale for this model was to propagate the embracement of the 
                                               
3 This term is in Gao Hongzhong’s memorial to Hongtaiji in 1630, in which Gao suggested that the 
Manchu regime “follow the Chosŏn Model to receive the Ming’s investiture and to use the reign-title of the 
Ming to count the date” (Ch. bi Chaoxian shili, qing feng wangwei, cong zhengshuo). See Ming Qing 
shiliao (Historical documents on the Ming dynasty and the Qing dynasty), series 3, vol. 1, 45. After 1644, 
the Qing followed this model to handle its relations with other countries, see Qinding daqing huidian (The 
collected statutes of the Great Qing, imperially ordained) (1899), vol. 39, 10b. For Ryukyu, see Qinding 
libu zeli (The regulations and cases of the Ministry of Rituals, imperially ordained) (1844), vol. 173, 6b, 
10a; for Vietnam, see ibid., vol. 174, 8a, 11a, 13b; for Laos, see ibid., vol. 175, 5b, 6a; for Thailand, see 
ibid., vol. 176, 6b, 8a. 
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Qing as the exclusive civilized center of the world with the supreme political and cultural 
position, replacing the old Ming-centric with a new Qing-centric Zongfan order.  
The Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship was thus far more than a part of the 
long-lasting Sino–Korean Zongfan history; it was indeed the final part of this history. 
Rather, it buttressed the rationale of the entire Zongfan system in the late imperial era, 
which kept the Chinese empire informed and transformed on the periphery when the 
empire was remade at the core by the Manchu regime. The consensus on the Qing’s 
Zongfan system has been that the Qing simply adopted the Ming’s Zongfan mechanism. 
This assumption has led scholars to the neglect of the Qing’s sedulous efforts to 
reconstruct the system in a unique way, drawing inspiration from its relationship with its 
outer fan, such as Chosŏn, that did not become a part of Chinese territory after the fall of 
the Qing in 1912. This neglect has further caused scholars to underappreciate the critical 
relationship between the Qing’s painstaking efforts to construct the Qing-centric Zongfan 
system and their earnest attempts to define the identities of both the Qing and its outer fan. 
Research on the Qing’s rise as a massive empire has adopted an intellectual framework 
that is delineated by the Chinese nation formed after the end of the Qing, in which 
nationhood is correlated with China’s national borders after 1912, in particular 1949. 
Employing the post-1949 borders as a framework for exploring the Qing’s post-1644 
expansion, however, scholars cannot grasp the vital role that the Qing’s relationship with 
its outer fan—in particular the first Confucian outer fan, Chosŏn—played in 
institutionalizing the entire Zongfan system and creating the Qing’s politico-cultural 
identity as a Chinese empire. 
As the Qing occupied Beijing in 1644, continued to conquer inner China proper, 
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and marched west and southwest, it exploited the Chosŏn Model as a handy soft-power 
weapon to consolidate its new position as the civilized Central Kingdom, possessing the 
source of legitimacy for other political entities in the Sinocentric world. By institutionally 
exploiting the Chosŏn Model, as Chapter 2 will demonstrate, Qing China converted 
Chosŏn and other countries or polities into “subordinate countries of foreign barbarians” 
(Ch. waiyi shuguo; Ma. tulergi gurun) on its periphery. Once its identification as the 
civilized center of “all-under-Heaven” was established by the highly institutionalized 
norms of these hierarchical Zongfan relationships, the Qing was able to succeed the Ming 
in the dynastical lineage as Zhongguo and the “Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. tianchao), the 
possessor of the orthodox legitimacy. At the same time, Qing China became the only 
mechanism for Chosŏn and other outer fan to pursue their own orthodox legitimacy, thus 
ensuring their domestic governance and stability and their status in the big and patriarchic 
Qing China-centric family. 
For the Qing, taking over Beijing in 1644 was not sufficient to secure its 
legitimate governance as the ruler of Zhongguo. Challenging the Qing’s power, the 
Southern Ming (1644–1662) emerged in South China, just as the Southern Song (1127–
1279) had done after the Northern Song (960–1127) was conquered in 1127 by the Jin 
(1115–1234), which was founded by the Jurchens, the Manchus’ ethnic ancestors. If the 
Southern Ming has been able to endure as long as the Southern Song had done, Chinese 
history since 1644 would have been completely different. Yet the vigor of the Manchu 
Eight Banners, along with the feebleness of the Southern Ming regime, excluded this 
scenario. In addition to its military power, the Qing significantly enhanced its orthodox 
legitimacy as Zhongguo through the Chosŏn Model during the steady growth of the 
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Qing-centric Zongfan order after 1644, which stabilized its rule over its vast conquered 
lands and population. Moreover, along with its rapid expansion into Inner Asia, the Qing 
adroitly applied the Chosŏn Model to the political entities in those areas, progressively 
incorporating them into its territory as outer fan in the big Qing-centric family. By the 
end of the eighteenth century, the Qing had accomplished its construction of a new 
imperial order within and without its multiethnic and multicultural Eurasian empire by 
substantially defining itself as Zhongguo and the Heavenly Dynasty. 
China underwent another profound transformation in the nineteenth century, when 
European powers encountered the Chinese Zongfan world in their contacts with such 
outer fan as Annam (Vietnam), Ryukyu, and Chosŏn. These powers were represented by 
Britain, which had been institutionally “barbarianized” by Qing China in the 1760s—that 
is, Britain was termed “a country of barbarians” on China’s periphery by the Chinese 
imperial codes and diplomatic discourse, as the well-known Macartney mission to China 
in 1793 illustrated. In the nineteenth century, these European powers successfully 
changed their image and status vis-à-vis China through gunboat diplomacy and unequal 
treaties, promulgating the treaty port system in the local countries. In the new setting, 
China, China’s outer fan, and the European powers were theoretically put on an equal 
footing in terms of their sovereignty under international law. Yet the newly imported 
political and diplomatic discourse could not change the nature of the China-centric 
hierarchical relationship between China and its outer fan. Both sides of the Zongfan 
hierarchy still needed to acquire orthodox legitimacy to maintain their legitimate status in 
the Chinese world. 
As a result, in their contacts with China’s outer fan in the late nineteenth century, 
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the Western powers were confused by the nebulous nature of the Zongfan mechanism and 
were constantly directed to negotiations with Beijing, the only place where diplomacy 
with outsiders could be conducted. The risky disputes emerging from China’s periphery 
were thus transferred to the center of the empire through Zongfan tenets, where they 
converged as an accumulative force to trigger certain reforms within China that in return 
spread to, and deeply influenced, the periphery. This model seems similar to the 
relationship between a metropolis of a European power and its overseas colonies of the 
day, but it possessed different structural fundamentals in the way in which legitimacy was 
mutually constituted within the Chinese world, as will be elaborated in later chapters. 
Among all the manifold and interwoven disputes in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the most significant arose in Chosŏn, the prototypical outer fan of the Great Qing 
since 1637. This dispute led both Chosŏn and China into a series of legal quagmires and 
finally to the irredeemable end of their Zongfan relationship in 1895, fifteen years before 
both states ceased to exist in the early 1910s. 
This dissertation suggests that, from the early seventeenth to early twentieth 
centuries, the process unleashed by the Qing’s extraordinary efforts at exploiting and 
adjusting its Zongfan relations with Chosŏn propelled China’s transformation from a 
cosmopolitan empire informed by the politico-cultural ideology of “all-under-Heaven” 
into a multiethnic sovereign state as a member of the “family of nations.” The Qing 
reinvented the Chinese empire by using its Zongfan relationship with Chosŏn as a 
yardstick for managing and reconfiguring its foreign relations with other political entities, 
revealing that the macro-transformation of the Qing’s self-identity in the Chinese world 
was deeply connected with its micro-transformation within the Sino–Korean bilateral 
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political arrangement. This prolonged transformation began in the 1610s when the 
Manchu regime rapidly rose from Manchuria and began reshuffling the political order of 
the Chinese world. In the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the 
Qing became a multiethnic and multicultural Eurasian empire and, shadowed by its 
former identity as a state of “barbarians,” made great efforts to pursue “Chineseness” in 
order to enhance its legitimacy as a Chinese empire in the pedigree of “China”/ 
Zhongguo. To that end, the Qing took full advantage of the political and cultural 
resources of the Zongfan system to regulate the discourse and norms of a Chinese empire, 
particularly in its perennial contacts with its first Confucian subordinate country and the 
“Little China,” Chosŏn. In the long nineteenth century, the Chinese empire under the 
Qing experienced another great transformation of its political order, which was 
crystalized by the significant reconfiguration of China’s relations with its outer fan, 
prominently Chosŏn, where the empire began to collapse. Qing China fell in 1912 as a 
result of the Revolution of 1911, yet certain principles underlining the Chinese empire 
and Zongfan system survived the 1911 divide and persisted in altered forms in the 
Chinese approaches toward the outside world in the twentieth century and beyond. 
The Zongfan System: Its Origins, Ideals, and Practices in the Late Imperial Period 
We adopt the Chinese term “Zongfan,” rather than its oft-cited English equivalent 
“tributary,” to refer to the relationship between the Ming or the Qing, as well as their 
predecessors, as “China” in history, on the one hand, and the countries that regarded the 
Ming or the Qing as “China,” from which they sought orthodox legitimacy to rule over 
the lands on behalf of the Chinese emperor, on the other. The term “Zongfan” 
encompasses two sub-terms, zong and fan. Zong refers to the royal lineage of the Son of 
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Heaven, who resided in the Central Kingdom with absolute patriarchal authority and 
exclusive orthodox legitimacy as the human agent of the Mandate of Heaven. Fan 
originally meant the clan(s) of the royal family who established outposts on China’s 
borders, where the rulers’ legitimate rule was fully dependent on investiture by the Son of 
Heaven. The two sides of the kinship constituted the familistic Zongfan hierarchy, which 
highlighted the primordial framework of “all-under-Heaven”—the Chinese 
Weltanschauung. 
As a politico-cultural structure, the Zongfan system is believed to have been 
established in the Western Zhou period (ca.1027–770 B.C.).4 It was associated with the 
kinship-based feudalism (Ch. zongfa fengjian) of the day,5 according to which the Zhou 
court was the center of the world—China, the Central Kingdom, or Zhongguo—and 
polities on China’s peripheries as the “Five Submissions” (Ch. wufu) or “Nine 
Submissions” (Ch. jiufu) could be called China’s fan. (Figures I. 1 and I. 2) The fan 
gradually became the equivalent of “subordinate kingdoms or countries”—shuguo in 
Chinese—when the notion of “country” or “state” (Ch. guo) evolved from a walled city 
to a larger political unit encompassing many walled cities, lands, and a population.6 The 
connotation of China’s periphery likewise evolved on this feudalistic model by 
incorporating all countries or polities outside of the Central Kingdom into the category of 
China’s fan.  
In addition to being defined by its geographical distance to China or the central 
court, the fan could be characterized in kinship terms inner fan and outer fan. The inner 
                                               
4 Guoyu (Discourses of the States), 4. 
5 Wang Guowei, “Yinzhou zhidu lun” (A discussion of the systems of the Shang and the Zhou dynasties), 
in Guantang jili (Collections of Wang Guowei), vol. 2, 451-480. 
6 Qian Mu, Guoshi dagang (Outline of Chinese history), 54-68. 
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fan maintained a strong blood relationship with the Son of Heaven, but the outer fan did 
not. Such a dual structure of the fan could be clearly found in the Ming for the last time in 
Chinese history, but it became quite vague during the Qing period due to the multilayered 
nature of the outer fan and the mixed usage of the term in political discourse.7 It should 
be noted that relations between the Central Kingdom and the outer fan were not always as 
peaceful as this ideal structure might suggest. In practice, the Central Kingdom could not 
always control its powerful subordinates, as happened during the Warring States Period 
(453–221 B.C.),8 yet it possessed the exclusive and divine authority over them—the 
Mandate of Heaven. 
Figures I. 1 and I. 2. The Arrangements of the “Five Submissions” and the “Nine 
Submissions” in the Western Zhou 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I. 1. The “Five Submissions”        Figure I. 2. The “Nine Submissions” 
 
Sources: Qinding shujing tushuo (Illustrations of the Classic of History, imperially ordained), vol. 
6, 87a; vol. 33, 2b. The echelon of “Five Submissions,” emanating from the center, namely the imperial 
court (Ch. didu, or wangji) or “Central Kingdom,” consists of “royal submission” (Ch. dianfu), “princely 
submission” (Ch. houfu), “pacifying submission” (Ch. suifu), “restrictive submission” (Ch. yaofu), and 
“cultivating submission” (Ch. huangfu). The distance between each submission was 500 li (the standard of 
Chinese li kept changing in history and in late imperial times 1 li was about 1/3 mile). See Sibu beiyao (The 
complete essentials of the Four Categories), case 9, vol. 6, 17b-18b. According to Zhouli (The Rites of the 
Zhou dynasty), the system of “Nine submissions,” encompasses “princely submission” (Ch. houfu), “royal 
submission” (Ch. dianfu), “baronial submission” (Ch. nanfu), “self-supporting submission” (Ch. caifu), 
“defensive submission” (Ch. weifu), “uncivilized submission” (manfu), “barbarian submission” (Ch. yifu), 
                                               
7 See, for example, Zhang Shuangzhi, Qingdai chaojin zhidu yanjiu (A study of the pilgrimage system of 
the Qing dynasty), 238-261. 
8 Yang Kuan, Zhanguo shi (History of the Warring States Period), 126. 
 11 
“obedient submission” (Ch. zhenfu), and “frontier submission” (Ch. fanfu). See Sibu beiyao, case 2, vol. 33, 
8b. 
 
According to the ideal Zongfan tenets, the outer fan should dispatch emissaries, 
“ministers of ministers” (Ch. peichen), bearing taxes or tribute to the central court on a 
regular basis, where they would offer appropriate obedience to the Son of Heaven and 
receive largess or gifts. In return, the Central Kingdom would dispatch envoys to the fan 
to invest the rulers with legitimate titles and perform its duty of protecting the fan 
whenever necessary. This reciprocity thus formed the policy of “serving the big country” 
or “serving the great” (Ch. shida; K. sadae) for the fan, and of “cherishing the small 
country” or “cherishing the small” (Ch. zixiao; K. chaso) for the Central Kingdom. The 
exchanges of emissaries between the two sides through ritual codes acted as the vehicle 
for running the Zongfan system. From the first days of the Zongfan contacts, ritual 
practices played a key role in maintaining the hierarchy and synergizing the orthodox 
legitimacy of both sides. This model later evolved into a basic philosophy of foreign 
policy of Chinese dynasties.9 
Meanwhile, the notion of “civilized China” (Ch. Huaxia) and its counterpart, 
“barbarians” (Ch. yi, or man), took root in the Zongfan norms as two key concepts 
respectively addressing the status of the Central Kingdom and its outer fan. The two 
terms derived from the notion of all-under-Heaven, which had developed into a 
worldview in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou periods, through which the three dynasties sought 
the orthodox legitimacy of their divine rule. In the same period, the political entities 
spanning China’s land identified xia—not referring to the Xia dynasty, but to a larger area 
where the regime once resided—as the symbol of a civilized community possessing the 
                                               
9 See, for example, John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in The Chinese World Order, 7-11; 
Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” Ibid., 37-41. 
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Mandate of Heaven, namely Zhongguo, Zhongyuan (the central plain) or Zhongtu (the 
central lands), and called it “civilized China.” At that time, the term “barbarian” primarily 
referred to those entities that were on the peripheries of the “central plain” and were quite 
reluctant to identify and embrace the concept of “civilized China,” as the state 
relationship between the Qin and the Chu illuminated.10 Yet the originally geographic 
notion of “barbarian” gradually became an instrument used by some political forces to 
deprecate their antagonists during the movement of the so-called “revering the court of 
the Zhou and expelling the barbarians” (Ch. zunzhou rangyi) in the Eastern Zhou (770–
256 B.C.), a chaotic time moving Confucius (551–479 B.C.) to call for restoring the ideal 
order of “proper conduct” (Ch. li) of the Western Zhou. Due to the fierce inter-state 
rivalries, the civilized–barbarian distinction was consolidated into a politico-cultural 
ideology and became the orthodoxy allowing Chinese dynastic regimes to acquire their 
centrality in the Chinese world and pursue the Mandate of Heaven and political 
legitimacy by continuously interpreting and reinterpreting the notion in the next two 
thousand years until the Revolution of 1911. 
After the Han dynasty (202B.C.–A.D.220), with the expansion of the concept of 
“all-under-Heaven,” the civilized–barbarian distinction became a critical theoretical 
framework in which the Chinese court managed foreign relations.11 In the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, with the rise of ardent assertions of orthodox legitimacy by some 
leading scholars of the Northern Song, who were facing grave challenges from “northern 
                                               
10 Tong Shuye, Chunqiu shi (History of the Spring and Autumn period), 277-279; Zhang Jinguang, Qinzhi 
yanjiu (Studies on the institutions of the Qin dynasty), 39-51. 
11 See, for example, Takeo Abe, Chūgokujin no tenka kannen: seiji shisōshiteki shiron (T’ien-hsia idea of 
the Chinese: a discussion on history of political thought); Yü Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han 
China: A Study in the Structure of Sino–Barbarian Economic Relations; John King Fairbank, ed., The 
Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. 
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barbarians,”12 the distinction became an essential cultural instrument with which the 
Chinese elites fit certain regimes into the pedigree of “legitimate historical narratives” 
(Ch. zhengshi) by expelling competing polities from these narratives. Some intellectuals, 
such as Shi Jie (1005–1045), the author of A Treatise on the Central Kingdom (Ch. 
Zhongguo lun), and Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072), the author of A Treatise on the Orthodox 
Legitimacy (Ch. Zhengtong lun), depicted the Song as the exclusive civilized center of 
the world and those political polities on the Song’s northern border as the uncivilized. 
One of the most influential chronological historical works, edited by Sima Guang (1019–
1086), A Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government (Ch. Zizhi tongjian), drew a clear 
lineage of various states identified as “China” possessing orthodox legitimacy from 403 
B.C. to A.D. 959. These intellectuals’ efforts paid off, for their rhetoric triumphed over 
that of the northern regimes, especially when neo-Confucianism, created and elaborated 
by such Song intellectual vanguards as Cheng Hao (1032–1085), Cheng Yi (1033–1107), 
and Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who emphasized the discourse of social order and orthodox 
legitimacy, became China’s official ideology in the Yuan (1271–1368), Ming, and Qing 
dynasties. This intellectual history could help explain why the official historical narrative 
of the People’s Republic still celebrates the Song for its legitimate status as Zhongguo 
and marginalizes the Liao (907–1125), Xixia (1038–1227), or Jin (1115–1234), treating 
them as “countries of barbarians” established by “ethnic minorities” (Ch. shaoshu minzu). 
In addition to the official efforts to install such civilized–barbarian distinction 
ideology from the top down, in the late imperial times the popular culture promulgated 
this consciousness from the bottom up. For instance, some operas popular among 
                                               
12 See Ge Zhaoguang, Zhaizi Zhongguo: chongjian youguan “Zhongguo” de lishi lunshu (Residing in 
Zhongguo: reconstructing the historical narrative about “Zhongguo”), 41-44. 
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commoners (Ch. zaju, lit. variety play) in the Ming depicted Ming China as the “central 
civilized country” (Ch. Zhonghua) bordered by “barbarians from four directions” (Ch. 
siyi) who paid homage and symbolic tribute to the Central Kingdom on a regular basis. 
The “barbarians” in these operas often found Chosŏn, Annam, Ryukyu, and political units 
in Inner Asia as representatives.13 The consciousness of China’s centrality in the world 
and the civilized–barbarian distinction behind such popular culture might have motivated 
Emperor Qianlong (1711–1799, r. 1735–1795) of the Qing to initiate the ambitious 
project of constructing the Qing as the Heavenly Dynasty and the “central civilized 
country” in the 1750s, as Chapter 2 will explain. 
It is worth noting that the Zongfan system underwent dramatic transformations 
through history, so its specific presentation differed from time to time. Since the sixth and 
seventh centuries, when the Ministry of Rituals (Ch. Libu) was created as a central 
institute of the Chinese bureaucracy, the Zongfan affairs were principally under the 
charge of the ministry and began to be institutionally regulated by intricate ritual norms. 
The unprecedented military expansion of the Mongolians under the Yuan broke the 
moderate nature of the system, for the Mongolian conquerors almost colonized Korea and 
Indochina, two pivotal venues of China’s outer fan. In the wake of the fall of the 
short-lived Yuan, the Han-Chinese rulers of the Ming, who claimed they were expelling 
the “northern barbarian” Mongolians and restoring the civilized Central Kingdom, 
adopted conventional Zongfan norms by following the classical theory and arrangement 
of the Zhou to manage the Ming court’s royal groups and foreign relations. Along this 
trajectory, the Ming defined its outer fan as polities with the right of autonomy or 
                                               
13 “Zhu wanshou wanguo laichao” (Ten thousand countries devoutly came to celebrate the emperor’s 
birthday), in Guben yuan ming zaju (The only existing copy of the operas in the Yuan and Ming times), vol. 
32. 
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self-rule, or zizhu in Chinese. In the late fourteenth century, the number of countries 
counted among the Ming’s outer fan reached fifteen, the majority of which became the 
Qing’s outer fan from the early seventeenth century, principally including Chosŏn, 
Ryukyu, Annam, Lanchang (Laos), Siam (Thailand), Sulu (the Philippines), and Burma.14 
For more than five centuries, from the late fourteenth to the late nineteenth, China 
maintained the Zongfan relationship primarily with these Asian countries, Chosŏn 
predominant among them. 
The long Chinese history, however, is never short of myths, legends, and 
misinterpretations. The Chinese historian Gu Jiegang argued in 1921 that ancient Chinese 
history was “an accumulated history with multilayers,” in which the later the historical 
narratives were made, the longer the ancient history and the more significant the key 
figures in this history would become.15 This situation is true for the Zongfan history, as 
well. The narrative of almost every case study on the Zongfan system, including that in 
this dissertation, prefers to give the system credit for its remarkable historical continuity 
and longevity,16 while agreeing that it became more elaborate and sophisticated in late 
imperial times.17 What further contributed to this complexity was the fact that “the ideas 
and institutions of this empire were neither constant over time nor uniform through 
                                               
14 Daming huidian (Collected statutes of the Great Ming), vol. 105, 1b; Huangming zuxun (The Ming 
emperor’s instructions) in Siku quanshu cunmu congshu (The collections of the books that only have titles 
in the Complete Books of the Four Categories), vol. 264, 167-168. For the Qing period, see Daqing huidian 
(The collected statutes of the Great Qing, imperially ordained) (1899), vol. 39, 2a-3a. 
15 Gu Jiegang, Gushi bian (Textual research on ancient Chinese history), vol. 1, 60. In 1909, the Japanese 
scholar Shiratori Kurakichi (1865–1942) also pointed out that myths existed in ancient Chinese history, see 
Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History, 117-122. 
16 For example, Lien-sheng Yang and John King Fairbank suggest that the origin of the Chinese tributary 
system originated in the Zhou dynasty, see The Chinese World Order, 3-9, 20-22. Morris Rossabi and 
Joanna Waley-Cohen prefer the Han dynasty, see Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia: from 1368 to the 
Present Day, 18-20; Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History, 14. 
17 For an introduction to the multidimensional tributary system in the Qing period, see Mark Mancall, “The 
Ch’ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay,” in The Chinese World Order, 63-89; Takeshi Hamashita, 
Chōkō shisutemu to kindai ajia (The tributary system and modern Asia), 9-24. 
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space,”18 a critical statement that could be well supported by the Qing–Chosŏn case 
analyzed in this dissertation and the Qing–Siamese case discussed by others.19 The above 
brief review of the evolution of the Zongfan system from the Western Zhou down to the 
Qing certainly risks being challenged by the rich literature on this system,20 but it should 
be able to reveal basic features of the system sufficient for the purpose of analyzing the 
Qing–Chosŏn relationship. 
The review here aims to underpin the fact that the rationale for the Qing–Chosŏn 
Zongfan order lay in classical Chinese theories nourished in ancient China. The Ming’s 
passionate restoration of the Zhou’s Zongfan system determined that this system under 
the Qing was directly connected with the classical and ideal tenets of the Zhou. A typical 
case highlighting this point was an official note of Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) in 1883, in 
which Li cited the Western Zhou’s Zongfan tenets to articulate that Chosŏn’s king was 
“outer vassal” (Ch. wai zhuhou) of the Son of Heaven, so this king was equal to China’s 
governor-generals and provincial governors, who were “inner vassals” (Ch. nei zhuhou), 
whereas the officials of Chosŏn were correspondingly on an equal footing with their 
Chinese counterparts below the ranks of governor-generals and provincial governors.21 
                                               
18 R. Bin Wong, “China’s Agrarian Empire: A Different Kind of Empire, A Different Kind of Lesson,” in 
Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moose, eds., Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and 
American Power, 190. 
19 See, for example, Chuang Chi-fa, “Xianluo guowang Zhengzhao rugong qingting kao” (A study of King 
Taksin’s sending tributary mission to the Qing court); Masuda Erika, “Siam’s ‘Chim Kong,’ Sending 
Tributary Missions to China, A Study of the Diplomatic Aspect of Sino–Siamese Relations during the 
Thonburi and Early Rattanakosin Periods (1767–1854),” and “The Fall of Ayutthaya and Siam’s Disrupted 
Order of Tribute to China (1767–1782).” 
20 For recent works about the general introduction to the Zongfan system, see, for example, Li Yunquan, 
Chaogong zhidu shilun: Zhongguo gudai duiwai guanxi tizhi yanjiu (History of Chinese tributary system: a 
study on Chinese foreign relations system in ancient times), Chen Shangsheng, ed., Zhongguo chuantong 
duiwai guanxi de sixiang, zhidu yu zhengce (The ideas, institutions, and policies of China’s traditional 
foreign relations), and Zhang Shuangzhi, Qingdai chaojin zhidu yanjiu (A study of the pilgrimage system 
of the Qing dynasty). 
21 Li to the Zongli Yamen, January 3, 1883, in Qingji zhong ri han guanxi shiliao (Historical materials 
pertaining to the relations between China, Japan and Korea in the late Qing, hereafter referred to as 
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In many works on the Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan contacts in the late nineteenth century, one 
will find that both the Qing and Chosŏn continuously solicited legal support for their 
policies toward each other from Zongfan precedents from the Western Zhou down 
through the Ming times. 
Here it is worth noting why we use “Zongfan” to address the Qing–Chosŏn 
relations. The Ming followed the Zhou’s principles to restore the Zongfan system within 
China, and in 1402 Emperor Yongle (1360–1424, r. 1402–1424) awarded the king of 
Chosŏn the official robe in accordance with the rank of first-degree prince (Ch. qinwang; 
K. ch’inwang, a brother of the emperor), which substantially added Chosŏn to the Ming’s 
Zongfan system, an arrangement identified by Chosŏn.22 The Qing did not change this 
nature when it replaced the Ming in the bilateral Zongfan system after 1637. This was the 
historical reason why in 1886, when Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), who resided at Chosŏn 
since 1884 as the “His Imperial Chinese Majesty’s Resident” (Ch. Qinming zhuzha 
Chaoxian zongli jiaoshe tongshang shiyi), asked Li Hongzhang what level of ritual he 
should perform in front of the king, Li noted that it would be courteous for Yuan to 
follow the rituals for Chinese provincial-level officials (Ch. sidao) to visit the first-degree 
princes (Ch. qinjunwang).23 Zongfan is thus the most appropriate term to address the 
Ming/Qing–Chosŏn relations. 
Under the Qing, the Zongfan order was maintained and embodied by the 
exchange of emissaries between the Qing—the host—and its “subordinate countries of 
foreign barbarians” (Ch. waiyi shuguo; Ma. tulergi gurun)—the guests. All exchanges 
                                                                                                                                            
QJZRH), vol. 3, 1072-1075. 
22 Sejong sillok (Veritable records of King Sejong of Chosŏn), vol. 4, 699. 
23 Li to Yuan, February 1, 1886, in Li Hongzhang quanji (Complete collection of Li Hongzhang) (hereafter 
referred to as “LHZQJ (2008)”), vol. 21, 655. 
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were conducted in accordance with the imperial code—The Universal Tributary 
Regulations (Ch. Chaogong tongli)—codified by the Ministry of Rituals, and the 
performance of the exchanges was supervised by the Host–Guest Office (Ch. Zhuke 
qinglisi; Ma. juke cing lii sy) of the ministry. These regulations primarily consisted of the 
seven mandates: 1) Investiture (Ch. cefeng), under which the Qing emperor gave the king 
of each fan a patent of appointment and an official seal for use in correspondence; 2) 
Reign-title (Ch. nianhao), under which the fan adopted the Qing’s reign-title as a way of 
counting the years; 3) Calendar (Ch. shuoli), under which the fan used the Qing’s 
calendar; 4) Paying tribute and sending emissaries to the Qing (Ch. chaogong), under 
which the fan sent tributary emissaries to Beijing to pay symbolic tribute, usually local 
products, to the emperor with a frequency to be individually determined; 5) Conferring 
noble rank on the late king or royal members of the fan (Ch. fengshi), under which the 
king or royal members of a fan who died received a noble rank from the emperor; 6) 
Reporting events to the Qing (Ch. zoushi), under which the fan informed the emperor of 
its important events, but did not need to ask for instructions and could assume that the 
Qing would not intervene in its domestic affairs; and 7) Trade (Ch. maoyi, or hushi), 
including trade at the frontiers and trade at the Foreign Emissaries’ Common 
Accommodations (Ch. Huitong siyi guan; Ma. acanjime isanjire tulergi gurun i bithe 
ubaliyambure kuren) in Beijing.24 All “subordinate countries of foreign barbarians” had 
to strictly follow these formalities in their communications with Qing China. The practice 
                                               
24 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 171, 1-14; vol. 172, 1-22; vol. 181, 1-7; vol. 184, 1-6; vol. 185, 1-3; vol. 
168, 1-5. For some discussions on the regulations, see John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in 
The Chinese World Order, 10-11; M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Order in Eastern Asia, 16-20; 
Shigeki Iwai, “Chōkō to goshi” (Tribute and trade), in Haruki Wada et al., ed., Higashi Ajia sekai no kindai: 
19 seiki (Modern East Asia: the 19th century), 134-153. John King Fairbank and S. Y. Têng have translated 
the tributary regulations in the Daqing huidian (1690 edition) and the “Ceremonies for the Guests” (Ch. 
binli) in the Daqing huidian (1764 edition), see “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies 6 (1941): 163-167, 170-173. 
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of the Zongfan order between Qing China and its prototypical fan—Chosŏn—is detailed 
in explanations of the Chosŏn Model in Chapter 2. 
Careful reading of the terminologies of the seven mandates is essential for 
grasping the key characteristics of the system and perceiving the discrepancies between 
the Chinese terms and their English renderings. This point could be highlighted by the 
prevalence of the fourth mandate mentioned above, namely chaogong, or paying tribute 
and sending emissaries to China, which concerns the general understanding of the entire 
system. The perennial activity of paying tribute was the most sensational and visible part 
of the bilateral contacts between Qing China and its fan on a regular and ritual basis. 
Therefore, it easily attracted the eyes of observers, prompting them to render this 
functional framework in English parlance. At least since the late eighteenth century, some 
Western travelers, observers, and diplomats who visited the Chinese world began 
adopting the term “tributary” to describe the nature of the relationship between China and 
Korea, Vietnam, and other “tributary countries” or “states tributary to China” in their 
books and reports.25 Their descriptions constituted the first step toward using “tribute 
system” or “tributary system” to refer to the Zongfan system in Western literature on 
China and East Asia. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the Western powers brought 
international law to East Asia, the Western invention and understanding of the “tribute 
system” was further enriched and misconstrued by the analogy between the East and the 
West made by Western diplomats. When the Western powers gradually integrated China 
and Japan into the European-norm-based family of nations, they found that Chosŏn 
maintained a special relationship with China which they could not explain in the context 
                                               
25 See, for example, Jean-Baptiste Grosier, A General Description of China. 
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of international law. Thus, “searching back into the categories which their international 
system listed, they hit upon that of suzerain and vassal as most nearly fitting this East 
Asiatic relationship, and they then proceeded to apply the legal attributes of vassalage to 
the non-legal status of a shu-pang.”26 As a result, the Sino–Korean relationship was 
depicted as a suzerain–vassal variety that could fit into the Western setting.27 The special 
relationship between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire at that time was seen as an 
instructive analogy, crystalized by Japan’s arduous strategy of using European legal 
terminology to undermine the Sino–Korean relationship.28 
This suzerain–vassal rendering of the Zongfan order quickly drew Western 
powers into a legal quagmire regarding the legal status of Chosŏn. Both China and 
Chosŏn declared that Chosŏn was China’s “subordinate country,” namely shuguo, with 
the right of “autonomy” or “self-rule,” namely zizhu, but the Western countries and Japan 
argued that it was an independent sovereign state with all international rights. The 
Wanguo gongfa (lit. the common law among ten thousand countries), the Chinese 
translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, was published by the 
Zongli Yamen (i.e., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in 1864 after it was translated by an 
American Presbyterian missionary, W. A. P. Martin (1827–1916). Yet this first Chinese 
edition of Western international law could not help the two parties settle disputes, 
because it adopts Zongfan concepts to translate and interpret English terms. For example, 
the English term “colony” was translated as pingfan (fence) or shubang/ shuguo 
(subordinate country); “dependency” as shubang; “vassal state” as fanshu (subordinate 
                                               
26 M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 292. 
27 See, for example, George N. Curzon’s book, Problems of the Far East: Japan–Korea–China. 
28 As for how Japan’s view about Asia in reference to Egypt, see Tamura Airi, “Ejiputo kenkyu kara mita 
kindai nihon no ajia kan” (Modern Japanese views of Asia in reference to Egyptian studies), Gakushuin 
shigaku (Gakushuin historical review) 9 (1972): 59-64. 
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and dependent country); “sovereign states” as zizhu zhi guo (countries with the right of 
self-rule); and “right of sovereignty” as zizhu zhi quan (the right of self-rule).29 These 
discrepancies reflect what M. Frederick Nelson has pointed out: “the East Asiatic 
Confucian society, national and international, was familistic and natural, not legal. It 
lacked such Western concepts as those of law, the state, sovereignty, and the legal 
equality of states.”30 As a result, the terminological conflicts led to great confusion over 
the nature of the Zongfan relationship.31 
Given these terminological discrepancies, which could be dated back to the 1780s 
at least,32 the Sino–Korean Zongfan relationship was understood by foreign diplomats in 
China after the 1850s as a “nominal” one, with China exercising “no real authority” over 
Chosŏn.33 In the late 1880s and early 1890s, Western diplomats were still struggling with 
the confusion, as William W. Rockhill (1854–1914) confessed in his study on Sino–
Korean relations, in which he tried to clarify “a puzzle for Western nations” of whether 
Korea was “an integral part of the Chinese empire” or “a sovereign state enjoying 
absolute international rights.” He critically pointed out that the Chinese term shuguo, 
“generally translated in English by ‘vassal kingdom, fief,’ etc.,” which were “misleading,” 
                                               
29 See Wanguo gongfa, 2b-3a, 25a-28b; Elements of International Law, 44-50, 79. As for the Chinese 
translation of the international law by W. A. P. Martin, see Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The 
Invention of China in Modern World Making, 108-139. 
30 M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 289. For similar comments, see Odd 
Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750, 81-82. 
31 See, for example, Takashi Okamoto, Zokkoku to jishu no aida: kindai Shin Kan kankei to higashi Ajia no 
meiun (Between the tributary state and self-rule: the modern Ch’ing–Korean relations and East Asia’s fate), 
and Sekai no naka no nitsu shin kan kankei shi: kōrin to zotsu koku, jishu to dokuritsu (History of relations 
between Japan, the Qing, and Korea in the world: “communicating with neighbor country” and 
“subordinate country”, “autonomy” and “independence”). 
32 Jean-Baptiste Grosier, A General Description of China, 244. 
33 See, Sir Edward Hertslet, “Memorandum respecting Corea,” Dec. 19, 1882, in British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs, Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I, Series E, vol. 2, 2-3; 
Low to Fish, November 23, 1871, Roll 32, in Davids Jules, American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The 
United States and China, 1861–1893, vol. 9, 184; Mori Arinori to the Zongli Yamen, January 15, 1876, in 
QJZRH, vol. 2, 270. 
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was “the key-note to the whole system of Korean dependency.”34 What led Rockhill to 
this “puzzle” must have been the European colonial experience of the day: the 
relationship between a colonial power and each of its overseas colonies, such as France 
vis-à-vis Algeria or Britain vis-à-vis India, was very clear, and the colony was 
undoubtedly an integral part of the empire, fully subject to the imperial administration. 
Some questions of Chosŏn’s relations with China raised by George N. Curzon in the early 
1890s reflected such colonial discourse.35 These concerns reflected the fact that the 
diplomats regarded the Zongfan system, just like their own colonial systems, as a 
legitimate system. This analogy that Western observes drew between the Zongfan system 
and colonialism might be why European powers never publicly denied that Chosŏn was a 
dependency of China before Japan did so in 1895. 
In the twentieth century, the promulgation of the term “tribute system,” combined 
with the concepts “suzerain” and “vassal,” owes a great debt to the popularity of a more 
neutral phrase, “Chinese world order,” proposed by John King Fairbank from the 1940s 
to the 1960s, when he convoked a constellation of historians and political scientists to 
explore the rationale behind China’s foreign relations in the late imperial times.36 
Although Fairbank was fully aware of the complexity of China-centric cosmopolitanism, 
or “Sinocentrism,” the term “Chinese world order,” which he preferred to use to broadly 
address this system, became a rough equivalent of the “tribute system,” allowing scholars 
in different fields to accept this English rendering and treat it as a counterpart to “treaty 
system” or “treaty port system.” Since the 1940s, some scholars have questioned the 
                                               
34 William W. Rockhill, “Korea in Its Relations with China,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 13 
(1889): 1-33. 
35 George N. Curzon, Problems of the Far East: Japan–Korea–China, 209-222. 
36 See John King Fairbank and S. Y. Têng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies 6 (1941): 135-246; John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order. 
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appositeness of “tributary system” or “suzerain–vassal relations,”37 yet their efforts have 
not changed the entrenched renderings and paradigms, and the conventional English 
parlance still profoundly influences scholars’ understanding of China’s foreign relations. 
The underlying problem with the term “tribute system” is that it can convey only 
a part of the connotations of the Zongfan system, while it blurs the multilayered nature of 
the system by trimming it down to a China-centric trade structure. Thus, it should not be 
loosely used as a master concept to address the entire structure. This is not to suggest, 
however, that the term “tribute system” will lose its power to analyze the structure when 
it is used as a conceptual interpretive tool. This point is clear in the debate among certain 
historians over the issue of when the practices of the Zongfan order became as mature, 
institutional, and systematic as they were in the Ming and Qing periods. John E. Wills, Jr., 
argues that “the tribute system as a system cannot be traced back farther than the Ming. In 
Ming times, it embraces all aspects of relations with all foreign countries, in theory and to 
a large degree in practice.”38 By further asserting that “the years from about 1425 to 
1550 were the only time in all of Chinese history when a unified tribute system 
embodying these tendencies was the matrix for policy decisions concerning all 
foreigners,” Wills suggests that “we should reserve the term ‘tribute system’ for this Ming 
                                               
37 See, for example, M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, xv, 288-297; Mark 
Mancall, “The Ch’ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay,” in The Chinese World Order, 63; John E. 
Wills, Jr., “Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about 
Mid-Ch’ing Foreign Relations,” The American Neptune 48. 4 (Fall 1988): 225-229; China and the 
Maritime Europe, 1500–1800, 2-5; Masataka Banno, Kindai Chūgoku seiji gaikōshi: Vasuko da Gama kara 
goshi undō made (Modern Chinese political and diplomatic history: from Vasco da Gama to the May 
Fourth Movement), 76-78; Frederick Foo Chien, The Opening of Korea: A Study of Chinese Diplomacy, 
1876–1885, 14-15; James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney 
Embassy of 1793, 9-15; Zhang Feng, “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual 
Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2.4 (winter 2009): 
545–574; Song Nianshen, “‘Tributary’ from a Multilateral and Multilayered Perspective,” Chinese Journal 
of International Politics 5. 2 (Summer 2012): 155-182. 
38 John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi, 1666–1687, 
173. 
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system and not use it loosely to refer to the less systematic and more varied diplomatic 
practices of other times.”39 By addressing the issue from the perspective of Qing China’s 
cartography, on the other hand, Richard J. Smith has contended that “as long as tributary 
institutions, regulations, policies and rhetoric were a significant part of the Chinese world 
view and self-image…until the very end of the nineteenth century, the term ‘tributary 
system’ is apposite.”40 What Smith calls the “tributary system” has virtually the same 
parameters as the Zongfan system.  
Fully aware of the existing and potential terminological problems, we adopt the 
term “Zongfan” or the neutral phrase “Chinese world order” to refer to the system, 
reserving “tributary” to address certain countries’ emissaries to China. Addressing 
relative issues of late imperial and modern China in the Zongfan framework, this 
dissertation discusses how the high politics of the Qing and Chosŏn regulated the running 
of the Chinese empire in certain ways, including the symbiotic legitimacy of Qing China 
and its other fan; the intricate ritual regulations and ritual performances both in Beijing 
and Hansŏng (Chosŏn’s capital, known as Seoul today); and the perennial exchanges of 
emissaries from the early seventeenth to late nineteenth centuries. This approach might 
risk being categorized as a cliché of the conventional Chinese point of view on foreign 
relations,41 but as the Korean historian Hae-Jong Chun has pointed out, “the nature of the 
Sino–Korean tributary system can best be explained from the point of view of politics.”42 
                                               
39 John E. Wills, Jr., China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800, 3. Wills’ understanding of “all foreigners” 
might be problematic because it does not match the Ming and Qing’s perception of “all-under-Heaven” in 
Chinese historical contexts. In addition, as a matter of fact, beyond the years from 1425 to 1550, the 
“tribute system” was very systematic too, as Chapter 2 of this dissertation demonstrates. 
40 Richard J. Smith, “Mapping China and the Question of a China-Centered Tributary Trade System,” The 
Asia–Pacific Journal 11.3 (January 28, 2013), online, accessed on May 6, 2014. 
41 See, for example, Morris Rossabi suggests that historians pay more emphasis on economic motives of 
China’s foreign policies. See Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, 18-22. 
42 Hae-Jong Chun, “Sino–Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” in The Chinese World Order, 
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In this way, one can best grasp the significance and magnitude of Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan 
relations and comprehend Qing China’s epoch-making recasting of the Chinese empire. 
The Civilized–Barbarian Distinction and Beyond: The Magnitude of the Chosŏn Model 
and Historical Narration of Late Imperial and Modern China 
Scholars have reached a consensus that Sino–Korean relations were the quintessential 
manifestation of the “tributary system.” 43  With this understanding in mind, many 
scholars tend to attribute this uniqueness to the shared Confucian culture, in particular 
neo-Confucianism, rather than to China’s political or military influence or control in the 
hegemonic sense.44 This approach suggests that the Zongfan relationship represents the 
acculturation of Korea into Chinese institutions, which further indicates that the Qing–
Chosŏn relationship was no more than an elaboration of that between the Ming and 
Chosŏn. This Chinese culture-centric methodology has its own logic, but it concurrently 
homogenizes the Qing–Chosŏn relationship with the monolithic Zongfan system before 
the Qing and therefore cannot explain the distinctive characteristics of the bilateral 
contacts in the Qing period.45 In this sense, what this dissertation attempts is not to 
enshrine the Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship in the pantheon of the Chinese Zongfan 
presentations since the Western Zhou, but to explore the uniqueness of this relationship 
and how it contributed fundamentally to the remodeling of the Chinese empire under the 
Qing. The best way to fulfill this task is to examine the Zongfan relationship from the 
                                                                                                                                            
110. 
43 See, for example, Benjamin I. Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present,” in 
The Chinese World Order, 276; Hae-Jong Chun, “Sino–Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” 
Ibid., 90. 
44 Yur-bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Korea, 1866–1887, 19-22. 
45 The research on Sino–Korean Zongfan relations has a rich literature, but the majority of the works have 
only described a rough picture of the relations due to difficulties of accessing and deciphering materials. 
Numerous valuable archives written in Chinese, Manchu, Korean, Japanese, English, Russian, and other 
languages from the early 1610s to the early 1910s are preserved in Beijing, Taipei, Seoul, Tokyo, London, 
Washington D.C., and other places. 
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first days of its establishment against the background of the civilized–barbarian 
distinction. 
The civilized–barbarian distinction constitutes the matrix of key analyses, in this 
dissertation, of the transformations of the political and cultural identities of the Manchu 
regime—the “Country of the Great Qing” (Ch. Daqing guo; Ma. daicing gurun) after 
1636—and the transformations of Sino–Korean relations after the 1610s, including the 
last days of the Ming–Chosŏn Zongfan relations and the ins and outs of the Qing–Chosŏn 
Zongfan arrangement. If there is any key to discovering the rise and fall of the Chinese 
empire during the Qing, it is precisely this distinction, with which the Qing saturated the 
discourse of its imperial enterprise both within and without its borders. Until the very late 
nineteenth century, Qing China’s worldview never detached from this orthodox ideology, 
for it concerned the very basis of the Qing’s legitimacy as Zhongguo. Chosŏn is the best 
case in foreign relations for epitomizing the historical rise of the Manchu regime and the 
serious challenges that the regime encountered in late imperial times. This is one of the 
main reasons why this dissertation explores late imperial and modern China through the 
lens of Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relations. 
Behind this approach stand two questions. The first is whether the Manchu regime 
could be regarded as “civilized,” which profoundly concerns the “Sinicization” (generally 
rendered into hanhua in Chinese) or “Sinification” (Ch. huahua) of the Manchus.46 
                                               
46  See, for example, Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih 
Restoration, 1862–1874; Gertraude Roth Li, “The Manchu–Chinese Relationship, 1618–1636,” in Jonathan 
Spence and John E. Wills, Jr., eds., From Ming to Ch’ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in 
Seventeenth-Century China, 2-38; Evelyn S. Rawski, “Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the 
Qing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55.4 (1996): 829-850; Ho Pingti, “The 
Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 26.2 (1967): 189-195, 
and “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn S. Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’,” The Journal 
of Asian Studies 57.1 (1998):123-155; Pamela Kyle Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu 
Generations and the End of the Qing World, The Manchus, and A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity 
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Discussions of this point have focused so far either on how the Han Chinese culturally 
assimilated the Manchus or on how the Manchus tried to retain their ethnic identity; both 
primarily concern the post-1644 Han Chinese culture-dominated period, in which the 
Manchu regime was facing grave challenges as “barbarians” in its daily life in both a 
cultural and an ethnic sense. This point is highlighted by several phenomena, including: 1) 
the book Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion (Ch. Dayi juemi lu), written by 
Emperor Yongzheng (1678–1735, r. 1723–1735) in the 1720s, in which the Manchu 
emperor painfully confessed that the Manchus once belonged to the “barbarians;” 2) the 
Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s, in which the fervent Han Chinese rebels mobilized its 
ethnic countrymen through the instigation of anti-Manchu propaganda; and 3) the 
Nationalist revolts in the 1900s, in which ardent Han Chinese revolutionaries again 
labeled the Manchu-ruled Qing a foreign “barbarian” presence. In this sense, the Qing 
was never free from the shadow of the civilized–barbarian distinction. Therefore, a 
helpful perspective on the debate concerning the Qing’s rise and its capable governance 
of its huge empire might be gained by examining the rise of the regime’s political 
discourse itself and the substantial roles it played in converting its identity into “China” 
in the setting of the civilized–barbarian distinction before and after 1644, although this 
approach risks being misinterpreted as a version of the Sinicization hypothesis. 
This dissertation addresses this question by examining the Manchu regime’s 
strategic goal of establishing, enhancing, and reinforcing their political identity as the 
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exclusive civilized center of the world by appropriating the orthodox Zongfan ideological 
norms and rituals after the 1630s. Through an intensive comparison of Chinese and 
Manchu terms specifically and purposely applied to the discourse based on which the 
Manchu regime began to reconfigure its worldview in the 1630s, the dissertation points 
out that the regime at the time was determined to “gradually develop the institutions of 
Zhongguo” (Ch. jianjiu Zhongguo zhi zhi), claiming that only in this way could it manage 
its great enterprise after it conquered the “barbarian place” of the Ming (Ch. manzi 
difang).47 As it subordinated “countries”/“states” (Ma. gurun) and other political entities 
in Manchuria and converted them into “barbarians” on its periphery through its political 
discourse before 1644, the Manchu regime advanced the consciousness of itself as 
Zhongguo, substantially strengthening this identity through highly formalized rituals in 
its intensive and institutionalized Zongfan contacts with Chosŏn.  
On the other hand, identifying itself as “Little China” and the successor to the 
defunct Ming, Chosŏn regarded Qing China as the “barbarian” for a long time after 
1644,48  although on the surface it devoutly followed the convention of “serving the 
great” to dispatch emissaries with tribute to Beijing. Yet this situation progressively 
changed, as Qing China grew more prosperous and powerful, and the bilateral 
relationship became more stable. Some Korean intellectuals who saw China’s prosperity 
in person in the eighteenth century enthusiastically called for their country to learn from 
Qing China, which transformed itself into the “civilized.” This perception violently shook 
                                               
47 Ning Wanwo’s memorial, September 11, 1633, in Tiancongchao chengong zouyi (Palace Memorials of 
Han Chinese officials during the Tiancong period, 1627–1636), vol. 3-1, 35a-35b. 
48 For recent study on Chosŏn’s ideology of “Little China” during the Qing period, see Sun Weiguo, 
Daming qihao yu xiao Zhonghua yishi: Chaoxian wangchao zunzhou siming wenti yanjiu, 1637–1800 (The 
Great Ming dynasty and the ideology of Little China: Studies on the issue of revering the Zhou dynasty and 
recalling the Ming dynasty during the Chosŏn dynasty, 1637–1800); Wang Yuanzhou, Xiao Zhonghua yishi 
de shanbian: jindai zhonghan guanxi de sixiangshi yanjiu (Transformations of the ideology of Little China: 
a study on modern Sino–Korean relations from the perspective of intellectual history). 
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the foundations of the pro-Ming, anti-Qing cultural creed among the Korean elite. 
Pro-Ming rhetoric actually evolved into a shared, lamentable historical memory among 
Korean intellectuals that facilitated the building of a spiritual home where they could 
claim to be the “civilized” and even dream about launching a northern expedition against 
the Manchu “barbarians” to restore the Ming. Pro-Qing pragmatism, meanwhile, 
increasingly became an indispensable part of the country’s daily life that endorsed the 
Qing’s position as the civilized China and ensured the means for Chosŏn to seek political 
legitimacy. In the nineteenth century, when Chosŏn refused to negotiate with Britain, 
France, the United States, and Japan in foreign affairs and directed them to Beijing, 
followed by the Qing’s committed fulfillment of “cherishing the small country” to protect 
Chosŏn’s interests, the Qing in Chosŏn’s eyes was no different from the Ming in terms of 
its identification as the civilized Central Kingdom. 
The second critical question behind the Chinese–Barbarian Distinction is whether 
Chosŏn could be called a “country of barbarians” in the Qing period, given that it was 
proud of its “Little China” identity, which encouraged Korean intellectuals to see the 
Manchu-ruled Qing as “a country of barbarians.” On Qing China’s side, Chosŏn’s 
identification as “Little China” was widely accepted by both ethnic Han and Manchu 
intellectuals. The Chinese officials and savants did not treat their Korean counterparts as 
“barbarians,” as they did the Europeans. Yet it was a fully different case when the Qing’s 
imperial political and cultural discourse located Chosŏn in the multileveled structure of 
“all-under-Heaven,” according to which Chosŏn was a “country of barbarians” on 
China’s periphery.  This description could be dated back to the seven years from 1637 to 
1644, when the Qing gradually converted Chosŏn into “a country from afar” (Ch. 
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yuanguo) that sent emissaries as “men from afar” (Ch. yuanren) bearing tribute to 
Mukden (Shenyang) “to be civilized” (Ch. laihua). After 1644, Chosŏn became the 
Qing’s prototypical fan, namely the prime exemplar of the “subordinate countries of 
foreign barbarians” (Ch. waiyi shuguo). This transformation fully restored Chosŏn’s 
status as “a country of barbarians,” to which it had been confined in the former 
Ming-centric world. This dissertation refers to this process as the “barbarianization” (Ch. 
yihua) of Chosŏn under the Qing. Local practices were consistent with this process. For 
example, Qing’s local authorities along China’s coast always termed people from Chosŏn 
and other countries, who suffered sea storms and were rescued by Chinese, as “barbarians 
who suffered from storm” (Ch. zaofeng nanyi; Ma. edun de lasihibufi jobolon de tušaha i 
niyalma). Such local practices lasted for more than two centuries, until the early twentieth 
century, a time when Chosŏn declared to be an independent, sovereign state. 
Although the Chosŏn Model provided a general pattern for the Manchu ruling 
house to deal with other political entities, it is necessary to specify its leading role in the 
entire historical background of the Qing’s Zongfan framework. For the purpose of 
analysis, it is worth clarifying what kind of fan or outer fan that Chosŏn specifically 
represented, given the fact that the term “outer fan” in the Qing period could refer to the 
political entities whose affairs were under the management of the Mongolian 
Superintendency (Ch. Lifan yuan; M. tulergi golo be dasara jurgan) and the foreign 
countries whose contacts with China were under the management of the Ministry of 
Rituals. The Mongolian Superintendency was established in 1638 by reorganizing the 
Ministry of Mongolian Affairs (Ch. Menggu yamen; M. monggo jurgan) created in 1636. 
Over the Qing period, the Mongolian Superintendency and the Ministry of Rituals were 
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two parallel central institutes responsible for the affairs of outer fan: the former managed 
mainly those fan from Qing China’s north and west (Inner Asia), while the latter managed 
those from the east, the south, and the West. This dissertation mainly discusses the outer 
fan under management of the Ministry of Rituals, rather than those under the Mongolian 
Superintendency, although the two types of outer fan were closely associated through the 
Chosŏn Model, as Chapter 2 will demonstrate. 
Viewed from the “subordinate countries of foreign barbarians,” the Qing made 
considerable changes to the Zongfan system that it inherited from the Ming. The Ming 
had had The Universal Tributary Regulations, by which the Ministry of Rituals of the 
Ming managed routine exchanges between China and the “subordinate barbarian 
countries on the four quarters” (Ch. fanguo, or siyi)—Chosŏn, Ryukyu, Annam, Jurchen, 
Mongolia, and other countries or political entities and also managed the exchanges 
between the Ming and “indigenous chieftains” (Ch. tuguan, or tusi), including those local 
chieftains in Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei provinces.49 The 
list of “foreign barbarian countries” in the new regulations of the Qing displayed at least 
two significant changes in the coverage.  
First, the “indigenous chieftains” under the Ming were excluded from the Qing’s 
list of tributary regulations as a result of the Qing’s policy toward “barbarian chieftains” 
(Ch. yimu) in southwestern China. Known as “transforming the hereditary indigenous 
chieftains system into an official nomination system” (Ch. gaitu guiliu), the policy had 
started in the Yuan and Ming, but only in the Yongzheng period of the Qing was it carried 
out on a truly large scale. This policy made the local chieftains part of the Qing’s 
bureaucracy, receiving official titles and ranks from the court. Those areas and 
                                               
49 Daming huidian, vols. 105-108; vol. 108, 9a-11a. 
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populations under the chieftains’ control were simultaneously integrated into the Qing’s 
territory and household registration system.50 As a result, these “indigenous chieftains” 
were excluded from the list of tributary regulations and were no longer supervised by the 
Ministry of Rituals. The line between “barbarians” from these political units and 
“barbarians” from other countries was very clear in the minds of the Manchu rulers at 
court and their deputies in provinces. 51  Second, the Western countries gradually 
disappeared from the list of tributary regulations. From the 1760s to the 1840s, the list 
included Holland and “Western Ocean countries” (Ch. xiyang) in addition to Chosŏn, 
Ryukyu, Annam, Lanchang, Siam, Sulu, and Burma,52 but in the 1890s the list covered 
only these seven Asian countries.53 This change showed that China’s worldview had 
greatly transformed over this period. 
Whereas in the Qianlong period the Mongolian, Tibetan, and Muslim areas under 
the management of the Mongolian Superintendency had “all entered [the Great Qing’s] 
map and registers” (Ch. xianru bantu) “like prefectures and counties” (Ch. youru 
junxian),54 the “subordinate countries of foreign barbarians” under the superintendence 
                                               
50 For the Qing’s expansions to the southwestern areas, see Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: 
Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China, and Bin Yang, Between Winds and Clouds: The 
Making of Yunnan, Second Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE. About the Qing’s policy of transforming 
the indigenous chieftains, see Gong Yin, Ming Qing Yunnan tusi tongzuan (A general compilation of the 
indigenous chieftains in Yunnan over the Ming and Qing periods), and Li Shiyu, Qingdai tusi zhidu lunkao 
(Research on the indigenous chieftains system in the Qing period). 
51 See, for example, palace memorials of Gao Qizhuo in the first years of the Yongzheng period, when he 
was in charge of the affairs of indigenous chieftains as Governor-General of Yunnan and Guizhou, in Zhupi 
yuzhi (Palace memorials with Emperor Yongzheng’s comments and instructions), vol. 45, 1a-81a. 
52 Qinding daqing huidian (1764), vol. 56, 1a-2b; Qinding libu zeli (1844), vols. 171-180. 
53 Qinding daqing huidian (1899), vol. 39, 2a-3a. The successive changes on the list over the Qing periods 
were highlighted by the five editions of Daqing huidian (1690’s, 1732’s, 1764’s, 1818’s and 1899’s). John 
King Fairbank and S. Y. Têng have done intensive research on this change, see Table 2 of their article “On 
the Ch’ing Tributary System,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6 (1941): 174; see also Banno Masataka, 
Kindai Chūgoku seiji gaikōshi, 87. 
54 Qinding daqing huidian (1764), vol. 80, 1a, 10b. Of course, as Peter C. Perdue points out, this claim 
“was much mythical as real.” See Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central 
Eurasia, 527. 
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of the Ministry of Rituals actually referred only to those that were not integrated into the 
territory of the Qing. Neither would these countries be treated as parts of the Republic of 
China and the People’s Republic of China in the twentieth century. By the same token, 
the dual management system regarding the outer fan—the Mongolian Superintendency 
and the Ministry of Rituals—made it difficult for people outside this institutional 
mechanism under the Qing to clearly draw a line between them. This might explain why, 
in the late nineteenth century when issues concerning Chosŏn became extremely 
complicated, some Qing officials suggested that Beijing apply its policy toward Mongolia 
and Tibet to Chosŏn by converting it into “prefectures and counties,” as it seemed to be in 
the Qianlong period.55 The rationale behind this suggestion concerned the basic structure 
of the Chinese empire under the Qing. 
The magnitude of the Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship is thus significant. The 
relationship should not be anachronistically treated simply as a specific embodiment of 
the Zongfan system, as scholars have preferred to do so far. Rather, it will be best 
understood from its prototypical role in prompting the formation of the Qing’s Zongfan 
system and its unparalleled role in helping the Manchu regime transform political identity 
so that the regime could claim centrality and access the orthodox legitimacy in the 
process of reshuffling the Chinese world. In short, the Qing–Chosŏn relationship was the 
seedbed of the Qing’s entire Zongfan arrangement, from which the political legitimacy of 
both sides became mutually dependent and mutually constitutive. 
By exploring this process of mutually defining legitimacy, this dissertation uses a 
long-term perspective to break the entrenched divide between premodern and modern 
Chinese history. Scholars basically identify the Opium War of 1839–1842 as the 
                                               
55 He Ruzhang to the Zongli Yamen, November 18, 1880, in QJZRH, vol. 2, 439-442. 
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beginning of the twilight of premodern China—which was often considered as an 
arrogant, stubborn, and stagnant polity after the late eighteenth century—and the dawn of 
modern China.56 Although the China-centric approach arose during the 1980s,57 many 
scholars still frame their questions about China in the entrenched paradigm informed by 
modern European history.58 
Reviewing Britain’s position in the Zongfan infrastructure before the Opium War 
can help us move beyond the 1840 or 1800 divide. As Chapter 2 will show, Britain had 
been institutionally portrayed as a “country of barbarians” by Qing China in the 1760s 
and was permitted to trade with China at Canton (Guangzhou). That the British were 
“barbarians” in the eyes of the Chinese is a cliché for scholars who, embracing the 
post-Westphalian international principles and a set of philosophical rules prevailing since 
the Enlightenment, prefer to deride the superciliousness of this Chinese worldview. Yet 
they have neglected that Sino–British contacts on China’s southern border were only a 
part of the entire institutionalized infrastructure, as those with Chosŏn were on the eastern 
border, with Russia on the northern border, with Ryukyu on the southeastern border, and 
with Vietnam, Burma, and Siam on the southwestern border. The Treaty of Nanjing of 
1842 allowed Britain to establish five treaty ports along the Chinese southeastern coast, 
but the rise of the treaty port system did not coincide with the synchronous decline of the 
Zongfan system. On the contrary, the latter was as vibrant as before, both on China’s 
borders and in the capital. Recent research on China’s customs system after the 1850s has 
                                               
56 See Alain Peyrefitte, The Immobile Empire: The First Great Collision of East and West, 1792–1794, 
trans. Jon Rothschild. 
57 See Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese 
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revealed that the Western customs system established and served primarily by the British, 
the Imperial Maritime Customs (Ch. Shuiwu si), never replaced or significantly weakened 
China’s local customs system under the “Superintendent of the Customs” (Ch. Haiguan 
jiandu).59 This critical finding suggests that the treaty port system might have not 
penetrated and remade the local polity as deeply and widely as has been presumed. 
The mainstream narrative of the Zongfan system, along with this said dichotomy, 
argues that tribute system was premodern and incompatible with the modern treaty 
system and was eventually replaced by the latter. The most significant problem with this 
paradigm might lie not in its Eurocentrism per se, but rather in its neglect of those factors 
that bridged the premodern and modern periods without significant inner changes but 
continuously nourished China’s systematic mechanism of foreign relations. In other 
words, the factors that have been widely claimed to lead to its “stagnation” before China 
encountered the industrialized West constitute the very key to understanding late imperial 
and modern China, for “the absence of apparent change suggests the reproduction of a set 
of relationships or conditions.”60 All in all, China was defined by indigenous norms, not 
Western ones. Exploring these indigenous factors is essential to depict the trajectory 
along which Qing China remade the Chinese empire. 
Beyond the Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan System: The Chinese Empire under the Qing and 
the So-called “Qing Imperialism” 
At the risk of trimming down its connotations, this dissertation defines the “Chinese 
empire”—often rendered into Zhonghua diguo in Chinese—as a multiethnic and 
multicultural polity that had the Central Kingdom or Zhongguo as its political and culture 
                                               
59 Ren Zhiyong, Wanqing haiguan zaiyanjiu: yi eryuan tizhi wei zhongxin (A restudy of the Chinese 
customs in the late Qing: Focusing on the system of duality), 18-25.  
60 R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience, 3. 
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core against the background of the civilized–barbarian distinction and took the two 
concepts of “Mandate of Heaven” and “all-under-Heaven” as constitutional ideologies for 
its political legitimacy. When he defined the formation and rise of the “civilized China” 
(Ch. Huaxia) community, the Chinese historian Zhang Jinguang pointed out the 
following four distinguishing features: 1) Its geopolitical consciousness gradually 
expanded from a smaller China to a larger one; 2) Its economic base was an advanced 
agrarian economy; 3) Its cultural connotation was a nation of “proper conduct” (Ch. li) 
performed by “men of honor” (Ch. junzi); and 4) Its spiritual characteristic was 
introverted, attached to the native land and reluctant to leave, and embracing peaceful 
coexistence.61 To a large degree, these four parameters delineate the perimeter of the 
“Chinese empire” defined here.   
In late imperial times, in particular from the early seventeenth to late nineteenth 
centuries, the Chinese empire considerably expanded Zhongguo by integrating 
Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and southwestern regions into its 
territory; formed a multiethnic and multicultural Chinese nation principally through 
domestic migrations from Inner China to the borderlands and through the simultaneous 
extension of the civil administrative systems; encouraged an agrarian economy and 
transferred this model to borderlands like Xinjiang; gave precedence to imperial civil 
service examinations to honor intellectuals and incorporate them into the meritocracy; 
promulgated “proper conduct” for people’s social behavior; and maintained the Zongfan 
system to manage foreign relations for peaceful coexistence with others. In many senses, 
China under the People’s Republic since 1949 is continuously being remade by the 
historical legacies bequeathed by the Chinese empire of the late imperial times. 
                                               
61 Zhang Jinguang, Qinzhi yanjiu, 33. 
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When China is viewed as an empire, a number of questions immediately follow. 
First of all, it is necessary to clarify in what sense Qing China could be defined as an 
“empire” and “Chinese empire.” Indeed, China’s history was full of imperial experiences, 
starting at least from the rise of its first “emperor” (Ch. huangdi) of the Qin (221–107 
B.C.) in 221 B.C., which had conquered six other states and unified China, to the demise 
of the Eurasian Qing dynasty in 1912.62 If an empire could be broadly defined as a 
political entity in which different peoples are governed differently,63 Chinese history 
from 221 B.C. to the present is no more than a history of empires, represented by the 
massive Eurasian Tang (618–907), Yuan, and Qing dynasties. Although historians barely 
question that China has been manifesting itself as an empire after 221 B.C., none of the 
Chinese dynasties ever claimed to be an “empire” (Ch. diguo). It seems that the term 
“empire” as a European political concept that would always be traced back to the Roman 
empire did not exist in China’s political lexicon until 1895, when the Qing was officially 
addressed as the “Great Qing Empire”—Daqing diguo in Chinese—in Chinese characters 
for the first time in the Treaty of Shimonoseki as a counterpart of the “Great Japanese 
Empire” (J. Dai nippon teikoku).64 Yet the term was not popular in China even after 1895. 
The second time it was conspicuously used was in a map collection titled Map of the 
Great Qing Empire (Ch. Daqing diguo quantu), published in Shanghai in 1905, when the 
European and Japanese empires intensively competed for superiority in China. (Map I. 1) 
Map I. 1. Map of the “Great Qing Empire” (Ch. Daqing diguo), 1905 
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Source: Daqing diguo quantu, Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1905. 
 
On the other hand, addressing the Manchu-ruled Qing as a “Chinese empire” was 
a long convention among European missionaries in China. In the Qing–Russian Treaty of 
Nerchinsk of 1689, whose original text was written in Latin by the French Jesuit 
Jean-François Gerbillon (1654–1707), serving the Manchu court, the Qing for the first 
time in history was officially called Sinici Imperii (Sinic empire or Chinese empire) in 
Latin as a counterpart of Rutheni Imperii (Russian Empire) and rendered into l’Empire de 
la Chine (Empire of China) in French as a counterpart of l’Empire de Moscovie (Empire 
of Muscovy).65 Several factors might have led missionaries to question the “Chineseness” 
of Qing China, including the following: 1) the ethnic difference between the Manchu 
rulers and other peoples; 2) the presentations of the Manchus’ “Sinicization”; and 3) the 
“Chineseness” that the Manchu regime possessed against the background of the 
civilized–barbarian distinction. None of these factors, however, diminished missionaries’ 
perception that the Qing was the Chinese empire as long as the Qing was China. 
Nevertheless, the concept of the “Chinese empire” is not completely equivalent to 
the concept of the “Great Qing Empire.” While the “Great Qing Empire” specifically 
means the polity of the Qing, the “Chinese empire” is generally presumed to refer to all 
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unified political units that claimed to be the Central Kingdom in Chinese history, 
including such dynasties as the Qin, Han (206 B.C.–A.D. 220), Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, 
and Qing. In the Qing period, the Chinese empire manifested itself in two dimensions: the 
territorial Chinese empire and the politico-cultural Chinese empire. The territorial 
Chinese empire was equal to the Great Qing, composed primarily of the Manchu court, 
the inner provinces, and the outer fan under the management of the Mongolian 
Superintendency (except for Russia). The politico-cultural Chinese empire encompassed 
these said political entities and the outer fan, but these outer fan’s contacts with China 
were managed by the Ministry of Rituals (such as Chosŏn, Ryukyu, and Annam) and they 
commonly identified the emperor in Beijing as the highest sovereign in the world. The 
following figure elucidates this structure. (Figure I. 3) 
The common approach among scholars to describing the multilayered Chinese 
world order in late imperial times does not see such countries as Chosŏn as a component 
of the Chinese empire.66 This view cleaves closely to a territorial definition of Chinese 
empire. The Chinese empire as a politico-cultural unit, however, stretched to its outer fan 
beyond China’s borderline, where China’s centrality was further constructed by local 
manifestations of the divine authority of the Chinese emperor. Before the European 
international law and the ideas embedded in it reached East Asia in the nineteenth century 
and acted as a catalyst for national independence attempts by challenging the Zongfan 
order, such as Korea’s anti-Chinese coup in 1884, China’s outer fan worshiped the same 
Chinese sovereign in Beijing, used the calendar issued by Beijing, pursued the legitimacy 
of their governance from Beijing, and espoused the principle that only the emperor 
                                               
66 See, for example, John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in The Chinese World Order, 13; 
Hamashita Takeshi, Kindai chūgoku no kokusai teki keiki: chōkō bōeki shisutemu to kindai ajia (The 
international opportunities of modern China: tribute trade system and modern Asia), 32-33. 
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possessed the power of communicating with foreigners coming from outside the Chinese 
sphere. This phenomenon of the running of the Chinese world thus concerns three key 
issues relating to the outer fan that would be questioned within the context of the rising 
nation-state order, namely: sovereignty, citizen, and border. 
Figure I. 3. The Structure of the Chinese Empire during the Qing Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: MOS=the Mongolian Superintendency; MOR=the Ministry of Rituals. A=the Manchu 
court; B=Inner provinces (Ch. sheng, or xingsheng); C=outer fan that under MOS except for Russia, such 
as Cahar Mongol, Tibet, and Xinjiang; D=outer fan under MOR, primarily Chosŏn, Ryukyu, and Annam; 
E=Western countries that were listed by the Qing as outer fan. AB=Inner China (Ch. Zhongyuan); ABC=the 
“Country of the Great Qing” (Ch. Daqing guo), or the territorial Chinese empire; ABCD=the 
politico-cultural Chinese empire; ABCDE=“All-under-Heaven” (Ch. tianxia). 
 
Under the Chinese empire, each outer fan enjoyed the right of “autonomy” or 
“self-rule”—zizhu—within the boundaries of its own country, so the king was an 
independent and supreme sovereign in his own lands, as Jean-Baptiste Grosier and 
George N. Curzon observed in 1788 and 1894 respectively.67 The kings of the Nguyễn 
dynasty (1802–1945) of Vietnam went even further, claiming to be “emperors” and 
calling Vietnam the “Central Kingdom” in the first half of the nineteenth century, 68 
which was not exceptional in Vietnamese history.69 Yet the kingship, with the embedded 
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right of zizhu, was eventually subjugated to the Chinese emperorship. The emperor 
possessed absolute patriarchal power over the kings of Chosŏn, Ryukyu, and Annam, as 
demonstrated in Emperor Qianlong’s abolishing the king of Vietnam, Lê Duy Kỳ (1765–
1793), and investing a new king in 1789. In the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895, some 
Chinese officials also proposed to abolish the king of Chosŏn. The patriarchal and divine 
imperial power was always real and effective, even though Beijing barely exercised it. In 
this sense, the prevalent argument among foreign ministers in China after the 1850s, that 
Sino–Korean relations were “nominal,” was superficial. 
What made the kingship dependent upon the emperorship were not China’s 
military power or geopolitical gravity, but the classical Zongfan tenets and Confucian 
ethos of undergirding the orthodox legitimacy. For the sovereign of an outer fan, 
challenging the emperorship was no different from a denial of his own position. 
Therefore, the nature of the sovereign of an outer fan was twofold: fully independent in 
terms of the territorial Chinese empire and fully dependent in relation to the 
politico-cultural Chinese empire. In 1832, the king of Chosŏn firmly refused to trade with 
British merchants on the grounds that “subordinates of a fan have no right to conduct 
diplomacy” (Ch. fanchen wu waijiao), winning high praise from Emperor Daoguang 
(1782–1850, r. 1821–1850).70 In the 1870s, the king of Chosŏn still firmly refused to 
negotiate with Western powers, noting that he, as a subordinate of the Chinese emperor, 
had no power to conduct “diplomacy” (Ch. waijiao) with Western foreigners. As 
mentioned above, in 1883 when Chosŏn had been defined as an independent sovereign 
state by its treaty with the United States in 1882, according to which the king was a 
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sovereign undoubtedly equal to the U.S. president, the Chinese official Li Hongzhang 
made it very clear that the king was “outer vassal” of the Chinese emperor and thus equal 
to the governors-general and provincial governors of China, who were “inner vassals.” 
Vietnam also held the same ideology until the 1880s.71 Such a fully dependent status of 
an outer fan could explain why Qing China was deeply involved in wars with France in 
Vietnam and with Japan in Chosŏn in the 1880s and 1890s. 
The differences between peoples and borders were clear between Qing China and 
its outer fan, but these distinctions did not exist in a nation-state sense. Under the Chinese 
empire, the territorial border between China and the outer fan did not matter as much as it 
does today, because it could be fully blurred by the ideology of “all-under-Heaven.” This 
was particularly true for the Qing, because the Manchu rulers tried to show their regime’s 
“Chineseness” through classical Chinese cultural ideology. Many Chinese-made and 
Korean-made maps of the world by Qing China’s and Chosŏn’s cartographers in the 
eighteenth century presented and substantiated such cosmopolitan ideology.72 A case par 
excellence was that of 1727, when Emperor Yongzheng, believing that all lands of the 
outer fan were indiscriminately under his rule, demarcated a new borderline with Annam 
that allowed Annam’s line to extend 12.45 miles (40 Chinese li) farther toward China.73 
For the Manchu court, such a borderline was fully subject to the imperial authority, so the 
issue of territorial increase was moot. Similarly, intellectuals of China’s outer fan were 
presumed in the first place to identify themselves as sincere followers of Confucianism 
                                               
71 Sun Hongnian, Qingdai zhongyue Zongfan guanxi yanjiu (Study on Sino–Vietnamese Zongfan relations 
during the Qing period), 92-93. 
72 See, for example, Richard J. Smith, Mapping China and Managing the World: Culture, Cartography and 
Cosmology in Late Imperial Times, 48-88; Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise, 33-49; Haedong 
chido (Maps of Korea), vol. 1, 2-3. 
73 Qing shizong shilu (Veritable records of Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing), vol. 7, 999-1001. For 
comments on Emperor Yongzheng’s edict, see Shao Xunzheng, Zhongfa yuenan guanxi shimo (The ins and 
outs of Sino–French relations regarding Vietnam), 38. 
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and subjects of the Chinese emperor, not as citizens of their own countries, as people 
would do in the twentieth century. 
Such conventional ideas strongly influenced Sino–Korean relations. In 1882, 
when the Chinese governors in Manchuria informed Beijing that many poor Korean 
peasants were crossing the border to cultivate Chinese lands, Emperor Guangxu (1871–
1908, r. 1875–1908) noted that “in the eyes of the local officials, there is certainly a line 
between them and us (Ch. bici zhi fen); yet in the eyes of the court, there is originally no 
difference between the inside and the outside (Ch. neiwai zhi bie).”74 Korean students 
learning Western technologies in Tianjin in 1882 were also treated by Chinese officials as 
the “loyal subjects of the Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. tianchao zhi chizi) and were free from 
tuition. 75  For Qing China, Chosŏn was equal to a “domestic subordinate” (Ch. 
neichen),76 which might propel some Chinese officials in the 1880s and 1890s to suggest 
Beijing convert Chosŏn into China’s “prefectures and counties”—called the 
“provincialization” of Chosŏn in this dissertation. These facts suggest that the 
nation-state perspective that became popular after WWII among Asian countries could 
neither encompass nor grasp the nature of the politico-cultural Chinese empire. It would 
otherwise be impossible to explain why national independence movements of China’s 
outer fan in modern times, such as Korea’s anti-Chinese coup in 1884 and anti-Japanese 
independent movement in 1919, had never before occurred under the Chinese empire.77 
The second critical problem regarding the Chinese empire under the Qing is 
                                               
74 Mingan to Emperor Guangxu, March 14, 1882, in Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe (The palace memorials 
with Emperor Guangxu’s imperial instructions), vol. 112, 243. 
75 Kim Yun-Sik, Ŭmch’ŏngsa (Cloudy and sunny diary), 40-41. 
76 Qing gaozong shilu (Veritable records of Emperor Qianlong of the Qing), vol. 24, 297. 
77 The same question could be asked in the case of the Roman Empire, see Gary B. Miles, “Roman and 
Modern Imperialism: A Reassessment.” 
 44 
so-called “Qing imperialism.” The concept of the politico-cultural Chinese empire 
defined above would face this issue as well, for it provocatively includes those countries 
that later became independent sovereign nation-states in the twentieth century. 
For scholars of China and East Asia, “imperialism” is generally identified with 
Japan or the West. In this context, it generally refers to a system that encompassed a 
series of aggressive political, economic, or diplomatic policies of Western and Japanese 
powers. These policies consisted in the powers’ attempting to reap the highest possible 
profits from certain countries, while competing with each other for power balance by 
extracting privileged priorities from the countries they subjugated through unequal 
treaties. Imperialism in East Asia is usually interpreted as a holdover of Western 
capitalism (Ch. ziben zhuyi) and colonialism (Ch. zhimin zhuyi) that reached the Chinese 
world after the 1840s.78 The Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895, along with the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, is commonly seen as the mark of the rise of imperialism (Ch. diguo zhuyi) 
in East Asia, from which China painfully suffered as a complete victim.79 In this context, 
the term “imperialist,” the agents of “imperialism,” is applied only to Western and 
Japanese powers, leaving the victimized Qing China outside the genre. The historical 
narratives of modern Chinese history following this methodology have been nourishing 
Chinese nationalism in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary milieus since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
If “imperialism” can be loosely defined as “an unequal power relationship 
between two states in which the dominant state exercises various forms of control, often 
                                               
78 See, for example, Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China, 97-147; Odd Arne Westad, Restless 
Empire: China and the World since 1750, 53-86. 
79 Akira Iriye, “Imperialism in East Asia,” in James B. Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays in 
Interpretation, 122-150; William Rome, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing, 231-243. 
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forcibly, over the weaker state,”80 one will easily find imperialism in Chinese history, at 
least since the Warring States Period, when stronger states coercively manipulated and 
exploited the weaker states. Since the 1990s, with the sharp rise of the People’s Republic 
of China on the world stage and fierce and controversies regarding China’s rise to 
superpower,81 the common understanding that Qing China was a victim of imperialism 
has been questioned by two groups of scholars. The first group comprises students of the 
High Qing, namely from the Kangxi (1654–1722; r. 1662–1722) to Qianlong periods in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who have promulgated the “New Qing History” 
paradigm.82 The second group consists in some students of Sino–Korean relations who 
have depicted Qing China in the late nineteenth century as an imperialistic power that 
exercised dominance over Chosŏn. The approach of the first group might be called “High 
Qing imperialism,” and that of the second group “Late Qing imperialism.” 
The High Qing imperialism school suggests that, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, Qing China manifested itself as an expansive empire characterized 
by three principal features: 1) territorial expansion to Inner Asia, Central Asia, and 
southwestern areas; 2) cultural expansion and human migration to the new conquered 
areas and frontiers; and 3) introduction of the Chinese civil administrative apparatus to 
the said areas. The requisite for this label is that Qing China shared certain features 
manifest in the expansions of European empires. Imperialism is thus interpreted as a 
system of coercive instruments aiming to extend the core area of an empire and keep it 
                                               
80 Craige B. Champion and Arthur M. Echstein, “Introduction: The Study of Roman Imperialism,” in 
Craige B. Champion, ed., Roman Imperialism: Readings and Sources, 3. 
81 For example, see David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia; Martin Jacques, 
When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of A New Global Order; Peter J. 
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82 See Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way, 32-35. 
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functioning. Some students of the High Qing have made this point clear. In his research 
on Qing China’s activities in Xinjiang from 1759 to 1864, James A. Millward knows how 
controversial the term “imperialism” could become when it is applied to Qing China, but 
this realization did not prevent him from asserting that “where there is an empire, there 
must be imperialism—the dynamic set of motivations, ideologies, policies, and practices 
by which that empire is gained, maintained, and conceived.” 83  Along the same 
intellectual line of deconstructing Chinese nationalist historiography, Peter C. Perdue 
depicts how Qing China conquered central Eurasia and incorporated it; Laura Hostetler 
highlights Qing China’s aggressive political and cultural policies toward the ethnic 
peoples on its southwestern frontiers, which had all the hallmarks of “colonialism;” 
James L. Hevia treats the Sino–British conflict in the Macartney mission in 1793 as 
taking place “between two expansive imperialisms;” and Satoshi Hirano discusses the 
formation and collapse of the multiethnic unification under Qing China in the case of 
Tibet.84 By primarily focusing on Qing China’s territorial expansion, these narratives 
have portrayed the High Qing as an institutional agent of colonialism and imperialism. 
High Qing imperialism, at its best, has further deconstructed the nationalist 
historiography and anachronistic discourse prevalent in post-1912 China. Yet such 
deconstruction is precisely the Achilles’ heel of this approach. If the High Qing were an 
agency of imperialism, one would immediately reach an impasse, in which the following 
question could be asked: Which regime in Chinese history that unified China or 
broadened its border—including the People’s Republic since 1949—would not fall into 
                                               
83 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass, 17. 
84 See Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West; Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise; James L. Hevia, 
Cherishing Men from Afar; Satoshi Hirano, Shin teikoku to chibetto mondai: taminzoku tōgō no seiritsu to 
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this category? In other words, the subject of this kind of imperialism is not unique to 
Qing China, but replaceable and interchangeable. These regimes, each of which fiercely 
competed with its political adversaries, could thus constitute an opulent repertoire for 
such replacement. In short, what the “High Qing imperialism” has actually captured is the 
ceaselessly changing nature of “China”—the Central Kingdom, Zhongguo—itself.  
Compared with High Qing imperialism, “Late Qing imperialism” has made Qing 
China distinct from its counterparts in Chinese history by asserting that it exercised 
imperialism through coercive means characterized by power politics in the Western sense, 
such as unequal treaties and military intervention overseas as practiced by European 
colonial empires. Indeed, the leading proponents of this argument agree that the late Qing 
was a victim of Western and Japanese imperialism, yet this understanding does not soften 
their assertion that the victimized Qing itself exercised imperialism over a weaker country. 
Martina Deuchler argues that China’s policies after 1882—the year China helped Chosŏn 
to sign a treaty with the United States, dispatched troops to Chosŏn to suppress a mutiny, 
and signed the first Western-style convention with Chosŏn—demonstrate that “the 
tributary system gave way to power politics.”85 Key-hiuk Kim elaborates upon this 
argument, asserting that after 1882 “the traditional suzerain–vassal relationship between 
China and Korea gave way to a new type of relationship between imperialist power and 
colonial dependent.”86 Borrowing the political concept of “informal empire,” Kirk W. 
Larsen argues that Qing China practiced “imperialism” in Chosŏn in the late nineteenth 
                                               
85 Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875–1885, 
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century, making the Chinese merchants its vanguard.87 All these assertions reflect a 
misconception common in the late nineteenth century, which M. Frederick Nelson 
summarized in the 1940s: “Under the assumption that China had nothing but a religious 
and ceremonial connection with Korea, Westerners viewed her growing de facto control 
of Korea as pure and unjustified power politics directed against an independent state.”88 
This relationship must therefore be examined beyond this assumption. As 
Chapters 4 to 6 of this dissertation suggest, all critical historical events in the 1880s, 
which according to many scholars marked China’s efforts to strengthen its “suzerainty,” 
including the true situation of Yuan Shikai in Chosŏn, actually manifested themselves in a 
very different way within the Zongfan system. By discussing these events, I will show 
that “Zongfanism”—if one can use “-ism” in this way—was different from both 
colonialism and imperialism. 
An essential issue that can connect and challenge the two kinds of “Qing 
imperialism” discussed above is the basic historical fact that the Qing never colonized 
Chosŏn. The relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn remained a non-colonial one 
from the 1630s, when the Qing thoroughly conquered the country, to the 1880s, when 
many Chinese officials suggested Beijing convert Chosŏn into Chinese territory. The 
Zongfan precedents included some cases of provincialization of both Korea and Vietnam 
in the Yuan and Ming periods, but Qing China never moved in the colonial or imperialist 
direction. Comparing China’s policies toward Chosŏn with those of Japan in the late 
nineteenth century, one finds why China had to help Chosŏn by fulfilling its political and 
moral commitments as Zhongguo, made under the Zongfan tenets since the 1630s, while 
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Japan, without such a heavy burden, could play the game of power politics. What drew 
China into the subsequent war with Japan was not the territorial Chinese empire, but the 
politico-cultural Chinese empire that intellectually regarded the outer fan as a part of 
itself. Similarly, what Japan defeated was the former, rather than the latter—an invisible 
empire beyond the Japanese world, a point that could help explain why Sino–Korean 
relations remained awkward from 1895, when Chosŏn was defined as an independent 
sovereign state, to 1910 when it was annexed by Japan. In the long run, it goes far to 
explain the special Sino–Korean relationship in the communist movement during the 
Cold War and thereafter. The two dual systems that the author of this dissertation puts 
forward and demonstrates in Chapters 4 and 5, namely the “inner dual system” and the 
“outer dual system,” aim to re-envision the Sino–Korean relationship since the middle of 
the nineteenth century. In this way, a new narrative of China’s great transformations in its 
late imperial and modern times can be constructed. 
Structure of This Dissertation 
This dissertation addresses the above mentioned issues by examining the changes in 
Sino–Korean relations from the 1610s to the 1910s in chronological order. Chapter 1 
examines the unique process by which the Qing established its Zongfan relationship with 
Chosŏn. In contrast to mainstream interpretations, this chapter uses significant Chinese, 
Manchu, and Korean archival materials to demonstrate that the Qing’s transformation of 
its relationship with Chosŏn established its political identity as “China”—the Central 
Kingdom, or Zhongguo—prior to 1644. Chapter 2 investigates the process through which 
Qing China exploited Chosŏn’s prototypical position as outer fan to develop the “Chosŏn 
Model” and used this model to manage its relations with other political entities and to 
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construct its politico-cultural identity as the Heavenly Dynasty in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In this prolonged process, Qing China gradually portrayed Chosŏn 
as “a country of barbarians” on the periphery of the China-ruled “Chinese empire.” This 
chapter also interprets the bilateral ritual practices. Chapter 3 describes the operation of 
the Zongfan order by examining several cases of Sino–Korean, Sino–Vietnamese, and 
Sino–British contacts in the era when Qing China institutionally portrayed these countries 
as “countries of barbarians.” Through comparisons of these cases, this chapter explores 
how the rulers of the Chinese empire navigated the balance between the political rhetoric 
of China’s foreign policies, on the one hand, and the practical consequences of China’s 
preeminence in the Zongfan world, on the other. 
Chapters 4 and 5 scrutinize the political and diplomatic conundrum of Chosŏn’s 
status as China’s shuguo and reinterpret the interwoven modifications of the two 
countries to their relations in the context of the two dual diplomatic systems, namely the 
“inner dual system” and the “outer dual system.” This reinterpretation contextualizes the 
legal dilemmas that China, Chosŏn, Japan, and Western powers encountered in a 
long-standing and consistent Zongfan lineage between China and Korea that both 
preceded and outlasted Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relations. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the 
process in which Qing China and Chosŏn eventually identified each other as sovereign 
states as a result of the partial disintegration of the Zongfan system in the 1880s and 
1890s. The two chapters also reveal that the two countries’ adjustments to their relations 
after the Sino–Japanese War kept the fundamentals of the Zongfan arrangement virtually 
untouched, for neither side of the hierarchy could overcome the ultimate dilemma caused 
by their mutually constitutive legitimacy in the Confucian world. Following this 
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trajectory, the conclusion demonstrates that the Chinese empire, manifested in the 
framework of Zongfan duality between China and Korea, persisted in an altered form, 
crossing the 1911 and 1949 divides, into the modern and contemporary era. It explores 
the historical legacies bequeathed by the Chinese empire under the Qing to post-Qing 
China, which continues to exist as a multiethnic sovereign state. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Conquering Chosŏn: The Rise of the Manchu Regime as the Central Kingdom, 1616–
1643 
With its rapid rise from the late 1610s to the early 1630s in Manchuria, the 
Jurchen/Manchu regime reshaped its political perceptions of other polities and eliminated 
its long-lasting identity as “barbarians” against the politico-cultural background of 
civilized–barbarian distinction. A main source from which it derived political and cultural 
resources was its relations with Chosŏn, which validated and reinforced its position as the 
Central Kingdom within the newly established hierarchical system. In the 1630s, it 
expressed a strategic goal to become Zhongguo. Simultaneously, it gradually 
appropriated the Ming’s Zongfan discourse to term other countries—including the 
Ming—“barbarians,” initiating a prolonged process that we term “barbarianization” of 
other polities in this dissertation. The regime’s intensive exchanges of emissaries with 
Chosŏn from 1637 to 1643, based on highly programmed formalities, consolidated its 
identity of Zhongguo and propelled the Sinicization of the regime and the 
barbarianization of other political entities by the regime. The Great Qing, the Manchu 
regime’s new title since 1636, had actually transformed into Zhongguo before the 
Manchus crossed the Great Wall in 1644. 
1.1 Barbarians, Rebellions, and Wars 
THE REBELLION OF THE NORTHEASTERN BARBARIANS 
On February 17, 1616, the Chinese New Year’s Day and the first day of the Forty-fourth 
Year of Wanli, many high-ranking officials of Ming China and tributary emissaries of 
Chosŏn and other outer fan of China assembled in the Meridian Gate (Ch. Wumen) of the 
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Forbidden City in Beijing, waiting to enter the imperial hall to present Emperor Wanli 
(1563–1620, r. 1573–1620) with their congratulations on the New Year. The day also 
marked the beginning of the two hundred and forty-ninth year of the Ming since it was 
founded in 1368. Finally, these officials had to pay the ceremonies in front of the gate 
because the emperor had no plan to give them an audience.1 For the officials, this was 
not surprising at all, because since 1587 the emperor had been uninterested in such 
ceremonies and many high-ranking officials in Beijing never saw the hermit-like Son of 
Heaven. No officials exactly knew what the emperor was busy with in the Forbidden City. 
As usual, the New Year started with no significance.2 The gigantic Heavenly Dynasty of 
the Ming and its lethargic human agent seemed to have fallen asleep. 
 The day, however, was significant in Hetuala, a small Manchurian town around 700 
miles northeast of Beijing, where a tribe called Jianzhou Jurchen founded its own country 
under the leadership of its chieftain, Nurhaci (1559–1626). Proclaiming himself the 
“brilliant khan caring for all countries/peoples” (Ma. abka geren gurun be ujikini seme 
sindaha genggiyen han; Ch. Tianren fuyu lieguo yingming han), Nurhaci accepted the 
congratulations of Jurchen and Mongolian officials and generals, took the reign-title of 
“Tianming” (mandate of heaven; Ma. abkai fulingga), and named his country “Houjin” 
(the later Jin).3 He thus defined his regime as the successor to the Jin dynasty established 
                                               
1 Ming shenzong shilu (Veritable records of Emperor Wanli of the Ming), vol. 541, 10283. 
2 See Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline. 
3 Manbun rōtō (Old records written in Manchu), vol. 1, 67. The Japanese translation of Nurhaci’s title is 
“ten ga shūkuni o onyōsuru yaonito ninjita Genggiyen Han” (Genggiyen Han appointed by the Heaven to 
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into Chinese “tian renming de fuyu lieguo de yingming han” (brilliant Han appointed by Heaven to care for 
all countries) (vol. 1, 37). In Qing taizu shilu (Veritable records of Nurhaci), the title appears in Chinese as 
“fuyu lieguo yingming huangdi” (brilliant khan caring for all countries), which must be modified by 
Nurhaci’s inheritors (vol. 1, 63-64). The Korean translation from Mongmun Manju sillok (The veritable 
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by their ancestors.4 
The establishment of the Houjin indicated that Nurhaci’s political ambition 
extended far beyond unifying the local tribes. Nurhaci soon proved it on May 7, 1618, 
when he attacked the Ming’s forces after announcing the “Seven Grievances” (Ma. nadan 
amba koro; Ch. qi dahen).5 Nurhaci had visited Beijing three times to present tributes to 
Emperor Wanli, and had been appointed by the court to govern the Jianzhou Jurchen, 
which were considered by the Ming to be “northeastern barbarians” (Ch. dongbei yi).6 In 
the “Seven Grievances,” Nurhaci identified Jianzhou as an “outer barbarian tribe” (Ch. 
waifan) that had guarded the Ming’s border for a long time.7 Yet various conflicts among 
his tribe, other tribes, and local leaders of the Ming contributed to his rebellion. The war 
thus started and would see the fall of a Chinese empire and the rise of a new Chinese 
empire over the following three decades. 
                                                                                                                                            
records of the Manchus written in Mongolian) is “manmin ŭl taedanhi chaaehago puchihancha t’aejo 
yŏngmyŏng hwangje” (brilliant Emperor Taizu who generously loves and supports all people), and the 
translator notes that the Chinese equivalent is “lieguo enzhan yingming huangdi” (brilliant emperor whose 
kindness is shared by all countries) (Choi Hak-kŭn, trans., vol. 1, 391). The Manchu term “han” has been 
understood as khan or emperor (Ch. huangdi), such as that in Manbun rōtō (vol. 1, 88). For more 
discussions on this issue, see Huang Chang-chien, “Qing taizu tianming jianyuan kao” (On the Reign-title 
“T’ien-ming” of Nurhaci), “Lun qing taizu yu chenghan hou chengdi, qing taizong jiweishi yi chengdi” 
(Respective Dates of Assuming Imperial Title by Nurhaci and Huang-t’ai-chi). The translation of this term 
can prove whether Nurhaci claimed himself emperor in the Chinese sense, which further concerns the 
competition of legitimacy between the Houjin and the Ming regarding the exclusiveness of Son of Heaven. 
See Iwai Shigeki, “Kanjin to chūgoku ni totte no Shinchō, Manju” (The Qing dynasty and Manchu that 
took over Han Chinese and China). 
4 Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China, 44. The Chosŏn’s officials also reviewed that the 
Houjin liked claiming to be descendants of the Jin, see Kwanghaegun ilgi (The annals of Kwanghaegun), 
vol. 29, 501. For the official narrative of the origin of the Manchus and their relations to the Jin, see 
Qinding manzhou yuanliu kao (Researches on Manchu origins, imperially ordained); Pamela Kyle Crossley, 
“Manzhou Yuanliu Kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage.” 
5 The “Seven Grievances” in Manbun rōtō (vol. 1, 86-89) and Qing taizu shilu (vol. 1, 69) might not be the 
original text. According to the Chinese historian Meng Sen, the text included in an official notification 
written in Chinese and issued by the Manchu leaders in 1630 might be the original version of the Seven 
Grievances. See Meng Sen, “Qing taizu gaotian qi dahen zhi zhenben yanjiu” (A study of the original text 
of Nurhaci’s Seven Grievances). Meanwhile, the 1630 edition reveals that the Manchu leaders tried to hide 
the Manchu’s self-identity as “barbarians” in Nurhaci period. 
6 See Daming huidian (Collected statutes of the Great Ming), vol. 107, 7a, vol. 113, 6a; Meng Sen, 
Qingdai shi (History of the Qing Dynasty), 105. See also Yao Ximeng, “Jianyi shouguan shimo” (The ins 
and outs of Jianzhou barbarians appointed by the Ming dynasty). 
7 Meng Sen, “Qing taizu gaotian qi dahen zhi zhenben yanjiu.” 
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 The Ming was confident about suppressing Nurhaci. It enlisted the tribe of Yehe, a 
long-time powerful enemy of the Jurchen, and Chosŏn, China’s most loyal outer fan since 
1392 when it was established, to attack the Jurchen. Viewing its relationship to the Ming 
in father–son and monarch–subordinate terms, Chosŏn, regarded Nurhaci’s rebellion as 
intolerable and the military assistance to the Ming as a “legal and moral duty” (K. 
chikbun, or ŭibun). Following the convention of “serving the big country” or “serving the 
great,” the king, Yi Hon (r. 1608–1623), known as Kwanghaegun in history, appointed 
General Kang Hong-rip to support the Ming’s “heavenly soldiers and heavenly officers” 
(K. ch’ŏnbyŏng ch’ŏnjang), although the king was worried that his forces would be 
defeated.8 From April 4 to 7, 1619, General Kang, with 13,000 soldiers under his 
command, crossed the Yalu River to join forces with the Ming army in Manchuria.9 
The united forces soon suffered a fiasco in the battle of Sarhū on April 17, in 
which General Kang surrendered to Nurhaci after more than 6,000 Korean soldiers were 
killed.10 The surrender was attributed to such factors as food shortages and inefficient 
logistics,11 but the king’s practical strategy toward Nurhaci and his secret instructions to 
General Kang on negotiating with Nurhaci mattered much.12 Significantly, the surrender, 
ending Chosŏn’s military engagement in the war, provided Nurhaci with a golden 
opportunity to open an official channel of communication with the sovereign of Chosŏn. 
In addition to seeking a peace agreement with Chosŏn to reduce the military risk on the 
Houjin’s eastern flank, Nurhaci showed a strong intention of changing relations with 
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Chosŏn by identifying his newly founded regime as a state equal to Chosŏn, rather than a 
state of lower-status in the framework of Jurchen–Chosŏn relations that bore a striking 
resemblance to Ming–Chosŏn Zongfan relations.13 This political ambition posed a grave 
challenge to Chosŏn in the setting of civilized–barbarian distinction, initiating an 
invisible war of political discourse between them. 
THE CONUNDRUM OF THE SOVEREIGN LETTERS 
The bilateral communications started with exchanges of letters. On May 3, 1619, Nurhaci 
sent a captured officer, Chŏng Ŭng-jŏng, back to Chosŏn to present a “sovereign letter” 
(Ch. guoshu; K. kuksŏ) and a copy of the “Seven Grievances” to the king.14 After 
explaining why he fought with the “big country” (Ch. daguo; Ma. amba gurun)—the 
Ming, Nurhaci asked the king to make common cause with him against the Ming.15 
Chosŏn had contacted with Nurhaci by letters through a local officer in the town of 
Manpo (K. manpo ch’ŏmsa) on northern border in the 1600s,16 but now Nurhaci’s 
“barbarian letter” (K. hosŏ) reached the court and posed a big problem for the king as to 
how to reply. 
After a fierce debate among officials, the king appointed Pak Yŏp, Governor of 
P’yŏng’an-do holding a vice second rank, to reply to Nurhaci, but the format of the reply, 
in particular how to address Nurhaci, turned out to be a big challenge. In Nurhaci’s letter, 
the Mongolian characters of his stamp read “Emperor Tianming of the Houjin” (K. 
                                               
13 See, for example, Kawachi Yoshihiro, Mindai Joshin shi no kenkyū (A study of the history of the Jurchen 
tribes in the Ming period), 424-450. 
14 Qing taizu shilu, vol. 1, 84-85; Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian, 1619–1643 
(Collection of sovereign letters communicated between the Manchus and Chosŏn, 1619–1643) (hereafter 
referred to as WLGS), 1-2. 
15 Manbun rōtō, vol. 1, 143. 
16 Sadae mungwe (Records about serving the big country), vol. 46, 28b-31a. 
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Hugŭm ch’ŏnmyŏng hwangje),17 which greatly shocked the king and the Border Defense 
Command (K. pibyŏng sa) because they believed the Ming emperor was the exclusive 
emperor in the known universe. Additionally, Chosŏn always called Nurhaci “old 
chieftain” (K. roch’u), “barbarian chieftain” (K. noch’u; ich’u), and “chieftain of thieves” 
(K. chŏkch’u), so in no way would it endorse Nurhaci’s self-proclaimed imperial title. 
Finally, the king, pretending that he could not understand the characters on Nurhaci’s seal, 
instructed Pak Yŏp to send a letter to the “assistant general of Jianzhou garrison” (K. 
Kŏnjuwi mabŏp; Ch. Jianzhouwei mafa).18 
The reply tried to kill two birds with one stone. First, it used the conventional 
term “Jianzhou garrison” (K. kŏnjuwi; Ch. Jianzhouwei) in accordance with the Ming’s 
border garrison system to refer to the Jurchen polity, rather than the “Houjin” or the “Jin”, 
indicating that Chosŏn did not acknowledge Nurhaci’s regime. Second, it called the 
addressee the “assistant general” (K. mabŏp; Ma. mafa; Ch. mafa), rather than “khan” or 
“emperor,” suggesting that Chosŏn did not endorse Nurhaci’s position as a sovereign  
and the letter should be delivered to an assistant general (K. p’yŏnbi) of Nurhaci, not to 
Nurhaci himself.19  The letter also called the addressee “You, the assistant general of the 
Jianzhou garrison” (K. Kŏnjuwi mabŏp chokha) and the term “You” (K. chokha) was 
used among officials equal to each other, not sovereigns.20 A good example about the 
                                               
17 It was likely that the Korean translator interpreted the Mongolian term “khan” into “emperor” (K. 
hwangje; Ch. huangdi) in the Chinese sense. Simultaneously, this interpretation proved that the name of 
Nurhaci’s regime was “Later Jin” (K. Hugŭm; Ch. Houjin) at the time. 
18 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 118, 127; WLGS, 3. 
19 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 128. Taisuke Mitamura argues that the term mafa was frequently used as a 
respectful title by the Jurchens to refer to the local officials of the Liaodong province of the Ming. See 
Shinchō zenshi no kenkyu (A Study of the Ch’ing Dynasty in the Manchu Period), 277, note 13. It seemed 
that Nurhaci had used the same term to call Chosŏn’s officials. Mafa is a Manchu term referring to ancestor 
or grandfather (Ch. zu), see Manbun rōtō, vol. 4, 3; Yao Yuanzhi, Zhuyeting zaji (Miscellanies of 
Zhuyeting), vol. 7, 158. 
20 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 126. 
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embedded political indications of this term was that in 1636 the Japanese officials of the 
Tsushima Island called the Ministry of Rituals of Chosŏn (K. yecho) “You” (K. chokha) 
in their letter, instead of the previously honorific term “Your Excellency” (K. kagha), 
resulting in Chosŏn’s rejection of the letter.21 Such subtle format issues in Pak’s letter to 
the Houjin, including stamping Pak’s own official stamp instead of the king’s on it, aimed 
to highlight Chosŏn’s political position. In this way, the king could avoid corresponding 
with the khan, sidestep the sensitive issue of the Jurchen regime’s legitimacy, and 
downgrade the communication with the Houjin to a provincial level. 
In his letter, Park noted that Chosŏn and the Houjin had been subjects (K. sin) of 
the “Heavenly Dynasty” for 200 years, so he suggested Nurhaci pledge allegiance to the 
“Imperial Ming” (K. hwangmyŏng; Ch. huangming) which would bring the reconciliation 
between Chosŏn and the Houjin too.22 This strong pro-Ming attitude made the Houjin 
uncomfortable.23  In his reply, calling himself gu, a Chinese term only used by a 
sovereign to refer to himself, Nurhaci inferred that the “Heavenly Dynasty” that Chosŏn 
referred to must be the “southern dynasty” (Ch. nanchao)—the Jurchen’s appellation for 
the Ming, indicating that the Houjin did not endorse the exclusively divine position of the 
Ming anymore. The khan clearly required the king to ally with him and suggested that the 
two countries kill a white horse and a black bull to offer to heaven and earth, smear the 
blood of the sacrifices on the mouths, and burn incense to swear an oath.24 The ceremony 
                                               
21 Yinjo sillok (Veritable records of King Yinjo of Chosŏn), vol. 34, 618, 627. 
22 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 128. 
23 Yi Min-hwan, Ch’aekjung illok, in Ja’am jip, vol. 5, 18-19. 
24 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 169. In Kwanghaegun ilgi, the Ming was referred to as the “Heavenly 
Dynasty” or “Imperial Ming” by Chosŏn, and there was no single Chinese character of “Ming” in the letter 
to the Houjin. However, in the copies of Chosŏn’s letter in Qing taizu shilu (vol. 1, 85; see also WLGS, 3-4), 
the “Heavenly Dynasty” was replaced by the “Great Ming” (Ch. Daming) or the “Ming Dynasty” (Ch. 
Mingchao). In addition, in the Qing taizu shilu, the term “Jianzhouwei mafa” was replaced by “manzhou 
guozhu” (the monarch of Manzhou country). I would like to identify Chosŏn’s record as the original. It 
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of swearing an oath that Nurhaci suggested was a long traditional custom in Chinese 
history when two or several countries or organizations allied with each other. Nurhaci had 
actually done this ceremony with such polities as Yehe, Hada, Ula, and Hūifa in 1597 and 
with the Ming in 1608. Later, Nurhaci started wars with these entities on account of their 
actions of disobeying the oath.25 
XU GUANGQI’S PROPOSAL TO “SUPERVISE AND PROTECT” CHOSŎN 
Chosŏn was uninterested in Nurhaci’s offer, particularly in the face of the Ming’s 
suspicious reaction to its contacts with the rebellious “barbarians.” The Ming officials, 
such as Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), suspected that Chosŏn would be joining the Jurchen’s 
rebellion against the Ming, so that they started to consider controlling Chosŏn in such a 
critical time. Xu was famous for his close relations with Western missionaries in China, 
predominantly the Italian Jesuit priest, Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), and for his remarkable 
achievements in introducing European science into China. In the wake of the Ming’s 
debacle in Manchuria, Xu put forward his new military strategy in a palace memorial to 
Emperor Wanli on August 7, 1619, in which he also brought forward a policy toward 
Chosŏn.26 
Xu argued that Beijing should follow historical precedents in the Zhou and Han 
dynasties to send an official to Chosŏn to “supervise and protect” (Ch. jianhu) it. Xu 
enthusiastically volunteered to take this position, while the Ministry of Personnel (Ch. 
Libu) and other central institutes strongly supported him. Yet the emperor, who had sent 
                                                                                                                                            
seems that the Qing royal historians made some changes in the Hongtaiji period or after 1644. After 1616, 
Nurhaci sometimes still called the Ming “Great Ming” (Ma. daiming), see Mongmun Manju sillok, vol. 1, 
391. 
25 Qing taizu shilu, vol. 1, 42, 50, 46, 60. 
26 Wang Zhongmin, ed., Xu Guangqi ji (Collections of Xu Guangqi), vol. 1, 106-117; Ming shenzong shilu, 
vol. 584, 11172-11173. 
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the Chinese forces to Chosŏn to save the country from the Japanese invasions in the 
1590s, did not grant this proposal. 27  For people who embrace ideas of modern 
international law, particularly the idea of the equality between sovereigns after 1648, 
Xu’s plan was a clear manifestation of “colonialism,” insomuch that the official who 
would “supervise and protect” Chosŏn seemed to be no different from a viceroy 
appointed by a colonial power, as what Japan did in Korea after 1910. However, it was 
exactly on this aspect that the Zongfan system showed different nature from that of the 
European international relations system. The discrepancies between the two systems 
would be exemplified in an unprecedentedly intensive way by the residence of the 
Chinese official Yuan Shikai in Chosŏn in the 1880s, when the Western ministers had to 
negotiate Yuan’s legal position with Beijing. In the 1610s, for Xu, who was free from 
those would-be imported Western political and diplomatic principles, the Sino–Korean 
relationship should be managed based on the classical Zongfan ideology of the ancient 
Zhou dynasty and the historical precedents of the Han dynasty. 
Moreover, Xu knew that the Mongolian empire of the Yuan dynasty, which was 
overthrown by the Ming in 1638, had conquered the Korŏ dynasty of Korea (918–1392) 
and converted the country into the “Eastward Expedition Province” (Ch. Zhengdong 
xingzhongshusheng) in the 1280s.28 The Yuan’s imperial court conferred official title of 
the province upon the king and sent Darughachi—a local superintendent served by ethnic 
Mongolians—as a supervisor to manage affairs together with the king. The primary 
purpose of the Eastward Expedition Province was to serve as a frontier base for the 
                                               
27 Xu Guangqi ji, vol.1, 117. 
28 Yuanshi (History of the Yuan dynasty), vol. 208; Yuan gaoli jishi (History of the Yuan dynasty and the 
Korŏ dynasty), 44; Kim Han-gyu, Hanjung kwan’gye sa (A history of Sino–Korean relations), vol.1, 
502-531. 
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Mongolian invasion of Japan, so it was different from other inner provinces of the Yuan 
and was soon abolished. Yet, in 1302, the officials of Liaoyang province of the Yuan 
suggested the emperor annex the Eastward Expedition Province to Liaoyang and moved 
its capital to Liaoyang. The emperor did not endorse this plan; otherwise, Korea could 
have totally incorporated into territory of the Chinese empire. 29  For the Chinese 
Confucian officials like Xu, soliciting classical theories and historical precedents was an 
efficient and legal way to form and legitimize China’s would-be policies toward Korea, a 
point would be outstandingly proved again and again in the late nineteenth century. 
Similarly, Chosŏn would not challenge the legitimacy of China’s practices in the 
country based on Zongfan precedents. Had Emperor Wanli endorsed Xu’s proposal in 
1620, Chosŏn would have accepted the supervision and protection of the Chinese 
imperial envoys. In fact, what really proved provocative for Chosŏn in Xu’s proposal was 
his assumption that it was collaborating with the Jurchen “barbarians” against the Ming, a 
very serious and intolerantly moral charge in the civilized–barbarian distinction setting. 
After he learned Xu’s proposal, the king immediately sent emissaries to Beijing to make a 
defense on the matter.30 Indeed, Chosŏn was not collaborating with the Jurchens, yet 
maintaining its political and moral allegiance to Beijing would not reduce the risk of an 
attack by the Jurchens. Therefore, rather than completely leaning to the Ming, the king 
adopted a practical approach by tactically maintaining connections with the Houjin but 
confining it at the local level. This pragmatism challenged the king’s loyalty to the Ming 
and eventually resulted in a bloody coup that cost the king’s rulership. 
                                               
29 Korŏ sa chŏlyo (Abstracts of history of the Korŏ dynasty), vol. 22, 29-30. 
30 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 223, 225, 231. 
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CHOSŎN’S ENDORSEMENT OF THE JURCHEN REGIME IN 1622 
The king, Yi Hon, and many high-ranking officials never hesitated to express their 
pro-Ming and anti-Houjin attitudes in passionate rhetoric, in which they referred to the 
Jurchens as “thieves” (K. chŏk) or “barbarians” (K. ho, i, no, orangk’ae, ro, or tal). Yet 
the monarch and a couple of his confidants frequently indicated that Chosŏn should not 
become an enemy of the Jurchens for the sake of Chosŏn’s safety.31 Consequently, Yi 
Hong’s strategy was to maintain the twofold neutral policy mentioned above. The king 
had reasons to take such a dual policy, as the situation of the Ming–Chosŏn alliance was 
not sanguine. Two emperors of Ming China died within two months in 1620, while the 
new emperor, with the reign title of Tianqi (1621–1627), was not good at managing crises 
and caused unstable political situation in the court and inconsecutive military policies 
toward the Houjin. On the battleground, the Ming was losing more and more lands to the 
hands of the Houjin. In May 1621, the Jurchens occupied Liaoyang, an important military 
fortress in Manchuria, and made it the Houjin’s new capital, cutting off the overland route 
of contacts between Chosŏn and the Ming.32 
In the face of Nurhaci’s fast expansion and aggressive posture, the king secretly 
sent a military officer of Manpo to negotiate in vain with Nurhaci for peace in late 
1621.33 In October 1622, the king made a risky move to send Nurhaci his first sovereign 
letter through a civil official of the Ministry of Rituals in Hansŏng. In this letter, the king 
addressed Houjin as “a neighboring country” (K. rin’guk) and Nurhaci as “Khan of the 
Houjin country” (K. Hugŭmguk kahan). The letter followed the same format of those sent 
to Japan in accordance with the policy of Kyorin, namely communicating with a 
                                               
31 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 29, 501, 503, 516; vol. 30, 193, 203, 559, 572; vol. 31, 57, 83, 87, 97, 106. 
32 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 31, 3. 
33 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 641-645. 
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neighboring country.34 By officially endorsing the Houjin as a legitimate neighboring 
country, these terms enhanced their bilateral communication to the monarch-to-monarch 
or sovereign-to-sovereign level. 
The king, however, was suddenly abolished on May 11, 1623, by a coup launched 
by his nephew, Yi Jong (1595–1649, r. 1623–1649).35 A primary charge against the king 
was that he failed to embrace the monarch–subordinate and father–son relationship with 
the Ming.36 With the high moral standard, Yi Jong became the new king and his fervent 
pro-Ming attitude won him the investiture from the Ming.37 In addition to mobilizing his 
subjects to prepare for another war with the Houjin and even planning to lead army by 
himself to attach the Jurchens, the king stopped the exchange of messengers with Nurhaci 
and imposed trade sanctions on him.38 Meanwhile, he firmly assisted the Ming general 
Mao Wenlong (1576–1629), who escaped to Chosŏn after Liaoyang was occupied and 
stationed his forces on the Ka Island (K. Kado, also known as Pi or Chik Island), an 
island close to mainland Chosŏn, to carry out a guerrilla war in order to prevent the 
Houjin from entering the Shanhai Pass.39 With more fugitives escaped to the island from 
Manchuria, Mao demanded more logistic support from Chosŏn to support his men. The 
overseas Chinese forces became a tremendous burden for Chosŏn, but the king strongly 
                                               
34 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 31, 129, 165-167; WLGS, 8. 
35 See Yi Kŭng-ik, Yŏllyŏsil gisul (The records of Yŏllyŏsil), vol. 3, 324-332; Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 31, 
256-257. 
36 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 31, 257; Yinjo sillok, vol. 33, 503. 
37 Yinjo sillok, vol. 33, 512, 522; Ming shi (History of the Ming), vol. 27, 8303. 
38 Yinjo sillok, vol. 33, 27; vol. 34, 244. See also Li Kuang-tao, “Qingren ruguan qian qiukuan zhi 
shimo”(An account of Manchu Khan’s petition for peace to the court of the Ming empire), “Ji jinguohan 
zhi po’erqiukuan” (An account of petition of Khan of Houjin country for peace to the court of the Ming 
empire); Kim Sŏng-gyun, “Ch’o’gi ŭi chojŏng kyŏngje kwan’gye gyosŏp yaggo” (A brief history of 
Chosŏn–Qing economic relations in the early period). 
39 Kwanghaegun ilgi, vol. 30, 610. 
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aided them,40 as a result of which Mao could expand the range of his guerrilla war.41  
Chosŏn’s new policies of active involvement posed considerable military and 
economic threats on the Jurchens, but the king had underestimated the power of his 
opponents. In 1625, Nurhaci occupied the most important city in Manchuria, Shenyang, 
and made the city his new capital. The regime also preferred to present itself as “Jin,” 
instead of “Houjin.” After Nurhaci died in 1626, his son Hongtaiji (1592–1643, r. 1627–
1643) became the new khan and immediately changed his father’s policy of not invading 
Chosŏn. In 1627, the first year of the Jin’s new reign-title of “Tiancong” (Ma. abkai sure), 
Hongtaiji launched an attack on Chosŏn.42 
1.2 Becoming the Elder Brother of Chosŏn: The Jin and the First Manchu–Chosŏn 
War of 1627 
On February 23, 1627, Hongtaiji ordered an expedition to Chosŏn. Within two weeks, the 
Jin forces under Amin’s command swept into northern Chosŏn, drove Mao’s army back 
to the Ka Island, and captured Pyongyang, forcing the king, who had escaped to the 
Kanghwa Island, to send emissaries for peace negotiations.43 As the preconditions for 
withdrawal, Amin required the king to swear an oath to heaven, through which Chosŏn 
would end its relations with the Ming and establish an “elder brother” (Ch. xiong)–
“younger brother” (Ch. di) relationship with the Jin, treating the latter as the elder 
brother.44 The request created a stir in Chosŏn. Many Confucian officials and students 
presented petitions and memorials to the king, arguing that Chosŏn should not end 
                                               
40 Yinjo sillok, vol. 33, 569, 614, 616; vol. 34, 16; Li Kuang-tao, “Mao Wenlong niangluan dongjiang 
benmo” (The Piracy of Mao Wen-lung in Tung-chiang at the End of the Ming Dynasty). 
41 Qing taizu shilu, vol. 1, 128-129, 136; see also Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han Zongfan maoyi,1637–1894 
(Sino–Korean Tributary Trade, 1637–1894), 7. 
42 Qing taizong shilu (Veritable records of Hongtaiji), vol. 2, 31-32. 
43 Ibid., 35-39. 
44 The letter of Amin to the king of Chosŏn, March 18, 1627, in WLGS, 12. 
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relations with the Ming and should stop negotiating with the barbarians, kill their 
messengers, and fight to the death. Proclaiming that Chosŏn would rather die than follow 
the terms of the “Jurchen clown” (K. yŏjin soch’u), the king told his subjects that the 
peace negotiations with the Jurchens were only stalling tactics, known as the “loose rein” 
policy (K. ki’mi; Ch. jimi).45 In this way, the king deflected the domestic moral challenge 
and continued to negotiate with Hongtaiji through sovereign letter. 
In his letter stamped with his seal, the king endorsed Hongtaiji’s political position 
by addressing him as “Khan of the country of the Jin” (K. Kŭmguk han),46 but he 
purposely selected certain neutral terms to call the Jin and Chosŏn. He called Chosŏn 
“our country” (K. oguk), instead of “our humble country” (K. p’yeguk) or “our small 
country” (K. sobang) that he would use in his memorials to the Ming, while he called the 
Jin “your honorable country” (K. kwiguk). No honorific expressions about Hongtaiji 
appeared at the beginning of the letter.47 In addition, the king articulated that Chosŏn 
would follow the policy of “communicating with a neighboring country” toward the Jin 
and that of “serving the big county” toward the Ming. By suggesting that he would not 
betray the Ming,48 the king used the Ming reign-title of “Tianqi” to count the date in his 
letter, resulting in the deadlock in the peace negotiations.49 Eventually, the king used the 
format of a “notice” (K. kech’ŏp; Ch. jietie;) for the letter, on which he did not need to 
put a reign-title,50 which helped the two sides reach an agreement with Chosŏn on 
swearing an oath. 
                                               
45 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 168; Yang Lien-sheng, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in The 
Chinese World Order, 31-33.  
46 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 163, 208. 
47 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 168; Sadae mungwe, vol. 17, 4b. 
48 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 176; Yŏllyŏsil gisul, vol. 3, 412. 
49 The letters of Amin to the king, March 23 and April 6, 1627, in WLGS, 14-15, 17. 
50 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 177; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 61-62, 182-183; Yŏllyŏsil gisul, vol. 3, 426-431. 
 66 
The oath-swearing ceremony occurred on April 18 at the palace on the Kanghwa 
Island. The king burned incense and the oaths to Heaven after one of his officials read 
them aloud. He then returned to his palace residence. After the Jin officials killed a white 
horse and a black bull and put their blood, flesh, and bones in vessels at the altar, nine 
highest officials of Chosŏn and eight high-ranking officials of Jin read their own oaths.51 
The Korean and Manchu records reveal that neither the king nor his officials performed 
the ceremony of kowtow. Nor did these records show that the king and the Jin officials 
practiced any hierarchical rituals to each other. Another oath-swearing ceremony took 
place on May 3 in Pyongyang between Amin and a brother of the king who had been sent 
to the Jurchen side as a hostage.52 The Pyongyang oath stated that the king should 
present gifts to the khan, host the Jin emissaries as he did for those from the Ming, and 
not reinforce the city walls or conduct military drills.53 The two ceremonies marked the 
arrival of a long peace that would last for a decade between the two countries. 
The Jin reached certain political and economic goals through the war. First of all, 
Chosŏn officially endorsed the Jurchen regime as a state with a supreme sovereign, 
helping to enhance the regime’s political legitimacy in the geopolitical setting. 
Meanwhile, as Chosŏn, the Confucian country as well as the “Little China,” would regard 
the Jin as its “elder brother,” the Jin’s politico-cultural self-identity would change from 
the “barbarian” that was imposed by the discourse of the Ming-centered cosmopolitan 
order to the “civilized.” Economically, in addition to setting up trade channels by asking 
Chosŏn to open markets at several towns on its northern border, the Jin requested Chosŏn 
                                               
51 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 181; Manbun rōtō, vol. 4, 51. 
52 About the Pyongyang swearing ceremony, see Liu Jiaju, Qingchao chuqi de zhonghan guanxi (Sino–
Korean relations in the early Qing period), 15-16. 
53 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 39-40. 
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to present “yearly tributes” (K. se’pye; Ch. suibi), as the following table shows (Table 
1.1). 
Table 1. 1. Items and Quantities of Chosŏn’s Tribute to the Jin, 1627–1636 
Items Quantities Items  Quantities 
Red silk 200 pieces Mats in multicolor 50 pieces 
Grass green silk 200 pieces Mats in other colors 50 pieces 
White silk 200 pieces Thin mats with dragon 
pattern 
1 piece 
White ramie cloth 200 pieces Sapan wood 200 catties 
White cloth 400 pieces Good swords 8 
Red ceiba cloth 300 pieces Small swords 8 
Black ceiba cloth 300 pieces Pepper 10 pecks (Ch.dou) 
Blue ceiba cloth 400 pieces Yellow chestnuts 10 pecks (Ch. dou) 
White ceiba cloth 1,000 pieces Jujubes 10 pecks (Ch. dou) 
Ceiba cloth 5,000 pieces Ginkgo nuts 10 pecks (Ch. dou) 
Leopard skins 50 pieces Dried persimmons 50 units (K. ch’ŏp) 
Otter skins 200 pieces Abalones 10 units (K. ch’ŏp) 
Black squirrel skins 160 pieces Tianchi tea  50 sacks (K. pong) 
Korean Jute paper 500 rolls Queshe tea  50 sacks (K. pong) 
White cotton paper 1,000 rolls   
 
Sources: WLGS, 138-139, 152-153; Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 623; Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han Zongfan 
maoyi, 7. 
 
1.3 Constructing A Jin-Centric Quasi-Zongfan System: The Jin’s New Position in 
Manchu–Chosŏn Relations, 1627–1636 
THE SUBTLE JIN–CHOSŎN RELATIONS AFTER 1627 
As his army withdrew from Chosŏn, Hongtaiji sent the king a letter, explaining why the 
Jin fought with the “southern dynasty”—the Ming—and attacked Chosŏn. He said, “The 
southern dynasty only regards itself as Son of Heaven and views people of other 
countries as inferior servants…The Mandate of Heaven is extremely righteous by 
assisting us with punishing it…In the future, our two countries should be brothers forever 
and never bully others as the southern dynasty does.”54 By invoking the theory of the 
Mandate of Heaven, the khan challenged the Ming’s divine position as the center of the 
                                               
54 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 208. It is worth noting that in this context Hongtaiji referred to the Ming dynasty, 
rather than the emperor of the Ming dynasty, as the “Son of Heaven.” 
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known universe. In the following decade, his regime’s construction of a Jin-centric 
quasi-Zongfan system gradually changed the Jin’s position in the Jin–Chosŏn relations. 
During several years after the attack on Chosŏn in 1627, the Jin actually lacked a 
clear-defined long-term political strategy toward Chosŏn and the Ming. Given the 
military and economic situations, the Jin did not force Chosŏn to stop exchanging 
emissaries with Beijing. The elder brother–younger brother relationship blueprinted by 
the Jin, one way or another, indicated that the Jin still identified the Ming as the father of 
the big family. Although Hongtaiji was challenging the Ming’s authority, it seemed that 
he had no plan to remove the Ming from power at the time. Rather, his primary goal was 
to reach a peace agreement with the Ming, through which the emperor could 
acknowledge the Jin’s status. The Jin made some efforts to sue for peace, including 
launching a highly risky attack on suburb of Beijing in 1629,55 and asking his “younger 
brother”—Chosŏn—to forward touching petitions to the emperor in 1633 and 1634.56 
Some Han Chinese intellectuals serving the Jin curt were also considering the ways of 
making peace with the Ming. In a palace memorial to Hongtaiji in 1630, Gao Hongzhong 
suggested that the Jin “follow the Chosŏn model to receive the [Ming’s] investiture with 
kingship and to use the reign-title [of the Ming] to count the date” (Ch. bi Chaoxian shili, 
qing feng wangwei, cong zhengshuo).57 Yet the Ming would never agree to negotiate 
with the “barbarian” rebels, so the war persisted. 
As long as the war continued, the Jin’s security would be at risk, in particular 
when it was exposed to the military threat of the three-side-blockade policy of the Ming, 
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in which Chosŏn, that in no case would it fulfill what the new “elder brother” expected, 
was involved.58 On the contrary, the country maintained his entrenched point of view as 
to the Jurchens, while the ideology of the civilized–barbarian distinction was reinforced 
by the 1627 invasion, which was known as “barbarian invasion of 1627” (K. Chŏngmyo 
horan, or Chŏngmyo roran) in Chosŏn. As a result, more conflicts arose in Jin–Chosŏn 
economic and political contacts during this period. 
Due to serious economic difficulties as a result of the war, the Jin required 
Chosŏn to open markets for trade in a northwestern border city, Ŭiju. After intensive 
negotiations in early 1628, Chosŏn agreed to open the markets twice a year, respectively 
in spring and autumn, rather than three times as Jin wished.59 On March 31, 1628, the 
Ŭiju market opened for the first time and the Jin emissary, Inggūldai (1596–1648), 
guided eight generals and more than one thousand people from Manchuria to the market. 
Yet it turned out that the Ŭiju market could not fulfill the Jin’s need because Chosŏn was 
not able to provide enough grain after the war. Hongtaiji urged Chosŏn to open another 
market on a northeastern border city, Hoeryŏng, but the Korean merchants were reluctant 
to go to Hoeryŏng in that the business at the city had declined for many years.60 
In the midst of difficulty, the Jin, one way or another, relied heavily on the “yearly 
gifts” presented by Chosŏn’s emissaries, who visited Shenyang in spring and autumn 
every year under the names of “Spring Emissary” (K. ch’un sinsa) and “Autumn 
Emissary” (K. ch’u sinsa). From 1627 to 1636, the categories of the gifts reached 85, but 
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the amounts of the gifts kept changing due to the Jin’s needs or Chosŏn’s concerns,61 
which became a barometer of their relations. For example, in 1630, when the king 
learned that Amin’s army was defeated by the Ming in a battle, he immediately reduced 
the amount of the gifts.62 In 1633, Hongtaiji required Chosŏn to present 100 taels of gold 
and 1,000 taels of silver as parts of the yearly gifts, but encountered the firm refusal of 
Chosŏn.63  
Although such conflicts, as a nettlesome issue for both sides, fueled Hongtaiji’s 
dissatisfaction with Chosŏn, the Korean emissaries did bring commercial opportunities to 
Shenyang. Along with the emissaries, many Korean merchants went to Shenyang to do 
business. The rapid rise of this market was so significant that the Border Defense 
Command of Chosŏn reported in 1631 that “the dispatches of emissaries were no 
different than going to open markets there.”64 Yet the Shenyang market, in common with 
the Ŭiju and Hoeryŏng markets, suffered from big differences in prices of consumer 
products of both sides, in particular those of black cloths and ginseng, which made it 
difficult for the Jin to make a profit.65 The trade imbalance manifested by the three 
markets in Ŭiju, Hoeryŏng, and Shenyang eventually contributed to the Jin’s invasion of 
Chosŏn in 1636. 
THE RISE OF THE JIN–CHOSŎN QUASI-ZONGFAN ORDER 
On the political side, Chosŏn and the Jin had very different understandings of their new 
relationship, as manifested by their political discourse applied to each other. Chosŏn 
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continued its Kyorin policy toward the Jin and put the Jin on an equal footing with itself. 
It called its emissaries to the Jin “messengers” (K. sinsa; Ch. xinshi), not “tributary 
emissaries” (K. kongsa; Ch. gongshi) like those to the Ming. The yearly gifts to 
Shenyang were “gifts” (K. yemul; Ch. liwu;), rather than “tributes” (K. kongmul; Ch. 
gongwu) like those presented to Beijing, and the name of the gift list was “list of gifts” (K. 
yedan; Ch. lidan), not “list of tributes” (K. kongdan; Ch. gongdan). These terms 
suggested that Chosŏn treated the Jin as a country that was lower than the Ming in the 
Ming-centric world. As the king noted in 1633 to Hongtaiji about the yearly gifts, “It is 
the proper principle (K. ye; Ch. li) that our two countries give each other local products in 
communications via emissaries.”66 For Chosŏn, the Ming-centered political arrangement 
of the world had not really changed. 
By contrast, the Jin progressively developed a new political discourse to nourish 
its self-identity as the center of the region that possessed a higher position than Chosŏn. 
With the steady rise of the Jin’s military power, especially after the Jin triumphed over 
the Ming’s forces in the battle at Dalinghe in late 1631 and early 1632, Hongtaiji dictated 
considerable reforms to the Jin’s political structure by abolishing the co-leading system at 
the highest level of the Jin’s court, making himself the exclusive and most powerful 
sovereign.67 Since 1632, in his letters to the Ming and Chosŏn, Hongtaiji had begun to 
call himself “the brilliant khan of the country of the Manchus” (Ma. manju gurun i sure 
han), rather than “the khan of the country of the Jin” (Ma. aisin gurun i han) as before.68 
More importantly, he imitated the Ming’s bureaucratic system to establish Six Ministries 
                                               
66 WLGS, 100; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 179-180. 
67 Manbun rōtō, vol. 5, 619-621. 
68 See, for example, Manbun rōtō, vol. 5, 803, 853. 
 72 
(Ch. liubu; Ma. ninggun jurgan) in Shenyang,69 and instructed his Manchu officials, such 
as Dahai, to translate Chinese classics into Manchu language (Ma. manju gisun).70 From 
then on, the regime substantially accelerated its Sinicization from the top down, which 
was featured in its institutional construction through the great efforts of a group of Han 
Chinese officials and intellectuals, such as Ning Wanwo, Fan Wencheng, Gao Hongzhong, 
Bao Chengxian, and Yang Fangxing. One of the most significant acts of these elites was 
to persuade Hongtaiji to produce annals of the monarch and the regime in both Chinese 
and Manchu languages.71 
The Chinese terms that these Han Chinese savants adopted to describe the 
exchanges of emissaries and diplomatic relations between the Jin and Chosŏn in the 
annals were crucial to change the Jin’s political identity. According to the Manchu 
records written by the Manchu intellectuals, the emissaries of Chosŏn (Ma. solho i elcin) 
“arrived [in Shenyang] and delivered the local products as gifts” (Ma. baci tucire doroi 
jaka benjime isinjiha). When they left, the khan “gave” (Ma. unggihe) or “awarded” (Ma. 
šangnaha) them and the king (Ma. solho wang) gifts.72 Although these Manchus terms 
were largely vernacular and had no strong hierarchical or political meaning, except 
šangnambi, a synonym of the Chinese term shang (to award from the superior),73 their 
Chinese counterparts in the Chinese-language records portrayed a very different 
relationship between the two countries. The visit of the emissaries, who were addressed 
as “tributary emissaries” (Ch. gongshi) with “tribute” (Ch. gongwu) or “local product” 
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(Ch. fangwu), became “the coming to the court to present themselves before the 
sovereign” (Ch. laichao), suggesting that the emissaries came to the Jin not because of 
the latter’s formidable military might, but its outstanding merits.74 Similarly, Hongtaiji’s 
gift-giving to the king and emissaries was “bestowing from the sovereign” (Ch. ci), a 
term in such setting always used by a Chinese emperor. 75  These Chinese terms 
comprised a hierarchical relationship between the sovereign—an emperor in the Chinese 
sense—and his subjects within the Zongfan system, such as Chosŏn, Vietnam, Ryukyu, 
and certain Central Asian states. 76  Meanwhile, the Jin invoked this political and 
diplomatic discourse that it developed toward Chosŏn to apply to the forces or political 
entities that sought shelter with, or surrendered to, the Jin.77 
This new discourse won the support of the steady rise of the Jin. In 1634, 
Hongtaiji changed the name of Shenyang into “Mukden” in Manchu or “Shengjing” (lit. 
prosperous capital) in Chinese, and next year he instructed his people to address the 
country “Manzhou” (M. manju; the Manchu state), not Jurchen or others.78 It indicated 
that the regime’s institutional construction was facilitated by the very clear ethnic 
identification. Furthermore, the Jin officials, particularly the Han Chinese, started to 
address Hongtaiji as “emperor” (Ch. huangshang, or huangdi). Some of them went 
further to suggest Hongtaiji perform conventional rituals established in the Han dynasty, 
                                               
74 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 171. For connotations of such Chinese terms as laichao in Chinese and East 
Asian history, see Li Hu, “Yindai waijiao zhidu chutan” (A study on the diplomatic system of the Shang 
dynasty); Chun Hae-jong, “Tongyang kodaesa e issŏsŏ ŭi kwihwa ŭi ŭiŭi” (Some notes on “Naturalization” 
in early East Asian history); John K. Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West.” 
75 For example, see Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 45, 51-52, 54, 57, 105, 110, 192-193. 
76 See Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368–1884,” in The Chinese World Order, 206-224; for 
the issue of the “tributes” and different political understandings of their relationship between Ming China 
and Central Asian states, see 206-209. 
77 For example, Bar Baturu, Nomun Dalai, and Coir Jamsu from Alakcot of Cahar went to the Jin in 1627, 
and Hongtaiji “awarded” them lands and live stocks. See Manbun rōtō, vol. 4, 99-100. The surrender of the 
Ming General Kong Youde was another good example, see Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 190-191. 
78 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 330-331. 
 74 
through which the khan would claim to be “Son of Heaven” in the Chinese sense.79 More 
importantly, these officials invoked the principles of the civilized–barbarian distinction to 
brand the Ming “barbarian” (Ch. manzi) and those Chinese who surrendered to the Jin 
“Han Chinese barbarians” (Ch. hanyi),80 thereby appropriating and completely reversing 
the Ming’s language as to the center of the world. 
With the consequential change of its worldview, the Manchu regime began to play 
the role of the exclusive institutional agency of the Mandate of Heaven with great virtue, 
to which “all barbarians on four quarters of the world willingly came in submission” (Ch. 
siyi xianfu).81 When the Ming generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming surrendered 
to Hongtaiji in 1633, the Jin jubilantly described it as “people from afar willingly coming 
to our court for civilization” (Ch. yuanren laigui).82 The euphoric adoption of the 
Chinese term “willingly coming to our court for civilization” (Ch. laigui, or guihua) 
demonstrated that the Manchu regime was purposely constructing a self-identity as the 
center of the world—the Central Kingdom—that possessed cultural superiority over 
“barbarians from afar” or on its periphery.83 These momentous changes in the political 
discourse were deeply rooted in orthodox Chinese political theory articulated in 
Confucian classics, such as Analects of Confucius (Ch. Lunyu) and Doctrine of the Mean 
(Ch. Zhongyong), showing the prodigious significance of both the Sinicization of the 
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Manchu regime and the Barbarianization by the regime. Such orthodox ideology would 
continuously assist the regime to define itself as the Central Kingdom until its very last 
years in the early twentieth century.84  
The use of the Chinese political rhetoric of this sort was no mere imitation of the 
Ming’s political discourse to please Hongtaiji. Rather, it meant to achieve a political goal 
by transforming the regime from a barbarian on the periphery of the Ming-centric world 
into a new center of gravity in a Jin-dominated one, which the young and vernacular 
Manchu language—including the “New Manchu” (Ma. ice manju hergen) developed in 
1632—was incapable of procuring.85 The Manchu–Chosŏn contacts were conducted in 
accordance with hierarchical principles within in a quasi-Zongfan system per se. 
All of these, with distinct hallmarks of Chinese political concepts, occurred in the 
late 1620s and early 1630s, when the Manchu regime was under new constructions with 
Ming China as the model. Some historians have argued that at the time the Manchus 
mainly derived political concepts of imperial rule from their Mongolian allies, rather than 
from Chinese.86 Yet, the concurrent transformation of the Manchu–Chosŏn relationship 
of the day suggested a very different story beyond the dichotomy between the Manchu–
Mongolian and Manchu–Ming communications. The synchronous transformation of the 
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Manchu regime’s understanding of its relations with neighboring nomadic and Confucian 
states indicates that the regime was enthusiastically constructing its new politico-cultural 
self-identity as the center of the known world by appropriating and exploiting the 
Chinese Zongfan discourse that had been used by the Ming and Chosŏn. This process 
also occurred much earlier than the “documentary institutionalization” that happened in 
the post-1644 era.87 The fundamental changes in the Manchus’ relations with their 
neighbors thus illuminate the fierce debate regarding the Sinicization of the Manchus. 
THE REGIME’S STRATEGIC GOAL OF TRANSFORMING ITSELF INTO 
“ZHONGGUO” 
While the Chinese quasi-Zongfan discourse connoting strong political meanings was 
remaking the self-image of the Manchu regime in the Chinese sense, the Manchu 
language provided the regime with an international setting by framing the Jin’s relations 
with other political entities as state-to-state relations. In Manchu records, the Jin, the 
Ming, Chosŏn, and such Mongolian polities as Korcin were all defined as gurun.88 The 
term gurun has several meanings, including “country” (Ch. guo), “tribe” (Ch. buluo), 
“people of a tribe” (Ch. zuzhong), and “race” (Ch. zhongzu). Simply put, it has two 
primary meanings: “people” (only in plural) and “country.” For instance, amba gurun 
could mean “big country” or “adults” and ajige gurun could mean “small country” or 
“children,” while haha gurun refers to “men” and hehe gurun refers to “women.”89 In 
specific political contexts in which the Manchus used the term to define the 
above-mentioned polities at that time, it primarily meant “country,” such as aisin gurun 
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(the country of the Jin), nikan gurun (the country of the Han-Chinese, namely the Ming), 
daiming gurun (the country of the Great Ming), solho gurun or coohiyan gurun (the 
country of Chosŏn), korcin gurun (the country of the Korcin Mongol), and cahar gurun 
(the country of the Cahar Mongol).90 In addition, the term can find its Mongolian 
equivalent ulus (country) in the Mongolian records as to the Manchu regime of the day.91 
Such interpretations could be facilitated by the fact that the Manchu rulers drew 
very clear geographical, social, and cultural lines between the Manchu regime and other 
“countries.” For example, in 1619, Nurhaci in his letters to the Kalka Mongol stated that 
“the Ming and Chosŏn have different languages, but share the same styles in clothing and 
hair dress, so the two countries look like a single country. Our two countries have the 
same situation and look like a single country too.”92 Since the 1620s, such consciousness 
of being a state had become more transparent in the regime’s political norms, in particular 
in the Chinese records. For instance, in April 1628, Hongtaiji called the Cahar Mongol a 
“different country” (Ma. encu gurun; Ch. yiguo) and termed it as a “far country” (Ch. 
yuanguo).93 In June 1629, Hongtaiji treated the prince of the “country of Korcin” (Ch. 
ke’erqin guo) to music and dances of “four countries” (Ch. siguo), including the Jin, the 
Korcin Mongol, the Ming, and Chosŏn.94 In July 1632, in his letter to the Ming’s 
officials, Hongtaiji juxtaposed his country with the Cahar Mongol as two “countries 
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outside of the Ming’s border” (Ma. jasei tulergi gurun; Ch. bianwai zhi guo).95 
The new political discourse fundamentally transformed the Manchu regime’s 
worldview from within by representing the regime as a state at the center of a multistate 
community. The strategic goal of this transformation, as Ning Wanwo expressed in 1633 
when he suggested that the Jin should compose an institutional code (Ch. Jindian) by 
modifying that of the Ming (Ch. Daming huidian), was to break the Ming’s conventions 
and “gradually develop the institutions of Zhongguo” (Ch. jianjiu Zhongguo zhi zhi) of 
the Manchu regime’s own. According to Ning, only in this way could the regime manage 
its great enterprise after it conquered the “barbarian places” of the Ming (Ch. manzi 
difang).96 This strategic plan proves that Zhongguo, being a politico-cultural identity of a 
regime, was available for the Manchu regime to embrace and claim. More importantly, it 
suggests that taking the “Central Plain” (Ch. Zhongyuan) was not necessarily a 
prerequisite for the Manchu regime to become Zhongguo as it had been widely assumed, 
in particular in the time when the Ming was “barbarianized” within the Jin’s discourse. 
Nurhaci once wished the “way” (Ma. doro) of his ethnic nation, or the 
Manchuness, could be well preserved by setting up the Shanhai Pass and the Liao River 
as the border between “the Chinese and the Jurchen countries” (Ma. nikan, jušen meni 
meni gurun). He tried to avoid “turning into the Chinese Way” (Ma. nikan i doro de 
dosimbi; Ch. xiao hansu;), or the Sinicization as we term it, which, in his eyes, the Liao, 
the Jin, and the Yuan dynasties had experienced after their founders left their own places 
for the “Chinese inner land” (Ma. nikan i dorgi bade; Ch. handi), where they “changed 
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way and all became Chinese” (Ma. doro forgošoro jakade, gemu nikan ohobi).97 
Although the Manchu leaders watchfully exhorted their ethnic cohorts to keep the “old 
way” (Ma. fe doro) by practicing Manchu archery, horse-riding, and costume in daily life, 
their regime was unavoidably following the “Chinese way” (Ma. nikan i doro) in its fast 
transformation in the 1630s, as Ning’s memorials suggested.98 In this sense, the regime 
could have arguably become Zhongguo, even if it remained in Manchuria and never 
crossed the Great Wall. Meanwhile, the Nurhaci’s above-mentioned words, recorded in 
both Manchu and Chinese languages, challenge the view that the Sinicization thesis “is a 
twentieth-century Han nationalist interpretation of China’s past.”99 
By practicing the newly adopted Chinese political discourse, the Manchu regime 
gradually absorbed the Chinese political philosophy of the Zongfan order into its 
understandings of the positions of itself and other polities in the known world. This 
Manchu–Chinese ideological combination produced a multilevel, hierarchical framework 
among these countries, in which the Jin replaced the Ming as the center of the world, with 
other countries, including the Ming itself, on its periphery. Moreover, aside from the 
Ming, the other countries served as the Jin’s outer fan per se by presenting “tribute” to 
the Chinese-emperor-like khan. This quasi-Zongfan system became so mature that in 
1636, in their Chinese letter to Chosŏn, the 49 princes of 16 countries of Mongols under 
the Jin’s leadership termed themselves “Mongols as outer fan of the Jin” (Ch. Jinguo 
waifan menggu), equivalent to the Manchu term tulergi goloi monggo (Mongols as the 
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outer fan). 100  Furthermore, in the same year, the Jin founded the Mongolian 
Superintendency or the Ministry of Mongolian Affairs (Ma. monggo jurgan; Ch. Menggu 
yamen) based on Chinese civil administrational concepts, which, as a creative institute 
parallel with the Ministry of Rituals, enabled the regime to transform its relations with 
the Mongols and to build and govern a vast empire in the following decades. 
The construction of this quasi-Zongfan discourse occurred primarily within the 
Jin’s borders. It was true that the regime was trying to sue for peace with the court of the 
Ming during the period and was short of long-term political strategy, yet the peace suing 
as a strategy of the war would not become an obstacle in the way of the reconstruction of 
its self-image within the country. In this process, the Jin found Chosŏn the best resource 
from outside that could support its discourse revolution. In the framework of bilateral 
contacts, the Jin progressively served as a supreme power and converted Chosŏn into its 
subordinate or outer fan, rather than a “younger brother” as it publicly claimed. Students 
of Sino–Korean relations tend to assume the Manchus adopted the Zongfan hierarchy 
discourse after 1637, when they imposed clear Zongfan terms on Chosŏn. The above 
analysis, however, proves that the process had veritably begun in an earlier period. 
THE PRACTICES OF THE MANCHU–CHOSŎN QUASI-ZONGFAN ORDER 
As the quasi-Zongfan discourse was under construction, the Manchu regime implemented 
it through the rituals in the exchange of emissaries. In Mukden, the Korean emissaries 
kowtowed five times to Hongtaiji.101 They were well housed in Mukden, and enjoyed an 
official welcome banquet (K. hama yŏn, lit. banquet for getting off a horse) and a 
                                               
100 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 625; Manbun rōtō, vol. 6, 981. 
101 Manbun rōtō, vol. 4, 92, 332. 
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farewell banquet (K. sangma yŏn, lit. banquet for getting on a horse).102 Hongtaiji 
“awarded” gifts to the king, emissaries, interpreters, and servants of Chosŏn.103 These 
formalities precisely imitated those practiced in the Ming–Chosŏn Zongfan exchanges, 
progressively institutionalizing a hierarchical Manchu–Chosŏn Zongfan order that would 
last for approximately 260 years since the 1630s. 
As an exchange, the Jin sent ethnic-Manchu emissaries to Hansŏng in spring and 
autumn every year. They were housed at Hall of Admiring the Central Civilized Country 
(K. Mohwa gwan; Ch. Muhua guan), a place that had accommodated Ming emissaries, 
and were treated to official welcome and farewell banquets.104 The emissaries also had 
an audience with the king in the palace, where they kowtowed three times to the king 
before they had tea and engaged in a short conversation.105 Although Chosŏn did not 
want to treat the Manchu emissaries like those of the Ming, the basic ritual procedures of 
greeting were practically identical.106 The Manchu emissaries only lacked their Ming 
counterparts’ standing as “imperial envoy” (Ch. qinshi) or “heavenly envoy” (Ch. 
tianshi). 
This de facto quasi-Zongfan relationship conflicted with the de jure one between 
the two “brothers,” a contradiction strikingly manifested in different formats of their 
sovereign letters to each other. In the letters, Chosŏn placed the two sides on a fully equal 
political position, which was hierarchically lower than the Ming’s. According to the 
Zongfan convention, whenever the characters regarding the Heaven or the Ming emperor 
                                               
102 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi (The Daily Records of Royal Secretariat of the Chosŏn Dynasty), vol. 22, the item 
dated October 23, 1628. 
103 Manbun rōtō, vol. 4, 94-95. 
104 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi, vol. 22, the item dated March 17 and 24, 1629. 
105 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi, vol. 22, the item dated March 19, 1629. 
106 The sovereign letter of the king to Hongtaiji, June 28, 1633, see WLGS, 113-114. 
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appeared, they should be placed at the top of a new line, and two character-spaces higher 
than “Chosŏn” and the first characters of other lines. This honorific elevation revered the 
Chinese emperor as the supreme human agent of the heaven with the highest divine 
position in the world. Hongtaiji also utilized honorific elevation in his letters, but he 
adopted a different arrangement of the hierarchy, as his letter to the Ming General Yuan 
Chonghuan (1584–1630) in 1627 showed. Hongtaiji divided the hierarchy into four levels, 
among which his position was lower than the Heaven and the Ming emperor, but higher 
than the Ming officials (Figure 1. 1). He also placed the Heaven higher than the emperor, 
in contrast to the Ming’s rule that General Yuan used in his letters to Hongtaiji (Figure 1. 
2). Hongtaiji was frustrated by Yuan’s format in that he regarded himself as “the monarch 
or the khan of another country” (Ma. encu gurun i ejen han; Ch. yiguo junzhu), who was 
“son of the Heaven and the Buddha” (Ma. abka fucihi i jui; Ch. tian fo zhi zi). He 
proclaimed that he would not accept any letters from the Ming as long as he was 
addressed at a status equal to, or lower than, the Ming officials.107 Nevertheless, when he 
communicated with the king of Chosŏn, he followed a pragmatic way by putting the king 
in a position almost equal to himself in order to avoid offending the king (Figure 1. 3). 
The king followed the same format in his response to Hongtaiji, but tried to 
obscure the imposed brotherhood (Figure 1. 4). Although Hongtaiji called the king 
“younger brother” in his letters of 1627 and 1628, the king never called Hongtaiji “elder 
brother.” After Hongtaiji questioned the king about this aspect, the king started to adopt 
friend-to-friend terms in his letters of 1629, in which he began with “the king of the 
country of Chosŏn presents the letter to the khan of the country of the Jin” (K. Chosŏn 
kugwang pongsŏ Kŭmguk han; Ma. coohiyan gurun i wang ni bithe, aisin gurun i han de 
                                               
107 See Manwen laodang, 821; Manbun rōtō, vol. 4, 28. 
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unggimbi), which matched Hongtaiji’s usage “the khan of the country of the Jin sends the 
letter to the king of the country of Chosŏn” (Ma. aisin gurun i han i bithe, coohiyan 
gurun i wang de unggimbi; Ch. Jinguohan zhishu yu Chaoxian guowang). Later, the king 
changed the word “present” (K. pong; Ma. jafambi) to “send” (K. ch’i; Ma. unggimbi), 
which eliminated hierarchical indications of the former term. This subtle change 
provoked the Jin in 1635, but Chosŏn explained that both terms were utilized between 
“neighboring countries” (K. rin’guk; Ma. adaki gurun).108 Chosŏn’s pro-Ming attitude 
became more pronounced in this process, which to the Jin meant the brotherhood was 
unstable. The Jin’s security would not be guaranteed so long as Chosŏn stood as a loyal 
subject of the Ming. The only way to solve this problem, for the Jin, was another war 
against Chosŏn. 
Figure 1. 1. The Format of Hongtaiji’s Letters to Yuan Chonghuan in 1627 
     Heaven 1 
    Emperor  2 
   Khan   3 
  Ming officials    4 
X X X X X X 5 
X X X X X X 6 
X X X X X X 7 
f e d c b a  
 
Sources: Hongtaiji’s letter to Yuan Chonghuan, in Manwen laodang, 821; Mambun Rōtō, vol. 4, 28; 
see also Hongtaiji’s letter to officials of Jinzhou, Manwen laodang, 847; Mambun Rōtō, vol. 4, 72. 
Notes: Arabic numerals represent horizontal lines from the top down, English letters represent 
vertical lines, and the direction of the writing was from right to left. “X” represents a Chinese character. 
The following figures follow the same format.  
 
Figure 1. 2. The Format of Yuan Chonghuan’s Letters to Hongtaiji in 1627 
   Emperor Heaven 1 
 Khan Ming officials   2 
X X X X X 3 
X X X X X 4 
X X X X X 5 
e d c b a  
 
                                               
108 WLGS, 168-169; Manbun rōtō, vol. 6, 893-898. 
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Sources: Hongtaiji’s letter to Yuan Chonghuan, in Manwen laodang, 821; Mambun Rōtō, vol. 4, 
28. 
 
Figure 1. 3. The Format of Hongtaiji’s Letters to the King of Chosŏn, 1627–1636 
     Heaven 1 
 Your country Jin King Khan  2 
X X X X X X 3 
X X X X X X 4 
X X X X X X  
f e d c b a  
 
Sources: The king’s letter to Hongtaiji, see Kakyu go bu (Records of miscellaneous documents), 
archive catalogue no. Ko-5710-5-4. 
 
Figure 1. 4. The Format of the Letters of the King of Chosŏn to Hongtaiji, 1627–
1636 
     Ming Heaven 1 
 Your country Our country Khan  King   2 
X X X X X X X 3 
X X X X X X X 4 
X X X X X X X  
g f e d c b a  
 
Sources: The king’s letter to Hongtaiji, see Chosŏnguk raesŏ bu (Records of letters from Chosŏn), 
vol. 1, archive catalogue no. Ko-5710-5-1. 
1.4 From Elder Brother of Chosŏn to Father of Chosŏn: The Second Manchu–Chosŏn 
War in 1636–1637 
CONFLICTS ON THE ORTHODOX LEGITIMACY 
In the middle of the 1630s, many Han Chinese and Manchu officials tried to persuade 
Hongtaiji to take a new reign-title as “emperor.” On February 4, 1636, these officials 
presented memorials to prompt Hongtaiji to follow the Mandate of Heaven (Ch. tianyi) to 
claim to be emperor. Following the Chinese ritual conventions, Hongtaiji ostensibly 
declined and suggested his officials send emissaries to Chosŏn to discuss the matter with 
the king, his “younger brother.”109 Hongtaiji’s true motivation, as the Korean official 
Hong Ik-han (1586–1637) shrewdly recognized, was to utilize Chosŏn’s identity as the 
“Little China” to assert before other countries that “Chosŏn reveres me as the Son of 
                                               
109 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 341-343. 
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Heaven,” a position that Chosŏn would on no account endorse.110 
On March 30, the Manchu officials Inggūldai (1596–1648) and Mafuta (?–1640) 
arrived in Hansŏng, along with 47 Mongolian princes, 30 generals, and 98 soldiers. They 
brought five letters. The first three letters extended Hongtaiji’s condolences for the death 
of the queen of Chosŏn. The fourth letter, written by eight Manchu princes (Ma. hošoi 
beile) and 17 high-ranking Manchu ministers (Ma. gūsai amban), and the fifth letter by 
49 princes of the Mongolian polities under the Chinese name of “Jinguo waifan menggu” 
(Mongols, the outer fan of the country of the Jin), aimed to persuade the king to submit a 
palace memorial supporting Hongtaiji to follow the Mandate of Heaven (Ma. abkai gūnin) 
to take the “great title” (Ma. amba gebu), namely emperor. The letters also emphasized 
that the Jin now owned “virtues” (Ma. erdemu) that enabled it to manage the world.111 
Yet, on March 31, 139 Confucian students of Chosŏn presented a petition against the 
Manchu emissaries, calling for the king “to kill the barbarian emissaries and burn the 
barbarian letters.”112 The situation suddenly threw Inggūldai and his followers into such 
a huge panic that next day they rushed to flee from the city, while people gathered along 
the road to tease and humiliate them.113 The mission had totally failed. 
Chosŏn’s stance against Hongtaiji’s political ambitions was further strengthened 
when the king dispatched Na Tŏk-hŏn as the Spring Emissary and Yi Kwak as the 
Response Emissary (K. hoetap sa) to Mukden in late April.114 On May 15, the Jin held a 
grand ceremony for Hongtaiji to assume the title “Emperor of lenience, kindheartedness, 
                                               
110 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 624. 
111 Manbun rōtō, vol. 6, 904-911; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 347-349; Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 624-625. For 
the original text written in Chinese, see Hidetaka Nakamura, Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū (Study on history 
of Japanese–Korean relations), vol. 3, 610-613. 
112 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 625. 
113 Ibid. See also Pyŏngjarok ilgi (Diary of the Manchu invasion of 1636). 
114 WLGS, 177-180; Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 626; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 358-359. 
 86 
beneficence, and brilliance” (Ma. gosin onco huwaliyasun enduringge han; Ch. Kuan 
wen ren sheng huangdi) and adopt the new reign-title “Chongde” (Ma. wesihun 
erdemungge, lit. worshiping virtues). The Jin also renamed itself the “Country of the 
Great Qing” (Ma. daicing gurun; Ch. Daqing guo).115 After gathering before Hongtaiji at 
his left and right flanks, all Manchu, Mongolian, and Han Chinese officials knelt down 
three times, each time bowing their heads three times (Ch. san gui jiu koutou; Ma. ilan 
jergi niyakūrafi uyun jergi hengkilembi). Although Na and Yi had conducted a ceremony 
of kowtow before Hongtaiji four times when they first arrived on May 6, they identified 
the ceremony as the “usurpation of the imperial title” (K. ch’amho; Ch. jianhao) and 
refused to perform it, expressing their strong stance against Hongtaiji’s political 
ambitions.116 
The ritual conflict posed a grave identity crisis to the Manchu regime. In terms of 
geopolitics, Chosŏn was the only Confucian country that was beyond the regime’s 
political and military control but maintained regular and official diplomatic 
communications with it.117 Without endorsement from Chosŏn, the Manchu regime’s 
political transformation would remain primarily within its borders and would not 
significantly influence regional politics. Furthermore, since Hongtaiji had claimed to be 
the Son of Heaven by following the Chinese “proper conduct” (Ch. li), he desperately 
needed Chosŏn’s identity as a Confucian country to counteract the designation of the 
Manchus as the “barbarian” and legitimize his emperorship in the Chinese sense. 
The Qing soon sent Na and Yi back to Chosŏn with Hongtaiji’s two 
                                               
115 Qing taizong shilu gaoben, 9. 
116 Manbun rōtō, vol. 6, 982, 993-994; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 360-363; Qing taizong shilu gaoben, 17; 
Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 631. 
117 Qing taizong shilu gaoben, 8. 
 87 
Chinese-language letters to the king. In the letters, Hongtaiji called himself “the emperor 
of the country of the Great Qing” (Ch. Daqing guo huangdi), rather than “the khan of the 
Jin,” and called Chosŏn “Your country” (Ch. erguo), instead of “Your honorable country” 
(Ch. guiguo), indicating the end of the bilateral brotherhood relationship.118 Invoking the 
time-honored classical theory that “the Heaven does not belong to one person, but to all 
people under the Heaven” (Ma. abkai fejergi emu niyalmai abkai fejergi waka, abkai 
fejergi niyalmai abkai fejergi), Hongtaiji sought to demonstrate that his regime could 
govern the space “all-under-Heaven” (Ch. tianxia; Ma. abkai fejergi) by following the 
precedents set by the Liao that was founded by the “northeastern barbarian” (Ch. 
Dongbeiyi; Ma. dergi amargi jušen), the Jin by the “eastern barbarian” (Ch. Dongyi; Ma. 
dergi jušen), and the Yuan by the “northern barbarian” (Ch. Beiyi; Ma. amargi monggo). 
By chronicling the rise and fall of these dynasties, Hongtaiji indicated that it was time for 
the Qing—the regime founded by Manchu barbarian—to rule as Son of Heaven because 
it possessed the “virtue” (Ch. de; Ma. erdemu) that the Ming had lost.119 This assertion 
was profoundly based on the Chinese political view that “the Great Heaven has no partial 
affections and it only helps the virtuous” (Ch. huangtian wu qin, wei de shi fu), a theory 
articulated in The Classic of History (Ch. Shangshu) that had endowed more than 30 
dynasties with legitimacy. This theory was later elaborated by Emperor 
Yongzheng—Hongtaiji’s great grandson—in 1729 in his book, Great Righteousness 
Resolving Confusion (Ch. Dayi juemi lu), in which the Son of Heaven with his Manchu 
ethnic identity publicly discussed the sensitive issue of the civilized–barbarian distinction 
                                               
118 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 631; Manbun rōtō, vol. 6, 1005-1006, 1008-1009. 
119 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 369-372; Manbun rōtō, vol. 6, 1005-1006. 
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with Han Chinese intellectuals in the wake of the case of Zeng Jing (1679–1735).120 In 
short, Hongtaiji hoped Chosŏn to serve as the Great Qing’s outer fan, just as it had served 
previous dynasties of China. 
Chosŏn, therefore, became the first external target on which the Qing promulgated 
its new Qing-centric Zongfan doctrine. Yet Hongtaiji’s oration was unpopular in Chosŏn 
because it was totally opposite to the orthodox legitimacy, upon which the Confucian 
country based its political and social principles. Except several high-ranking and 
sophisticated officials, such as Ch’oi Myŏng-kil (1586–1647), the majority of the 
officials called for “revering China and expelling the barbarians” (K. chon Chungguk, 
yang yi chŏk; Ch. zun Zhongguo, rang yidi) to accord with “the doctrine of revering the 
Zhou dynasty” (K. chonju ǔiri).121 In the face of tremendous moral pressure, the king 
reaffirmed that Chosŏn would not endorse Hongtaiji’s emperorship. 122  Due to the 
impasse, the Qing decided to wage another war against Chosŏn, a war that was for name 
and legitimacy. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MANCHU–CHOSŎN ZONGFAN RELATIONS 
On December 28, 1636, the Qing troops began to attack Chosŏn and captured 
Hansŏng on January 9, 1637, without encountering strong resistance. The king had barely 
been able to escape to the Namhan Mountain Fortress (K. Namhan sansŏng) with some 
officials, while the crown prince, the royal family members, and other officials fled to the 
Kanghwa Island. The Qing forces surrounded the Namhan fortress and, as the 
precondition for peaceful negotiation, they urged the king to send the crown prince as 
                                               
120 Dayi juemi lu (Great righteousness resolving confusion), vol. 1, 1-13. About the case of Zeng Jing, see 
Jonathan Spence, Treason by the Book. 
121 For example, see Cho Bin’s palace memorial to the king, in Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 649.  
122 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 635. 
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hostage. The king refused and mobilized his forces to resist the invasion and protect the 
“great justice under the heaven” (K. ch’ŏnha taeǔi). The king also led his officials to 
perform ceremonies in the besieged fortress to celebrate the birthday of Emperor 
Chongzhen (1611–1644, r. 1628–1644) of the Ming on January 19, when Hongtaiji was 
marching toward the fortress with more troops.123 Yet the king was fully aware that 
Chosŏn’s fate was now at a crossroads. On January 26, 1637, the New Year’s Day 
according to the lunar calendar, a solar eclipse occurred, which, in the conventional 
political context, was an inauspicious sign. On the day, the king performed vested rituals 
toward the direction where the Ming emperor was supposed to be in order to fulfill 
Chosŏn’s duty as the Ming’s outer fan, while in Beijing the emperor had cancelled the 
grand ceremony for celebrating the New Year’s Day due to the eclipse.124 After the 
ceremony, the king sent two officials to negotiate with the Qing. 
Two days later, the king presented a sovereign letter to Hongtaiji, in which he 
called Hongtaiji “Emperor of lenience, kindheartedness, beneficence, and brilliance of 
the country of the Great Qing” (K. Dae ch’ŏngguk kwan mun in song hwangje) and 
termed the Qing as the “big country” (K. taeguk) and Chosŏn the “small country” (K. 
sobang). The activity of presenting the letter was defined as “submitting the letter to the 
higher authority” (K. songsŏ).125 Hongtaiji insisted that the king should present himself 
in person, so the two sides negotiated for two more weeks, during which the Qing troops 
shelled the fortress and defeated several Chosŏn’s reinforcements from provinces.126 On 
February 15, the king presented a letter with the new format to Hongtaiji, in which he 
                                               
123 Ibid., 657, 659. 
124 Chongzhen shilu (Veritable records of Emperor Chongzhen), vol. 2, 299. 
125 Chosŏnguk raesŏ bu, vol. 2, archive catalogue no. Ko-5710-5-2, 21-22; WLGS, 199-200. 
126 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 414, 416-417. 
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called Hongtaiji “Your Majesty” (K. p’yeha) and himself a “subordinate” (K. sin; Ch. 
chen) of the emperor (Figure 1. 5). At the end of the letter, he used the Qing’s reign-title 
“Chongde” to count the date.127 This suggested that the king had decided to surrender 
before the Kanghwa Island was conquered on February 16.128 On February 17, the king 
submitted a sovereign letter to Hongtaiji, declaring that Chosŏn would “present the 
humble palace memorial (K. p’yo; Ch. biao) as the subordinate to serve as the Great 
Qing’s fan (K. pŏnbang; Ch. fanbang) forever.” The king stated that “from now on all 
rituals about serving the big countries would be performed as the vested formats.”129 The 
country officially took the Qing’s terms. 
Figure 1. 5. The Format of the King’s Letters to Hongtaiji in February, 1637 
  Great Qing  Qing Emperor Heaven 1 
      2 
X X Chosŏn X King X 3 
X X X X X X 4 
X X X X X X 5 
f e d c b a  
 
Sources: The king’s letters to Hongtaiji, see Chosŏnguk raesŏ bu, vol. 2, archive catalogue no. 
Ko-5710-5-2, 26-38. 
 
On February 22, Inggūldai brought the emperor’s edict to the king. Inggūldai 
asked the Korean officials who greeted him outside the fortress to perform the same 
rituals that they had done to receive imperial edicts from the “southern dynasty” (the 
Ming).130 This marked the first time that the Qing replaced the role of the Ming in ritual 
exchanges with Chosŏn on Chosŏn’s territory. In the edict, Hongtaiji listed ten terms of 
submission, among which the following two stood out: 
 
                                               
127 Chosŏnguk raesŏ bu, vol. 2, archive catalogue no. Ko-5710-5-2, 26-29; WLGS, 207-209. 
128 About the fall of the Kanghwa Island, see Yi Kŭng-ik, Yŏllyŏsil gisul, vol. 3, 491-498. 
129 Chosŏnguk raesŏ bu, vol. 2, archive catalogue no. Ko-5710-5-2, 29-32; WLGS, 210-212. 
130 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 671. 
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First, the king should submit to the Qing the imperial investiture and the seal that 
he had received from the Ming and stop communicating with the Ming. Chosŏn 
must stop using the reign-title of the Ming and start to use that of the Qing to 
indicate the date in all documents. Second, the king must dispatch officials to the 
Qing every year, bringing humble palace memorials, presenting gifts, and 
performing rituals to celebrate the birthdays of the emperor, empress, and crown 
prince, the winter solstice and the New Year’s Day, and good news of the Qing, or 
to extend condolences on the loss of the Qing’s royal members, and so forth. The 
format of the humble palace memorials must precisely follow the established one 
of those Chosŏn had presented to the Ming. The rituals of receiving imperial 
decrees, accommodating imperial emissaries in Chosŏn, and paying formal visits 
to the Qing emperor by Chosŏn’s emissaries in the Qing, must exactly follow the 
established way of the Ming (Ch. Mingguo jiuli).131 
 
Meanwhile, Hongtaiji listed the items and amounts of Chosŏn’s tributes to the Qing and 
permitted the country to start presenting the tributes from 1639 (Table 1. 2). 
Table 1. 2. Items and Quantities of Chosŏn’s Tributes to the Qing in 1637 
Items Quantities Items  Quantities 
Gold 100 tael  Sapan wood  200 catties 
Silver 1,000 tael Good large-size paper 1,000 rolls 
Buffalo horn-made bows 200 Good small-size paper 1,500 rolls 
Leopard skins 100 pieces Mats with dragon pattern 4 pieces 
Deer skins 100 pieces Mats with variegated pattern 40 pieces 
Tea 1,000 sacks White ramie cloth 200 pieces 
Otter skins 400 pieces Silk with different colors 2,000 rolls 
Black squirrel skins 300 pieces 
Thin ramie cloth with different 
colors 
400 rolls 
Pepper  10 pecks (Ch. dou) Thin cloth with different colors 10,000 rolls 
Good girdle knives 26 Cloth 1,400 rolls 
Multi-edged knives 20 Rice 10,000 sacks 
 
Sources: Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 671; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 430-431; Tongmun hwiko, vol. 2, 
1488; WLGS, 213-215; Chun Hae-Jong, “Sino–Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” 90-111. 
 
The king unconditionally accepted all terms. On February 24, he presented 
himself before Hongtaiji at Samjŏndo, a place near the Hangang River, where the Qing 
had built a big altar for Hongtaiji to receive the king’s surrender. During the ceremony 
over which the Ministry of Rituals of the Qing presided, the king knelt down three times, 
each time bowing his head three times before the emperor, after which he handed in his 
                                               
131 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 671; Tongmun hwiko (Collections of Chosŏn’s diplomatic materials), vol. 2, 1488. 
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seal issued by the Ming.132 The ceremony marked the official establishment of the 
Zongfan relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn, as the king stated in his memorial to 
Hongtaiji on December 16, 1637.133 The Qing’s forces soon returned to Mukden, taking 
the crown prince, Yi Wang (1612–1645), and the king’s second son, Yi Ho (1619–1659, r. 
1649–1659), as hostages. Beginning on March 24, 1637, Chosŏn used the reign-title of 
the Qing to count the date.134 In all senses, Chosŏn became the Qing’s outer fan. 
1.5 “Cherishing the Small Country” As the “Big Country”: The Qing’s Construction of 
Its “Zhongguo” Identity, 1637–1643 
THE QING’S TRANSFORMING INTO THE “BIG COUNTRY” 
According to the new Zongfan relationship, the Qing was the monarch over Chosŏn and 
father of the big family principally consisting of the Qing, Chosŏn, and Mongolian states. 
With such authority, the Qing could use the subordination of Chosŏn to its advantages. 
The first and the most direct effect was the formation of the new military allies between 
the two countries. By conquering Chosŏn, the Qing reinforced home front by eliminating 
potential military threat on its east flank in the war with the Ming. It also gained material 
assistance from Chosŏn, such as war horses, grain, warships, cannons, and soldiers.135 
Two months after Chosŏn’s subordination, the Manchu forces conquered the Ka Island, 
destroying the most important and the last military base of the Ming in Chosŏn.136 In the 
next few years, some Chosŏn soldiers, particularly the gunners, would follow the 
Manchus to fight and garrison Jinzhou and other newly conquered cities in Manchuria.137 
                                               
132 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 432-433; Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 673. 
133 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 511. 
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In hindsight, the subordination of Chosŏn in 1637 contributed greatly to the 
remarkable transformation of the cultural and political identity as well as its 
representation of the Manchu regime. By turning its relationship with Chosŏn from the 
elder brother–younger brother type into the monarch–subordinate or father–son one, the 
political legitimacy of the Son of Heaven of the Qing was officially endorsed by Chosŏn, 
a foreign country beyond the Qing’s geographical border and a Confucian country within 
the Qing’s political and cultural concerns. Given that the Chinese culturally understood 
all foreign relations as Zongfan relations with “China”—the Central Kingdom—as the 
center,138 the establishment of this sort of relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn 
defined the Qing as the Central Kingdom. In other words, the identities of both China and 
the countries on its periphery within the Zongfan framework were “mutually 
constitutive.”139 This rationale behind the Zongfan framework lent the Qing political and 
cultural foundations to help it legitimize its centrality in the Chinese world. 
                                                                                                                                            
1643), and 890 (June 26, 1643). The Qing also invoked the military assistance from Chosŏn in the 1650s, 
see Qing shizu shilu (Veritable records of Emperor Shunzhi of the Qing), vol. 3, 898 (March 22, 1658). 
138 J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Têng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” 141. Fairbank and Têng’s statement, 
in accordance with T. F. Tsiang’s similar assertion made in 1936, has been critically challenged by 
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out that the tribute presented to the Chinese emperor was “a sine qua non” for foreign “barbarians” to 
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critical analyses of the “flexibility” of “tribute system” and his case of the Manchu trade with Chosŏn 
before 1644 have formed a contradictory voice against his own assertion. See Mark Mancall, “The Ch’ing 
Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay.” Addressing this tribute trade dyad, Iwai Shigeki argues that tribute 
and trade had been existing as two systems before 1380, when the Ming government abolished the 
Maritime Trade Superintendency (Ch. Shibo si) and integrated the trade system into the tribute system. See 
Iwai Shigeki, “Chōkō to goshi” (Tribute and Trade). No matter how flexible this “tribute system” presented 
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tribute relationship was always bilateral, never multilateral: one partner was always the ruler of China.” 
(Mancall, op. cit., 65). 
139 On the conception of “mutually constitutive,” see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of 
It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46. 2: 391-425. 
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This transformation did not exist primarily at the linguistic and rhetorical levels or 
within the Manchu regime, as it had done in the previous brotherhood decade; rather, it 
became public and was concretely corroborated by the intensive exchanges of missions 
between the two countries from 1637 to 1643. The exchanges started immediately after 
the subordination of Chosŏn. On May 13, 1637, Chosŏn sent its first tributary mission to 
Mukden to present the king’s humble memorials and tributes to the Qing emperor.140 
Meanwhile, Chosŏn started calling Mukden “capital” (K. Kyŏngsa; Ch. Jingshi), a term 
that previously referred to Beijing, expressing Chosŏn’s endorsement of Mukden as the 
new political center of the world, at least on the surface.141 The mission had three 
primary members, including an envoy, Yi Sŏng-ku; an associate envoy, Yi Tŏk-in, and a 
secretary, Ch’ae Yu-hu, totaling 315 members.142 After traveling 517 miles along the 
conventional tributary overland route between Hansŏng and Beijing,143 Yi Sŏng-ku led 
his mission to arrive in Mukden on July 8. The next day, the Korean officials made 
prostrations before Hongtaiji by performing the highest level of kowtow—kneeling down 
three times, each time bowing their heads three times. 
During the imperial audience, the Qing’s officials read the king’s humble 
memorials that were written in a hierarchical format as those the king had presented to 
the Ming emperor before 1637 (Figure 1. 5). By praising the admirable virtues of the “big 
country” (K. taebang; Ch. dabang), the Great Qing, that “brought Chosŏn to life again,” 
the texts of the memorials endowed the Qing with the position of the Central Kingdom by 
saying “all far countries on the periphery [of the Qing] have willingly subordinated” (K. 
                                               
140 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 684. 
141 Tongmun hwiko, vol. 2, 1533. 
142 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 451. 
143 See Yi Kyŏng-chik, Pusin ilgi (Diary of journey to Shenyang), in Lim Key-zung, ed., Yŏnhaeng nok 
jŏnjip (Comprehensive collection of records of Chosŏn’s emissaries to Beijing), vol. 15, 445. 
 95 
hwangbok hambin; Ch. huangfu xianbin) and stating that the Qing held the virtue of 
“cherishing the small.” This position was consolidated by the Qing itself in the imperial 
edict to the king, in which the relationship was clearly defined by orthodox Zongfan 
concepts, such as “serving the big country” and “cherishing the small country.”144 In this 
politico-cultural context, the Qing became the Central Kingdom possessing cultural 
superiority and Chosŏn was defined as a “far country,” a “small country,” and the 
“remote land” (K. py’ ŏnyang; Ch. pianrang) on the periphery of the new civilized 
center.145 In this process of framing the mutually constitutive identities, Chosŏn fell into 
the category of “barbarians” surrounding Qing China. 
At the same time, the frequent visits to Mukden by the “tributary emissaries” of 
Mongols and political entities of other ethnic minorities whose affairs were under the 
management of the Mongolian Superintendency highlighted the rise of the Qing-centric 
Zongfan circle. For the previous two decades, the Manchu regime had gradually eroded 
the Ming’s Zongfan system from the periphery and used the disconnected parts to 
construct a similar model with itself as the center. After establishing its Zongfan 
relationship with Chosŏn, the Qing sought to institutionalize its Zongfan mechanism by 
imitating the Ming’s policy and improving it to meet the Qing’s needs. 
The institutionalization of this system occurred when the Qing greeted Chosŏn’s 
emissaries with certain formalities through the Ministry of Rituals. Although the Ministry 
of Revenue (Ch. Hubu), the Ministry of War (Ch. Bingbu), and the Ministry of Justice 
(Ch. Xingbu) also exchanged official notes (Ch. ziwen) with the king for some cases 
regarding financial and military assistance or illegal border crossing, the Ministry of 
                                               
144 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 459. 
145 Chosŏnguk raesŏ bu, vol. 2, archive catalogue no. Ko-5710-5-2, 36-41. 
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Rituals acted as the most important channel between the emissaries and the Qing court. It 
forwarded the king’s humble memorials to the emperor, guided the emissaries’ visits, 
treated the emissaries to banquets, accommodated them at their residence in Mukden for 
40 days, forwarded imperial edicts to them, and issued official response notes to the 
king.146 With the assistance of the ministry, the Korean emissaries performed the highest 
level of kowtow (Ch. san gui jiu koutou) to the emperor, presented tributes, and received 
imperial edicts.147 In this process, the highly programmed ritual practices demonstrated, 
institutionalized, and consolidated the bilateral Zongfan relationship in a concrete way. 
The Qing also sent ethnic-Manchu emissaries to Chosŏn to invest the king and 
other core royal members with certain titles to formalize the Zongfan relationship. On 
December 11, 1637, the first imperial mission led by Inggūldai, Mafuta, and Daiyun left 
Mukden for Hansŏng to officially invest the king. After traveling 315 miles along the 
same overland route, the mission arrived on January 4, 1638. The king greeted the envoys 
at Hall of Admiring the Central Civilized Country outside the West Gate of the capital.148 
Later, in the palace, the king received the imperial edicts of investiture, gold seal, and 
imperial gifts by performing established rituals. The edicts stated that with the 
establishment of “investiture–subordinate” (Ch. fanfeng) relations, Chosŏn must serve as 
a “fan and fence” (Ch. fanping) of the Great Qing “until the Yellow River becomes as 
narrow as a belt and the Taishan Mountain becomes as small as a grindstone” (Ch. daihe 
lishan).149 Following the ceremony, the king visited the envoys at their residence, the 
South Palace Annex (K. Nambyǒl gung), where he treated them to banquets. All ritual 
                                               
146 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 695-696. 
147 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 459. 
148 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 709. 
149 See Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 586-587, 363. The same words first appeared in Hongtaiji’s investiture 
edict to King Yi Jong in 1637, see Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 510-511, and Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 709. 
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procedures were identical to those that had been performed between Chosŏn and the 
Ming before 1637. The Qing’s investiture legitimatized the bilateral Zongfan relationship 
between the two countries, an arrangement that would last for 258 years until 1895. 
THE STELE OF THE HONORS AND VIRTUES OF EMPEROR OF THE GREAT 
QING 
In order to formalize the Zongfan relationship, the Qing forced Chosŏn to erect a 
monument to enshrine Hongtaiji’s achievements at Samjŏndo, where the king 
subordinated himself to Hongtaiji in 1637. The Korean official Yi Kyŏng-sŏk drafted a 
Chinese-language inscription, which was approved by the Chinese official Fan Wencheng. 
After that, the Qing sent interpreters to Hansŏng to translate the inscription into Manchu 
and Mongolian languages, so the inscription was eventually engraved in Manchu, 
Mongolian, and Chinese characters on the stele. In 1639 the monument was erected with 
the title Stele of the Honors and Virtues of Emperor of the Great Qing (Ma. daicing gurun 
i enduringge han i gung erdemui bei; Ch. Daqing huangdi gongde bei; K. Daechŏng 
hwangje gongdŏk bi), known as Samjŏndo Monument (K. Samjŏndo bi) (Figure 1. 6).150 
Humbly reviewing the history between the two countries from 1619 to 1637 from 
Chosŏn’s perspective, the inscription exalted the Qing’s great virtues of “bringing Chosŏn 
to life again.” It stated that their Zongfan relationship should last for “ten thousand years” 
under “the emperor’s goodness” (Ch. huangdi zhi xiu; K. hwangje chi hyu; Ma. 
enduringge han i sain).151 The most significant aspect turned out to be the official 
                                               
150 Yinjo sillok, vol. 35, 7, 63; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 653. 
151 For studies of the Manchu text of the monument, see W. R. Carles, “A Corea Monument to Manchu 
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transformation of the identity of the Manchu regime that was manifested in certain terms. 
The inscription called the Qing the “big country” (Ch. dabang, or dachao; K. taeguk; 
taejo; Ma. amba gurun) or “upper country” (Ch. shangguo; K. sangguk; Ma. dergi gurun), 
while it termed Chosŏn as the “small country” (Ch. xiaobang; K. sobang; Ma. ajige 
gurun). Among these terms, which had been used between Chosŏn and the Ming but now 
were grafted onto the Qing–Chosŏn relationship, the Manchu term amba gurun (big 
country) stood out as the most prominent one. As a literal translation of the Chinese term 
dabang or dachao, the term had been used by Chosŏn to exclusively refer to the Ming, 
and in Nurhaci’s time it was even applied to Chosŏn by the Jurchens. Yet the term was 
now used by Chosŏn to address the Qing. More importantly, after 1644, the Manchu 
rulers adopted this term as a key equivalent of the Chinese terms tianchao (the Heavenly 
Dynasty) and Zhongguo (Ma. dulimbai gurun; K. chungguk). The inscription probably 
was the first time that the Qing publicly addressed itself as amba gurun in history, and in 
the following two-and-a-half centuries this term would entirely refer to Qing China. 
In addition, the inscription called Chosŏn “a country from afar” (Ch. yuanguo), 
indicating that the Little China now became a country of barbarians who regarded the 
Qing as the civilized Central Kingdom. The fact that the two countries geographically 
bordered each other did not prevent the Qing redefining Chosŏn as “a country from afar” 
in the politico-cultural sense. It also claimed that in 1637 the king surrendered “not to 
[the Qing’s] might but to [its] virtues” (Ma. horon de gelere teile waka, erdemu de 
dahahangge kai), insomuch that the Qing’s great virtues made “all the far [people] 
willingly subordinate” (Ch. wuyuan bufu; Ma. goroki ci aname gemu dahambi). This 
suggested that Chosŏn, as the representative of the “country from afar” as well as “men 
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from afar” (Ch. yuanren), was barbarianized by the Qing as to its politico-cultural 
identity in the setting of the civilized–barbarian distinction in the Qing-centric world. 
Figure 1. 6. Parts of the Manchu and Chinese Inscriptions on Stele of the Honors 
and Virtues of Emperor of the Great Qing 
 
    
 
Sources: Daishin kōtei kudoku hi (Stele of the Honors and Virtues of Emperor of the Great Qing), 
photographs, file no. VI-1-269, at Tōyō Bunko, Tokyo, Japan. 
Notes: The left picture is a part of the rubbing of the Manchu inscription and the right picture is a 
part of the rubbing of the Chinese inscription. The stele, as the Historic Site No. 101 of the Republic of 
Korea, is now located at 47 Chamsil-dong, Songp’a-gu, Seoul, around 1.5 miles east of where it was 
originally erected in 1639. 
“CHERISHING MEN FROM AFAR” AS ZHONGGUO PER SE, 1637–1643 
If the Manchu–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship was largely a self-imagined order restricted 
at the level of political discourse and confined within the border of the Manchu regime 
from 1627 to 1636, it became public and, therefore, legitimate after 1637 as the official 
monarch–subject and father–son framework between them. The Qing was able to use the 
powerful Zongfan discourse to gain cultural superiority over Chosŏn and eliminate its 
previous identity as “barbarians” in the Ming-dominated world. Simultaneously, the Qing 
started to apply the conventional Chinese policy of “cherishing the small country” and 
“cherishing men from afar” (Ch. rouyuan, huairou yuanren) to Chosŏn in order to win the 
loyalty of the country.152 
                                               
152 See Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 649. 
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In addition to providing Chosŏn’s emissaries with better accommodations in 
Mukden and bestowing more gifts on the king and emissaries, the Qing continuously 
reduced the amount of Chosŏn’s tributes from the early 1640s, a time when the Qing 
controlled more sources because of its military triumphs over the Ming. For example, in 
1640, Hongtaiji reduced the number of sacks of rice from 10,000 to 1,000.153 In 1643, 
Emperor Shunzhi (1638–1661, r. 1644–1661) further reduced the amount of Chosŏn’s 
yearly tribute and reduced the gifts that Chosŏn gave to the Manchu envoys by more than 
half. The emperor also permanently abolished many conventions, such as providing the 
imperial envoys with falcons and official prostitutes.154 According to the emperor, these 
exemptions aimed to embody the Qing’s policy of “cherishing the small country with 
benevolence.”155 Compared with the late Ming that tried to extract the maximum of 
economic and military benefits from Chosŏn, the Qing’s continuous exemptions 
represented a very placatory approach to treating its outer fan, which substantially 
facilitated the Qing’s historical transformation into Zhongguo by acquiring more 
Chineseness in the conventional setting. The Qing’s great efforts paid off in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Chosŏn’s emissaries and savants eventually 
identified the Qing as the civilized Zhongguo, as Chapters 2 and 3 will demonstrate. 
The Qing was more a down-to-earth doer than a passionate elocutionist, so its 
policy of appealing to the subordinate country was crystalized in its frequent contacts 
with Chosŏn. From 1637 to 1643, the Qing sent 12 missions and 28 emissaries to Chosŏn, 
an average of 1.5 missions per year, while Chosŏn sent 56 missions and 102 emissaries to 
                                               
153 Tongmun hwiko, vol. 2, 1497-1498. 
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the Qing, an average of 7 missions per year.156 All ritual formalities regarding the 
greetings of the imperial envoy in Hansŏng and the Chosŏn’s emissaries in Mukden, 
along with highly formatted political and cultural discourse embodied in the Qing’s 
imperial edicts and Chosŏn’s palace memorials, consolidated the Qing’s centrality in the 
known world. More importantly, the Qing’s intensive Zongfan contacts with Chosŏn 
endowed it with a powerful tool of managing its relations with other countries or political 
entities in the post-1637 period. In 1638, a year after it converted Chosŏn from a 
“younger brother” into an outer fan, the Qing changed the Chinese name of the 
Mongolian Superintendency or the Ministry of Mongolian Affairs from Menggu yamen to 
Lifan yuan (lit. the ministry of managing affairs of the Qing’s fan; Ma. tulergi golo be 
dasara jurgan), transforming those Mongolian countries into the Qing’s outer fan in the 
Qing-centric big family. It could be argued that this dramatic change of the Manchu–
Mongolian relations was deeply based on Zongfan concepts and it was the Qing’s first 
application of its Zongfan model of Chosŏn to other political entities. 
In retrospect, the Qing–Chosŏn contacts through the exchanges of emissaries and 
a series of entrenched rituals within the Zongfan framework over the seven years from 
1637 to 1644 helped the Qing progressively transform its identity into the “big country” 
and the civilized Central Kingdom against the politico-cultural background of the 
civilized–barbarian distinction. As a result, the Qing made substantial progress toward the 
strategic goal of “gradually developing the institutions of Zhongguo” that was outlined in 
the early 1630s. In the long run, this transformation prepared the Qing for the coming 
imperial rule over massive lands, huge population, and various political entities after the 
Manchus crossed the Great Wall in 1644. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Barbarianizing Chosŏn: The “Chosŏn Model” and the Qing’s Recasting of the 
“Chinese Empire,” 1644–1761 
After 1644, the Qing started using Chosŏn as a prototypical fan to construct the new 
imperial order within and beyond the Qing’s border by defining itself as Zhongguo and 
the Heavenly Dynasty. The dissertation terms this prototype the “Chosŏn Model” (Ch. 
Chaoxian shili), a pattern by which a country or a political entity could follow Chosŏn 
into the Qing-centric Zongfan system primarily by receiving imperial investitures and 
norms from the Qing, adopting the reign-title of the Qing to count dates and sending 
tributary emissaries to the Qing. The Chosŏn Model was an institutionalized policy of the 
Qing for constructing the infrastructure of foreign relations. It was embodied by 
well-established and highly-programmed formalities in the contacts between the Qing 
and its fan that were materially conducted by their emissaries to one another. Through 
this model, the Qing rulers initiated a twofold transformation, constructing the Qing as 
the new Heavenly Dynasty at the center of the known universe and converting Chosŏn 
and other countries into “countries of barbarians” on its periphery. This construction was 
fundamentally accomplished in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the Qing 
published the imperial book, Illustrations of Subordinate Peoples of the Imperial Qing 
(Ch. Huangqing zhigong tu). 
Scholars have demonstrated how the Qing transformed itself from a local and 
“barbarian” Manchu regime into a Chinese empire, together with the Sinicization of the 
Manchus.1 Yet how the Qing accomplished this momentous transformation by utilizing 
                                               
1 See, for example, Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial 
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resources from outside itself—that is, the Qing’s outer fan, particularly Chosŏn, remains 
little studies and obscure. This chapter aims to reveal how the Qing constructed its new, 
dual identity as the Central Kingdom and the Heavenly Dynasty by exploiting the Chosŏn 
Model in its foreign relations from the 1640s to the 1790s, demonstrating that over the 
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the macro-transformation of the 
identity of the Manchu regime in the cosmopolitan politico-cultural context was deeply 
connected with the micro-transformation of that in the Manchus–Chosŏn bilateral 
framework. 
2.1 China, the Heavenly Dynasty, and the Rise of the Chosŏn Model 
CHINA/ZHONGGUO AND THE HEAVENLY DYNASTY OF THE QING 
On October 30, 1644, Emperor Shunzhi offered a great sacrifice to heaven and earth in 
the Qing’s new capital, Beijing, during which the six-year-old Son of Heaven claimed to 
be emperor and asserted that the Qing would “pacify China” (Ch. sui Zhongguo) and “set 
a good example for ten thousand countries” (Ch. biaozheng wanbang).2 For many people, 
this event marked the great rise of the Qing as the equivalent of China—Zhongguo—and 
the new Heavenly Dynasty in history. The historical truth, however, is not self-evident as 
has been assumed. 
Historians of the Qing and modern China tend to treat “China” and the “Heavenly 
Dynasty” as two homogeneous terms referring to the political unit of Qing China, or the 
Qing dynasty. Yet it is worth pointing out that these two terms were both used by the 
Qing to describe itself almost exclusively in the context of foreign relations with the 
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2 Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 91-92. 
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“men from afar” (Ch. yuanren) or “foreign barbarians” (Ch. waiyi), whereas in the 
domestic context, these terms were replaced by others, such as the “Great Qing” (Ch. 
daqing), “our dynasty” (Ch. wochao, benchao, or guochao), “our country” (Ch. wo 
guojia), or the “imperial dynasty” (Ch. huangchao, or shengchao). In 1767, after finding 
that a local magistrate in Yunnan province failed to address the Qing as the Heavenly 
Dynasty or China in an official note to the “foreign barbarians” of Burma, Emperor 
Qianlong furiously pointed out in his decree that, “The decree to the foreign barbarians 
should be addressed in a proper way…It is the rule for one to address the court as the 
Heavenly Dynasty or Zhongguo when he mentions it to the men from afar. Our country 
has unified the central area and external areas and even the barbarians know the virtue 
and civilization of the Great Qing.”3 According to the emperor’s pronouncement on the 
basic spectrum of the Heavenly Dynasty and Zhongguo, the two terms were 
interchangeable at the time. Yet what the emperor did not mention—or was perhaps not 
able to realize at all—was the fact that the Qing did not simultaneously take the two titles 
when it replaced the Ming in the early seventeenth century. The Manchu regime had 
started to build a Zongfan framework through its relations with Chosŏn after 1627 and 
made remarkable advancements in the construction of its identity as Zhongguo after 1637. 
In 1644, the transformation into Zhongguo was assumed to be accomplished, while the 
transformation into the Heavenly Dynasty had barely started. 
In the late 1640s, when the Manchu Eight Banners were marching into South 
China, Southwest China, and Northwest China, the Qing started using Chosŏn to 
construct the new image of the Heavenly Dynasty, yet it proved a process difficult and 
even embarrassing. According to the early Qing archives currently available to scholars, 
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the Qing intellectuals termed the Qing the “Heavenly Dynasty” for the first time in a draft 
of Emperor Shunzhi’s edict to invest Yi Ho as the new king of Chosŏn in 1649. The 
manuscript of the edict was drafted by Fu Yijian (1609–1645), a Han Chinese intellectual 
from Shandong province, who had won the championship in the first imperial 
examination of the Qing in 1645.4 By writing that the king should be “an important 
subordinate serving the Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. pinghan tianchao) and must be loyal to 
“civilized China” (Ch. huaxia), Fu apparently equated the Qing, who had become 
Zhongguo, with the Heavenly Dynasty and the “civilized China.” The final edition that 
was sent to Chosŏn, however, deleted the two latter terms,5 suggesting that the Qing was 
not prepared to claim to be the Heavenly Dynasty. 
Nevertheless, the growing political enterprise of the Qing required the regime to 
intellectually construct a new Qing-centric international order in its known world. This 
occurred precisely at a time when a new post-Westphalia international political order, 
based on the concept of the sovereign state, was initiated in Europe as a result of the 
Thirty Years’ War. Europe and China were both under reconstruction, yet they were 
heading in different directions. Breaking away from the rule of a big empire like the Holy 
Roman Empire proved no easy task, while building up a new huge Chinese empire was 
similarly arduous. The Qing spent much more time constructing its new identity as the 
Heavenly Dynasty through its communications with foreign countries in the post-1644 
era, starting in the late 1640s during the Shunzhi period and institutionally completing 
only in the middle of the eighteenth century during the Qianlong period. The reason the 
Qing was able to serve as “China” in a comparatively short time but had spent more than 
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a century building up the politico-cultural representation of the Heavenly Dynasty lies in 
the intrinsic natures of the two terms that distinguish them. 
“China,” or “Zhongguo,” on the one hand, as a general geographical term, could 
be clearly defined by the Qing’s borders, no matter how the borders were expanded and 
reinvented. Viewed from this perspective, the inherent meaning of the “Central Kingdom” 
could be manifestly achieved so long as the Qing took over the Ming’s territory, at least 
the Central Plain (Ch. Zhongyuan).6 Actually, after 1644 when the Qing rulers began 
writing their pre-1644 history, they deliberately deleted some Manchu terms referring to 
the Ming as Zhongguo (Ma. dulimbai gurun).7 In 1689, 45 years after the Manchus 
entered Beijing, the Qing signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia, the Manchu 
version of which clearly defined the Qing as the dulimbai gurun, which might be the first 
time that the Qing termed itself “Zhongguo” in Manchu language.8 On the surface, the 
term suggests that the Qing was defined as the center of the world. Since the treaty aimed 
to draw a clear demarcation between the Qing and Russia, the dulimbai gurun was equal 
to the daicing gurun (Ch. Daqing guo, the country of the Great Qing), as identified by the 
inscription on the boundary monument.9 The Qing thus presented itself as Zhongguo in a 
very favorable and definitive way. 
The “Heavenly Dynasty,” or “Tianchao,” on the other hand, could not be 
                                               
6 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass, 36-38. 
7 For example, in Hongtaiji’s letter to the Ming on July 29, 1632, he explained that the Jin fought with the 
Ming because “the Ming officials in Liaodong did not follow the way of China” (Ma. liyoodung i hafasa 
dulimbai gurun i doroi tondoi beiderakū), in which “China”—Zhongguo—was clearly termed in the 
Manchu term dulimbai gurun. Later, the Chinese edition of Qing taizong shilu replaced the phrase of the 
“way of China” (Ch. Zhongguo/Zhongyuan zhi dao; Ma. dulimbai gurun i doro) with the “way of rightness” 
(Ch. zhengzhi zhi dao). Hongtaiji called the Ming “You China” (Ma. suweni dulimbai gurun), yet later the 
Chinese edition only stated “You Country” (Ch. erguo) by deleting the meaning of “China.” See Manbun 
rōtō, vol. 5, 790-792; Manwen laodang, 1297-1299; Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 165. 
8 Choi Hyong-won, “Nerchinsk choyak ŭi manjumun koch’al” (On the Manchu Text of the Treaty 
Nerchinsk). 
9 Qing shengzu shilu (Veritable records of Emperor Kangxi of the Qing), vol. 5, 578.  
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delineated in the same way because it was based on the notion of “all-under-Heaven”—a 
China-centered politico-cultural term with no connection to the concept of border in the 
geographical sense. Put another way, Zhongguo could be self-defined by the Qing from 
within, while the “Heavenly Dynasty” would have to be defined with the support of more 
resources from outside the Qing—that is, in order to make sense of the Qing as the 
“Heavenly Dynasty,” the new regime would have to build up a new, Qing-centric, and 
multinational Zongfan system in the first place. The then-expectation that the Qing would 
become a new imperial power required the regime to transform the countries that had 
served as the Ming’s fan into the Qing’s fan. The Ming had conducted the same policy 
when it “became the ruler of China” (Ch. zhu Zhongguo) in 1368 and immediately sent 
imperial envoys to those countries that had served as the Yuan dynasty’s fan with the aim 
of converting them into the Ming’s.10 Although it had become routine in Chinese history 
for China’s rulers to handle relations with other countries, for the Manchu rulers in 1644, 
their status as barbarians during the Ming period comprised a tremendous 
politico-cultural challenge in the wake of the fierce and long-lived civilized–barbarian 
distinction. Thus, compared with the mission to identify the Qing as China and the 
legitimate successor to the Ming within the Qing’s borders, the mission of constructing 
the Qing as a new Heavenly Dynasty beyond its borders called for extraordinarily 
prodigious effort. 
Besides political considerations, from the perspective of comparative philology, 
the Chinese term tianchao (the Heavenly Dynasty) was awkward in the Manchu language, 
in which it was literally rendered abkai gurun (the heavenly country) or amba gurun (the 
big country). Linguistically speaking, the Manchu rulers once had difficulty identifying 
                                               
10 Daming jili (Collected rituals of the Great Ming), vol. 32, 7a-8b. 
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with this term and the Chinese political concepts behind it.11 For example, on July 11, 
1637, after reviewing the draft edict of investiture to the king of Chosŏn, Hongtaiji 
commented that he did not like to equate himself with heaven as the Ming emperor 
preferred to do, which suggests that his officials must have employed the Chinese word 
tian (heaven) or the Manchu term abka (heaven) in the edict.12 Nevertheless, the great 
enterprise of the reconstruction of the Qing’s new “China” in the seventeenth century left 
the Manchu rulers no choice but to accept this peculiar term. Similarly, the Great Qing 
had to serve as the abkai gurun or the amba gurun on the new historical platform. 
A good example of this intellectual transformation of the Qing’s ruling house is 
the visit of the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617–1682) to Beijing in 1653. Emperor Shunzhi had 
planned to greet the Dalai Lama in Daiga, a place outside of Beijing, yet this schedule 
provoked a fierce debate between Manchu and Han Chinese officials over whether the 
emperor should meet the Dalai Lama outside the capital. The Manchu officials supported 
the emperor’s plan, according to which the Ūlet Mongols, who militarily controlled Tibet, 
would be pacified by the emperor’s gracious behavior. Yet the Han Chinese officials 
argued that the emperor should not go, for he was “the ruler of all countries under heaven” 
(Ch. tianxia guojia zhi zhu), who should not violate conventions to meet with a lama, 
even a Dalai Lama, in person outside the capital. The emperor finally followed the Han 
Chinese officials’ advice on account of his identity as Son of Heaven, and as an 
alternative he welcomed the Dalai Lama in the South Garden of Beijing in early 1653.13 
                                               
11 For this subtle explanation, the author is grateful to the two prestigious Chinese archivists and scholars, 
Mr. Wu Yuanfeng at the First Historical Archives of China and Mr. Zhao Zhiqiang at Beijing Academy of 
Social Sciences, whose mother tongue is Manchu. 
12 Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 455. 
13 Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 530-554; Shi Miaozhou, Meng zang fojiao shi (The history of Buddhism of 
Mongolia and Tibet), 78-87; Guo Meilan, “Wushi dalai lama rujin lunshu” (The account of the Fifth Dalai 
Lama’s visit to Beijing). 
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This case suggests that the Qing was in the transitional period of its new political identity 
in the first years of the post-1644 era, during which the Manchu emperor had to adjust to 
fit his role as Son of Heaven in the Confucian sense. 
THE RISE OF THE CHOSŎN MODEL UNDER THE QING 
The Qing was not alone on the way to the dual construction of its new identity. Chosŏn, 
the first Confucian outer fan of the Qing, played an unparalleled role in providing the 
Manchu conquerors with resources to construct a new “China” and a new “Heavenly 
Dynasty.” Chosŏn’s primordial role can be well observed in two historical phases: the 
seven years from 1637 to 1643, and the 250 years from 1644 to 1895. In the first phase, 
Chosŏn began serving as the outer fan of the Qing by precisely obeying the well 
formulated and institutionalized discipline of the Sino–Korean Zongfan system, which 
had functioned between the Ming and Chosŏn for more than two centuries. The Qing 
could thus make a significant move toward the great transformation of its identity by 
completely taking the place of the Ming in the framework of Sino–Korean Zongfan 
relations. When Chosŏn dispatched tributary emissaries to Mukden every year, the Qing 
was able to act as Zhongguo in a general sense. As a result, the barbarian nature of the 
Manchu regime gradually rubbed off and was obliterated in 1644. In this period, Chosŏn 
significantly contributed to the rise and nourishment of the Qing’s centrality in the 
Chinese world. 
With its sharp rise as a Ming-style nation-wide regime and the extensive 
expansion of its border in the post-1644 era, Qing China had to manage relations with 
neighboring countries, such as Annam, Ryukyu, Lanchang, Siam, Sulu, and Burma. All 
these countries had served as the outer fan or “subordinate countries” (Ch. shuguo) of the 
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Ming in the Ming-centered Zongfan system. Thus, what Qing China needed to do was to 
inherit these fan from the Ming and to resume and reconstruct the Zongfan system 
according to its own standards. In this regard, the Qing had gained valuable experience 
from its institutionalized communications with Chosŏn and had developed a 
comparatively mature model of the Qing-centric Zongfan system after the late l630s. This 
could be called the “Chosŏn Model,” a pattern by which a country or a political entity 
could follow Chosŏn into the Qing-centric Zongfan system primarily by receiving the 
imperial investitures from the Qing, adopting the reign-title of the Qing to count dates 
and sending tributary emissaries to the Qing.14 
As has been argued, the Chosŏn Model was primarily a ritual-centric pattern. 
Although the Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship was established by the Manchu military 
conquest of 1637, as a result of which the crown prince of Chosŏn, another son of the 
king, and sons of high-ranking officials of Chosŏn were detained in Mukden as hostages, 
the situation fundamentally changed as the Qing permanently released the hostages to 
Chosŏn in 1644.15 From the late 1630s, the Qing began significantly reducing Chosŏn’s 
tributes. In the late 1730s the tributes were less than one-tenth of those in the late 1630s 
and increasingly turned into a symbol of Chosŏn’s political subordination to the Qing.16 
Together with the symbolic tributes were a set of highly programmed formalities that 
must be performed, in which the hierarchical Zongfan order and the Qing’s new 
                                               
14 Qinding daqing huidian (1899), vol. 39, 10b. In terms of the case of Ryukyu, see Qinding libu zeli 
(1844), vol. 173, 6b, 10a; for Annam (Vietnam), vol. 174, 8a, 11a, 13b; for Lanchang (Laos), vol. 175, 5b, 
6a; for Siam (Thailand), vol. 176, 6b, 8a.  
15 Simyang janggye (Reports from Shenyang) and Sohyŏn simyang ilgi (Diary of the crown prince of 
Sohyŏn in Shenyang). These records portray the life of the crown prince, Sohyŏn seja Yi Wang, in 
Shenyang as hostage from February 24, 1637, to July 21, 1644. Yi Wang also went to Beijing together with 
the Manchu regent Dorgon (1612–1650) in early June 1644 when the Qing occupied Beijing and stayed in 
the Forbidden City for 22 days before he returned to Shenyang. Yi Wang died on May 21, 1645, three 
months after he was released back to Chosŏn. 
16 Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han Zongfan maoyi, 25-27. 
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normative identity manifested themselves. In the first years after 1644, the Qing found 
that the Chosŏn Model was the most powerful and practical way of managing its relations 
with other countries and extending its influence and authority. 
The Chosŏn Model was articulated by Emperor Shunzhi in 1647 after the Qing 
army conquered Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces and prepared to establish 
relations with Ryukyu, Annam, Siam, and Japan. On March 17 and August 25, the 
emperor announced that the Qing would “give preferential treatment to these countries as 
to Chosŏn” (Ch. yu Chaoxian yiti youdai) as long as they “subordinated themselves to 
‘the civilized’ and paid tributes to the court” (Ch. qingxin xianghua, chengchen 
rugong).17 In this way, the Manchu rulers publicly converted Chosŏn into a prototypical 
fan and established the Qing–Chosŏn relationship as the yardstick for relations between 
the Qing and other countries or political entities. Different from the aggressive and 
colonizing foreign policy of the Yuan, the Qing, as the best student of the Ming’s Zongfan 
mechanism, erected a very sophisticated Chosŏn Model and replicated this highly 
Confucian model for Ryukyu, Annam, Lanchang, Siam, Burma, and other countries to 
maintain peace on the frontier and to construct a new Chinese empire beyond it. The 
Qing’s establishment of the Zongfan relationship with Ryukyu in the early years after 
1644 revealed that the Qing employed the full-fledged model with alacrity to formalize 
its relations with other countries.18 
As a result of the Qing rulers’ efforts at promulgating the Chosŏn Model after 
1644, some political units beyond the Qing’s control also regarded it as an ideal way of 
                                               
17 Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 251, 272; Lidai bao’an (Historical archives of the Ryukyu Kingdom), vol. 1, 
107. 
18 See, for example, Wu Yuanfeng, “Qingchu cefeng Liuqiu guowang Shang Zhi shimo” (The ins and outs 
of the Qing’s investiture to Shang Zhi, King of Ryukyu, in the early Qing period). 
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solving conflicts with the Qing and retaining their own privileges. A typical case was the 
prolonged negotiations over Taiwan between the Qing and Zheng Jing (1642–1681), the 
eldest son of Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662), who occupied Taiwan. During about eight 
years from 1662 to 1669, when the Qing tried persuading him to surrender, Zheng Jing 
insisted on “following the Chosŏn Model” (Ch. zhao Chaoxian shili) into the Qing’s 
Zongfan system by “proclaiming to be subordinate and paying tribute” (Ch. chengchen 
nagong) but not cutting the hair in the Qing style.19 For Zheng, the Chosŏn Model was 
the most favorable and the most likely way to solve the conflicts with the Qing and to 
preserve what he and his father had cherished under the late Ming. His proposal, however, 
was refused by Emperor Kangxi and his primary assistants on the case on the grounds 
that Chosŏn was “always a foreign country” (Ch. conglai suoyou zhi waiguo; Ma. daci 
bihe encu gurun), while Zheng and his followers were “people of Zhongguo” (Ch. 
Zhongguo zhi ren; Ma. dulimbai gurun i niyalma).20 This case demonstrates how the 
applicability and coverage of the Chosŏn Model had been perceived, when either 
independence or complete annexation were not an acceptable solution as viewed by the 
Qing or the Zheng regime in Taiwan. 
2.2  The Practice of the Chosŏn Model under the Chinese Empire of the Qing 
The Chosŏn Model representing the subtly-programmed Zongfan mechanism can be 
grasped from the following five aspects. 
(1) Frequency and Composition of Missions 
The exchange of missions between the Qing and Chosŏn started in 1637 and continued 
                                               
19 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji (The supplementary history of Taiwan), 175, 176, 187, 194, 205, 207. 
20 Emperor Kangxi’s imperial edict persuading Zheng Jing to surrender to the Qing in 1669, archive no. 
038209, in Museum of the Institute of History and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. 
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without interruptions until the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895, regardless of the 
opening of the two countries to the West in the nineteenth century. The frequency of 
Chosŏn’s missions to the Qing was so high that none of the other countries could 
compete. Compared with those countries that should send a tributary mission to Beijing 
every other year (Ryukyu), three years (Siam), four years (Annam), five years (Sulu), or 
ten years (Lanchang and Burma), Chosŏn dispatched several emissaries every year.21 
Over the 258 years from 1637 to 1894, Chosŏn sent 698 official tributary missions to the 
Qing, an average of 2.71 missions per year; the purposes of these missions fell into 
approximately 26 categories. 22  In 1784 and 1788, Emperor Qianlong commented 
jubilantly that Chosŏn was almost the peer of the Qing’s inner fan (Ch. neifan).23 
According to the imperial regulations, a tributary mission of Chosŏn should have 
30 members, including an envoy (holding a vice first rank), an associate envoy (vice 
second rank), a secretary (fourth rank), three interpreters, and 24 tribute guard officers. 
The envoy, associate envoy, and secretary were the three key members to visit the 
emperor on behalf of the king. The numbers of attendants and servants were not limited, 
which was a privilege granted to Chosŏn,24 but only 30 of them could receive imperial 
gifts.25 In contrast, members holding lower ranks than the two envoys of missions from 
                                               
21 Qinding libu zeli (1844), for Chosŏn, see vol. 172, 1b; for Ryukyu, see vol. 173, 1a; for Annam, see vol. 
174, 1b; for Siam, see vol. 176, 1a; for Sulu, see vol. 177, 1a; for Lanchang, see vol. 175, 1a. Please note 
that Siam sent emissaries once in three years before 1839 but once in four years thereafter 
22  See Tongmun hwiko, vol. 2, 1700-1744; Ch’ŏng sŏn go (Selected collections regarding Chosŏn 
institutes), vol. 2, 404-502; Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han Zongfan maoyi, 18-19; Liu Wei, Qingdai zhongchao 
shizhe wanglai yanjiu (Study on China-Korean envoys in the Qing dynasty), 154-251. According to 
Tongmun hwiko and Ch’ŏng sŏn go, from 1637 to 1643, Chosŏn sent 56 missions to the Qing, and from 
1644 to 1894, it sent 642 missions (76 missions in the Shunzhi period, 168 missions in the Kangxi, 45 in 
the Yongzheng, 140 in the Qianlong, 60 in the Jiaqing, 66 in the Daoguang, 24 in the Xianfeng, 24 in the 
Tongzhi, and 39 in the Guangxu period). 
23 Qing gaozong shilu, vol. 24, 297; vol. 25, 715.  
24 The number of attendants of servants of Sulu’s missions was also open, but Sulu was allowed to send a 
mission only every five years, and was therefore not comparable. See Qinding lizu zeli (1844), vol. 177, 1. 
25 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 1b-2a; T’ongmun’gwan ji (Records of the Office of Interpreters), vol. 
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Ryukyu, Lanchang, Burma, and Holland were not to exceed 20; from other Western 
countries including Britain 22; from Siam 26, and from Annam 30.26 The said open 
number created further opportunities for more Korean intellectuals and businessmen 
visited the Qing as attendants or servants of the missions in order to appreciate the 
Chinese culture or seek their fortune, so a mission often numbered several hundred 
people. For example, the annual tribute mission of 1653 totaled 225 members, the Thanks 
mission of 1777 totaled 310, the Thanks mission of 1803 213, the annual tribute mission 
of 1863 311, and the Congratulations mission of 1889 also 311. 27  Until the late 
nineteenth century, legions of Chosŏn’s missions continued their pilgrimages to Beijing 
every year bearing various tributes, hundreds of horses, many wraps, colorful flags, 
wooden boards, and wheelbarrows.28  
When the missions entered its territory, the Qing had to provide food, 
accommodations, and security guards. In addition to housing the visitors at each transfer 
station (Ch. gongshi guanshe; Ma. alban jafara elcin i tatara guwan i boo),29 housing 
them in Beijing was a huge challenge and a heavy burden. In 1829, two missions with 
more than 600 people arrived in Beijing at the same time, so that the Ministry of Rituals 
                                                                                                                                            
1, 85-94. 
26 Qinding libu zeli (1844), for Ryukyu, see vol. 173, 1b; for Annam, see vol. 174, 1b; for Lanchang, see 
vol. 175, 1b; for Siam, see vol. 176, 1b; for Holland, see vol. 178, 1b; for Burma, see vol. 179, 1b; for other 
Western countries, see vol. 180, 1a. 
27 For the mission of 1653, see Neige like shishu (Chronicle of the Ministry of Rituals censorate section of 
Grand Secretariat, hereafter referred to as LKSS), archive no. 2-1, in FHAC; for that of 1777, see Yi Kon, 
Yŏnhaeng kisa (Records of the mission to Beijing), in Lim Key-zung, ed., Yŏnhaeng nok jŏnjip, vol. 58, 
314; for the mission of 1803, see Junjichu hanwen lufu zouzhe (The Chinese copies of palace memorials of 
Grand Council, LFZZ), microfilm no. 3-163-7728-8, in FHAC; for that of 1863, see LFZZ, no. 
3-163-7730-25; for that of 1889, see LFZZ, no. 3-163-7730-35. 
28 The number of horses of a Chosŏn tributary mission to Beijing was over 200. See T’ongmun’gwan ji, 
vol. 1, 94-98. For instance, the mission of 1760 had 198 horses and the one of 1777 had 223 horses, see Yi 
Sang-bong, Pugwon rok (The record of the journey to the Qing), in Yŏnhaeng nok sŏnjip boyu (The 
addenda to selected collection of records of Chosŏn’s emissaries to Beijing), vol. 1, 707-709; Yi Kon, 
Yŏnhaeng kisa, in Yŏnhaeng nok jŏnjip, vol. 58, 314. 
29 Junjichu manwen lufu zouzhe (The Manchu copies of palace memorials of Grand Council, hereafter 
referred to as MWLF), microfilm no. 017-00137. 
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and the Ministry of Works (Ch. Gongbu) had to borrow 20 large tents from the Imperial 
Household Department (Ch. neiwufu, Ma. dorgi baita be uheri kadalara yamun) to house 
the additional visitors.30 Nevertheless, the Qing never complained about this to Chosŏn 
because the significant visits provided opportunities to employ the policy of “cherishing 
men from afar” (Ch. huairou yuanren; Ma. goroki niyalma be bilume gosimbi). 
On the other hand, the frequency of the Qing’s imperial missions to Chosŏn was 
quite low, and the size of the missions was not big either. From 1637 to 1895, the Qing 
dispatched 172 missions to Chosŏn, an average of 0.67 missions per year. The goals of 
these missions fell into around five categories. In the early Qing, the emperor sent some 
envoys to Chosŏn to investigate and to negotiate with the king about cases of homicide 
and smuggling on the border, yet after the middle period of Emperor Kangxi’s reign, such 
envoys disappeared, and these cases were handled by officials from the two countries in 
Mukden or Fenghuang City.31 The imperial missions to Chosŏn were thus of two 
primary types: cefeng and fengshi, both of which concerned power shifts in Chosŏn that 
required the emperor to dispatch his representatives to endow the shifts with legitimacy.  
The size of the imperial missions was not big. In the early period, a mission had 
around a hundred men, many of whom came from the Eight Banners to trade. In 1658, 
the size was significantly trimmed by Emperor Shunzhi when he called for the end of 
Manchu trade in Hansŏng. As a result, a mission comprised an envoy, an associate envoy, 
four interpreters, and 18 attendants.32 The number of core members was further reduced 
                                               
30 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 184, 4b.  
31 Tongmun hwiko, vo. 1, 903-1044, vol. 2, 1045-1245, 1747-1771; Liu Wei, Qingdai zhongchao shizhe 
wanglai yanjiu, 39-41; Chun Hae-jong, “Sino–Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” 92-94, 
101; Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han Zongfan maoyi, 48-49; Liu Wei, Qingdai zhongchao shizhe wanglai yanjiu, 
35-41, 154-251. 
32 Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 940; T’ongmun’gwan ji, vol. 1, 215-218; see also Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han 
Zongfan maoyi, 64-68. 
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to four by Emperor Daoguang in 1845 and 1846.33 Taking attendants into account, after 
the early nineteenth century, the members of an imperial mission numbered fewer than 30. 
For example, the mission in 1876 totaled 20 members and the last mission in 1890 had 28 
members.34 Although the size of the missions was small, each mission proved to be a 
huge financial burden for Chosŏn to assume, in particular for the P’yŏngan Province 
bordering the Qing.35 
All of the imperial envoys to Chosŏn—from the first envoy in 1637, Inggūldai, to 
the last in 1890, Xuchang—were high-ranking ethnic Manchu officials, including some 
from the Mongol Eight Banners, and not Han Chinese or those from the Han Eight 
Banners, while the envoys to Annam and Ryukyu were mainly Han Chinese rather than 
Manchus.36 The envoys would fulfill the Qing’s role as Chosŏn’s father in the bilateral 
framework by performing various highly formalized ceremonies on behalf of the emperor 
on Chosŏn’s territory. The procedure was purely ritual, yet it should not be conducted by 
Han Chinese. Even in the late nineteenth century, when certain high-ranking Han Chinese 
officials, such as Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai, were deeply involved in Chosŏn’s 
affairs or served as China’s representatives in Chosŏn, the envoys of imperial missions to 
Chosŏn within the Zongfan framework were still exclusively served by the Manchus. The 
                                               
33 Qingdai gongzhongdang zouzhe ji junjichu zhejian (The palace memorials of the Forbidden City and the 
Grand Council, hereafter referred to as JJCZ), archive no. 072667; Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 181, 1b-2a. 
For the mission in 1845, see Huashana, Dongshi jicheng (Diary of the imperial mission to Chosŏn), and 
JJCZ, archive no. 076837. 
34 Ch’iksa ilgi (Diaries of welcoming the imperial envoys), archive no. M/F 73-101-5, vol. 17 (the year of 
1876), 14b; Chongli, Fengshi Chaoxian riji (Diary of the journey to Chosŏn as an imperial emissary), 
22b-23a; Shihan jilue (Notes on the imperial mission to Korea in 1890), in Zhu Chaoxian shiguan dang, 
Yuan Shikai (Archives of Chinese legation to Chosŏn, regarding Yuan Shikai), microfilm no. 01-41-016-08, 
in the Archives of Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 8. 
35 See Kwon Naehyun, “Chosŏn–Qing Relations and the Society of P’yŏngan Province during the Late 
Chosŏn Period,” in Sun Joo Kim, ed., The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture, 37-61. 
36 See Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 181, 1b; Tongmun hwiko, vol. 2, 1747-1771; Koo Bum-jin, “Ch’ǒng ǔi 
Chosǒn sahaeng insǒn gwa ‘dae Ch’ǒng cheguk ch’eje’” (A study on the personnel appointments of Qing 
imperial envoys to Korea: Reconsidering Korea’s position in the world order under Qing hegemony). 
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door was never opened for Han Chinese because, in the wake of the fierce civilized–
barbarian distinction, the Manchu rulers and their regime needed to demonstrate, 
maintain, and consolidate their legitimacy as the human and institutional agents of the 
Mandate of Heaven and strengthen their “Chineseness” through the very hierarchical 
relationship with Chosŏn. For this reason, the Zongfan affairs regarding Chosŏn must be 
firmly in the hands of the Manchu rulers, rather than their Han Chinese subordinates. 
(2) Routine Documents, Tributes, and Gifts 
Since 1637, Chosŏn followed the format of official documents that had been used in the 
Ming period. In 1705, in the wake of some different terms in the king’s memorials, 
Emperor Kangxi instructed the Ministry of Rituals to standardize the format of Chosŏn’s 
memorials. The ministry soon set down a set of specific criteria, which was strictly 
followed for 190 years until 1895.37 In his highly formalized memorials, the king termed 
himself “subordinate,” Chosŏn the “small country,” and the Qing the “big country,” the 
“upper country,” the “big dynasty,” or the “middle dynasty” (Ch. zhongchao; K. 
chungcho).38 These terms exploited Chosŏn’s subordinate status to contribute to the 
construction of the Qing’s image of the Central Kingdom and the Heavenly Dynasty. 
The most typical phrase proclaimed that the Qing “has pacified the four seas 
surrounding China under heaven, and ten thousand countries devoutly came to revere the 
emperor” (Ch. sihai yi er wanguo laiwang).39 If it had been a Jin/Qing-centric imagined 
order in the 1630s, it was certainly not in the early eighteenth century, when Chosŏn, 
                                               
37 Tongmun hwiko, vo. 1, 672; T’ongmun’gwan ji, vol. 1, 112-130; Neige waijiao zhuan’an, Chaoxian 
(Diplomatic categories of Grand Secretariat about Chosŏn, hereafter referred to as WJZA), no. 4, in FHAC. 
For a study of the format of Chosŏn’s memorial to China during the Ming and Qing periods, see Yi 
Sŏn-hong’s PhD dissertation, “Chosŏn sidae dae Chungguk oegyo munsŏ yŏn’gu” (Study on Chosŏn’s 
diplomatic documents to China in the Chosŏn period). 
38 See, for example, Memorial of the Ministry of Rituals, July 31, 1846, LFZZ, archive no. 3-163-7729-42. 
39 T’ongmun’gwan ji, vol. 1, 113. 
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Ryukyu, Annam, Burma, Siam, Lanchang, Sulu, Holland, other Western countries, and 
the Inner Asian political units willingly sent “tributary” missions to Beijing. Rather, the 
Qing had become a Chinese empire and needed others beyond the Qing’s borders to 
define its centrality in the world. Year after year, Chosŏn, as the representative par 
excellence of the others that served as a “country of barbarians” outside the Qing’s border, 
helped to consolidate the Qing’s supreme self-identity. 
On the Qing side, the imperial decrees granting late kings noble rank or investing 
the new king with a patent of appointment and an official seal highlighted the Zongfan 
relationship by consistently defining Chosŏn as the Qing’s fan. The special terms used in 
these decrees also experienced a transformation in the post-1644 era. In January 1638, 
when the Qing invested Yi Jong around nine months after it conquered the country, the 
imperial decree of investiture stated only that Chosŏn would serve as the Qing’s fan 
forever.40 Yet, after 1644, some terms with special political meanings were added. For 
example, the decree of investiture in 1649 clearly defined Chosŏn as an outer fan in the 
“very far area” (Ch. xiahuang) that “submitted itself to the Qing’s great virtues and 
civilization” (Ch. xianghua).41 In 1675, the phrase of “cherishing the eastern country” 
(Ch. huairou dongtu) appeared.42 These terms substantially broadened the scope of the 
Qing’s political and cultural ideology by transforming their identities in accordance with 
the civilized–barbarian distinction. 
The tributes of Chosŏn had eight primary categories according to the purpose of 
its missions: yearly gifts, gifts for the emperor’s birthday, for the Chinese New Year’s 
Day, for the winter solstice, for imperial celebrations, for thanks, for reports, and for 
                                               
40 Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 709. 
41 Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 363. 
42 Qing shengzu shilu, vol. 4, 678-679. 
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imperial visits to Mukden.43 The following five tables list some tributes after 1728 when 
they were finally settled by Emperor Yongzheng after a continuous reduction.44 
Table 2. 1. The Yearly Tributes that Chosŏn Presented to the Qing 
Items  Quantities Items  Quantities 
White ramie cloth 200 pieces Deer skins 100 pieces 
White cotton silk 200 pieces Otter skins 300 pieces 
Red cotton silk 100 pieces Black squirrel skins 300 pieces 
Green cotton silk 100 pieces Girdle knives 10 
Cotton cloth 3,000 pieces Good large-size paper 2,000 rolls 
Mats with dragon pattern 2 pieces Good small-size paper 3,500 rolls 
Mats with variegated pattern 20 pieces Sticky rice 40 piculs (Ch. dan) 
 
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 2a. 
 
Table 2. 2. Chosŏn’s Tributes for Emperor’s Birthday 
Items Emperor Empress Dowager  Empress 
Yellow ramie cloth 10 pieces / / 
White ramie cloth 20 pieces 20 pieces 20 pieces 
Red ramie cloth / 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Yellow cotton silk 30 pieces / / 
Purple cotton silk 20 pieces 20 pieces 20 pieces 
White cotton silk 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Mats with dragon pattern 2 pieces / / 
Mats with yellow flower pattern 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Square mates with full pattern 20 pieces / / 
Mats with full pattern / 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Mats with variegated pattern 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Otter skins 20 pieces / / 
White cotton-paper 1,400 rolls / / 
Thick oilpaper 10 rolls / / 
 
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 2b-3c. The slash mark means the items were not 
given. 
 
Table 2. 3. Chosŏn’s Tributes for the Chinese New Year’s Day 
Items Emperor Empress Dowager Empress 
Yellow ramie cloth 10 pieces / / 
White ramie cloth 20 pieces 20 pieces 20 pieces 
Red ramie cloth / 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Yellow cotton silk 20 pieces / / 
Purple cotton silk / 20 pieces 20 pieces 
White cotton silk 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Mats with dragon pattern 2 pieces / / 
Mats with yellow flower pattern 15 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Square mates with full pattern 15 pieces / / 
Mats with full pattern 15 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Mats with variegated pattern 15 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
                                               
43 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 1b-5b. 
44 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 2a. 
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White cotton-paper 1,300 rolls / / 
Dressing case with mother-of-pearl inlay / 1 1 
 
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 3a-3b. 
 
Table 2. 4. Chosŏn’s Tributes for the Winter Solstice 
Items Emperor Empress Dowager Empress 
Yellow ramie cloth 10 pieces / / 
White ramie cloth 20 pieces 20 pieces 20 pieces 
Red ramie cloth / 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Yellow cotton silk 20 pieces / / 
Purple cotton silk / 20 pieces 20 pieces 
White cotton silk 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Mats with dragon pattern 2 pieces / / 
Mats with yellow flower pattern 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Square mates with full pattern 20 pieces / / 
Mats with full pattern 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Mats with variegated pattern 20 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
White cotton-paper 1,300 rolls / / 
Dressing case with mother-of-pearl inlay / 1 1 
 
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 3b. 
 
Table 2. 5. Chosŏn’s Tributes for Imperial Celebrations and for Thanks 
Items Emperor Empress Dowager Empress 
Yellow ramie cloth 30 pieces / / 
White ramie cloth 30 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Red ramie cloth / 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Yellow cotton silk 20 pieces / / 
Purple cotton silk 20 pieces / / 
White cotton silk 30 pieces 20 pieces 20 pieces 
Mats with yellow flower pattern 15 pieces / / 
Square mates with full pattern 15 pieces / / 
Mats with full pattern 15 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
Mats with variegated pattern 15 pieces 10 pieces 10 pieces 
White cotton-paper 2,000 rolls / / 
 
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 3b-4b. In 1780, Emperor Qianlong decreed that the 
king did not need to submit gifts when he presented memorial to thank the emperor’s favor. Yet the king 
still presented gifts in 1783, 1786, 1822, and 1831. See Qinding libu zeli 1844, vol. 172, 4a-4b; Memorials 
of the Ministry of Rituals, dated November 18, 1822, Junjichu hanwen lufu zouzhe (The Chinese copies of 
palace memorials of Grand Council, hereafter referred to as LFZZ), archive no. 3-163-7729-18/19. 
 
These tables generalize the tributes and the quantities that Chosŏn had to present 
from the late 1720s to the early 1890s.45 In addition to the yearly tributes submitted to 
                                               
45 See, for example, Qingdai zhongchao guanxi dang’an shiliao xubian (Continuing collections of archives 
on China-Chosŏn relations in the Qing period, hereafter referred to as ZCSLXB), 90-100; Qingdai 
zhongchao guanxi dang’an shiliao huibian (Collections of archives on Sino–Korean relations in the Qing 
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the Qing with a symbolic political meaning, all further tributes were specifically given to 
the emperors, empresses, and dowager empresses. In practice, all tributes were submitted 
to the Imperial Household Department, which was in charge of the affairs of the Manchu 
royal house and had a financial system independent of the one managed by the Ministry 
of Revenue.46 Therefore, the Zongfan relationship between the two countries manifested 
itself in a hierarchical court-to-court way between the Manchu imperial court and the 
Chosŏn’s royal court. 
Compared with Chosŏn’s tributes, the Qing’s imperial gifts to Chosŏn were 
simple, but the bulk of them were first-rate silk for official robes. The imperial missions 
for investing a king or a crown prince would bring the gifts listed in the following tables. 
Table 2. 6. The Qing’s Gifts to Chosŏn for Investiture of a New King 
Items King Queen 
Black fox fur coat 1 pieces / 
Third-class marten skins 100 pieces 10 pieces 
Horse with harness 1 / 
Large-size satin with dragon embroidery 2 pieces 2 pieces 
Small-size satin with dragon embroidery 1 pieces / 
Satin with flower embroidery 1 pieces 2 pieces 
Brocade 1 pieces 2 pieces 
Large-size satin 2 pieces 3 pieces 
Satin with four groups of dragon embroidery 2 pieces / 
Cyan satin 1 pieces 2 pieces 
Japanese satin / 2 pieces 
Bright satin /  2 pieces 
Hat satin /  2 pieces 
Satin without patterns / 2 pieces 
Satin with the rough surface /  3 pieces 
Yarn / 4 pieces 
Silk /  4 pieces 
  
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 181, 2a-2b. 
  
Table 2. 7. The Qing’s Gifts to Chosŏn for Investiture of a New Crown Prince 
                                                                                                                                            
period, hereafter referred to as ZCSLHB), 66-69, 72-73, 250-252, 307-312, 358-363. See also archives in 
LFZZ, Nos. 3-163-7729-21/22 (February 23, 1823), 3-163-7729-26/27/29/31 (February 21, 1831), 
3-163-7729-32/33 (March 21, 1835), 3-163-7729-34/35 (July 1, 1835), 3-163-7729-36/37/38/39 (December 
15, 1835), 3-163-7729-45/46 (November 9, 1849), and 3-163-7730-32/33 (August 13, 1886). 
46 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 6a-6b; Ming Qing shiliao, series. 7, vol. 5, 469b. 
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Items Crown Prince 
Satin with golden embroidery 4 pieces 
Satin 4 pieces 
Yarn 4 pieces 
Coarse silk  4 pieces 
Silk linings for satin with golden embroidery 4 pieces 
Silk linings for satin 4 pieces 
Silk linings for yarn 4 pieces 
Silk linings for coarse silk 4 pieces 
  
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 181, 3b. 
  
If imperial missions were dispatched to extend the emperor’s condolences on the 
loss of core royal members, the gifts would be elements that were to be consumed at the 
ceremonies. In practice, the calf, sheep, pigs, table mats and wine would be converted 
into 150 to 300 taels of silver by the Ministry of Revenue.47 Over the course of the 
seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, the imperial envoys precisely followed this 
routine to deliver the condolences and gifts for the ceremonies, including the last envoy 
in 1890 with Emperor Guangxu’s condolences on the loss of Senior Queen Dowager Cho 
(Table 2. 8). 
Table 2. 8. The Qing’s Gifts to Chosŏn on the Loss of the Senior Queen Dowager 
in 1890 
 
Items Quantities 
Sandalwood incense 1 unit 
Silk 1 piece 
White satin silk 6 pieces 
While filature 6 pieces 
Blue filature 2 pieces 
Silver kettle 1 unit (1.0 kilogram) 
Silver wine vessel 3 units (0.5 kilograms each) 
Calf  1 
Sheep 2 
Pig 2 
Table mat 20 pieces 
Wine 2 urns 
  
Sources: Chongli, Fengshi Chaoxian riji, 12b-13b. Please note that the imperial mission of 1890 
converted the calf, sheep, pigs, table mats, and wine into silver and received 300 taels from the Ministry of 
Revenue.  
                                               
47 See Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 168, 1b-2a. 
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(3) The Overland Route and Chosŏn’s Privileges  
In the post-1644 period, emissaries of the two countries traveled on an overland route, 
about 950 miles long, linking Hansŏng and Beijing via around 82 stations, including 
Pyongyang, Ŭiju, the Yalu River, Fenghuang City, Mukden, Shanhai Pass, and Tongzhou 
(Map 2. 1). From 1644 to 1895, Chosŏn’s tributary emissaries were never permitted by 
the emperor to visit Beijing by sea. All imperial emissaries were also required to follow 
the overland route to Hansŏng except the last one in 1890, which was permitted to take a 
maritime route.48 After crossing the Yalu River to the Qing territory, the emissaries were 
to arrive in Beijing under escort of Qing soldiers within 28 days through 39 transfer 
stations, where they were well accommodated by the Qing.49 In general, a mission might 
need 40 or 50 days to reach Beijing from Hansŏng. For example, in 1777, the emissary Yi 
Kwang and his mission spent 62 days travelling to Beijing, walking more than 970 
miles.50 Over a hundred years later, in 1882, the mission led by Kim Yun-sik spent 50 
days travelling to Beijing, walking around 930 miles.51 The imperial emissaries had the 
same long trudge to Hansŏng. In 1844, the envoy Baijun (?–1859) spent 39 days making 
the trek to Hansŏng, walking around 900 miles.52 The overland route was surrounded by 
a long chain-link willow palisade from Fenghuang City to Shanhai Pass, where it 
connected with the Great Wall. Right outside of the palisade was a trench of the same 
length. The willow palisade was built immediately after the Manchus took over Beijing, 
with the aim of preserving their economic privileges in their home base in Manchuria and 
                                               
48 Chongli, Fengshi Chaoxian riji, 14a.  
49 T’ongmun’gwan ji, vol. 1, 152-154. 
50 Yi Kon, Yŏnhaeng kisa, in Lim Key-zung, ed., Yŏnhaeng nok jŏnjip, vol. 58, 256-388; vol. 59, 12-15. 
51 See Kim Yun-Sik, Ŭmch’ŏngsa (Cloudy and sunny diary). 
52 Baijun, Fengshi Chaoxian yicheng riji (Diary of the journey of the imperial mission to Chosŏn), in Yin 
Mengxia and Yu Hao, eds., Shi Chaoxian lu (Records of imperial missions to Chosŏn), vol. 2, 547-661. 
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demarcating domestic lines between Manchu, Mongolian, and Han Chinese regions.53 In 
the early period of Kangxi’s reign, the palisade was around 560 miles long and had 17 
gates.54 The activities of Chosŏn’s emissaries were strictly confined to the areas between 
the willow palisade and Bohai Sea. 
Map 2. 1. The Overland Route of Chosŏn’s Emissaries to Beijing in the Qing 
(Late Eighteenth Century) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Based on Ipyŏn chŏngdo do (Map of the route of Chosŏn’s emissaries to Beijing), in 
Han’guk ŭi kojido (Old maps of Korea), 128. The black line connecting points A, B, C, and D on the map 
was the long chain-link willow palisade. The palisade started from Fenghuang City (A) and ended at 
Shanhai Pass (D), where it connected with the Great Wall (the line connecting points D, E, and F). The map 
shows that there were fourteen gates of the willow palisade. The black line connecting points A, G, H, I, 
and J is the overland route of the Chosŏn’s emissaries to Beijing after they entered the Qing domain. The 
map marks forty-six stations that emissaries stayed in or pass through. 
 
Considering the high frequency of Chosŏn’s missions to the Qing, the long 
overland route was full of Chosŏn’s emissaries, so that the country would send a new 
mission to Beijing before the previous one returned. These endless missions thus 
produced considerable lucrative commercial opportunities for merchants of the two 
countries. Many Chinese people in main cities on the route became rich by trading with 
Koreans. What overwhelmingly flowed into the Qing together with Korean goods was 
silver. The mission of 1777, for instance, carried more than 93,000 taels of silver to 
                                               
53 For the establishment and the roles of the willow palisade, see Qinding daqing huidian shili (1899), vol. 
233, 20a; Yang Bin, Liubian jilue (Records of the willow palisade), vol. 1, 1; Yang Shusen, ed., Qingdai 
liutiao bian (The willow palisade in the Qing period); Li Huazi, Choch’ŏng kukkyŏng munje yŏn’gu (Study 
on the border between Chosŏn and the Qing), 59-88; Kim Seon-min, “Ongjŏngje ǔi sŏnggyŏng chiyŏk 
t’ongch’i”(Emperor Yongzheng’s rule in northeast area of the Qing). 
54 Shengjing tongzhi (Comprehensive history of Shengjing [Shenyang]), vol. 11, 5a-6a. 
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purchase Chinese goods.55 More importantly, the largest part of the silver was originally 
from Japan, through the trade between Tsushima and Chosŏn, which bore a close 
resemblance to that between Chosŏn and the Qing. The Hansŏng–Fenghuang City–
Mukden–Beijing overland trade route was an extension of the Kyoto–Osaka–Tsushima–
Pusan–Hansŏng overland and maritime trade route per se,56 on which Hansŏng and 
Beijing were the two biggest entrepots. In this sense, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
the overland route between Beijing and Hansŏng was the busiest, the most prosperous, 
and the most lucrative long-distance and international trade route in East Asia before 
Chosŏn opened treaty ports and entered the “family of nations” in the 1880s. 
Chosŏn’s emissaries also enjoyed some special privileges in terms of their visits 
to the Qing. All emissaries of the Qing’s fan had specific tributary routes to follow, and 
they dared not break the rules. Before they went to Beijing, Ryukyu’s emissaries were 
instructed to arrive at Min’an in Fujian province, Sulu’s at Xiamen also in Fujian, 
Western countries’ at Macau in Guangdong, Siam’s at Humen also in Guangdong, 
Annam’s at Taiping in Guangxi, Burma’s at Yongchang in Yunnan, and Lanchang’s at 
Pu’er also in Yunnan. At those places they would first be greeted by governor-general (Ch. 
zongdu) and governor (Ch. xunfu) who would report their arrival to the Ministry of 
Rituals on their behalf and instruct several subordinate officials to send them on to 
Beijing.57 Chosŏn was the only exception, having no such relations with officials of the 
provinces through which they passed, particularly the governor-general of Zhili province. 
                                               
55 Yi Kon, Yŏnhaeng kisa, in Lim Key-zung, ed., Yŏnhaeng nok jŏnjip, vol. 58, 314-315. 
56 See, for example, Miyake Hidetoshi, Kinsei ajia no nihon to Chōsen hantō (Japan and the Korean 
peninsula in modern times), 157-159. 
57 Qinding daqing huidian (1764), vol. 56, 2b-3a; Qinding daqing huidian (1899), vol. 39, 3b. About the 
changes to their tribute routes, see J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Têng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” 
175-176, Table 3 “Frequency and routes of embassies.” 
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Rather, it communicated directly with the Ministry of Rituals in Mukden and Beijing. 
This situation began changing in the 1870s, when Li Hongzhang became 
Governor-General of Zhili and Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China 
(Ch. Beiyang tongshang dachen) and became very influential in the Qing’s diplomatic 
policy-making process. Yet, even then, Li was not further endowed by the Manchu rulers 
with the right to handle conventional affairs regarding Chosŏn. The core elements of the 
Zongfan affairs were still controlled by the Ministry of Rituals and the Manchu court. 
(4) Emissaries’ Activities in the Capitals 
Almost all of the official activities of Chosŏn’s emissaries in Beijing and the imperial 
emissaries in Hansŏng concerned highly programmed rituals. This was in particular true 
for Chosŏn’s emissaries. After arriving in Beijing, the emissaries first visited the Ministry 
of Rituals to present the king’s memorials and the list of tributes. In the main hall of the 
ministry, the emissaries would pass the king’s memorials on to the head officials of the 
ministry, who would subsequently put the memorials on a desk in the middle of the hall, 
after which the emissaries would kneel down once to make three prostrations (Ch. yi gui 
san koutou) toward the head officials, who would in return bow toward the emissaries 
with their hands folded in front (Ch. zuoyi) three times. When this had been accomplished, 
the emissaries would kneel down three times, each time bowing their heads three times 
(Ch. san gui jiu koutou) toward the table.58 The documents would be submitted to the 
emperor next day by the ministry. 
The Ministry of Rituals was in complete charge of the communications between 
the emissaries and the Chinese side, which mainly included transferring Chosŏn’s tributes 
                                               
58 See Yi Chae-hak, Yŏnhaeng ilgi (Diary of the journey to Beijing), in Lim Key-zung, ed., Yŏnhaeng nok 
jŏnjip, vol. 58, 100-101; Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 171, 11b-12a. 
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to the Imperial Household Department and the king’s memorials to the emperor, and 
forwarding the emperor’s decrees and largess to the emissaries. No emissaries from 
Chosŏn or other countries, and the kings they represented, had the right to directly 
present any memorials to the emperor. They had to submit all documents through the 
ministry with which they could communicate with each other via official notes (Ch. 
ziwen) (Figure 2. 1). 
Figure 2. 1. The Network of Sino–Korean Official Communications before the 1880s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After presenting official documents to the Ministry of Rituals, the emissaries 
would go back to their residence, the Foreign Emissaries’ Common Accommodations, 
and wait for the imperial audience. Two Manchu generals (Ch. zhangjing; M. janggin), 
two Manchu officers (Ch. xiaoqixiao; Ma. funde bošokū), and 24 soldiers from the 
Commander General of the Metropolitan Infantry Brigade Yamen (Ch. Bujun tongling 
yamen) guarded the hotel.59 Three further institutes were immediately involved to wait 
upon the guests. The Court of Imperial Entertainments (Ch. Guanglusi) was responsible 
for daily food, the Ministry of Revenue for horses’ fodder, and the Ministry of Works for 
charcoal. The food, fruit, and other daily consumer goods were distributed to each 
member of the mission according to his rank. For example, the envoy, associate envoy, 
                                               
59 See Ming Qing shiliao, series. 7, vol. 5, 449b. The members of the officers and soldiers differed on the 
basis of the categories of the missions, see ibid., 450b.  
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and the secretary would be offered 24 items, such as mutton, milk, beef, goose, chicken, 
fish, flour, yellow wine, bean curd, pickles, soy sauce, vinegar, tea, salt, apples, and 
pears.60 This specific and well-calculated list was the exact embodiment of the Qing’s 
policy of “cherishing men from afar.” After 1790, the Imperial Household Department 
took over the running of receptions for emissaries from all other countries except Chosŏn, 
and the Ministry of Rituals sent only two officials as assistants.61 
While lingering in the hotel, the emissaries had responsibilities to fulfill. If there 
were a Great Court Assembly of the officials in the Forbidden City, the emissaries had to 
attend and pay homage at the end of the wing of the Qing’s civil officials. One of their 
main tasks was to pay a formal visit to the emperor under the guidance of high-ranking 
officials from the Ministry of Rituals. If the emperor were at the Summer Palace in 
Beijing or the Rehe Palace in Chengde, the emissaries should apply for an audience at 
that place. After the audience, they would be invited to attend certain activities, such as 
banquets in the Forbidden City, the Peking Opera, or the firework shows at the Summer 
Palace.62 The emissaries would also receive gifts bestowed by the emperor in the main 
hall of the Ministry of Rituals, where they would kneel down three times, each time 
making three prostrations. This ceremony was followed by two official banquets held at 
the Ministry of Rituals and their residence.  
The receptions were so huge that many institutes were involved. In addition to the 
Court of Imperial Entertainments, which was in charge of the work with the assistance of 
the Food Supply Office (Ch. Jingshan qinglisi) of the Ministry of Rituals, the Ministry of 
                                               
60 Guanglusi zeli (The regulations and cases of the Court of Imperial Entertainments) (Beijing, 1775), vol. 
36, 1a-15a; Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 200, 1b-4a. 
61 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 171, 3b. 
62 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 171, 3b-4a, 11b-15a; Qinding daqing tongli (The comprehensive rites of 
the Great Qing, imperially ordained), vol. 43, 1-6. 
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Revenue, the Ministry of Works, the Ministry of War, the Shuntian prefecture (Ch. 
Shuntian fu), the Revenue Superintendent of the Chongwen Gate (Ch. Liangyi shuiwu 
jiandu), and royal contractors (Ch. hanghu) were also assigned specific tasks.63 More 
often than not, the Court of Imperial Entertainments needed to set up 45 tables at the 
Ministry of Rituals and 40 tables at the hotel. Each of the three key members of the 
mission—envoy, associate envoy, and secretary—was treated to a fifth-level Manchu 
banquet, and the other members were treated to a sixth-level Manchu banquet. This was 
special treatment because emissaries from other countries were not treated to Manchu 
banquets.64 The high cost of the banquets was fully covered by the Qing. 
The banquets were full of ritual performances undergirding the bilateral 
hierarchical order. Before the banquets, the emissaries, together with the Qing officials, 
had to perform the same highest-level ceremony of kowtow toward an incense burner 
table (Ch. xiang’an), which was set by an official from the Shuntian prefecture. The 
emissaries had to kneel down once and make three prostrations toward the head officials 
from the Ministry of Rituals or the hotel, who would in return bow toward the emissaries 
with their hands folded in front three times, exactly as the two sides had done on the first 
day when the emissaries arrived in Beijing.65 All ritual procedures were minutely 
regulated and practiced. In this, Chosŏn again acted as a model. As the imperial code 
noted, the seating arrangements for the banquets and the ceremonies for emissaries from 
other countries to perform should follow the Chosŏn’s pattern (Ch. geguo gongshi 
fangci).66 
                                               
63 Guanglusi zeli, vol. 23, 1a-12b. 
64 Ibid., vol. 23, 1b. 
65 Guanglusi zeli, vol. 23, 4b-6a; Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 299, 7a-7b. 
66 “Illustration of the banquets for Chosŏn’s tributary emissaries” (Ch. Chaoxian gongshi yantu), in 
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These rituals were not new products of the Qing. At least from the Guest Rituals 
(Ch. binli) in The Rituals of the Great Tang (Ch. Datang kaiyuan li), an imperial 
codification of the Tang dynasty compiled in 732, such rituals between the Chinese 
emperor and foreign emissaries or kings had long been regulated and institutionalized.67 
In the Qing period, they became extremely elaborate and rich and many new cases 
developed in the Qianlong period. The emissaries were always required to rehearse the 
complicated ceremonies in advance. The political objective of the rehearsals was far 
beyond what the specific ceremonials required. Rather, it aimed to exploit the “loyalty of 
Chosŏn” to “civilize the barbarians on the four quarters under the Heaven” (Ch. feng 
siyi).68 This role that Chosŏn played in the Ming became more significant, more typical, 
and more critical in the Qing for the Manchu ruling house that needed to pursue the 
Chineseness. 
In their sojourn in Beijing, the emissaries, particularly those intellectuals who 
were without official status and responsibilities, were enthusiastic about socializing with 
the Qing’s literati who were very interested in communicating with the visitors too. Their 
principal activities were meeting for drinks, making poems together, and exchanging their 
own literary works and calligraphy. When they socialized, they made conversation by 
writing Chinese characters (Ch. bitan; K. p’iltam), so they could accurately understand 
each other, precluding misunderstanding caused by mistranslations by the interpreters. 
Learning the same Confucian classics, cherishing the same neo-Confucianism, and using 
the same Chinese characters, these intellectuals were easily able to identify one another 
                                                                                                                                            
Qinding libu zeli (1844). 
67 Datang kaiyuan li (The rituals of the Great Tang), 386-392. 
68 The memorial of the Ministry of Rituals to Emperor Wanli, February 2, 1603, in Sadae mungwe, vol. 42, 
14b-15b. 
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as men of the same caliber. The fact that Chosŏn was known as “Little China” may also 
have lent this kind of transnational literary social gathering homologous cultural identity. 
These savants thus formed an informal, perennial, and transnational literati club in which 
they could exchange ideas of history and literature and to improve their perceptions of the 
two countries. Many intellectuals became very close friends and continued to correspond. 
When the Chinese official Yan Cheng (1733–?) died in the Qianlong period, he put a 
letter from his Korean friend, Hong Tae-yong (1731–1783), on his abdomen to treasure 
their friendship.69 
The literary social gathering lasted until the late nineteenth century. In the 1860s, 
many officials of the Qing, such as Dong Wenhuan (1833–1877) who was serving at the 
Imperial Academy (Ch. Hanlin yuan) and known for calligraphy and epigraphy, were 
very active in socializing with Korean intellectuals. 70  Dong’s diary suggested that 
socializing with his Korean counterparts became an essential part of his daily life.71 Such 
social gatherings were fascinating for the Korean visitors too. For example, Pak Kyu-su 
(1807–1876), the emissary of the mission of 1872, made more than a hundred famous 
Chinese intellectuals his friends through social gatherings.72 Interestingly enough, the 
majority of the Chinese literati with whom their Korean counterparts were interested in 
talking were Han Chinese, so the Manchus seemed to be excluded from the literati club 
of the “central civilized country” (Ch. Zhonghua). By the same token, this transnational 
literati club had its bottom line in that those savants did not discuss statecraft or politics. 
                                               
69 Wu Jiaxuan, Chaoxian shizhe Jin Yongjue bitanji (Record of conversation in writing with the Chosŏn’s 
emissary Kim Yŏng-jak), in Li Yu and Ch’oi Yŏng-hŭi, eds., Hanke shicun (The poems of Korean guests), 
261-266. 
70 See Dong Wenhuan, Xianqiao shanfang riji (The diary of Dong Wenhuan), in Dong Shouping and Li Yu, 
eds., Qingji hongtong dongshi riji liuzhong (The six diaries of the Dongs of Hongtong in late Qing). 
71 Dong Wenhuan, Xianqiao shanfang riji, in Qingji hongtong dongshi riji liuzhong, vol. 1, 18-27. 
72 Pak Kyu-su, Hwanjae sŏnsaengjip (The collection of Pak Kyu-su), 6-7. 
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Rather, they confined their conversations and correspondence to the fields of Chinese 
literature and personal friendship and never crossed that line until the 1860s and 1870s, 
when France and the United States came to Chosŏn to pursue the opening of the country. 
Compared with their active Korean counterparts in Beijing, the Qing’s envoys in 
Hansŏng were confined to ritual exchanges, and no transnational literati club like the one 
in Beijing ever formed. A Beijing-style literary social gathering indeed formed in Shuri, 
the capital of Ryukyu, when the imperial envoys served by the Han Chinese stayed there 
for investiture,73 but never in Hansŏng. The envoys did not go outside of their hotel to 
converse with local officials or intellectuals. After 1658, when the Manchu trade in 
Hansŏng was cancelled by Emperor Shunzhi, the Qing envoys were only temporary 
visitors who would return as soon as their missions were accomplished, while the 
Chosŏn’s emissaries could stay in Beijing for at least 40 days. 
During their sojourn, the envoys and the king performed three primary 
ceremonies. The first was the welcoming ceremony performed at the Gate of Receiving 
Imperial Favors (K. Yŏngŭn mun), outside the West Gate of the city, by the king or his 
deputy when the envoys arrived and were housed at Hall of Admiring the Central 
Civilized Country on the outskirts. The second ceremony was conducted in the palace in 
the city, where the envoys would transfer the imperial documents and other items to the 
king. The third ceremony was the visit of the king, crown prince, and other high-ranking 
officials to the envoys at their residence, the South Palace Annex. All the procedures of 
these ceremonies were regulated by ritual codes, and were executed until the last decade 
                                               
73 Ch’en Ta-tuan, “Investiture of Liu-Ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period,” in The Chinese World Order, 
156-159. 
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of the nineteenth century.74 The contacts between the two sides were conducted by the 
Ministry of Rituals of Chosŏn. The Korean side had no responsibility to report any 
domestic affairs to the envoys. Neither would the envoys intervene in any such affairs. 
Even in the 1880s, when Yuan Shikai resided in Chosŏn as “His Imperial Chinese 
Majesty’s Resident,” the imperial envoys visited Hansŏng still performed their duties 
according to ritual conventions of the Zongfan mechanism and did not intervened in local 
political or diplomatic affairs. 
(5) The Qing Emperor’s Role in the Zongfan System 
Once the Zongfan mechanism embodied by a series of intricate ritual norms started, each 
procedure had to be conducted precisely according to the imperial ritual codes and 
conventional precedents. The question thus turned on what roles the emperor was able to 
play in practice. At first sight, it might seem that the role of the emperor was noticeably 
dwarfed by the entirety of the routine, well-designed structure of the Zongfan mechanism. 
Yet it would be too much to claim that the whole system had become so rigid that the 
emperor could fulfill no more than his function as one of the institutional agencies at the 
highest level of the hierarchy. Rather, he was able to exploit the occasions of imperial 
audiences to modify and lubricate the mechanism from the top down by freely giving 
emissaries various extra gifts. 
Once again, Chosŏn could easily serve as a model for other fan. After Chosŏn’s 
emissaries presented tributes to the emperor, the sovereign would bestow gifts upon them 
and the king. The items and quantities were regulated according to the categories of the 
missions. The following table shows the gifts for annual tributary and winter solstice 
                                               
74 T’ongmun’gwan ji, vol. 1, 235-264; Mangi yoran chaeyong p’yŏn (The collection of cases of the 
finances of Chosŏn), 691-695; Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 181, 5b-7b. 
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missions (Table 2. 9). The silk and satin among the gifts were taken from the Imperial 
Household Department, rather than the Ministry of Revenue, in order to show the 
emperor’s favorable treatment to “king of the fan” (Ch. fanwang).75 Some specialists on 
the Zongfan trade argue that the routine of the imperial gifts awarded to the emissaries 
was only an institutionalized part of the entire mechanism and hence might be insufficient 
to suggest flexibility.76 This is true if the Qing, or the court of the Qing, is treated as 
simply one side of the stereotypical dramatis personae in Zongfan contacts, but in fact, 
the emperor could break this routine by freely awarding the emissaries with extra gifts 
during audiences (Table 2. 10). In this way, the emperor highlighted his individual role in 
moderating the system by lending it flexibility, uncertainty, and novelty. 
Table 2. 9. The Imperial Gifts to Annual Tributary Missions and Winter Solstice 
Missions of Chosŏn 
 
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 8b.  
Note 1: Each of the two envoys, three interpreters, 24 guard officers, and 30 servants of the 
mission would get the quantities listed above.  
Note 2: The imperial gifts to the imperial birthday celebration missions and the Chinese New Year 
celebration missions were similar to the items listed above. Yet the king would get a second-class horse 
with bridles and each of the two envoys would get a third-class horse with bridles. In addition, the 
quantities of silver were higher—that is, 50 tales for each of the secretary, 30 taels for each interpreter, 20 
taels for each officer, and 5 taels for each servant. See Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 9a-9b. Therefore, 
for each of these four kinds of mission, the Qing would give 680 (for annual tributary missions and winter 
solstice missions) or 850 taels (for imperial birthday celebration missions and Chinese New Year 
                                               
75 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 9b. 
76 See, for example, Iwai Shigeki, “Chōkō to goshi,” 137. 
Items King Envoy Secretary Interpreter Officer Servant 
Biao-satin  5 pieces / / / / / 
Linings 5 pieces / / / / / 
Zhuang-satin 4 pieces / / / / / 
Yun-satin 4 pieces / / / / / 
Marten skins 100 pieces / / / / / 
Large-size satin / 1 piece 1 piece 1 piece / / 
Mao-satin / 1 piece  / / / 
Peng-satin / 1 piece 1 piece / 1 piece / 
Silk / 1 piece / / / / 
Filature / 1 piece / / / / 
Coarse silk / 2 pieces 1 piece 1 piece / / 
Cloth / / / / 2 pieces / 
Silver / 50 taels 40 taels 20 taels 15 taels 4 taels 
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celebration missions) of silver in addition to other gifts. For a general examination on the value of imperial 
gifts, see Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han Zongfan maoyi, Table 9, 36-37. 
 
Table 2. 10. Emperor Qianlong’s Extra-Gifts to Chosŏn’s Emissaries, September 
9–28, 1790 
 
Dates 
(Sep.) 
Items Envoy 
Associate  
Envoy 
Secretary 
First-class 
Interpreter 
9, 10 
Tea 1 bottle 1 bottle 1 bottle 1 bottle 
Tea cream 1 box 1 box / / 
Porcelain plate 1 1 1 1 
Apples 4 4 4 4 
12 
Zhang-silk 1 piece 1 piece 1 piece 1 piece 
Five-thread satin 1 piece 1 piece / / 
Embroidered pouches 2 pairs 2 pairs 1 pair 1 pair 
13 
Colored satin 1 piece 1 piece / / 
Large-size satin 1 piece 1 piece / / 
Zhang-silk / / 1 piece 1 piece 
Eight-thread satin 2 piece 2 piece 2 piece 1 piece 
Five-thread satin 2 piece 2 piece 2 piece 2 piece 
Writing paper 1 volume 1 volume 1 volume / 
Chinese brush pens 1 box 1 box 1 box / 
Chinese Ink 1 box 1 box 1 box / 
Ink stone 1 1 / / 
Animal-skin bowl 1 1 1 1 
Porcelain snuff-pots 1 1 1 1 
Silver / / / 20 taels 
14 Porcelain plates 1 1 1 1 
16 
Milk cake 1 box 1 box / / 
Tea 2 boxes 2 boxes / / 
Milk cream 2 boxes 2 boxes / / 
18 
Porcelain articles 2 pieces 2 pieces 1 piece 1 piece 
Leather articles 3 pieces 3 pieces 3 pieces 3 pieces 
Chayote 4 4 4 4 
porcelain snuff-pots 1 1 1 1 
19 Embroidered pouches 2 pairs 2 pairs / / 
26 
First-class incense 50 pieces / / 
Second-class incense 400 pieces / / 
28 
Large-size satin 2 pieces 2 pieces / / 
Zhang-silk 1 piece 1 piece / / 
Jiang-silk 1 piece 1 piece / / 
Zou-silk 1 piece 1 piece / / 
 
Sources: Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 11a-12a. 
 
The extra imperial gifts were multifarious. In February 1795, Emperor Qianlong 
even awarded the king with a hundred copies of the Chinese character of “happiness” (Ch. 
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fu), which he wrote on small red square papers.77 This sort of largesse was seemingly 
random, but it should in no way be regarded as simply the imperial prerogative. Neither 
should it be understood as a deviation from the flowcharts of ritual codes as some would 
argue.78 Rather, it highlighted the dynamic roles of the emperor at the highest level of the 
Zongfan hierarchical system and the policy of “giving more and getting less” (Ch. 
houwang bolai) in Sino–foreign communications. As the leading proponent of this policy, 
the emperor now had opportunities to put it into practice. More importantly, such largesse 
proved that the Zongfan mechanism at its top level was not as routine as it seemed to be 
at its lower levels, nor was it stagnant as has generally been assumed. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the emperor awarded more extra gifts 
to Chosŏn’s missions to underline the Qing’s generosity and its policy of “giving more 
and getting less,” while he constantly reduced Chosŏn’s tributes which in the 1730s 
became less than one-tenth of what it had been in the 1630s. The trajectories of the two 
simultaneous policies toward Chosŏn from the 1630s to the 1850s can be well perceived 
in Figure 2. 2. 
Figure 2. 2. The Decrease in Chosŏn’s Tributes and the Increase in the Qing’s 
Extra Imperial Gifts, 1630s–1850s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
77 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 12b. 
78 Huang Chih-lien, Chaoxian de ruhua qingjing gouzao: Chaoxian wangchao yu manqing wangchao de 
guanxi xingtai lun (The construction of Confucian context in Chosŏn: Comments on relations between the 
Manchu Qing dynasty and the Chosŏn dynasty), 479-491. Huang argues that Emperor Qianlong’s free 
activities of awarding Chosŏn’s emissaries with small gifts distorted “the ritual system of the Heavenly 
Dynasty” (Ch. tianchao lizhi tixi) as he puts it. 
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Sources: Tongmun hwiko, vol. 2, 1474-1475, 1494, 1497-1498, 1503; Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 35; 
Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 9a-19a; Archives with no. 193-198, in ZCSLXB, 255-259; Ming Qing 
shiliao, series 7, vol. 5, 461a-461b; Chun Hae-Jong, Hanjung kwan’gye sa yŏnggu, 79-82; Chang Tsun-wu, 
Qing Han Zongfan maoyi, 25-27.  
Notes: The quantities of tributes and extra gifts from 1637 to 1643 were roughly taken as 100 and 
10 respectively as reference quantities. 
 
As the figure shows, the extra imperial gifts reached their peak in the 1790s, a 
time when Emperor Qianlong, in his eighties, loved extolling the image of the Heavenly 
Dynasty, to which Chosŏn served as the best foil. At this level, the Qing court did not 
seriously take the economic concerns—the appropriate balance between the value of the 
tributes and the imperial gifts—into consideration. In 1793, a Korean emissary 
acknowledged that the Qing treated Chosŏn in such a favorable way that the spending on 
accommodations and the value of the various imperial items much outweighed the value 
of Chosŏn’s “local products.”79 
2.3 The Chosŏn Model and the Qing’s Expansion into Inner Asia 
Along with the military conquest of the Ming’s territory and the territorial expansion into 
Inner Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Qing applied the Chosŏn 
Model to the political units in the Inner Asian area and gradually incorporated them into 
the Qing’s outer fan.80 Some scholars have argued that, in that period the Qing’s rapid 
expansion into Inner Asia resulted in its “passive attitude” toward Chosŏn, which “was 
very much neglected so long as she continued her regular tributes and accepted the 
investitures from the Chinese Emperor.” 81  The truth was that Chosŏn, as a 
well-established model, was playing a primary role in providing practical concepts for 
                                               
79 Yi Chae-hak, Yŏnhaeng ilgi, in Lim Key-zung, ed., Yŏnhaeng nok jŏnjip, vol. 58, 193-194. John K. 
Fairbank also makes the same argument, see “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West,” 135. 
80 See Qi Yunshi, Huangchao fanbu yaolue (A general survey of the subordinates of the imperial Qing 
dynasty).  
81 Frederick Foo Chien, The Opening of Korea: A Study of Chinese Diplomacy, 1876–1885, 14. 
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pacifying Inner Asia and helping the Qing to build up its new political status and 
administrative systems in that area. 
The affairs of Inner Asia were under the management of the Mongolian 
Superintendency. During the Qing, the Mongolian Superintendency and the Ministry of 
Rituals were two parallel central institutes responsible for the affairs of the outer fan, with 
the former managing mainly those fan from Qing China’s north and west (Inner Asia), 
and the latter managing those from the east, the south, and the West. Comparing the 
imperial codes of the two institutes, it seems that the Mongolian Superintendency 
borrowed institutional regulations from the Ministry of Rituals to formalize the 
communications between the Manchu rulers and the Mongolian fan in Inner Asia.82 The 
prototypical role of Chosŏn in nourishing the entire Zongfan system might have arguably 
contributed to the Qing’s policies toward Inner Asia. On the surface, the geographical 
responsibilities of the Ministry of Rituals did not overlap those of the Mongolian 
Superintendency, as the Qing officials articulated in 1743,83 so ostensibly the Qing–
Chosŏn contacts seemed to have no relations with the Qing–Inner Asian contacts. This 
impression might be further corroborated by the relationship between the Manchu court 
and such areas like Tibet, which had always been understood from the religious 
perspective in which the Manchu emperor was Bodhisattva of Manjushree (Ma. manjusiri 
dergi han; Ch. Wenshushili huangdi) in the world, as the Dalai Lama always addressed 
                                               
82 See, for example, Qinding daqing huidian (The collected statutes of the Great Qing, imperially ordained) 
(Beijing, 1764), vols. 79-80, Qinding libu zeli (1844), vols. 171-187, and Qinding lifanyuan zeli (The 
regulations and cases of the Mongolian Superintendency, imperially ordained), vol. 16. As J. K. Fairbank 
and S. Y. Têng put, the way that the Qing controlled and managed these Mongol tribes was “all in the 
traditional forms of the tributary relationship.” See “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” 158-163. 
83 Qinding daqing huidian shili (The collected statutes and precedents of the Great Qing, imperially 
ordained) (Beijing, 1899), vol. 975, 9b-10a. 
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the Manchu monarch in his memorials to Beijing.84 Yet in terms of the political spectrum, 
as early as the first years following 1644, the Qing rulers had begun applying the Chosŏn 
Model to Inner Asia, and the Ministry of Rituals was also in charge of the affairs of some 
lamas in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces until the 1740s when it transferred the right of 
political management to the Mongolian Superintendency. 
In the above-mentioned case of the visit of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1653, the Qing 
successfully used the opportunity to invest the Dalai Lama and the Gusi Khan (1582–
1655) of the Ūlet Mongols by incorporating them into the Qing-dominated extended 
family and putting them under the Qing’s jurisdiction. Interestingly enough, in a time 
when the Mongolian Superintendency still administratively remained in close relations 
with the Ministry of Rituals, it was a Manchu minister (Ch. shangshu; Ma. aliha amban) 
from the Ministry of Rituals, Langkio, and an assistant minister (Ch. shilang; Ma. ashan i 
amban) from the Mongolian Superintendency, Sidali, who gave the lama and the khan the 
investiture books. This was the beginning of the institutionalization of the Qing’s 
Zongfan system in this area. The words in the investiture book to the khan bore a 
remarkable resemblance to those in the one to the new king of Chosŏn in 1649. As key 
terms, it articulated that the receiver must serve as the Qing’s “subordinate” or “fence” 
(Ch. pingfu) “until the Yellow River becomes as narrow as a belt and the Taishan 
Mountain becomes as small as a grindstone” (Ch. daili shanhe).85 In addition, the 
mechanism behind the exchanges of “local products” or “tributes” that the lama and the 
                                               
84 Qinggong zhencang lishi Dalai Lama dang’an huicui (The treasure collection of the Dalai Lama from 
the archives of the Qing dynasty), 15. 
85 Qing shizu shilu, vol. 3, 586-587, 363. The same words first appeared in Hongtaiji’s investiture edict to 
King of Chosŏn in 1637, see Qing taizong shilu, vol. 2, 510-511, and Yinjo sillok, vol. 34, 709. For the 
investiture edict to the Dalai Lama that was written in Mongolian was different from the one to the Gusi 
Khan, see Qinggong zhencang lishi Dalai Lama dang’an huicui, 10-11. The lama’s official title in Manchu 
language is Wargi abkai amba sain jigara fucihi i abkai fejergi fucihi tacihiyan be aliha eaten be sara 
wacira dara dalai lama (Ch. xitian dashan zizai fo suoling tianxia shijiao putong wachiladala dalai lama). 
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khan presented to the emperor and the empress dowager in 1654 and the imperial gifts 
they received from the emperor was very close to that between the Qing and Chosŏn.86 
The Chosŏn Model thus became a normative, standard, as well as powerful soft weapon 
in the repertoire of the Qing court, allowing the Manchu rulers to govern the areas 
conquered by the formidable Eight Banners in Inner Asia, which arguably smoothed the 
way for the Qing to insert its civil administrative system into these areas during the 
Yongzheng and Qianlong periods. Some historians have pointed out that after 1644 the 
Mongolian Superintendency “used rites and forms of the traditional Confucian Chinese 
system to conduct relations with the ‘barbarians’,”87 but what they have missed is that 
those formalities were precisely based upon the Chosŏn Model. 
In this historical process, besides communication with Chosŏn, Ryukyu, Annam, 
Burma, Siam, and other countries under the management of the Ministry of Rituals, the 
Qing efficiently exploited its contacts with Russia and the political units in Inner Asia 
through the Mongolian Superintendency to define and consolidate its identity as China 
and the Heavenly Dynasty. In the Qing’s long process of pacifying the Zunghar Mongols 
who were treated by the Qing rulers as people “beyond virtue and civilization” (Ch. 
dehua zhi wai),88 the discourse of “all-under-Heaven” and “people without difference 
between the outside and the inside” emphasized by the emperor and his agents in the area 
found the Zunghar Mongols, Tibetan forces, and other political forces to be a good 
                                               
86 See the list of the tributes presented by the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gusi Khan and the imperial gifts 
bestowed to them, dated November 15, 1654, in Qinggong zhencang lishi Dalai Lama dang’an huicui, 
18-19. 
87 Mark Mancall, “The Ch’ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay,” 72-73. 
88 Qing shizong shilu (Veritable records of Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing), vol. 8, 388. For the Qing’s 
penetration into Inner Asia by conquering Zunghar and Turkestan, see Peter C. Perdue, China Marches 
West, 133-299; James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass, 25-36, and Eurasian Crossroads: A History of 
Xinjiang, 88-97. 
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audience.89 Although the Zunghar were eventually annihilated by Emperor Qianlong, the 
leading strategy of the Qing for tackling its relations with the Zunghar and other political 
forces in Inner Asia was to transform them into the Qing’s outer fan and integrate them 
into the Qing’s Zongfan mechanism, as the Chosŏn Model suggested.90 An extensive 
treatment of this issue invites more specific research on Qing–Inner Asian relations, 
which exceeds the current boundaries of this dissertation. 
2.4 Institutional Barbarianization of Chosŏn under the Chinese Empire of the Qing 
In Zongfan communications with the prototypical fan, which occurred several times a 
year in Beijing, the Qing toward the middle of the eighteenth century was able to 
confidently and freely demonstrate its identity as the Heavenly Dynasty before Chosŏn, 
Ryukyu, Annam, and other foreign countries that were naturally considered its 
subordinates. The Qing accomplished this construction of its new political and cultural 
identity by institutionally and intellectually barbarianizing Chosŏn—that is, the Qing 
gradually transformed Chosŏn from a country known as “Little China” into a country of 
“foreign barbarians” (Ch. waiyi) that served as the most typical “people from afar” (Ch. 
yuanren; Ma. goroki niyalma) in the Qing’s political discourse and imperial documents.91 
As a result, all foreign countries followed the prototypical fan into the category of 
“foreign barbarians” in the Qing’s politico-cultural discourse and norms. The remarkable 
                                               
89 See, for example, Yu Bao’s memorial to Emperor Qianlong, August 19, 1747, in Qingdai junjichu 
manwen aocha dang (The records preserved at the Grand Council regarding to the emissaries of Zunghar 
Mongols to Tibetan temples for donations), vol. 1, 1123; Hai Wang’s memorial to Emperor Qianlong, May 
7, 1748, ibid., vol. 2, 1476. 
90 Qinding daqing huidian (Beijing, 1764), vol. 80, 26a. For the communications between the Qing 
policy-makers and Zunghar Mongols from 1734 (the 12th Year of Yongzheng) to 1754 (the 19th Year of 
Qianlong), see Junjichu manwen zhungaer shizhe dang yibian (The Chinese translations of the Manchu 
records preserved at the Grand Council regarding to the emissaries of Zunghar Mongols). The collection 
was originally entitled by the Qing court Yishi dang (The records of the barbarian emissaries). 
91 Qianlong chao manwen jixindang yibian (The collection of the Chinese translations of the Manchu 
record books of imperial edicts), vol. 12, 115-120. 
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milestone in this dual intellectual transformation as well as reconstruction was the 
imperial collection Illustrations of Subordinate Peoples of the Imperial Qing, first 
published in 1761, in the Qianlong period.92 
THE CONUNDRUM OF “BARBARIANS” FROM YONGZHENG TO QIANLONG 
The Qing’s attitude toward the civilized–barbarian distinction underwent a sharp change 
in the transitional days between the Yongzheng and the Qianlong periods in the 1730s. In 
the late 1720s, Emperor Yongzheng publicized the issue to all intellectuals of the Qing as 
a result of the case of Zeng Jing, in which the emperor himself was deeply involved. In 
June 1733, when Zeng was engaging in his itinerant lectures in the provinces, Yongzheng 
issued an edict to prohibit changing Chinese characters with the meaning of “barbarian” 
(Ch. hu, lu, yi, and di) in books. He defined “barbarian” from the geographical point of 
view and confessed that the ancestors of the dynasty could be called “eastern barbarians” 
(Ch. dongyi), like those ancient Chinese saints. This tone, as Chapter 1 describes, had 
actually been set by Hongtaiji in 1636 in his letter to king of Chosŏn, and Yongzheng 
repeated the points in his book Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion (Ch. Dayi juemi 
lu) in 1729. By proclaiming that “people living both within and outside China are in the 
same family” (Ch. zhongwai yijia), Yongzheng insisted that the issue of the civilized–
barbarian distinction should not be understood from the cultural sense, and if it were, 
only those who were “beyond the civilization” (Ch. wanghua zhi wai) like Zunghar, 
might be called “barbarians.”93 This meant that all the Qing’s fan under the Qing’s 
civilized management must not be regarded as “barbarians” either. Consequently, the 
                                               
92 Huangqing zhigong tu; Chuang Chi-fa, Xie Sui zhigong tu manwen tushuo jiaozhu (Interpretations and 
annotations on the Manchu characters in Zhigong tu made drawn Xie Sui). 
93 Qing shizong shilu, vol. 8, 696-697. 
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yardstick for judging “barbarians” became nebulous in the late years of the Yongzheng 
period, in that the ruling dynasty identified itself with one of the “barbarians.” 
The outright statements of Yongzheng led some students of the Qing to conclude 
that the Manchu rulers at that time began carrying out a policy of “cultural egalitarianism” 
in order to redistribute cultural resources within the vast multiethnic empire.94 It is safe 
to state that Yongzheng tried to overcome the prejudice of the stereotypical civilized–
barbarian distinction among Han Chinese intellectuals in the background of the Manchus’ 
Sinicization,95 but it would be far-fetched to assert that the emperor and his regime took 
a position “against the thought of the civilized–barbarian distinction.”96 By bringing a 
sharp termination to Zeng Jing’s own life in 1735, Emperor Qianlong fundamentally 
changed his father’s policy by clearly differentiating the “civilized” Qing China from all 
the countries surrounding it. In this way, the emperor brought the civilized–barbarian 
distinction back to its original point of departure, where cultural factors played a pivotal 
role, while he efficiently exploited the heritage of his father regarding free and public use 
of all Chinese characters with the meaning of “barbarian.”  
As a result of Qianlong’s passionate restoration of the issue, Yongzheng’s rhetoric 
in his book was proved to be a distortion of the whole chain of the civilized–barbarian 
distinction. In the Qianlong period, the use of “foreign barbarians” in Qing official 
documents reached its zenith in history, through which the Qing identified itself as 
Zhongguo and the Heavenly Dynasty with cultural superiority.97 Qianlong achieved his 
                                               
94 Hirano Satoshi, Shin teikoku to chibetto mondai: taminzoku tōgō no seiritsu to gakai (The Qing empire 
and the Tibet issue: the formation and collapse of the multiethnic unification), 71-112. 
95 Takeo Abe, Shindaisi no kenkyu (Historical studies of the Qing dynasty), 33-56. 
96 Hirano Satoshi, Shin teikoku to chibetto mondai: taminzoku tōgō no seiritsu to gakai, 71-133. 
97 For the changes of relations between Zhongguo and “foreign barbarians” (waiyi) during the Ming and 
Qing times, see Kishimoto Mio, “‘Chūgoku’ to ‘gai i’: myōdai kara shin ‘chūki ni okeru kokka koshō no 
mondai” (“China” and “foreign barbarians”: The issue of China’s from the Ming period to the middle Qing 
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goals by institutionally barbarianizing all other countries and the majority of ethnic 
groups under his emperorship, of which one of the most important targets was Chosŏn. 
INSTITUTIONAL BARBARIANIZATION OF CHOSŎN AND OTHERS 
On June 26, 1751, Emperor Qianlong made the essential move by instructing his 
ministers of the Grand Council (Ch. Junji chu) to order governor-generals or governors 
on the Qing’s borders to draw pictures of “domestic and foreign barbarians” (Ch. neiwai 
miaoyi, waiyi fanzhong) in order to show the flourishing of the Qing.98 As it turned out, 
the emperor was following a tradition of Emperor Taizong (599–649, r. 627–649) of the 
Tang dynasty, who was believed to have brought China the most prosperous days of the 
pre-Qing era. Since Tang Taizong had drawn pictures of those “barbarians” from the 
Tang’s periphery and “countries from afar” (Ch. yuanguo) to celebrate the great event 
when “ten thousand countries devoutly came to revere the emperor” (Ch. wanguo 
laichao),99 Emperor Qianlong had every reason to believe that the more prosperous days 
under his rule in the Great Qing should be enshrined as well. 
Beyond the obvious political factors, as a big fan of Chinese opera who 
contributed greatly to the birth of the Peking Opera, Emperor Qianlong might have been 
considerably influenced by certain operas popular in society that extolled the virtues of 
“ten thousand countries [that] devoutly came to revere the emperor.” These operas could 
be dated at least to the Yuan period, but in the Ming and the earlier Qing periods they 
were still performed in local communities of such Chinese cities as Beijing. The scripts 
of these operas described the Ming as the “Heavenly Dynasty,” the “upper country,” or 
                                                                                                                                            
period), manuscript, cited with the author’s permission. 
98 Qing gaozong shilu, vol. 14, 120-121. 
99 Jiu tang shu (Old history of the Tang dynasty), vol. 16, 5274. 
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the “central civilized country” (Ch. Zhonghua), bordered by “barbarians from four 
directions” (Ch. siyi) paying tribute and presenting palace memorials to the emperor. The 
“four barbarians” in these operas were frequently represented as Chosŏn, Annam, and 
political units in Inner Asia. This kind of popular culture in Chinese society at the time 
might have motivated Emperor Qianlong to initiate the project.100 
Ten years later, in 1761, the first edition of the imperial collection, entitled 
Illustrations of Subordinate Peoples of the Imperial Qing (Ch. Huangqing zhigong tu), 
was published in four volumes, containing 600 colorful pictures of people from the 
Qing’s outer fan or “barbarian places” in the Qing’s territory or on its periphery. Once 
again, Chosŏn became the model for others in the collection, and its prototypical role was 
made clear by Qing scholars in the Essentials of Complete Books of the Four Storehouses 
Catalogue (Ch. Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao).101 The first picture in the collection was of 
a Korean official who wore the Ming-style official robe but was termed the “barbarian 
official of Country of Chosŏn” (Ch. Chaoxian guo yiguan) (Figure 2. 3). Chosŏn, the 
“Little China,” now was institutionally converted into a country of “barbarians” by the 
Qing’s political discourse and imperial documentary mechanism. 
Along with Chosŏn, other countries, including Ryukyu, Annam, Siam, Sulu, 
Lanchang, Burma, Britain, France, Japan, Holland, and Russia, were likewise converted 
into countries of “barbarians,” together with the many ethnic minorities under the Qing’s 
administrative management. 102  In nearly every case, the narrative constructed an 
                                               
100 “Zhu wanshou wanguo laichao” (Ten thousand countries devoutly came to celebrate the emperor’s 
birthday), in Guben yuan ming zaju (The only existing copy of the operas in the Yuan and Ming times), vol. 
32. 
101 Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao (Essentials of Complete Books of the Four Storehouses Catalogue), vol. 15, 
12 
102 Huangqing zhigong tu, 40-154, 155-1067. 
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imperial pedigree by reviewing a long history of Zongfan relations with the said foreign 
“country” (Ch. guo; Ma. gurun) or domestic “tribe” (Ch. buluo; Ma. aiman) from the 
Zhou to the Ming. Furthermore, the collection culturally emphasized that it was the great 
merits of the Qing that made the “barbarians” “send emissaries to come to pay tribute” 
(Ch. qianshi rugong; Ma. elcin takūrafi albabun jafanjimbi) or “come to kowtow with 
tribute” (Ch. chaogong; Ma. albabun jafame hengkilenjimbi).103 In this way, the Qing 
assimilated conventional influences into its own Zongfan relations with these countries or 
tribes and consolidated its historical legitimacy as Zhongguo (Ma. dulimbai gurun).104 In 
his poem specially made for these pictures, Emperor Qianlong, although he put the Qing 
on an equal footing with the Tang, highlighted this political motive by stating that “these 
illustrations are not to show how great we are, but to forever embrace the peaceful order 
that we have.”105 
Figure 2. 3. The Official of Chosŏn in Illustrations of Subordinate Peoples of the 
Imperial Qing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Huangqing zhigong tu, 33. 
Notes: The Chinese characters on the picture read the “barbarian official of Country of Chosŏn” 
                                               
103 See, for example, Huangqing zhigong tu, 40-41, 54-55, 58-59, 66-67. 
104 Chuang Chi-fa, Xie Sui zhigong tu manwen tushuo jiaozhu, 60-61, 78-79; Laura Hostetler, Qing 
Colonial Enterprise, 47; Richard J. Smith, Mapping China and Managing the World: Culture, Cartography 
and Cosmology in Late Imperial Times, 75-76. 
105 Huangqing zhigong tu, 2. Even in the Qing expansion into Central Asia, Emperor Qianlong identified 
“the efforts of the Han and Tang dynasties to extend Chinese power into Central Asia” as “historical 
milestones” to measure his own progress. See James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass, 25. 
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(Ch. Chaoxian guo yiguan). The Manchu equivalent, which was added later, noted only “the official of 
Country of Chosŏn” (Ma. coohiyan gurun i hafan), by deleting the meaning of the character “barbarian.” 
See Chuang Chi-fa, Xie Sui zhigong tu manwen tushuo jiaozhu, 40-41. The same thing happened to people 
of other countries whom in Chinese were depicted as “barbarians.” 
 
If there is “documentary institutionalization,” 106  the one for the Qing’s 
transformation of its self-identity in the Zongfan world achieved in 1761 is Illustrations 
of Subordinate Peoples of the Imperial Qing. In the same year, in order to celebrate the 
empress dowager’s seventieth birthday, the Qing published another magnificent 
collection of illustrations, Illustrations of the Great Celebration (Ch. Luhuan huijing tu). 
The first illustration had the title “Ten thousand countries devoutly came to revere the 
emperor” (Ch. wanguo laichao), precisely the phrase the Tang dynasty had used. 
Emperor Qianlong also put the same poem on the illustration.107 Behind the cheerful 
façade of the greatness of the empire measured by the former prosperous Tang dynasty 
was the Qing’s hope of sustaining the ongoing political and cultural order. To a large 
degree, the two homogeneous collections marked the accomplishment of the Qing’s 
prolonged construction of its cultural representation as the Heavenly Dynasty since 1644. 
As mentioned above, Britain, known as “Country of Ying ji li” by the Qing (Ch. 
Yingjili guo; Ma. ing gi lii gurun), was also institutionally barbarianized in the collection 
of 1761.108 It is worth noting that, at the end of the same year, the emperor instructed his 
representatives in Guangzhou (Canton) to notify the “men from afar” and the “foreign 
barbarians” there—the British merchants—that “the Heavenly Dynasty has everything it 
needs, so it does not need foreign barbarians to bring trivial goods for trade.”109 The 
imperial edict was a result of the petitions of James Flint in 1759 and Captain Nicholas 
                                               
106 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Manzhou Yuanliu Kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage,” in The 
Journal of Asian Studies 46. 4 (Nov., 1987): 761. 
107 Qingshi tudian (Illustrated history of the Qing dynasty), vol. 6, 197-198. 
108 Huangqing zhigong tu, 102-104. 
109 Qing gaozong shilu, vol. 17, 259-260. 
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Skottowe in 1761. Both men, as representatives of the British merchants in Guangzhou, 
wanted to change the Canton system of trade, but their efforts proved futile, indeed 
occasioning stricter regulations on Western traders in China.110 In this sense, what 
George Macartney would learn from the emperor in 1793 was only a repetition of the 
institutionalized rhetoric that had been directed at other British representatives in 1761. 
NORMALIZING CHOSON’S STATUS AS “FOREIGN BARBARIANS” 
This prolonged construction of the Qing’s new identity and its political discourse toward 
other countries should not be regarded as the result of the emperor’s personal activities or 
political motivations, imposed upon the whole administration from the top down. Neither 
should it be understood as purely a process of penetration of the political will of the 
Manchu court. Rather, the Qing’s officials at the local level, from provinces to prefectures 
to counties, also contributed to this construction from the bottom up. As a result, in the 
eighteenth century, Chosŏn’s status as “foreign barbarians” was normalized in the Qing’s 
Zongfan norms. 
A typical case illustrating this point was the Qing’s policy towards fishermen or 
people of other countries who suffered shipwreck and were rescued by local officials on 
the coast. At least from the early Qianlong period, in the Qing official documents, these 
victims from Chosŏn, Ryukyu, Annam, and other countries were called “barbarians who 
suffered from storm” (Ch. zaofeng nanyi; Ma. edun de lasihibufi jobolon de tušaha i 
niyalma), who would be sent to Beijing or certain provincial capitals where they could go 
home together with embassies from their own country. The Qing archives, with a span of 
one and a half centuries from the 1730s to the 1880s, were full of such reports of local 
                                               
110 Earl H. Pritchard, Anglo–Chinese Relations during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 133-138, 
and his The Crucial Years of Early Anglo–Chinese Relations, 1750–1800, 128-134. 
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officials, among which those concerning Chosŏn were prominent.111 By accommodating 
these victims on humanitarian grounds, the Qing tried to highlight its policy of 
“cherishing men from afar” and to “display the deep and outstanding merits of the 
Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. zhao tianchao rouyuan shenren; Ma. abkai gurun i goroki urse 
be gosire šumin gosin be iletulembi).112 This sort of rhetoric reached its peak during the 
Qianlong period with the aim of formalizing, consolidating, and justifying the “way of 
the Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. tianchao tizhi; Ma. abkai gurun i doro yoso). 
Since Chosŏn had the most frequent contacts with the Qing, the “way of the 
Heavenly Dynasty” made Chosŏn its best agent in practice and permeated many aspects 
of Qing–Chosŏn communication. For instance, in 1776, 1,000 taels of silver of a Korean 
mission were stolen by Chinese thieves in Jinzhou, a city near Mukden. Emperor 
Qianlong instructed the Manchu General of Mukden, Hūngšang, to compensate the 
mission for their losses in order to “meet the way of our Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. he wo 
tianchao tizhi; Ma. musei amba gurun i doro de acanambi). More important, the emperor 
emphasized in his Chinese edict that “Chosŏn was [a country of] foreign barbarians” (Ch. 
Chaoxian nai waiyi zhi ren), which was further explained in his Manchu edict by 
articulating that “the people of the country of Chosŏn were people of foreign barbarians” 
(Ma. coohiyan gurun i niyalma serengge, tulergi aiman i niyalma).113 Considering that 
many similar incidents took place in the history of Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relations, the 
case in 1776 was not exceptional.114 Indeed, it is through such a normal case that one can 
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114 Kim Seon-min, “Kŏllyung nyŏnkan Chosŏn sahaeng ŭi ŭn bunsil sagŏn.” 
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perceive that the Qing’s political discourse on the entire Zongfan system had become 
mature and that the momentous institutional transformations of its identity as Zhongguo 
and the Heavenly Dynasty and of Chosŏn’s identity as barbarians were very significant. 
THE SYMBIOTIC LEGITIMACY BEHIND THE CHOSŎN MODEL 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the Qing accomplished the momentous 
transformation of its identity as the Heavenly Dynasty by extending the Chosŏn Model to 
other countries in Southeast Asia and Inner Asia in the course of constructing the 
Qing-centric Zongfan system. It also completed the institutionalization of its new 
political discourse on the apparatus, according to which other countries served as 
countries of “barbarians” and the Qing’s fan on the periphery of Qing China. 
As the prototypical fan, Chosŏn provided the Qing with sources, several times a 
year, for reinforcing the infrastructure of the entire system by visiting Beijing, submitting 
tributes and memorials, and performing concrete ceremonies. That the Qing was the 
center of the world, with the hallmark of Zhongguo and the “Heavenly Dynasty,” could 
be regularly, materially, and institutionally demonstrated to people inside and outside the 
ritual relationship and those within and outside of the Qing’s borders. Similarly, in the 
bilateral contacts, Chosŏn, as well as Ryukyu, Annam, and other countries, could gain its 
own identity as a subordinate of China, and its king, like those of the other fan, could 
obtain legitimacy as monarch to govern his country as an agent of the Son of Heaven of 
China. This concept was shared by the Qing-centric world and highlighted by Emperor 
Yongzheng’s imperial edict to the king of Annam on June 22, 1727, in which he 
demarcated a new border line between the Qing and Annam, allowing Annam’s line to 
extend 12.45 miles (40 Chinese li) more toward the Qing, based on the idea that all lands 
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of the Qing’s fan were under his rule.115 This Chinese ideology of “all-under-Heaven” 
thus endowed both sides with identity and legitimacy and cemented the entire system in 
practice through the exchanges of emissaries. 
This point goes far to explain a paradox in the Qing period: certain Confucian 
countries, in particular Chosŏn and Annam, were reluctant in their own mind to identify 
the Qing as the supreme representative of Chinese culture, while in practice they never 
challenged the Qing’s status as the superior country; quite the contrary, they frequently 
sent tributary missions to Beijing to display their obedience. The reason behind this 
paradox was precisely that the missions related fundamentally not only to the legitimacy 
of the Qing as a Chinese empire, but also to that of the monarchs of the fan. Therefore, 
the Zongfan relationship between the Qing and its fan was an incarnation of this 
symbiotic and synergistic legitimacy, namely the orthodox legitimacy that was embodied 
by highly-programmed ritual performances in the exchanges of emissaries. 
The orthodox legitimacy was the reason King Taksin (r. 1767–1782) of the 
Thonburi regime (1767–1782) of Siam sent tributary missions to Beijing to pursue 
investiture after the fall of the Ayutthaya regime (1350–1767), which was later exactly 
emulated by Rama I (r. 1782–1809) of the present Rattanakosin dynasty after the fall of 
King Taksin, even though the understanding regarding “paying tribute” (Ch. jingong) of 
both King Taksin and Rama was fundamentally different from that of the Qing.116 The 
legitimacy could also explain why Nguyễn Huệ (1753–1792, r. 1788–1792), the leader of 
the peasant rebellion against the Lê dynasty (1428–1788) of Annam, defeated the Qing 
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army in 1789, but accepted the Qing’s investiture in 1790.117 It was also in 1790 that 
Burma accepted the Qing’s investiture after winning the Burmese–Qing War in the early 
1770s.118 Besides pragmatic concerns of these countries on account of geopolitics and 
China’s military might, pursuing political legitimacy from China proved crucial for their 
own rule. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century, during the reign of Emperor Qianlong, 
the Qing-centric Zongfan system developed fully with the rise of the new empire and 
worked in a remarkably stable and systematic way. To a large degree, this was the fruit of 
the Manchu regime’s continuous efforts since the 1610s. Toward the end of the eighteenth 
century, when all the Qing’s fan were institutionally barbarianzed, the Qing had no 
difficulty identifying itself as “China” and the “Heavenly Dynasty.” This identity and the 
Qing-centric world order were further materially substantiated by perennial tributary 
emissaries from Chosŏn, demonstrating their symbiotic legitimacy and mutually 
constitutive identity in the Chinese world.  For Qing China, the known world proved no 
peer within or outside its borders. Its primary policy toward its outer fan turned out to be 
“cherishing men from afar,” which was specifically highlighted by its economic rule of 
“giving more and getting less.” This policy meant to demonstrate the Qing’s 
incomparable generosity and superiority, yet properly conducting it was very challenging 
for the Qing’s bureaucracy. The visits to Beijing of the “barbarian” emissaries of Chosŏn, 
Annam, and Britain in the 1790s were good examples to illustrate this point.  
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CHAPTER 3 
“Cherishing Men From Afar”: The Way of the Heavenly Dynasty and the Barbarian 
Emissaries, 1762–1861 
Since the 1760s, the Qing maintained the policy of “cherishing men from afar” toward 
“countries of barbarians,” which lasted until the Second Opium War of 1856–1860. The 
Qing recognized this policy as one of the most widely held premises undergirding the 
“way of the Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. tianchao tizhi; Ma. abkai gurun i doro yoso), and it 
demonstrated that the Chosŏn Model was at its political heart. Assuming that all 
“countries of barbarians” should follow the imperial codes and the Zongfan discipline as 
Chosŏn did, the Qing punished any deviation from this policy that caused tensions 
between the Manchu rulers and local bureaucrats of the Qing and those between the Qing 
and other countries. This chapter explores the interior aspects and function of the 
Zongfan order and how the Qing’s rule of “cherishing the men from afar” operated in the 
ritual protocol and presentations of diplomatic missions between the Qing, Chosŏn, and 
other countries from 1762 to 1861. 
3.1  “Cherishing Men from Afar”: The Chosŏn Missions in 1780 and 1790 
RE-PERCEIVING THE “BARBARIAN” QING BY THE “LITTLE CHINA” IN 1780 
Although the Qing institutionally portrayed Chosŏn as a “country of barbarian” and 
Chosŏn’s emissaries as the “men from afar,” Chosŏn, in its own mind, was reluctant to 
regard the Qing as the civilized center of the world. For intellectuals of Chosŏn who were 
neo-Confucian followers and embraced the principle of the civilized–barbarian 
distinction, the Manchu barbarians’ conquest of China proper in 1644 marked the end of 
Chinese culture on the territory of the civilized Ming China. With the irreversible 
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downfall of the Ming, Chosŏn unprecedentedly strengthened its identity as the “Little 
China” by recognizing itself as the exclusive and genuine successor to the “central 
civilized country” (Ch. Zhonghua). This identity was shared by many unlettered Korean 
civilians, such as Ch’oe Hyo-il, who sacrificed himself in front of the tomb of Emperor 
Chongzhen of the Ming in 1644 after the Manchus took over Beijing. The self-sacrifice 
could not be explained by modern nationalism in East Asia, for it illuminated the 
transnational nature of China-centric cosmopolitanism and the ideology of the civilized–
barbarian distinction. It also exposed the difficulties that the Qing was facing in 
transforming itself into China and the Heavenly Dynasty in the post-Ming period. 
After 1644, Chosŏn maintained its political subordination to the Qing on the 
surface, which was used by the Qing to construct the Qing’s Chineseness. Chosŏn, 
however, constructed its own Chineseness within the country by depicting the Qing as 
“barbarians” in particular moments. In 1704, Chosŏn established the “Great Altar for 
Gratitude” (K. taebodan) to commemorate the great favors of the “Imperial Ming” who 
saved the country from the Japanese invasion in the 1590s. The year in Chosŏn’s official 
record was termed as “the 77th Year of Chongzhen,” which set the starting year to 
1628—the year Chongzhen became the last emperor of the Ming. Recalling the history of 
the past six decades, the king emphasized that “the barbarians occupied our Central Plain 
where the rituals and clothes consequently became barbarian.”1 The “rituals and clothes” 
were traditional Chinese metaphors for civilization, which in this niche suggested that 
China was barbarianized by the Manchu conquerors. Along with this approach, in 1715 
Chosŏn invested Ch’oe Hyo-il with an honorable rank to praise his spirit for being 
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committed to the Heavenly Dynasty of the Ming.2 Chosŏn continued to commemorate 
the Ming for three centuries, until it became Japan’s protectorate in the 1900s. 
From the late seventeenth to the middle of eighteenth centuries, the anti-Qing 
attitude was so popular among Korean intellectuals that a leading scholar Song Si-yŏl 
(1607–1689) arduously proposed in 1687 a bold plan of “Northern Expedition” against 
the Qing in order to “recover Central Plain” on behalf of the Ming. Many others in the 
intelligentsia supported his views.3 The Korean monarch and intellectual stratum, like 
their ancestors in 1626 and 1636, followed the doctrines of neo-Confucianism out of an 
obligation to be the filial son and loyal subordinate to the Ming. As a result of this moral 
kidnapping, on the top level, the king presented himself as the loyal subordinate to the 
Qing to maintain the orthodox legitimacy between the two courts and the two countries.  
The monarch also served as the moral leader of the anti-barbarian Qing inside Chosŏn to 
preserve the orthodox legitimacy between his rulership and his subordinates. On the 
bottom level, Chosŏn’s tributary emissaries to the Qing represented this contradictory, for 
they were treated as “men from afar” by the Qing, on the one hand, and they recognized 
the Qing as a “country of barbarians,” on the other. 
This intrinsic incongruity of Chosŏn’s moral and cultural judgment prompted the 
country to isolate itself from Qing China in many aspects. Since the second half of the 
eighteenth century, however, some Korean intellectuals started to reconsider their 
entrenched perception about the “barbarian” Qing after they witnessed the Qing’s 
prosperity in their journeys to Beijing. As a consequence of their disillusionment with 
Chosŏn’s self-imagined cultural superiority, these pundits recognized the Qing as a 
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civilized country. They called for Chosŏn to learn practical techniques from Qing China 
for its own good, beyond its embrace of the doctrine of “revering China and expelling the 
barbarians.” This approach was known as “practical knowledge” (K. sirhak), which 
generated the so-called “school of learning from the north” (K. puk’ak p’ae). A leading 
figure of this school was Pak Chi-wŏn (1737–1805), who visited Beijing in 1780 as an 
affiliated member of the tributary mission. 
Pak Chi-wŏn was born an aristocrat of the hereditary Yangban (lit. two classes). In 
1780, his cousin, Pak Myŏng-wŏn (1725–1790), was appointed as the emissary to Beijing 
to celebrate Emperor Qianlong’s seventieth birthday. This gave Pak Chi-wŏn a good 
opportunity to visit China. As he was not an official member of the mission, Pak Chi-wŏn 
later told his Chinese counterparts that his purpose was “tourism in the Upper Country.” 
Thanks to his special status as the emissary’s cousin, Pak attended the imperial audience 
and met with the Sixth Panchen Lama at Rehe and had intensive written conversations 
with some Han Chinese and Manchu intellectuals and officials in Rehe and Beijing. 
Shocked by the Qing’s prosperity from small towns on border to the metropolitan areas of 
Beijing, Pak realized that the stereotypical perception about the “barbarian” Qing among 
the meritocracy of Chosŏn had become a hurdle to correctly understand the Qing and 
make steady progress on people’s livelihood. 
In his Yŏrha ilgi (Rehe diary) about his journey to the Qing, Pak struggled with 
the stereotypical moral correctness of his pro-Ming and anti-Qing principles. He desired 
to learn from the Qing and “use techniques to benefit people’s livelihood” (K. iyong 
husaeng). This was a virtual admission of the great achievements of the “barbarian” Qing, 
and its implication was that the Qing was the civilized Zhongguo and Chosŏn was a 
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“country of barbarians.” This logic violently shook the civilized–barbarian distinction in 
this mind and ignited a self-contradiction that was crystallized by the progressive and 
substantial changes of his perceptions of the Qing along his trip. 
Pak was greatly shocked from the first day, when he saw the Qing’s small town on 
the border. On July 28, 1780, after crossing the Yalu River, the tributary mission reached 
the Gate of the Fence (Ch. Zhamen) at the entrance to Fenghuang City. Pak noticed that 
the houses, walls, doors, and streets of the town inside the fence were well-designed and 
well-managed and the town had no “indication of inferior rural style.” Pak suddenly 
realized that such scenery on the “eastern end” of the Qing could only suggest a more 
prosperous world in the inner land. He felt so uncomfortable that he even wanted to 
return to Hansŏng immediately. According to his prejudiced perception of the Qing, there 
was no way that the land under the Manchu “barbarian” rulers could be so efficiently 
managed, especially not in such an impressive way and to such a significant degree. Pak 
asked his private servant Chang Bok, with great frustration, “how is it if you were born in 
China?” Chang immediately answered, “China is barbarian (K. Chungguk ho ya; Ch. 
Zhongguo hu ye), so I do not want to be born in China.”4 The young and illiterate servant 
was probably only trying to please his master, but his answer was precisely what his 
master sincerely believed. It was also a reflection of how deep and prevalent the 
perception of the Qing as “barbarian” was among Korean people. Nevertheless, Pak must 
have realized that his journey would not be as peaceful as he had wished. 
Indeed, it turned out to be an extremely challenging trip for Pak. When he passed 
by Liaoyang, Mukden, small towns, and villages, Pak was favorably impressed by 
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magnificent buildings, thriving markets, and flourishing urban and rural communities, 
where he was treated by the local civilians and officials in a very friendly way. He also 
enjoyed written conversations with Han Chinese and Manchu intellectuals and officials, 
and appreciated local sceneries and historical sites. At these places and moments, Pak’s 
charge that the Qing was “barbarian” was completely absent from his diary. 
Although he could freely discuss classics with his Chinese counterparts, Pak saw 
a gap between them in a practical sense that resulted from Chosŏn’s cultural isolation 
from the Qing after 1644. When he visited a pawnshop at the Xinmin village, he was 
invited by the owner to write some Chinese characters. Pak recalled that he saw four big 
characters of “exceeding frost, surpassing snow” (K. kisang saesǒl; Ch. qishuang saixue) 
on front doors of some shops in Mukden and Liaoyang, so he put them down by 
assuming that they must mean that a businessman’s heart should be as pure as frost and 
snow. Yet the four characters actually represented a metaphor for high quality of flour. 
The shop owner, being totally confused by the characters, shook his head and murmured 
that they were not related to his business. Pak left angrily.5 Next day, when he camped at 
the Xiaoheishan village, he wrote the same four characters for another shop owner selling 
women’s jewelry.Yet this owner was confused too, asking him that, “I am selling 
women’s jewelry, not flour, so why did you write these characters for me?” Pak, suddenly 
realizing what the characters really meant, felt extremely awkward and upset, but he 
remained calm and wrote other characters that won him high praise from the owner.6 
Following the disturbing episode, Pak made a critical self-examination on 
Chosŏn’s popular perception of the “barbarian” Qing. He put forward the idea of “using 
                                               
5 Ibid., vol. 1, 59b-60a. 
6 Ibid., vol. 1, 65b. 
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techniques to benefit people’s livelihood” by comparing attitudes toward the Qing among 
Chosŏn’s intellectuals. He divided these intellectuals into three categories, including 
“Upper Savants” (K. sangsa), “Middle Savants” (K. chongsa), and “Lower Savants” (K. 
hasa). He discussed a scenario first, in which the Korean people who had never visited 
the Qing would ask those who returned from Beijing about the most impressive thing 
they had seen in their journey. According to Pak, whereas many visitors would list certain 
things without hesitation, such as the white pagoda of Liaodong, the Chinese markets, the 
Shanhai Pass, the Upper Savants would seriously answer that “nothing is impressive” 
because the people in China, from the Son of Heaven to the common subjects, were 
“barbarians as long as they shaved their hair.” Since “barbarians are dogs and sheep,” 
nothing was worth praising and this point should be “the first-class argumentation.” The 
Middle Savants would argue that “the mountains and lands became barbarian and nothing 
over there is impressive until we lead 100,000 forces to cross the Shanhai Pass to recover 
China.”7 
Identifying himself as one of the Lower Savants who supported the attitude of 
“revering China and expelling the barbarians” of the Upper and Middle Savants, Pak 
passionately called for his colleagues to “learn the good ways and useful systems as long 
as they can benefit our people and country, even if these ways and systems were created 
by barbarians.” He argued that, “if we want to expel the barbarians, we should learn all 
the Chinese good systems to change ours, after which we might be able to say that China 
has nothing impressive.” For him, the impressive things were China’s techniques of 
efficiently using such “waste of the world” as stools and broken tiles to benefit people’s 
daily life. Pak tried to separate practical techniques from the moral charges against the 
                                               
7 Ibid., vol. 2, 1a-2a. 
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Qing, sharing similarities with the Chinese policy of “learning the superior techniques of 
the barbarians” (Ch. shi yi changji) in the 1840s. Yet this approach would simultaneously 
mean to blur the boundary of the civilized and the barbarian. In this sense, his argument 
became a double-edged sword not only for himself, but also for the general moral 
foundation of his country.  
As he saw increasingly prosperous Chinese places, Pak’s understanding of the 
Qing evolved in complexity. On August 30, by walking 630 miles via 33 transfer stations 
after they crossed the Yalu River, Pak and the mission arrived in Beijing, where he was 
greatly shocked again by the grandness of the metropolis. In his diary of the day, he used 
the Qing’s reign-title to count the date for the first time by writing that “it is the 1st day of 
the 8th month of the 45th Year of Qianlong,” incorporating himself into the Zongfan 
trajectory by identifying the Qing’s legitimate status as China.8 
IDENTIFYING AS THE LOYAL SUBORDINATE OF THE GREAT QING AT REHE 
IN 1780 
When they arrived in Beijing, the emissaries learned that Emperor Qianlong had moved 
to the imperial summer palace at Rehe, where the Sixth Panchen Lama and Mongolian 
princes would convene to celebrate the imperial birthday on September 11. On September 
2, the emperor instructed the Ministry of Rituals to ask the emissaries to visit Rehe and 
ordered a minister of the Grand Council to Beijing to welcome them, which was “an 
extraordinary imperial benevolence.” The envoy immediately organized a special team on 
an ad hoc basis, to which Pak Chi-wŏn was attached. Five days later, they arrived at Rehe 
and were lodged at the Hall of the Highest Learning (Ch. Taixue guan). 
Yet the Korean emissaries were soon involved in some subtle conflicts with the 
                                               
8 Ibid., vol. 2, 57b. 
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Ministry of Rituals. Upon their arrival, Emperor Qianlong instructed that the emissaries 
would stand at the end of the right wing of China’s second-rank civil officials during the 
grand ceremony on the celebration day, which was the emperor’s “special and 
unprecedented grace” because the imperial ritual codes required the emissaries to stand at 
the end of the left wing of the civil officials. The ministers of the ministry promptly asked 
the envoy to submit a memorial to show Chosŏn’s appreciation. The envoy hesitated as it 
would be inappropriate to do so without the king’s authorization, but the ministers 
insisted that it would be fine and hastily pushed him to draft the memorial. Pak 
commented that the ministers tried to meet the emperor’s desires for his pleasure in the 
wake of the fact that the aged emperor became more suspicious and strict.9 
The conflict escalated when the emperor wanted the emissaries to visit the Sixth 
Panchen Lama from Tibet. On September 8, the emperor sent a minister of the Grand 
Council to ask if the envoy and associate envoy would like to visit “the saint monk from 
the western area” (Ch. xifan shengseng), namely the Panchen Lama. The envoy replied 
that, “The emperor cherishes our small country and regards us as an inner subordinate. 
We never stop communicating with people of China, but we do not dare communicate 
with people of other country. This is a rule for our small country.” Yet the emperor 
instructed that “it would be fine to pay the visit together with people of the Central 
Dynasty,” forcing the envoys to a tight corner. Some people of the mission insisted that it 
would be awkward for the envoys to visit the Panchen Lama, while others suggested that 
the mission should present a petition to the Ministry of Rituals to turn the invitation down. 
Without any consensus, the two envoys were pushed by the ministers of the ministry to 
                                               
9 Yŏlha ilgi, vol. 3, 20b; Min Tu-Ki, “The Jehol Diary and the Character of Ch’ing Rule,” in Min Tu-Ki, 
National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation of Late Imperial China, 4. 
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leave for the imperial residence, but the audience was suddenly shifted by the emperor to 
another day due to the tight schedule.10 
Next day, the envoys and interpreters were granted an audience with the emperor, 
during which the two sides made a short conversation: 
 
Emperor Qianlong [in Chinese]: Is the king healthy?  
Pak Myŏng-wŏn [the envoy] [in Korean]: The king is healthy. 
Emperor Qianlong [in Chinese]: Do any of you speak Manchu? 
Yun Kap-chong [the first interpreter] [in Manchu]: I know some Manchu.11 
 
Hearing that Yun answered in Manchu, the emperor happily looked at his assistants on his 
left and right and smiled. The emperor then ordered the envoys to visit the Panchen Lama 
at his monastery, which according to Pak Chi-wŏn produced complex feelings among the 
Koreans. The two envoys felt reluctant to visit the Panchen Lama, the interpreters busied 
themselves with socials to make sure that the visit would go smoothly, and the servants of 
the envoys complained about the imperial order. In fact, the two envoys had discussed the 
issue with a Manchu minister of the Ministry of Rituals, Debao, arguing that they should 
not kowtow to the Panchen Lama. At the end of the debate, Debao gave up persuading 
the envoys to kowtow and angrily threw his official hat to the ground, threw himself to 
the bed, and yelled to the envoy “Get out of here! Get out of here!” Finally, in the 
emperor-arranged meeting with the Panchen Lama, the envoys did not perform the ritual 
of kowtow to him.12 
The way of communications between the envoys and the Panchen Lama during 
the meeting turned out to be very complicated. The Panchen Lama first spoke to the 
Mongolian Prince next to him, who forwarded the words to the minister of the Grand 
                                               
10 Ibid., vol. 3, 26a-27a. 
11 Ibid., vol. 3, 32b. 
12 Ibid., vol. 3, 85a-86b. 
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Council next to him, then the minister forwarded them to the Qing interpreter, who 
further forwarded them to the Korean interpreter, and the Korean interpreter eventually 
translated the words into Korean for the envoys. It was likely that the conversation 
involved Tibetan, Mongolian, Manchu, Chinese, and Korean. Thus, to what extent the 
Panchen Lama and the Korean envoys could understand each other and grasp the political 
meanings behind certain words remained unclear. The envoys, who almost became 
“earth-made dolls and wood-made puppets” according to Pak, followed the guidance of 
the minister of the Grand Council to present the Panchen Lama with silk handkerchiefs, 
while the latter gave the envoys three small bronze figurines of Buddha, some Hada, Pulu, 
and Tibetan burning incense in return.13 When the envoys returned to their residence, 
they instructed that the figurines of Buddha should not be put in the Hall of the Highest 
Learning for the sake of the distinction between Buddhism and Confucianism. Later, the 
envoys sold these figurines in Beijing for some silver distributed among their servants.14 
For the Chosŏn’s envoys, the Panchen Lama was from another country, with 
whom they believed they should not meet according to the Zongfan principle. What they 
defended in their conflicts with the Ministry of Rituals over the ritual of kowtow toward 
the Panchen Lama crystalized Chosŏn’s loyalty as China’s fan and subordinate, and it is 
exactly on this ground level that the envoys blurred the line of pro-Ming and anti-Qing 
attitudes. Pak made a defense of the envoys’ behavior in his written conversation with a 
Manchu official later, in which he articulated that, “Our humble country is in the same 
family with the Big Country and there is no difference between inside and outside 
between us, yet the lama is a man of the western area, so how our envoys could dare go 
                                               
13 Ibid., vol. 3, 92a. 
14 Ibid., vol. 3, 87a-87b, 92a-92b. 
 164 
to visit him. This is the rule that ‘subordinates have no right to conduct diplomacy’ (K. 
insin mu oegyo; Ch. renchen wu waijiao).”15 This principle would be emphasized by the 
king of Chosŏn again and again to Western powers that tried to directly contact Chosŏn 
from the 1830s to the 1870s, which confused the powers for decades until 1895. 
At this juncture, a tremendous and unsurpassable dilemma emerged for the 
intellectuals of Chosŏn. They saw the Qing as a barbarianized place and themselves as 
the civilized descendants of the Ming, but when another political entity approached 
Chosŏn, they would immediately identify the Qing as Zhongguo/China and themselves as 
the Qing’s loyal subordinates. Thus, while they lived in an imagined Chosŏn-led cultural 
world, in practice they piously followed the Qing’s Zongfan lines to underscore their 
unique role as the representative of “men from afar” cherished by China. The game rules 
of the Qing’s bureaucracy also contributed to this phenomenon, and a good example was 
the memorial of the Ministry of Rituals to the emperor on September 10 describing the 
envoys’ meeting with the Panchen Lama. By concealing its ritual conflict with the envoys, 
the ministry made up a scene that after receiving the gifts from the Panchen Lama the 
envoys immediately “performed kowtow to show their gratitude” (Ch. kouxie).16 
On the same day, Emperor Qianlong issued an imperial edict after he treated the 
representatives of the Qing’s outer fan and inner fan, including the Panchen Lama, 
Mongolian Princes from Mongolia, Muslim Princes from Xinjiang, emissaries from 
Chosŏn, and indigenous chiefs from southwestern China to the grand banquet. The 
emperor lauded Chosŏn’s fealty to China, declaring to those gathered at the banquet that 
“Chosŏn has been serving as a fan for generations and has always been loyal. It pays 
                                               
15 Ibid., vol. 3, 75a. 
16 Ibid., vol. 3, 91b. 
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annual tribute in time and that is really worth praising.” The emperor added that, “We 
monarch and subordinates trust each other so much and we are in the same family inside 
and outside China, so we should not bother us by these overelaborate rituals.” He then 
decided that Chosŏn needed only to present annual tributes, and all other tributes with 
other humble memorials, should be permanently cancelled in order to demonstrate his 
policy of “cherishing men from afar with substantial measures rather than rhetoric” (Ch. 
rouhui yuanren, yi shi bu yi wen).17 The emperor articulated the status of the Chosŏn’s 
emissaries as “men from afar,” as per Qing China’s Zongfan norms. This corroborated 
what he had commented four years ago in a Manchu edict that “the people of the country 
of Chosŏn were people of foreign barbarians.”18 
This status was further consolidated when the ministry modified and forwarded 
the envoys’ memorial to the emperor. On September 11, the grand ceremony was held in 
the palace where the envoys performed the ritual of kowtow as scheduled. The emperor 
bestowed routine and extra gifts upon the envoys and their servants.19 Next day, the 
ministry forwarded a memorial of the envoys to the emperor showing their gratitude. 
When the envoys received the memorial with the emperor’s comments, they found that 
the ministry had modified some of the original words. In his diary, Pak Chi-wŏn recorded 
the original words by the envoys and those added or modified by the ministry (as in 
italics and strikethrough in the following citation): 
 
The Chosŏn’s emissaries submitted a memorial saying that their country was 
really excited to send emissaries to celebrate the imperial birthday, as all lands 
under the heaven did. We were humbly granted an audience with the saint monk 
and were blessed. Your Majesty treats our Small Country with special grace and 
                                               
17 Qing gaozong shilu, vol. 22, 872. 
18 See Qing gaozong shilu, vol. 21, 578; Qianlong chao manwen jixindang yibian, vol. 12, 117. 
19 Qinding libu zeli (1844), vol. 172, 9b. 
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all humble emissaries shared the generosity generously bestowed additional silk 
and silvers on the king, the emissaries, and the servants. The glory we humbly 
received from Your Majesty is unprecedented. We shall report this to our king 
when we return and we will present another humble memorial to express our 
gratitude. We are deeply grateful for the imperial grace.20 
 
The envoys were astonished at the revisions and immediately sent an interpreter to 
question the ministry in vain. The emperor would never know the true story of the 
memorial, as he never knew that Siam’s “tribute” to him actually had a quite different 
meaning in the Siamese side before the Siamese letter was translated into the “gold 
humble memorial” by the Zongfan discourse in Canton. Such subtle changes at the lower 
level of the court-to-court communications between the Qing and its fan were entirely 
beyond the eyes of the emperor atop the whole hierarchy. Rather, what the emperor could 
only see was the loyalty of Chosŏn, Annam, Siam, and other fan. What Pak had seen was 
that Chosŏn could not change its institutional status as “barbarian” on the top level of the 
Qing-centric Zongfan arrangement. 
After returned to Chosŏn, Pak ardently called for his colleagues to learn useful 
techniques from the Qing, and on this level he moved beyond the civilized–barbarian 
distinction more significantly than many of his generation. By the same token, as a 
pro-Ming intellectual of the highest caliber, Pak had no difficulty in freely returning to 
his world in Chosŏn. In 1783, in the preface for his Rehe diary, Pak used “the 156th Year 
of Chongzhen” to count the year, referred to the Qing as “barbarian,” and expressed his 
regret over not being able to “expel the barbarians and recover the Central Plain.”21 As 
other Korean savants followed Pak’s footsteps and made their own perennial visits to 
Beijing, their perceptions about the Ming and the Qing kept transforming. 
                                               
20 Yŏlha ilgi, vol. 3, 94a. 
21 Ibid., vol. 1, 34a. 
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THE GRAND BANQUET, THE “SYTEM” OF THE HEAVENLY DYNASTY, AND 
THE “MEN FROM AFAR” OF CHOSŎN AT REHE IN 1790 
As the meritocracy in Chosŏn gradually realized that they could not restore the Ming 
dynasty in China, this disillusionment served to normalize their service to the Qing under 
the principle of “serving the great.” Compared with Pak Chi-wŏn’s passionate narratives 
in 1780, the diary of Sŏ Ho-su (1736–1799), who visited Rehe to celebrate Emperor 
Qianlong’s eightieth birthday as the associate envoy of the tributary mission in 1790, 
outlined bilateral Zongfan relations in a very institutionalized and moderate way. From 
the eyes of Sŏ, one may see how the Qing carried out its premise of “cherishing the men 
from afar” not only toward emissaries of Chosŏn, but also toward the descendant of 
Confucius, Mongolian and Muslim princes, the king of Annam, and the emissaries of 
Lanchang and Burma. In 1790, as the representatives of the outer fan and inner fan of the 
Qing convened again at Rehe to celebrate the imperial birthday, the emperor particularly 
needed its model fan and he saw the attendance of Chosŏn’s emissaries as an 
indispensable part of the “system” or “fundamentals” (Ch. tizhi) of his empire. 
Under these circumstances, the emperor was concerned about the time it would 
take for the Korean emissaries to reach the celebration at Rehe. The mission, led by the 
envoy Hwang In-jŏm (?–1802), associate envoy Sŏ Ho-su, and secretary Yi Paek-hyŏng 
(1737–?), left Hansŏng for Beijing on July 9 and arrived at Ŭiju two weeks later, where 
they could not cross the Yalu River in the flood season. On August 1, the mission 
received an official note from the Ministry of Rituals in Beijing via the Manchu General 
of Mukden, which was sent at the speed of 500 li (ca. 155 miles) per day, one of the 
highest speeds of the Qing’s mailing system. The ministry instructed them to head to 
Rehe directly, as they needed to arrive by August 19. This deadline was the one the 
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emperor had set for the king of Annam and the emissaries of Lanchang and Burma to 
arrive at the grand banquet.22 When the mission crossed the river the next day, the 
second note sent by the ministry at the speed of 500 li per day had arrived. In the second 
missive, the ministry expressed its concern over the mission’s arrival date, as the previous 
one in 1780 did not reach Rehe until early September. The ministry asked the mission to 
accelerate their speed to meet the deadline because otherwise it would “particularly 
concern the system” (Ch. shu yu tizhi youguan).23 
The third note soon arrived, but stated that it would be fine if the mission could 
not reach Rehe in time. The emissaries, perceiving that this sharp turn of the emperor’s 
attitude was a subtle way of “cherishing the men from afar,” immediately organized a 
special team that would head for Rehe with humble memorials and selected tributes in 
advance, while the rest of the mission would go to Beijing as scheduled. Trudging for 
more than 260 miles after they passed by Mukden, the emissaries who led the special 
team reached Rehe on August 24, where they learned that the emperor had changed the 
date for the grand banquet to August 25 so that Chosŏn’s mission had enough time to 
arrive. The Mongolian and Muslim princes, emissaries of Burma and Lanchang, 
indigenous chiefs of Taiwan, and the king of Annam had arrived several days earlier.24  
Chosŏn did “particularly concern the system,” as the grand banquet on August 25 
proved. The following day, a minister from the Ministry of Rituals guided Chosŏn’s 
envoy, associate envoy, and secretary to the palace. Three ministers of the Grand Council, 
including Hešen (Heshen, 1750–1799), Fucangga (Fuchang’an, 1760–1817), and Wang 
Jie (1725–1805), guided them further inside to the grand hall for their audience with the 
                                               
22 Sŏ Ho-su, Yŏrha kiyu (Records on the journey to Rehe), vol. 1, 4a-5b. 
23 Ibid., vol. 1, 7a. 
24 Ibid., vol. 1, 46b-47a. 
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emperor. The emperor held a short conversation with the emissaries: 
 
Emperor Qianlong: Is the king healthy? 
The envoy: Thanks to Your Majesty’s great grace, the king is healthy. 
Emperor Qianlong: Does the king have a son now? 
The envoy: Your Majesty bestowed the character of “happiness” upon our king on 
the New Year’s Day, which was the unprecedented grace. Our king has been 
appreciating the imperial grace and had a son on July 29. It was a grand favor 
by Your Majesty. 
Emperor Qianlong [smiling]: Really? That is great. That is great. 
 
After asking the emissaries’ names and ranks, the emperor ordered them to attend the 
grand banquet and watch the Peking Opera. The emissaries were arranged at the first 
position of the wing of the “emissaries of other countries,” while those of Annam were at 
the second position, Lanchang third, Burma forth, and indigenous chiefs fifth. 25 
Chosŏn’s prominent status was fully embodied by the order of the arrangement. In 
addition, Chosŏn’s well-written, humble memorials became a model for other countries. 
Hešen, the emperor’s indulged Manchu minister, showed one of the memorials to the 
king of Annam, Nguyễn Huệ, and commented that, “The characters are beautifully 
written and the paper is so neat and fine. Chosŏn serves the great in such a good manner 
that it is the model for other fan.” The king inspected the memorial several times and 
highly praised it.26 
With the shift of the grand meeting from Rehe to Beijing in early September, the 
emissaries of Chosŏn continued their prominent role of “men from afar” in all ritual 
performances in the Yuan-Ming-Yuan and the Forbidden City. The emperor frequently 
granted the emissaries audiences, invited them to watch Peking Operas, treated them to 
Manchu banquets, and gave them various gifts (Table 2.10). The emperor’s gift-giving 
                                               
25 Ibid., vol. 2, 3b-4a. 
26 Ibid., vol. 2, 6a. 
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and generous treatment of Chosŏn’s emissaries became a model for his successors in the 
following century. On October 11, the Korean mission left Beijing for their homeland. 
Unlike the mission of 1780, it left without leaving behind any unpleasant episodes. 
3.2 Mercy and Discipline: The Vietnamese Mission in 1790 and the British Embassy in 
1793 
“THE MEAN BETWEEN ABUNDANCE AND SCARCITY,” THE “SYSTEM” OF 
THE HEAVENLY DYNASTY, AND THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN 1790 
The Qing expected other tributary emissaries from its fan to accept and follow the 
Zongfan rules as readily as those from Chosŏn did, especially with regards to ritual codes. 
Any deviation from the Zongfan trajectory would, on the one hand, cause the conflict 
between the Qing and the fan. On the other, it would also result in interior tension 
between the Qing monarch and his local officials within the empire. This very issue 
surfaced during the visit to Beijing of the king of Annam, Nguyễn Huệ, who himself met 
the Chosŏn’s emissaries at Rehe in 1790. The importance of this episode was 
compounded by the arrival of the British mission led by George Macartney in 1793. 
Annam was rife with turbulent events toward the end of the eighteenth century 
and the Qing was drawn into the turmoil. In 1771, Nguyễn Huệ and his two brothers 
rebelled against the Nguyễn family controlling the south of Vietnam, known as the 
Tây-so’n Rebellion, through which they restored the rule of the king of the Later Lê 
dynasty (1428–1788). In 1788, worried over the strong influence of Nguyễn Huệ, the 
young king, Lê Duy Kỳ (1765–1793), fled the capital, Hanoi. Upon the request of Lê, 
Emperor Qianlong quickly sent troops under the command of Governor-General of 
Liangguang, Sun Shiyi (1720–1796), to Annam that had been the Qing’s “outer fan for 
more than 100 years.” Being committed to its moral obligation to “cherish the small 
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country,” the Qing the military action as one that “particularly concerned the system” of 
the Heavenly Dynasty (Ch. titong youguan).27 In the 1880s, the Qing would do the same 
with regards to Vietnam and Chosŏn, with the aim of protecting these countries from 
French and Japanese predations. 
Sun’s army easily occupied Hanoi and restored the governance of Lê Duy Kỳ, but 
the army was defeated by an unexpected attack of Nguyễn Huệ’s forces in January 1789 
and as a result Lê fled from Hanoi again. The emperor immediately appointed his favorite 
Manchu general, Fuk’anggan (Fukang’an, 1753–1796), who had just suppressed the 
Taiwan Rebellion, to replace Sun and organize a counterattack. Yet the emperor was not 
interested in conquering Vietnam through a large-scale war, as he might have been 
influenced at the time by his frustration with the war in Burma that finally ended with the 
Burmese tributary mission to Beijing in 1788. In an edict in February 1879, the emperor 
reviewed China’s frustrating experiences of “converting Vietnam into China’s prefectures 
and counties” (Ch. junxian qi di) in history and articulated that the Qing would not 
“integrate Annam into China’s map and register” (Ch. shouru bantu) by imitating the case 
of Xinjiang, where Beijing had to dispatch many officials to manage the land after the 
military conquest. He thus instructed Fuk’anggan and Sun to be receptive to any attempts 
by Nguyễn to sue for peace, which was a possibility.28 Indeed, Nguyễn was not ready for 
a battle with China’s outnumbered forces, so in the same month he presented Sun with “a 
humble memorial” to express his willingness to become a subordinate of the “Heavenly 
Dynasty,” marking the end of the war on the battle ground. 
Recognizing the motivation behind Nguyễn’s act of subordinating himself to the 
                                               
27 Qing gaozong shilu, vol. 25, 817, 973. 
28 Ibid., vol. 25, 873-874. 
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Qing, Emperor Qianlong issued an edict on May 15 declaring that, for the sake of the 
“barbarian people of Annam,” he would not use force against the country. Furthermore, 
the emperor, believing that “the Heaven has abandoned the Lê,” had settled the Lê family 
and their loyal followers in the city of Guilin in Guangxi, a province of China bordering 
Vietnam.29 This arrangement suggested that the Qing’s ruling house was preparing to 
support a new regime in Annam. For that purpose, the emperor indicated that he might 
invest Nguyễn as king if Nguyễn visited Beijing in person. This way, according to the 
emperor, was precisely how he managed foreign barbarians “with mercy and discipline” 
(Ch. enwei bingzhu).30 In late May, the emperor emphasized again that he would not 
invest Nguyễn with any title unless Nguyễn visited Beijing. The emperor refused to 
accept Nguyễn’s tributes, but did not shut the door on Nguyễn’s desire for peace and 
investiture. Rather, he suggested that Nguyễn seize the opportunity to visit Beijing for the 
celebration of the emperor’s eightieth birthday in September 1790. The emperor 
confirmed to Nguyễn’s that Lê Duy Kỳ would not be sent back to Annam for restoration, 
and to that end he sacrificed the Lê refugees by ordering them to cut hair into the Qing 
style and wear the Qing’s clothes.31 In Guilin, Fuk’anggan and Sun Shiyi told Lê that 
“you are on the lands of the central civilized country (Ch. Zhonghua zhi tu), so you 
should obey its system (Ch. Zhongguo zhi zhi) to change hairstyle and clothes.”32 
As the de facto manager of communications on the border, Fuk’anggan perfectly 
understood the mood of his aged and vainglorious master, insomuch that his memorials 
impressed on the emperor Nguyễn’s willingness to visit Beijing. The emperor quickly 
                                               
29 Ibid., 874, 966-967, 972-974. 
30 Ibid., vol. 25, 966-967. 
31 Ibid., vol. 25, 978-981. 
32 Qinding annan jilue (The brief record of appeasing Annam, imperially ordained), vol. 21, 14a. 
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invested Nguyễn as the new king in August, so that Nguyễn would have the orthodox 
legitimacy to govern and stabilize Annam. In the book of investiture, the emperor 
emphasized the principle of “serving the big country” for an outer fan and that of 
“cherishing the small country” for China, highlighting the reciprocal ideology that also 
existed between Chosŏn and the Qing. The emperor took four actions to welcome the 
new king to Beijing. First, he instructed the Grand Secretariat and the Ministry of Rituals 
to create new “rituals of guest–host” (Ch. binzhu zhi li) between the king and the Qing’s 
governor-generals and governors. He also decided to endow the king with a belt in golden 
color that was only used by the Qing’s “royal branches” (Ch. Zongfan).33 Second, he 
moved the dethroned Lê further to Beijing from Guilin and appointed him as a hereditary 
major of Han Eight Banners. The 376 followers of Lê, however, were registered with the 
banner household system and many were moved to Jiangnan, Zhejiang, Sichuan, and 
other provinces.34 Third, the emperor allowed the new regime to pick up the Chinese 
calendar books every year from the governor of Guangxi in lieu of visiting Beijing from 
Hanoi. Fourth, he promised to open the border market after Nguyễn visited Beijing, based 
on the idea that “the barbarian people of that country are all loyal children of the 
Heavenly Dynasty.”35 All these measures aimed to stimulate Nguyễn’s “sincerity of 
transforming into a subordinate of the civilized” (Ch. xianghua zhi cheng). 
On May 26, 1790, the king and his mission compromising 150 members reached 
the Qing’s border, where he performed the highest level of kowtow to the imperial 
documents and gifts. Some scholars believe that the king was not Nguyễn Huệ himself, 
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but his double. 36  Be that as it may, what really mattered for Beijing was the 
subordination of Annam’s new sovereign to the Qing’s supreme authority. Fuk’anggan 
would accompany him to Beijing and Rehe, and they would reach Rehe by passing 
through Guangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan, and Zhili provinces. In 
April, the mission arrived in the port of Guangzhou and the “Western barbarians” of the 
13 Cohong gathered to see the significant homage paid by the king of an outer fan.37 In 
June, the emperor invested Nguyễn’s son as the crown prince and enthusiastically 
emphasized the father–son relationship between him and Nguyễn in the same family. 
Following the precedents of welcoming the king of Chosŏn and the Mongolian khan of 
Korcin, the emperor also dispatched a minister of the Ministry of Rituals to welcome and 
treat the king to tea at Liangxiang, a county a few miles to the south of Beijing.38 The 
practice of the policy of “cherishing the men from afar” went smoothly, until a report 
from the prefecture of Rehe in late July sharply made the emperor quite uncomfortable. 
On July 20, the officials of Rehe reported to the Grand Council that they had 
received an unofficial note (Ch. chuandan) saying the daily expense of entertaining and 
accommodating the Vietnamese mission in Jiangxi was around 4,000 taels of silver. The 
officials were worried that it would be inappropriate for them to treat the mission in an 
inferior way when it reached Rehe, but they could barely add anything more impressive 
that what were available in Rehe.39 The emperor was also greatly shocked by the cost, 
for when he treated Mongolian princes and emissaries of other countries with annual 
banquets the expense was less than 1,000 taels. An expense of 4,000 taels per day meant 
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that the total amount spent receiving the king would reach 0.8 million taels during his 
200-day-long sojourn in China. According to the emperor, the amount was so large that it 
could be turned into a military budget for a war against Vietnam. 
Considering that this case “deeply concerned the system of the Heavenly Dynasty” 
(Ch. yu tizhi dayou guanxi), the emperor lectured his officials that “the great Heavenly 
Dynasty should not welcome one or two subordinates of the fan from the remote lands in 
a luxurious way.”40 In addition, said the emperor, if the king were treated too lavishly in 
the provinces, he would not feel the imperial grace when treated with less opulence in 
Rehe. Chosŏn’s missions could the best case to illuminate the emperor’s point. Its 
emissaries prepared meals at each transfer station by themselves after they crossed the 
Yalu River to reach China’s territory. Once they arrived in Beijing or Rehe, all the daily 
logistics were entirely taken over by the Qing’s personnel, and the emissaries were 
treated in a sumptuous way, as Chapter 2 describes. This substantial difference in 
hospitality between the provinces and Beijing was exactly what the emperor needed. The 
danger presented by such luxurious treatment of Annam’s emissaries lay in its potential to 
undermine the rationale behind the Chosŏn Model. Thus, the emperor instructed that 
Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan, and Zhili progressively tone down the extravagance of the 
receptions, as this was the only way that “the mean between abundance and scarcity” (Ch. 
fengjian shizhong) could be realized.41 It was the first time in the Qianlong period that 
the emperor instructed his officials to seek “the mean between abundance and scarcity,” 
which actually only pertained to the level of luxury in entertaining foreign dignitaries.42 
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The event was turning into an opportunity for the emperor to discipline his “local 
officials of the provinces” (Ch. waisheng difang guan). As he advanced in age, the 
emperor was inclined to show his provincial officials less trust. The surprising expense 
seemingly proved that his worries were reasonable. He listed two possible reasons for the 
astonishing expense: either the managers deliberately spent too much for profitable 
reimbursement from the country in the future, or the escorts extorted too much from the 
provinces they passed. Either could damage the “system of the Heavenly Dynasty” (Ch. 
tianchao tizhi). The emperor required six governors to investigate when and where the 
daily expense occurred, including Fuk’anggan, Governor-General of Liangguang, He 
Yucheng (1726–1790), former Governor of Jiangxi who was on his way to Anhui to 
govern the province, Yao Fen (?–1801), He Yucheng’s successor in Jiangxi, Bi Yuan 
(1730–1797), Governor-General of Huguang, Muherin (?–1796), Governor of Henan, and 
Liang Kentang (1715–1802), Governor-General of Zhili. Yet, in a short time, all officials 
submitted memorials claiming that the event never happened in their provinces. The 
emperor, however, insisted that the origin of the note be found. 
In an edict to Liang on August 10, the emperor said that since Jiangxi, Hubei, and 
Henan reported that Fuk’anggan had notified them to treat the mission by the “mean 
between abundance and scarcity,” the note must have been produced in Zhili as “it could 
not fly to Rehe by crossing Zhili.” This meant Liang must be responsible for it. Very soon 
Liang submitted a memorial to report that the note was wrongly printed in his province 
and the 4,000 taels were, in fact, the entire amount allocated to escort the mission from 
the border to Beijing. The emperor condemned Liang, but immediately closed the case by 
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saying that it was not worth more investigations.43 As the scapegoat of the emperor’s 
face-saving inquiry, Liang must have been impressed by the subtle way of “cherishing 
men from afar” that his monarch wished him and his colleagues to master. 
When the mission arrived in Rehe on August 20, the king was granted an 
audience with the emperor, together with the indigenous chiefs of southwestern China 
and Taiwan, the khan of Kazak, the princes of Mongolian and the Muslim tributaries, and 
the emissaries of Burma and Lanchang. The emperor also bestowed the Qing’s official 
robes to the king and his followers. Chosŏn’s emissaries were on their way, trudging 
toward for Rehe as described by the first section of this chapter. On August 25, Chosŏn’s 
bedraggled emissaries arrived, and all “men from afar” convened at the imperial hall for 
the grand banquet. The banquets at Rehe and later in Beijing turned out to be abundant, 
during which all “men from afar” from the Qing’s periphery performed the ritual of 
kowtow to their shared Son of Heaven. 
“THE MEAN BETWEEN ABUNDANCE AND SCARCITY,” RITUALS, AND THE 
BRITISH MISSION IN 1793 
Emperor Qianlong received the prostration of his Annam subordinates in 1790, yet three 
years later he would not witness the same loyal attitude from a different group of the 
“men from afar,” this time from England. In September 1792, Lord Macartney (1737–
1806) departed from Portsmouth in England to China, where his mission was to seek 
more commercial opportunities from the vast Chinese empire in the name of celebrating 
Emperor Qianlong’s birthday. In July 1793, the mission, which was treated by the 
Chinese side as a tributary mission led by a tributary envoy (Ch. gongshi), reached Dagu 
harbor of Tianjin and were welcomed by Governor-General of Zhili, Liang Kentang, and 
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Changlu Salt Tax Commissioner, Zhengrui. On September 14, Macartney and his 
assistants were granted an audience with Emperor Qianlong at Rehe, after which the 
mission was sent back to Canton through overland route. This event has been intensively 
studied by scholars as a great collision between two different cultural, social, or imperial 
systems, and as the beginning of the West–East encounter that eventually led to the epical 
First Opium War of 1839–1842.44 This section, without the intention of reviewing the 
whole case, examines the episode by connecting it to the legacy of Annam’s mission in 
1790, against a historical background in which the Qing had institutionally barbarianized 
all other countries, including Britain. 
Since the embassy was treated by the Qing as a tributary mission from an outer 
fan, all bilateral contacts had to be conducted according to Zongfan codes. The emperor 
particularly instructed his local officials to appropriately treat the tributary emissaries on 
their road to Beijing. On July 24, 1793, the emperor instructed Liang and Zhengrui that 
they must treat the “foreign barbarians” of the British tributary mission in an appropriate 
way between abundance and scarcity (Ch. fengjian shizhong). This way, said the emperor, 
should accord with “the system” of the “Upper Country” and not let the “men from afar” 
disdain China.45 Among all the officials involved in the entertaining for the mission, 
Liang was, perhaps, the only one who thoroughly understood what the emperor meant. 
The memory of the harsh investigation over Annam’s 4,000 taels expenses per day was 
still fresh for the governor-general. Similarly, the emperor might have also taken the 
precedent of 1790 as a standard for testing his provincial officials. He was not certain that 
they knew how to appropriately treat the “foreign barbarians,” so that the game between 
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the emperor and his officials now returned. 
In August, after learning that the officials in Zhejiang, Shandong, and Tianjin had 
generously treated the British envoys with food, the emperor felt necessary to admonish 
his officials on the matter because the envoys would be attending the grand banquet with 
Mongolian princes and emissaries of Burma and other outer fan in Rehe. The emperor 
expected that the British visitors would make a comparison between their treatment in the 
provinces and the imperial palace in Rehe. Thus, he lectured Zhengrui that “the way of 
welcoming the men from afar” should be sought in the balance between inadequacy and 
abundance. The inadequacy, he explained, might “prevent them from transforming into 
the civilized,” while the abundance might “result in their contempt for the system and 
dignity of the Heavenly Dynasty.” The point was to show “neither inferiority nor 
superiority” (Ch. bubei bukang) in entertaining to “accord with the system and highlight 
the cherishment.” He also reminded Governor-General Liang several times that pursuing 
the “mean between abundance and scarcity” was the “proper way” (Ch. tuoshan).46 
The mission reached Rehe on September 8, but Macartney and his assistants 
insisted that they would not prostrate themselves in front of the emperor, introducing 
Rehe to the ritual crisis that had been ongoing since the envoys arrived at Tianjin. The 
ritual conflict shocked the imperial court, as all tributary emissaries were supposed to 
kowtow to the emperor. The next day, the emperor issued an edict to Liang and his 
colleagues, showing his extreme disappointment over the British tributary envoys. The 
edict attributed the disturbing incident to the lavish treatment of the envoys of the 
provinces, which must have stimulated the conceited manner of these barbarians and 
reduced the degree that they could have been impressed in Rehe. As a remedy for this 
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abundance, as well as a punishment, the emperor instructed that the mission must return 
to Guangdong by the overland route and inner rivers, and all accommodations and meals 
in transfer stations must be strictly provided in conformity with tributary precedents, 
rather than abundance or shortage for “such rude foreign barbarians.”47 The emperor 
further instructed that the hospitality in Beijing should be reduced in order to “highlight 
the system” through this punishment.48 For the emperor, an essential way of controlling 
the envoys of outer fan lay in the skill of mastering the appropriate method of “cherishing 
men from afar” through the bureaucratic apparatus. 
After compromise was negotiated on the performance of the rituals, Macartney, 
his deputy George Staunton (1737–1801), Staunton’s 12-year-old son Thomas Staunton 
(1781–1859), and other members of the mission were granted an audience with the 
emperor at the grand tent on September 14. Rather than performing the ritual of kowtow, 
they mission knelt down on one knee and bowed their heads down to the ground nine 
times. The mission performed the same compromise ritual again on September 17, the 
imperial birthday, and days after that both at Rehe and Beijing.49 Following Zongfan 
conventions, the emperor endowed the mission with some Korean clothing that had been 
piling up in a considerable amount in Beijing, an accumulated result of Chosŏn’s annual 
tributes.50 Nevertheless, the emperor could not fundamentally change his perception of 
the mission. In an edict to his governors on September 23, he lectured them again on how 
the “outer provinces always fail to moderate the welcome of emissaries of outer fan by 
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treating them in an overabundant way that stimulates the emissaries’ arrogance, or in an 
inferior way that undermines the rule of cherishment.”51 This suggested that beyond the 
political rhetoric, food and supplies for foreign missions was a crucial tool for the 
emperor to modify the Zongfan and bureaucratic mechanisms from the top down. 
On the same day, the emperor received a Chinese Zongfan-style version of a 
“humble memorial” by Britain, in which the British made such requests as permanently 
residing a representative in Beijing and opening other places outside Guangzhou for trade. 
The emperor immediately issued a long edict to King George III (1738–1820, r. 1760–
1820), refusing all British requests. He explained that no such precedents beyond the 
“established rules” existed, so the British were challenging “the way of cherishing the 
men from afar and the barbarians on the four directions of the Heavenly Dynasty.” In 
other words, the requests could damage the event-driven cosmopolitan fairness among 
the Qing’s fan by eroding the foundation of the entire Zongfan system. When he refused 
to allow the British to preach the gospel in China, the emperor emphasized that “the 
civilized–barbarian distinction is extremely strict” (Ch. huayi zhi bian shenyan). 
Although the distinction as a contradictory and fierce challenge had been haunting the 
Manchu dynasty for one and a half centuries since 1644, the emperor in 1793 skillfully 
used the rationale behind this challenge to identify the Qing as the civilized.52 As a result, 
Macartney failed to fulfill his mission, following the same fate of James Flint in 1759 and 
Nicholas Skottowe in 1761. Rather, the British envoy’s presentation as a “tributary” 
mission in the Qing’s norms successfully strengthened the Qing as the civilized Heavenly 
Dynasty and reinforced the rules of the Zongfan system outwardly and the bureaucratic 
                                               
51 YSFHHB, 54-55. 
52 YSFHHB, 57-60, 162-164, 172-175. 
 182 
system inwardly. 
On January 8, 1794, Macartney departed from Canton for England. The next day, 
three emissaries of Ryukyu were granted an audience with Emperor Qianlong in the 
Forbidden City in Beijing, where they kowtowed to the emperor as usual.53 On January 
22, the Mongolian and Muslim princes, and the chiefs of southwestern China were 
granted another imperial audience in the Forbidden City, where all these subjects 
kowtowed to the emperor too.54 Three days later, the emissaries of Chosŏn’s annual 
tributary mission prostrated themselves in front of the emperor. On January 31, the 
Chinese New Year’s Day, all princes and emissaries convened in the Forbidden City to 
attend the grand assembly together with Chinese officials, where they all knelt down 
three times and each time bowed their heads three times. The Chosŏn’s emissaries stood 
at the end of the west wing of civil officials, followed by their Ryukyu counterparts.55 On 
February 1, all these emissaries convened again for the annual grand banquet and 
received imperial gifts.56 In the time after the unpleasant chapter of the British mission, 
the Zongfan mechanism between the Qing and its fan worked as perfectly as it had been. 
3.3 The Heavenly Dynasty in Chosŏn: China’s Imperial Envoys to Chosŏn in 1844 and 
1845 
In 1816, a year after the Congress of Vienna, Lord Amherst (1783–1857) of Britain 
visited China as the new ambassador. Thomas Staunton, the 12-year-old boy who met 
with Emperor Qianlong with Lord Macartney in 1793, served as Amherst’s deputy. China 
was now under the rule of Emperor Qianlong’s son, Emperor Jiaqing (1760–1820, r. 
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1796–1820), who had been governing the country for 21 years. In July the British 
mission arrived in Tianjin and contacted the local officials regarding their coming visit to 
Beijing.57 Tuojin, the Deputy Governor-General of Zhili, assured Emperor Jiaqing that 
he would strictly follow the appropriate precedents and welcome the “tributary” mission 
“without delicate abundance” in order to prevent the foreigners from disdaining China.58 
This tone precisely reflected that of local officials in 1790 and 1793. 
The ritual crisis involving the kowtow to the emperor emerged again between the 
guest and the host. The mission arrived at their residence near Yuan-Ming-Yuan in 
Beijing on August 28, but they failed to visit the emperor next morning because of the 
unsettled ritual dispute.59 Being ill-informed by his cunning officials, the emperor even 
saw this incident as the British contempt that “China as the common leader under the 
Heaven could not tolerate.” It was not surprising that the emperor refused to receive the 
emissaries’ “humble memorial,” returned their “tributes,” and ordered them to be sent 
back to their homeland through Tianjin with some imperial gifts. Meanwhile, the emperor 
punished four officials who accompanied the mission in Tianjin and Beijing by degrading 
or removing their ranks. This unpleasant episode suggested that in the highly 
institutionalized period the Qing’s authority would not abandon routinized principles of 
the Zongfan framework, in particular those regarding rituals, in order to preserve the 
“system” or “fundamentals” of the Heavenly Dynasty. 
Britain and the Qing were on the edge of war in the late 1830s, a consequence of 
the conflicts in Canton between British merchants and local government over the opium 
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trade. In 1840, Thomas Staunton, who became an honorable member of British 
Parliament for Portsmouth, provoked his colleagues into using force against China. Very 
soon after, the First Opium War broke out in 1839, which was ended by the Treaty of 
Nanjing in 1842, the 22nd year of Emperor Daoguang, Emperor Qianlong’s grandson. 
According to the treaty negotiated in Western political and diplomatic norms, Britain 
gained the right of extraterritoriality, consular jurisdiction, and most-favored-nation, 
planting the seeds of European imperialism in the Chinese world through the rising treaty 
port framework. 
In 1844, the Qing established the Superintendent of Trade for the Five Ports (Ch. 
Wukou tongshang dachen) to manage contacts between China and Britain, France, 
America, and other countries in the treaty ports. On the surface, this new post moved 
these treaty nations out the management of the Ministry of Rituals and the scope of 
Zongfan framework. Yet it was served by Qiying (1787–1858), a Manchu representative 
and a signatory of the Treaty of Nanjing, who became Governor-General of Liangguang 
soon after, to be in charge of the tributary affairs of Western countries, Annam, Siam, and 
so forth. In other words, the new post was attached to the established Zongfan system 
without changing the nature of the system per se. In other parts of the Qing’s periphery, 
nothing really changed either as a result of the war and treaty. The Zongfan contacts 
between the Qing and Chosŏn remained as usual. 
After Princess Kim of Chosŏn passed away in late 1843, Emperor Daoguang 
appointed two Manchu officials, Baijun and Hengxing, as envoys to Hansŏng to deliver 
his condolences.60 On February 26, 1844, the two envoys went to the Ministry of Rituals 
to pick up the imperial book of condolence, after which they left Beijing for Chosŏn. On 
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March 24, after they crossed the Gate of the Fence and marched around 9.3 miles toward 
the Yalu River, they found the Chosŏn side had set up several shanties to welcome the 
imperial book.61 The envoys soon crossed the river by Korean boats to reach Ŭiju, where 
the Magistrate, Yun Chŏng-ch’i, the Receiver of the Imperial Mission, Cho Pyŏng-hyŏn 
(1791–1849), and the Recorder of the Imperial Mission, Yi Hŏn-ku (1784–1858) 
welcomed them. The king also sent an official to welcome by presenting the king’s name 
card. In the envoys’ residence, the envoys met with local officials, gave Korean officers 
who accompanied them small knives and Chinese purses, and gave 13 soldiers 2,000 qian 
(around two taels of silver).62 In the following days, the envoys would distribute more 
gifts among local officers, soldiers, and servants. On April 7, after travelling more than 
942 miles, the imperial mission arrived in Hongjewŏn in the suburb of Hansŏng. A 
high-ranking official with the king’s name card and a minister of the Ŭijŏngbu—the 
cabinet—Kwŏn Ton-in (1783–1859) welcomed them. When they met with each other, 
Kwŏn knelt down and bowed his head once toward the envoys, while the envoys stood up 
and received the performance; when Kwŏn stood up, the envoys bowed toward Kwŏn 
once. The two sides performed the same ritual again when Kwŏn left.63 
The grand ceremony was held on April 8. In the morning, the envoys were 
escorted from Hongjewŏn to the Hall of Admiring the Central Civilized Country on the 
outskirts of the West Gate of Hansŏng, where Baijun saw the Gate of Receiving Imperial 
Favors. The king came out the West Gate to receive the imperial edict and returned to his 
palace first. The envoys were consequently escorted to the palace through the South Gate 
and they got off their horses near a gate in the palace. After he was guided by an usher to 
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the grand hall, Baijun, the envoy, put the imperial book of condolence and condolence 
money on a desk at the east side of the hall, after which he stood next to the desk. The 
king, under the steps of the hall, kowtowed toward the imperial items. When this was 
finished, the king went to a tent to put on a mourning cloth and went to the mourning hall 
next to the grand hall, in which the two envoys made offerings to the spirit of the dead in 
turn, and stood toward south. The king led his royal members into the hall and knelt 
down in front of the envoys. The envoys read the imperial book to express the emperor’s 
condolences. The usher then requested that the king and the envoys wail. After that, the 
imperial book was moved into the burning furnace, and all people on the site showed 
their respect by seeing it was burned as the last step of the ceremony.64 
The king, changing into a plain robe, invited the two envoys to the former hall for 
a tea ceremony, where the envoys sit toward west and the king sit facing east. The king 
tried to perform a ceremony of obeisance to the envoys by bowing his body twice with 
his hands folded in front (Ch. zaibai), but the envoys insisted that there was no need to 
perform such a high-level etiquette. As an alternative, the two sides bowed once to each 
other, followed by a short conversation. With the end of the tea banquet, the two sides 
bowed once to each other again. The envoys went to their residence, the South Palace 
Annex, and the king sent an official and a eunuch to visit them with more food.65 Next 
day, the king visited the envoys to treat them with a tea banquet, followed by more food. 
On the same day, many officials visited the envoys to ask for Chinese handwritings, 
which made the guests overwhelmingly busy. While the envoys received the local visitors, 
they distributed 300 taels of silver and 490 felt-caps among local servants. On April 12, 
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the king came to send off the envoys,66 and he gave each envoy 2,500 taels of silver as 
gifts. After they returned to Beijing in May, the envoys reported their mission to the 
emperor and suggested that the emperor preserve the 5,000 tales of silver in the Ministry 
of Rituals that could return the silver to Chosŏn through its next mission to Beijing. This 
way, said the envoys, could show the imperial kindness of “cherishing the men from 
afar.”67 Finally, the silver was returned to Chosŏn in late 1844.68 
During their three-day-long sojourn in Hansŏng, the envoys did not talk with the 
king about any events in China related to the Opium War, the treaties signed with Western 
countries, or the changes in the China’s foreign policies in South China. Neither did the 
king ask anything about these aspects or Chinese situation. All of their contacts were 
about rituals that were minutely conducted by ritual codes, underneath which stood the 
long-lived mutual dependence of their legitimacy as Zhongguo and its outer fan. This 
point would be demonstrated again in spring 1845, when Beijing dispatched another 
mission to Hansŏng to invest a new princess. On February 27, 1845, Emperor Daoguang 
appointed Huashana (1806–1859), a Manchu minister of the Ministry of Revenues, and 
Deshun, an associate general of Mongol Eight Banners, as envoys.69 On April 9, the 
envoys received two imperial books of investiture and gifts at the Ministry of Rituals and 
left Beijing. A month later, they reached Fenghuang City and saw Korean merchants 
trading horses with Chinese merchants on the border market. After travelling more than 
942 miles as had their predecessors in 1844, they arrived in Hansŏng on May 22. 
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In the morning of May 22, the king went outside the city to welcome the envoys 
and imperial books of investiture. When this was finished, the envoys were carried out by 
sedan chairs to the palace, where they got off in front of a door of the grand hall and 
carried out the imperial books of investiture to the hall. The king entered the hall to 
receive the imperial books by performing the kowtow. An usher received the books and 
read it aloud outside the hall to Chosŏn’s officials, after which the king led his officials in 
a cheer, extolling “Long live the emperor” three times.70 When this was finished, the 
king invited the envoys to a tea banquet. The king bowed once to them with his hands 
folded in front, and the latter performed the same etiquette to the monarch in reciprocity. 
They watched Korean dances together and had a short conversation, where the king 
expressed his thanks for returning the 5,000 taels of silver.71 As usual, the envoys were 
lodged at the South Palace Annex and the king frequently sent the envoys food, flowers, 
and other supplies. The next day, the king treated the envoys with another banquet at their 
residence. Huashana and Deshun also busied themselves with writing Chinese characters 
for local visitors and distributed some gifts among servants.72 On May 25, the envoys 
left for Beijing after a leave-taking with the king outside the city. 
The mission demonstrated that the infrastructure of the Qing–Chosŏn relationship 
remained unchanged. As envoy and one of the high-ranking ministers of the Qing, 
Huashana was still living in a Qing-centric world and he enthusiastically extolled the 
greatness of the Heavenly Dynasty that embraced its outer fan with generosity. In a poem 
made in Hansŏng, he trumpeted that “I brought the magnificent imperial books to the 
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eastern fan, and the shuguo has been sincere to the rituals for a thousand years.”73 
Emperor Daoguang shared the same ideas with his ministers. On July 1, when the 
envoys reported to the Forbidden City, the emperor asked them the distance they travelled, 
the king’s clothes, the weather in Chosŏn, and the gifts from the king, but did not ask 
anything about Chosŏn’s politics or other domestic issues.74 For the emperor, the crises 
and challenges imposed by the war with Britain and the opening of treaty ports in South 
China were thoroughly outside the purview of Qing–Chosŏn relations. At the top of the 
Qing administration, the China-centric cosmopolitan order and the Qing’s identity as the 
Heavenly Dynasty remained untouched. This is likely one of the primary reasons why 
Beijing did not initiate reforms in the following decade, putting off changes until it was 
humiliated by the Anglo–French Alliance in the Second Opium War of 1856–1860. In 
1858, Huashana became one of the ministers to negotiate with British and French in 
Tianjin, where he found himself and his magnificent “Heavenly Dynasty” unbelievably 
vulnerable to the “barbarians” possessing formidable gunboats, treaties, and norms. 
3.4 The “Barbarian” Emissaries with Cannon and Tribute: The British Embassy and 
the Korean Mission in 1860 and 1861 
THE CIVILIZED–BARBARIAN DISTINCTION AND THE PERMANENT 
RESIDENCE OF “BARBARIAN” EMISSARIES IN BEIJING 
In 1856, seven months after the Crimean War ended in Europe and four months after the 
Taiping Warriors defeated the Qing armies near Nanjing, the Second Opium War between 
Qing China and the Anglo–French Alliance erupted in Canton. In January 1858, the 
Governor-General and Imperial Commissioner, Ye Mingchen (1807–1859), who was in 
charge of foreign affairs in Canton, was captured at his office by the Alliance under the 
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leadership of Lord Elgin (1811–1863). Ye had served in Canton for more than a decade 
before he became a prisoner of war and he was one of the strongest voices against 
allowing the British representatives and merchants to move into the walled city of Canton 
due to the civilized–barbarian distinction that he heartily embraced. In his last memorial 
submitted to Emperor Xianfeng (1831–1861, r. 1851–1861) on December 27, 1857, Ye 
analyzed his negotiations with the British, French, and American ministers in Canton and 
underlined his strategy of “secretly preparing for crises and publicly cherishing the 
barbarians.”75 The governor-general never treated his negotiations with his Western 
counterparts at state-to-state discourse, at least not from a diplomatic perspective. 
The expansion of the Western powers to East Asia, such as Britain, France, Russia, 
and the U.S., remained incomprehensible to Ye and his colleagues. All contacts, including 
conflicts, skirmishes, and even the ongoing war, were still conceptualized in the Zongfan 
framework. The emperor, with no better understanding than his governors, also regarded 
the British and French behavior as “rebellion” and emphasized that China’s first principle 
was to “cherish” them to “preserve the national polity and refuse their requests” (Ch. zun 
guoti er du yaoqiu).76 The rationale behind this policy was the same that of Emperor 
Qianlong’s instructions regarding the Macartney embassy in 1793. The emperor, his 
ministers on the court, and his governors on the border did not perceive that they were 
dealing with several global powers with gunboat diplomacy. 
As long as the conflicts with the foreigners remained on the borders—Britain, 
France, and the U.S. on the southern border and Russia on the northern border—the Qing 
court could not perceive the necessity of solving the problems in Beijing. The situation 
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continued to escalated, and in April 1858 the ministers of the four countries convened in 
Tianjin and dispatched an ultimatum to Beijing for negotiations with “plenipotentiaries” 
(Ch. quanquan dachen). The Russian minister, Yevfimy Putyatin (1803–1883), acted as a 
mediator by taking advantage of Russia’s special relationship with China. Since the early 
Qing period, Russia had been regarded as an outer fan by the Qing court. Its contacts with 
China were under the management of the Mongolian Superintendency and it always had 
students and priests residing in Beijing. Among the powers’ requests, such as expanding 
trade to inner land and opening more ports, the most offensive one for the Qing was to 
permanently reside representatives in Beijing, precisely as Macartney had asked in 1793. 
The court resisted the visit of ministers to Beijing because such a visit would 
endanger the civilized–barbarian distinction by breaking ritual codes. For more than two 
centuries, all foreign emissaries visited the capital only as China’s subordinates, so the 
scenario that the British and other Western ministers visited Beijing without performing 
the ritual of kowtow would violently challenge the divine authority of the emperor and 
the Qing’s self-identity and dignity as the Central Kingdom. The court instructed the 
Governor-General of Zhili, Tan Tingxiang (?–1870), who was negotiating with the 
ministers in Tianjin, to clarify to Putyatin that, “All contacts between China and foreign 
countries have always been conducted on the borders and only those countries among 
China’s shuguo can visit Beijing to pay tributes (Ch. chaogong). No commissioners of 
those countries have ever been allowed to permanently reside in Beijing.” The court also 
refused to appoint any “plenipotentiaries” because “no minister plenipotentiary has ever 
been appointed according to the rules and system of the Heavenly Dynasty and neither 
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has been the envoy extraordinary (Ch. bianyi xingshi).”77 
Within the event-driven institutional structure, the Qing could not surpass 
precedents to challenge its own system, one that was informed by a series of established 
rituals. On May 15, the emperor explained that “China is not afraid of the visit of the 
barbarians to Beijing—no matter how many people will come; the problem is that such 
visit does not fit the system.”78 Along the same line, he refused to allow the American 
minister, William Reed (1806–1876), to visit Beijing because “the U.S. is a friendly 
country (Ch. yuguo), but the imperial collection of precedents does not record how we 
should treat a friendly country, so the practice of entertaining might be inappropriate.”79 
The emperor asked that the ministers to return to Canton and discuss such issues as tariff 
with Governor-General of Liangguang, suggesting that the negotiations should be 
conducted with the Superintendent of Trade for the Five Ports on the border, rather than 
in Beijing. The locations of negotiations, as an integrated part of the entire Zongfan order, 
mattered much in the eyes of the Qing rulers. 
The emperor’s instructions were followed by the occupation of the Dagu Forts by 
the Anglo–French Alliance on May 20, after which Putyatin forwarded Governor-General 
Tan a note listing two requests of the four nations, including their entry into Tianjin for 
negotiations with the Chinese plenipotentiaries and into Beijing where they would either 
pay a visit to the emperor or meet with Grand Secretaries (Ch. da xueshi). The entry into 
Beijing touched the bottom line of the emperor. On May 28, the emperor appointed the 
Manchu Grand Secretary, Guiliang (1785–1862), and the Manchu minister, Huashana, as 
minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Tianjin for negotiations. Huashana, the 
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imperial envoy to Chosŏn in 1845 as the deputy of the Son of Heaven, now became a 
diplomatic representative of the Chinese sovereign who was equal to monarchs of Britain 
and France. The emperor specially instructed Tan to articulate to the ministers that there 
was no need for them to visit Beijing, while his high-ranking officials, such as Prince Yi 
(1816–1861), firmly refused the ministers’ request of residing representatives in Beijing. 
Meanwhile, the emperor instructed the Mongolian Prince Sengge Rinchen (1811–1865) 
to lead his Mongolian warriors to reinforce the garrison between Tianjin and Beijing. 
The Sino–British negotiation soon resulted in a deadlock due to the issue of 
permanently residing the British representatives in Beijing. Conceptualizing the issue in 
the Zongfan setting, the emperor instructed his plenipotentiaries to tell Lord Elgin that 
Britain could follow the established case of “Russian barbarians” to reside some students 
in Beijing, rather than commissioners. The students must change their clothes into 
Chinese style, abide by Chinese rules, concentrate on Chinese techniques learning, and 
not touch official affairs. According to the emperor, Britain could negotiate with China’s 
governor-generals and governors over trade affairs at treaty ports, which would share the 
same convenience with residing its representatives in Beijing. On the other hand, if the 
Britain commissioners insisted on visiting Beijing, the emperor instructed that they must 
go to Beijing from Shanghai through overland route and must be escorted by Chinese 
officials. All accommodations and meals must be covered by China. They could visit 
Beijing once every three or five years, not annually.80 This plan precisely originated from 
the ritual codes of the Zongfan system, into which the emperor was trying to draw Britain. 
All in all, the emperor wished to prevent British commissioners from permanently 
                                               
80 Chouban yiwu shimo, Xianfeng chao, vol. 3, 938. 
 194 
residing in Beijing, which would be the “proper way,”81 a tone reflecting that of Emperor 
Qianlong regarding the Macartney embassy in 1793. 
The emperor’s ideal design was soon partly realized in an opaque way in the 
treaty with the U.S. concluded on June 18 in Tianjin. Article V of the treaty regulated the 
visit of the American minister to Beijing by following specific Zongfan ritual codes for 
the Qing’s outer fan,82 such as the frequency of the visits to Beijing, the overland route 
from Tianjin to Beijing, the entertaining by local authorities, the written notice to the 
Ministry of Rituals, and the number of the mission—20 was the maximum number of 
tributary missions allowed for Ryukyu, Lanchang, Burma, or Holland. 83  Although 
Beijing gave the U.S. the right of the most-favored-nation in the treaty, it only regarded 
such right as special grace for the foreign barbarians, suggesting that Beijing was still 
thoroughly saturated in the Zongfan norms that treated the U.S. as a tributary state in the 
treaty per se. For Beijing, the ongoing war was simply a war within the ends of the 
Chinese world, just like the war in South China between the court and the Taiping rebels. 
The court, as Emperor Qianlong pointed out in 1793, believed that “the civilized–
barbarian distinction is extremely strict.” On June 23, 30 officials led by Zhou Zupei 
(1793–1867) submitted memorials against the permanent residence of the “barbarian 
emissaries” in Beijing. Among the “eight evils” of the residence that Zhou highlighted, 
preaching the gospel by the foreigners would “barbarianize our race of clothes and rituals 
into beasts.” He particularly noted that, “If the countries, such as Chosŏn and Ryukyu that 
have been loyal to China for a long time and sincerely send emissaries and pay tributes to 
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the court, saw the disobedience of these barbarians, they would despise the Heavenly 
Dynasty too.” This argument was further underscored by Chen Rui, who emphasized “the 
fundamental divide between China and the others” (Ch. zhongwai dafang).84 These 
officials, the majority of whom were Han Chinese, represented the intellectual force 
behind China’s post-Qianlong institutionalized order. They employed the orthodox 
ideology in order to nourish the political legitimacy of their civilized homeland in the 
face of barbarianizing foreigners. 
The keen resistance turned out to be a pipe dream, as Guiliang and Huashana 
accepted the British-drafted treaty on June 26. Partly aiming to change the Chinese way 
of contacts with the Western countries, the treaty allowed Britain to appoint diplomatic 
agents to the court of Beijing, where they would not kowtow to the emperor. Article III of 
the treaty stated that the British ambassador, minister, or other diplomatic agent “shall not 
be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to him as representing the Sovereign 
of an independent nation, on a footing of equality with that of China. On the other hand, 
he shall use the same forms of ceremony and respect to His Majesty the Emperor as are 
employed by the Ambassadors, Ministers, or Diplomatic Agents of Her Majesty towards 
the Sovereigns of independent and equal European nations.”85 This article made the door 
of Beijing open to the representatives of Britain and other treaty nations and marked the 
collapse of the several-century-long ritual system managed by the Ministry of Rituals. 
The elementary ritual rules of the civilized–barbarian distinction of the Zongfan 
infrastructure partially broke down. Simultaneously, the Qing was circumscribed from a 
cosmopolitan Chinese empire to a Chinese state equal to Britain by post-Westphalian 
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political and diplomatic norms.  
Although this change was sharp and historical, the Chinese might not have 
perceived the day’s importance due to the discrepancies in English and Chinese terms. 
The Chinese version of the phrase “the Sovereign of an independent nation, on a footing 
of equality with that of China” in the article was translated into “Britain is a nation of 
zizhu on a footing of equality with China” (Ch. Yingguo zizhu zhi bang, yu Zhongguo 
pingdeng). The term “zizhu,” which meant self-rule or autonomy, was usually used in a 
Zongfan context. China regarded its outer fan as possessing such a right, so it was very 
different from the British understanding of the term “independent.” This sharp divergence 
would become apparent in the following years when China and the Western powers tried 
to articulate and define the nature of the Sino–Korean Zongfan relationship. It would also 
become a point of contention in the Sino–Japanese rivalry over Chosŏn’s status in the 
1870s. The seeds of further conflicts between the norms of the Chinese Zongfan system 
and those of the European international law were planted in this inconspicuous manner. 
What further shook the foundation of the civilized–barbarian distinction was 
Article LI of the 1858 treaty, which especially articulates that “henceforward, the 
character “I” 夷 [barbarian], shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her 
Britannic Majesty in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese Authorities 
either in the Capital or in the Provinces.”86 Britain and other Western nations that were 
eligible to invoke the most-favored-nation clause thus institutionally broke away from the 
category of “barbarian” in the Qing’s diplomatic discourse. From then on, the Chinese 
character “夷” (barbarian) was increasingly replaced by “洋” (Ch. yang; overseas, 
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foreign) and the term “barbarians” (Ch. yiren 夷人) was replaced by “foreigners” (Ch. 
yangren 洋人) in Chinese official narratives.87 
By the same token, this amendment, no matter how shocking it was for the Qing’s 
ruling house, only applied to Western treaty nations that had never really occupied an 
essential position in the Zongfan system. The Qing’s other outer fan after 1858 were still 
considered as “countries of barbarian” in the hierarchy. In this sense, the treaty port 
system, although it was rapidly expanding to other Chinese ports at the end of the 1850s, 
only complicated the Qing’s view of the countries in the “Western Ocean.” Rather than 
fundamentally transforming the Qing-centric Zongfan system, the episode actually 
reinforced the core of the Zongfan principles. In other words, the disintegration of the 
Sinocentrism as a result of the 1858 treaties occurred on the Qing’s intellectual periphery, 
not in its core represented by the outer fan, such as Chosŏn. The ministers of the treaty 
nations residing in Beijing would soon appreciate the complexity of this issue. The 
Zongfan relationship led to increasing confusion, and conflict, between the Qing and 
Chosŏn, Vietnam, and Ryukyu from the 1860s onward. 
DISCIPLINE AND WORSHIP IN THE EMPIRE: THE BRITISH AND THE KOREAN 
MISSIONS TO BEIJING IN 1860 AND 1861 
The ministers of the four nations left Tianjin with the treaties for Shanghai, where they 
signed additional treaties on tariff with Chinese representatives. The war could have been 
over, had the British and French ministers in summer 1859 followed the Qing’s designed 
route to enter Beijing after they landed at Beitang, the area near the Dagu Forts, to 
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exchange the ratification of the treaties. Yet the ministers refused to follow Beijing’s 
instructions and their rash entry into the firth of the Beihe River near the Dagu Forts 
ended in heavy losses under Chinese bombardment. The war resumed. Under the 
leadership of Lord Elgin, who was determined to resort to gunboat diplomacy against 
Beijing, the Anglo–French Alliance returned to China in summer 1860 and reoccupied 
the Dagu Forts. There the alliance almost annihilated the Mongolian cavalry of Prince 
Sengge Rinchen by using the Armstrong gun, a new weapon created by Britain as a result 
of the Crimean War, employed in combat for the first time in history. The Qing would 
submit not only to the joint imperialism of the European powers, but also to modern 
European military technology in the post-Crimean War period. 
The Qing failed to check the Alliance that occupied Tianjin and was marching 
toward Beijing in late August. The court soon sent representatives to Tongzhou, near 
Beijing, for the negotiation, where Prince Sengge Rinchen on September 18 captured 
Harry Parkes (1828–1885), the British Commissioner at Canton, Henry Loch (1827–
1900), Lord Elgin’s private secretary, and other twenty-four English and thirteen French 
officers and soldiers, whom were sent to prisons in Beijing as hostages. Only half of 
these prisoners of war—including Parkes and Loch—eventually survived and were 
released since October 8, the day the Alliance gained control of Beijing’s suburbs and 
started looting the imperial palace of Yuan-Ming-Yuan outside the city. 
The frightened Son of Heaven, Emperor Xianfeng, fled to Rehe on September 22 
after he appointed his little brother Prince Gong (a.k.a. Prince Kung, 1833–1898) as the 
imperial envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary (Ch. Qinchai bianyi xingshi quanquan 
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dachen) to supervise the uncertain peace negotiation.88 On October 13, the Alliance took 
over the Anding Gate of Beijing after it was surrendered by the city’s garrison. The Qing 
thus encountered its gravest crisis since 1644, for the Western “barbarians” might 
permanently occupy the capital and overthrow the dynasty. This scenario was a more 
serious threat to Beijing than the then-ongoing Taiping Rebellion in South China. The 
court in Rehe and the caretaker administration in Beijing were extremely vulnerable to 
the Alliance and their powerful cannons positioned on the city’s northern walls. 
From October 12 to 16, the survivors and corpses of the prisoners of war were 
continuously brought back to the Alliance, and the cruelties evident in the bodies that 
were mutilated beyond recognition greatly shocked Lord Elgin and his fellow 
commanders. Lord Elgin “at once notified to Prince Kung that he was too horrified by 
what had occurred to hold further communication with a government guilty of such deeds 
of treachery and bloodshed, until by some great punishment inflicted upon the Emperor 
and the governing classes.”89 The “great punishment” turned out to be the destruction of 
Yuan-Ming-Yuan by fire. On October 18, the second day after the Alliance buried the 
bodies, volumes of smoke engulfed the imperial garden. According to Henry Loch, 
“During the whole of Friday the 19th, Yuen-Ming-Yuen was still burning; the clouds of 
smoke driven by the wind, hung like a vast black pall over Pekin.”90 Numerous buildings 
where the Qing emperors gave audience to emissaries of outer fan—once including 
Britain—were burnt down to the earth. On October 20, Prince Gong informed Lord Elgin 
with China’s absolute submission to the demands of the allies. 
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The whole imperial capital under the Yuan-Ming-Yuan’s smoke was open to the 
Alliance now. On September 21, Parkes and Lock entered the city and satirically selected 
the grand hall of the Ministry of Rituals as the place where the ceremony of the signature 
of the convention would be conducted. On October 24, Lord Elgin, accompanied by a 
large escort of more than 600 men and himself on a sedan chair carried by 16 
Chinese—the highest level of the Chinese sedan chair that was exclusively used by 
emperor—departed for the grand hall of the ministry. Loch said that, “Crowds of Chinese 
lined both sides of the streets through which we passed; they were exceedingly quiet and 
well-behaved, and there was an entire absence of any appearance of alarm. There was 
immense curiosity, however, to see Lord Elgin; the people pressed forward as his chair 
passed to obtain a glimpse of a man who at that time was more powerful than even their 
own Emperor.”91 The scene was not considered a textbook case of Western imperialism 
until China’s rulers used it to cultivate Chinese nationalism more than a century later. 
When Lord Elgin reached the hall, Prince Gong “advanced to receive Lord Elgin 
with an anxious, hesitating salutation.” Lord Elgin “bowed, and at once walked forward 
to his seat, motioning Prince Kung to take the one on the right.” After they signed the 
convention, exchanged treaties, and made a short conversation about keeping friendship 
between the two countries, “Lord Elgin rose to take leave; Prince Kung accompanied him 
a short distance, and then stopped; but on Lord Elgin doing so likewise, the principal 
mandarins in attendance urgently beckoned Prince Kung to move forward, and after a 
few moments of hesitation he walked with Lord Elgin to the edge of the steps.”92 Prince 
Gong was apparently adjusting himself to a new etiquette that he had never performed. 
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As a witness of the ceremony, Loch commented that, “Thus was happily concluded an 
event which was the commencement of a new era, not only in the history of the Empire 
of China, but of the world, by the introduction of four hundred millions of the human race 
into the family of civilized nations.”93 
Although whether or not the Chinese people were brought into “the family of 
civilized nations” remains disputable, Loch was correct in asserting that China had 
entered a new era. In January 1861, the Zongli geguo shiwu yamen (hereafter as “the 
Zongli Yamen”), or the ministry of foreign affairs, was established in Beijing under 
Prince Gong’s supervision as the institute in charge of China’s foreign affairs with Britain, 
France, the U.S., Russia, and other treaty nations.94 The Zongli Yamen was designed as 
an expedient political institute by following the model of the Grand Council in order to 
meet a great challenge at a time of crisis. Its designers considered it as an imitation of 
Foreign Emissaries’ Common Accommodations (Ch. Huitong siyi guan) by categorizing 
it as a part of the Zongfan system.95 According to Prince Gong, when the crisis passed, 
foreign affairs would revert to management of the Ministry of Rituals as usual for the 
sake of the point of “cherishing the outer fan.”96  
Never was this to be realized. Rather, like the Grand Council, the Zongli Yamen 
would become a permanent institute and it surpassed the Ministry of Rituals and other 
ministries as the most important governmental organ in the following decades. With the 
foundation of the Yamen, Beijing made a diplomatic network from the top down by 
creating two Superintendents of Trade (Ch. Tongshang dachen) at Tianjin and Shanghai. 
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The court also instructed officials at Guangdong and Shanghai to dispatch linguists who 
knew English and French to Beijing to serve as consultants and interpreters.97 From 
March 1861, the French, British, Russian, and American ministers arrived in Beijing. A 
new era began. 
These institutional changes to the Zongfan framework only affected the parts that 
governed relations with the treaty nations—beyond that, the system stood as firmly as 
before. After he learned from the annual tributary mission to Beijing of 1860 that the 
emperor had moved to Rehe in September, the king of Chosŏn immediately sent a special 
mission to Beijing with the hope of visiting the emperor at Rehe, to show Chosŏn’s 
serious concern as a loyal subordinate of the “imperial dynasty.”98 In early 1861, the 
Korean emissaries reached Beijing with tributes and performed the same rituals as usual 
at the grand hall of the Ministry of Rituals, where Prince Gong and Lord Elgin signed the 
convention several months ago. The ministry asked the emperor if the emissaries should 
visit Rehe by following the precedents of Annam’s mission in 1790, Lanchang’s and 
Burma’s missions in 1795, and Annam’s mission in 1803.99 The emperor answered that 
there was no need for the emissaries to visit Rehe because he was sick, but he ordered the 
ministry to follow conventions and treat the emissaries with banquets and endow them 
and the king with gifts to show his “ultimate kindness of cherishing the fan and the 
subordinate in such a favored way.”100  
In May, another tributary mission of Chosŏn arrived in Beijing to pay tributes.101 
From November 1858 to May 1861, Chosŏn dispatched five missions and more than 
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fifteen emissaries to Beijing, in spite of the widespread panic in Chosŏn that the war 
between the Qing and the Alliance caused. In the early 1790s, Chosŏn and British 
emissaries convened in Rehe and Beijing as representatives of two outer fan as well as 
two nations of “barbarians.” In the early 1860s, the British emissaries entered Beijing by 
violently changing their status in the Chinese world with cannons, while their Chosŏn 
counterparts visited the city with tributes and remained in the same position as before. 
The loyal emissaries were unable to see Emperor Xianfeng again. The paranoiac 
emperor did not return to the Forbidden City until his death at Rehe on August 22, 1861. 
Before he died, he was extremely worried about the likely face-to-face meeting with the 
“barbarian” ministers in Beijing, where they would not perform the ritual of kowtow to 
him.102 This grave scenario frightened him, as he could not cope with the fact that those 
countries were not outer fan from China’s periphery as his great ancestors had assumed 
for more than a century. He refused to see any “barbarian” ministers and even felt very 
uneasy about Prince Gong’s meeting with them. Living in the post-Qianlong period with 
the highly institutionalized ideology of the civilized–barbarian distinction, Emperor 
Xianfeng died the last emperor who never saw the “barbarian emissaries” stand up before 
him without kowtowing. He was the last Son of Heaven in Chinese history who lived in 
the self-built home of the Heavenly Dynasty until the last minute of his life. It was not 
until twelve years later, in 1873, that his son, Emperor Tongzhi (1856–1875, r. 1862–
1875), gave foreign ministers in Beijing the first imperial audience at the Purple Light 
Pavilion in the Forbidden City. It was the same venue used by the Qing emperor to meet 
with emissaries of the subordinated outer fan starting in 1761, the year when the Qing 
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institutionalized all other countries in the known universe. Interestingly enough, from 
1949 onward the pavilion has been used as the primary location for Chinese leaders to 
meet with foreign guests in the context of national revival. 
RE-ENVISIONING QING CHINA WITHIN AND BEYOND ITS PERIPHERY 
From the very first day that Western “barbarians” entered Beijing as permanent 
diplomatic representatives, “everyday familiarity” collapsed103 for the Qing ruling house 
and intelligentsia. As the Self-Strengthening Movement unfolded in the 1860s, the option 
of pursuing the European way to enhance China’s military and technical abilities for the 
sake of China’s future rose high on Beijing’s agenda. The proposed innovations by some 
reformers caught the eyes of the Chinese officials, but they also resulted in sharp disputes 
and conflicts in the bureaucracy. The strategy of “learning the superior techniques of the 
barbarians” (Ch. shi yi changji), which was later termed by historians as China’s 
modernization, gradually became China’s primary concern. The Qing’s elite, such as 
Prince Gong, Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885), and Li Hongzhang, 
surveyed the world beyond China’s periphery and acted as the pioneers of reform 
movements, the entrenched concept of “all-under-Heaven” gradually gave way to the 
geographical world in the minds of the majority of the literate stratum. 
In late 1864, Wanguo gongfa, the Chinese edition of Henry Wheaton’s Elements 
of International Law that was published in 1836, was published in Beijing as the first 
international law guide for China and the Chinese world. Different from its English 
edition, the Chinese edition added a map of the world to highlight the global geography 
(Map 3. 1), which further eroded the China-centric conception encapsulated in the 
                                               
103 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, 176. 
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Illustrations of Subordinate Peoples of the Imperial Qing of 1761. The Qing began to 
transform its political and diplomatic norms by integrating the notions of international 
law into its own constitutional and institutional systems. 
Map 3. 1. Map of the World in Wanguo gongfa, 1864 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Ding Weiliang (W. A. P. Martin) trans., Wanguo gongfa (Elements of International Law), 
1864, vol. 1, 1. 
 
This irredeemable disintegration of the self-imagined concept of “barbarian” 
countries, however, did not lead to a similar breakdown in the Zongfan infrastructure 
between the Manchu court in Beijing and the Korean court in Hansŏng. For more than 
two centuries, until the 1860s, the Zongfan norms had been nourishing, maintaining, and 
consolidating the political and cultural identities both of the Qing and its outer fan. The 
symbiotic legitimacy, which could not be redefined or circumscribed by international law, 
still strongly influenced their internal and external policies and behavior in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. In this sense, the two opium wars and the treaties from 1840 to 
1860 did not simply mark “the dawn of the New” or “the twilight of the Old,” as some 
historians have argued within the East–West dichotomy. 104  Rather, the treaty port 
network imposed from outside and the long-living Zongfan arrangement that vibrantly 
functioned inside the Qing-centric world formed a dual and co-existing system, in which 
                                               
104 John King Fairbank, “The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order,” 257. 
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the former did not go toward the direction of replacing or incorporating the latter as 
scholars have argued, generalized and presumed. This point is vividly demonstrated by 
the fierce debates that occurred between China and Western powers over Chosŏn’s 
international status in the late nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Defending the Shuguo: The Rise of the Challenge of Chosŏn’s Status, 1862–1876 
After the 1860s, greater contact between Chosŏn and the West made it more difficult for 
Qing China to define and articulate its Zongfan relationship with Chosŏn. Relations 
between Beijing and Hansŏng were difficult to define by the standards of international 
law, and as a result the Western powers found the Qing–Chosŏn relationship problematic 
to define. 
Chosŏn’s legal status, namely whether or not it was a China’s shuguo or shubang 
(the equivalent of fan, that is, a subordinate or dependent country) developed into the key 
issue between the Qing and the treaty powers. Did Chosŏn have the right of zizhu, as 
Beijing and Hansŏng claimed, or was it a state possessing independent sovereignty? The 
Qing tried to impose its definition of the Zongfan relationship with Chosŏn in fierce 
debates with other countries, while preserving conventional Zongfan practices. The 
Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876 signed between Japan and Chosŏn, did not alter the nature of 
the Zongfan relationship and Sino–Korean relations remained perplexing to the Western 
powers. 
4.1 Chosŏn as China’s Shuguo: The Sino–French Negotiation in 1866 and the 
Dilemma of Chosŏn’s Status 
THE FRENCH EXPEDITION TO CHOSŎN  AND THE SINO–FRENCH 
NEGOTIATION IN 1866 
In his report to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish on January 13, 1872, the minister of the 
United States at Beijing, Frederick F. Low, explained why he forwarded a letter to the 
king of Chosŏn, instead of the principal minister for foreign affairs before his expedition 
 208 
to the country in 1871. His reason was “such an official as a minister for foreign affairs 
did not exist.” In order to make his argument clear, he made “a brief description of the 
organization of the Chinese government of which that of Corea is a counterpart.”1 He 
discussed the ambiguous position of the Zongli Yamen in the Qing’s institutional 
hierarchy, explaining that, “The Tsung-li Yamen, or foreign office, had no existence prior 
to 1861. It was organized in that year by imperial decree, to meet an emergency forced 
upon the government by the presence of resident foreign ministers in Peking, who were 
unwilling to transact their business with either of the boards. But even now it is not a 
department of the government recognized by law, nor is it mentioned in the published list 
of officers.” Furthermore, he pointed out that “The Tsung-li Yamen is composed of seven 
high ministers, all of whom are presidents or vice-presidents of the six boards before 
referred to, with Prince Kung at the head as chief secretary for foreign affairs. The 
ministers’ position as members of the foreign office is ex officio simply, the business 
instructed to them being in addition to their legitimate duties as officers of the several 
boards.” 2 Throughout the course of his expedition, what confused Low was not the 
absence of a minister for foreign affairs, but what appeared, to him, ambiguous and 
perplexing nature of the Sino–Korean relationship. It was the Zongli Yamen that confused 
the minister when it explained China’s policy toward Chosŏn. Yet, before Low came to 
China, it was the French minister in Beijing who was baffled by the Yamen’s explanation, 
when he launched a punitive expedition against Chosŏn in 1866, five years after the 
Yamen was established. 
The French expedition in 1866 was a response to anti-Catholic purges initiated by 
                                               
1 Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, No. 77, January 13, 1872, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter referred 
to as FRUS), 1872–’73, 127. 
2 Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, No. 77, January 13, 1872, in FRUS, 1872–’73, 127.  
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the Taewŏn’gun, Yi Ha-ŭng (1820–1898), in Chosŏn, which killed several French 
missionaries. When his 12-year-old son, Yi Hŭi (1852–1919, r. 1863–1907), assumed the 
kingship in 1863 as the legitimate successor to the late King Ikchong (1809–1830), Yi 
Ha-ŭng gradually became the de facto regent. Yi Ha-ŭng’s power was consolidated in 
early 1866 by the end of the regency of Senior Queen Dowager Cho (1808–1890) as a 
result of the king’s marriage.3 During the decade of Taewŏn’gun’s regency, which ended 
in 1873 when his son assumed personal rule, Chosŏn carried out important domestic 
reforms. As a follower of Confucianism, Taewŏn’gun regarded Western religions in 
Chosŏn as heresies or “evil ideas” (K. sahak). In early 1866, he started eliminating 
converts to Christianity and Catholicism in order to purify the Confucian foundation on 
which he believed the country’s morals were built. On March 7, two Korean converts and 
four French missionaries were beheaded in Hansŏng, marking the beginning of the 
bloody purge of Catholics.4 In the following months, nine French missionaries and 
hundreds of native converts were executed. 
When the news about the purge reached Beijing, the French chargé d’affaires, 
Henri de Bellonet, decided to launch a punitive expedition against Chosŏn. On July 14, 
Bellonet sent the Zongli Yamen a note, threatening to invade and temporarily occupy 
Chosŏn and to appoint a new king. Bellonet noted that the expedition would have no 
                                               
3 Kojong sunjong sillok (Veritable records of King Kojong and King Sunjong), vol. 1, 121. King Ikchong, 
Yi Yŏng, as the crown prince of King Sunjo (1790–1834, r. 1800–1834), never became king before he died 
in 1830. His wife, Princess Cho, was powerful when her son Yi Hwan (1827–1849, r. 1834–1849) became 
the king in 1834 after King Sunjo died. When the young and childless Yi Hwan died in 1849, Yi Pyŏn 
(1831–1863, r. 1849–1863) became the new king as successor to King Sunjo. After Li Pyŏn died in 1863 
when all his sons had died, Senior Queen Dowager Cho selected Taewŏn’gun’s second son, Yi Hŭi, as the 
king being the successor to King Ikchong. Senior Queen Dowager Cho thus became stepmother of Yi Hŭi 
and the most powerful woman in the country. This complex changes of Chosŏn’s royal lineage from 1830 
to 1863 deeply concerned the inner political struggles among different cliques in the court. Senior Queen 
Dowager Cho’s story shared striking similarities with Empress Dowager Cixi of the Qing. 
4 Ilsŏngnok (Records of daily reflections), vol. 66, 199-201. 
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relations with China, as he was informed by the Chinese government in 1865 that Chosŏn 
managed all of its own affairs.5 In 1865, Bellonet asked the Yamen to issue a dispatch to 
Chosŏn to inform the king that some French missionaries wanted to preach the gospel to 
the kingdom. The Yamen declined and told him that “Chosŏn, as a shuguo of China, only 
uses the Chinese calendar, uses Chinese reign title, and pays yearly tributes to China.”6 
For Bellonet, this response indicated that “the Chinese government has no authority or 
power over Corea.”7 From then on, it became extremely difficult for both the treaty 
powers and the Yamen to pin down Chosŏn’s status as China’s shuguo. 
Indeed, the Yamen claimed that Chosŏn was a shuguo of China, on the one hand, 
and emphasized that Chosŏn managed all its own affairs under the rule of zizhu and 
China would not intervene, on the other. This statement was clear in the Zongfan world, 
but equivocal and paradoxical for Western ministers. While Bellonet stated that Chosŏn 
was “formerly assumed the bonds of vassalage to the Chinese empire,” he asserted that 
“we do not recognize any authority whatever of the Chinese government over the 
kingdom of Corea.” This statement was arguing that Chosŏn was an independent nation,8 
but the Yamen’s Chinese translation missed the political meaning behind the French note. 
The Yamen could not find a way to clarify the Zongfan relationship. The Wanguo gongfa, 
published in 1864, did not provide the Yamen with a definition of the Shuguo that could 
be translated into Western terms. In practice, Prince Gong and his colleagues had to draw 
from Chinese ideology, employing the familiar terms such as “all-under-Heaven.” They 
                                               
5 M. de Bellonet to the Zongli Yamen, July 14, 1866, in QJZRH, vol. 2, 27-28. 
6 The Zongli Yamen to Mr. Alcock, July 17, 1866, in QJZRH, vol. 2, 29. 
7 Mr. de Bellonet to Prince Kung, July 13, 1866, Inclosure No. 1 of Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, No. 
122, December 12, 1866, in FRUS, 1867–’68, vol. I, 420. 
8 M. de Bellonet to Prince Kung, July 13, 1866, Inclosure No. 1 of Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, No. 122, 
December 12, 1866, in FRUS, 1867–’68, vol. I, 420. 
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were informed by the Spring and Autumn Periods in Chinese history, and the prefaces of 
the Wanguo gongfa, by Dong Xun (1807–1892) and Zhang Sigui (1816–1888), 
demonstrated this worldview.9 
More importantly, as a temporary institution established on an ad hoc basis, the 
Yamen had no right to communicate with Chosŏn and it did not gain such a right until the 
end of their Zongfan relationship in 1895. Rather, it was the Ministry of Rituals that was 
in charge of Chosŏn’s affairs. Yet, identifying the Yamen as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the foreign ministers in Beijing never negotiated with the Ministry of Rituals 
over their contacts with Chosŏn, Vietnam, and the Qing’s other fan. The Yamen, on its 
part, had serious bureaucratic and institutional relations with the Ministry of Rituals and 
it always sent the cases about Chosŏn to the ministry to process. The ministry, however, 
could not make changes to the established imperials codes, formalities, and precedents 
regarding Chosŏn, so it often forwarded the cases to the emperor and the Grant Council 
for further instructions.  
This process made the ministry serve as an exclusive and inefficient official 
channel of communication between the Zongli Yamen and the court of Chosŏn. This 
convention-driven arrangement persisted until 1882, when Beijing endowed Li 
Hongzhang, the Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China (Ch. Beiyang 
tongshang dachen; hereafter referred to as the “Beiyang Superintendent”), with the right 
to communicate with the king of Chosŏn. In the middle ground between the Zongli 
Yamen and the Ministry of Rituals, the Qing’s policymaking deficiencies were exposed 
by contacts between Chosŏn and the Western powers. These shortcomings would endure 
for three more decades, lasting until 1895. 
                                               
9 Wanguo gongfa (Elements of International Law), vol. 1. 
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The Zongli Yamen formed a policy of “mediation” (Ch. paijie) between Chosŏn 
and the powers. It replied Bellonet that China would mediate between France and Chosŏn, 
while Beijing investigated the anti-Catholic violence and that the French side should not 
rush to an attack against Chosŏn. The Yamen did not claim responsibility for the killings 
of the French missionaries, but it expressed serious concerns over the French hostility to 
Chosŏn in a memorial to the emperor and in a confidential letter to all governors-general 
and governors of the coastal provinces and Manchu generals in Manchuria. The Yamen 
proclaimed that China could “in no way sit it out” (Ch. duan nan zuoshi) when Chosŏn 
was in danger of being attacked by foreigners.10 It also forwarded a note to Chosŏn via 
the Ministry of Rituals, informing it that French forces might launch an expedition.11 
Bellonet soon instructed Admiral Pierre Gustave Roze, the commander of the 
French Far Eastern Squadron, to launch the expedition. On September 20, Roze led three 
warships from Zhifu (Chefoo, nowadays Yantai) on the Shandong peninsula to across the 
Bohai Sea and arrived at a small island off the coast of Inchon, where they investigated 
the waters along the coastlines to make navigational charts. Roze refused contact with 
local officials while conducting these activities. 12  Although the Taewŏn’gun’s 
government learned of the arrival of the foreign “ships in strange shape” (K. iyang sŏn), 
the anti-Catholic purge continued and more converts were arrested and executed. Ten 
days before French forces arrived, the king issued a “decree of anti-heresy” (K. ch’ŏksa 
yunŭm) to the whole country to highlight the strong anti-Catholic attitude of its rulers.13 
On October 1, the three primary members of the tributary mission to Beijing, Yu 
                                               
10 The Zongli Yamen to the Commissioner of Trade for Shanghai, July 28, 1866, in QJZRH, vol. 2, 33-34. 
11 Ilsŏngnok, vol. 66, 614. 
12 Ibid., vol. 66, 564-585. 
13 Kojong sunjong sillok, vol. 1, 227-228. 
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Hu-bok, Sŏ Tang-po, and Hong Sun-hak, returned from Beijing to Hansŏng and were 
granted an audience with the king. They had been charged with requesting the Qing court 
to invest the daughter of the late official, Min Ch’i-rok (1799–1858), with the title of 
princess—and she was, in fact, later known as Princess Min (1851–1895).14 Yu told the 
king that the coming of the foreign ships might be the consequence of the destruction of 
an American ship, the General Sherman, in Pyongyang in September. For officials like 
Yu, all Western ships were the same that represented nothing but threat, and it appeared 
that the threat was approaching Hansŏng. Yu also informed the king that the foreigners in 
Beijing were beyond Chinese jurisdiction and were not afraid of the “big country,” so 
they were doing many things that had never happened before.15 Yu’s stories might have 
given the court the impression that China had become a victim of Western foreigners, 
while Chosŏn would be the next one soon. This nightmare scenario reinforced the 
Taewŏn’gun’s anti-Catholic and xenophobic attitude, making him believe that Chosŏn’s 
security would be guaranteed only by resisting the “foreign barbarians” (K. yang’i). 
Two weeks after the audience, the French squadron hugged the coast of Inchon 
again and blockaded all entrances to Hansŏng’s river. In the following month, the French 
marines effected landings, occupied and looted the capital of the Kanghwa prefecture and 
other nearby towns, and started withdrawing to Zhifu on November 11 due to the cold 
weather.16 The Western ministers in Beijing had assumed that the expedition would bring 
Chosŏn to a new world, including the American chargé d’affaires, S. Wells Williams. He 
reported to Secretary of State, William H. Seward, that “the expedition will result in 
throwing open to the western world the last country which now forbids intercourse with 
                                               
14 Ilsŏngnok, vol. 66, 309. 
15 Ibid., vol. 66, 582. 
16 Kojong sidaesa (The chronicle of the period of King Kojong), vol. 1, 248-294. 
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other lands…It is full time that Corea was introduced into the family of nations.”17 The 
expedition, however, finally frustrated Williams and his fellow ministers in Beijing. The 
French failed to conduct any negotiations with the Chosŏn government, much less 
introduce any ideas of the family of nations into the country. Rather, it provided the 
Taewŏn’gun with another good opportunity to promulgate his four principles of 
“anti-barbarians and protecting the nation” (K. yang’i poguk).18 The event proved that 
the Qing did not intervene into Chosŏn’s foreign affairs, highlighting the Zongli Yamen’s 
first assertion of Chosŏn’s right of Zizhu. 
THE IMPERIAL ENVOYS IN 1866: CONDUCTING ZONGFAN FORMALITIES AS 
USUAL 
The Zongfan practice between China and Chosŏn in this period manifested Chosŏn’s 
status as China’s shuguo. On November 1, 1866, while the battle with the French marines 
was raging in the Kanghwa area, the king held a grand ceremony in Hansŏng to welcome 
the two imperial envoys from Beijing, Kuiling and Xiyuan, who came to invest Princess 
Min.19 The coming of the imperial mission to invest the princess was a positive and 
routine response by the Qing court to Chosŏn’s request. 
That day, the king went to the outskirts of Hansŏng to the Hall of Admiring the 
Central Civilized Country to welcome the envoys. After that, in the palace in Hansŏng, 
they performed a series of rituals in accordance to the imperial ritual codes. During this 
ceremony, the king kowtowed to the imperial decrees, followed by the reading of the 
decrees by Korean officials in the grand hall.20 According to the decrees, Chosŏn had 
                                               
17 Mr. Williams to Mr. Seward, No. 44, October 24, 1866, in FRUS, 1867–’68, vol. I, 416.  
18 Kojong sunjong sillok, vol. 1, 235; Yongho hanrok (The idle records of Mr. Yongho), vol. 4, 44-45. 
19 Ilsŏngnok, vol. 66, 643. 
20 Kuiling, Dongshi jishi shilue (Some poems on the visit to Chosŏn), 735-736. 
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been a loyal “fan and fence” (Ch. fanping) of China for generations and the princess 
should assist the king to make the country prosperous. After the envoys forwarded the 
imperial gifts to the princess, the king invited them to the grand hall, where they bowed 
to each other before having a tea ceremony. During a short conversation, the king asked if 
the emperor and the two empress dowagers were healthy. At the end, the envoys went to 
their residence in the South Palace Annex, where Taewŏn’gun, the high-ranking official 
Yi Chae-myŏn (1845–1912), and other officials visited for pen conversations.21 The king 
soon issued a decree to celebrate the investiture, in which he stated that Chosŏn, the 
“lower country” (K. haguk; Ch. xiaguo), appreciated the great favor of the “central 
dynasty” (K. chungcho; Ch. zhongchao) as well as the “big country.”22 The next day, the 
king visited the envoys’ residence to treat the envoys to a tea ceremony. On November 3, 
the king visited the envoys again to send them off in person.23 
All of the investiture’s ritual procedures were performed according to precedents 
during the three-day-long sojourn of the imperial envoys. The conversations between the 
Korean side and the envoys did not mention the ongoing war with the French, raging just 
25 miles away from the city. The envoys, the agents of the Qing’s imperial court, did not 
ask anything about Chosŏn’s domestic or foreign affairs beyond the investiture 
ceremonies. Neither did the king and his officials inform the envoys of such affairs. The 
boundary between the tributary matters and the diplomatic affairs was very clear. 
The dispatch of imperial envoys to Chosŏn raised concern among the French, and 
Bellonet asked the Zongli Yamen for explanations. Prince Gong answered that the envoys 
“were [in Chosŏn] on affairs of ceremonial and in accordance with long-established 
                                               
21 Kuiling, Dongshi jishi shilue, 737. 
22 Ilsŏngnok, vol. 66, 643-644. 
23 Ilsŏngnok, vol. 66, 645-648. 
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usage, having no reference to the quarrel between France and Corea.” 24  The 
correspondence between the two sides comprised the misunderstanding of the Sino–
Korean relationship between Beijing and treaty powers.25 This episode caused tensions 
between China and France after Prince Gong circulated their correspondence among 
foreign ministers in Beijing. Yet, in this way, Beijing made China’s understanding of the 
nature of the Sino–Korean Zongfan relationship and China’s attitude toward relations 
between Chosŏn and treaty powers public and known to all members of the diplomatic 
corps in Beijing. 
While Prince Gong argued with Bellonet in November and December 1866, two 
Korean tributary missions arrived in Beijing in succession. The first mission, headed by 
Han Mun-kyu, arrived on November 6 in order to receive the new Chinese calendar for 
next year. Following the ritual procedures, Han Mun-kyu submitted the king’s memorial 
to the emperor through the Ministry of Rituals. After reporting that a foreign schooner 
was burned in Pyongyang, the king articulated that Chosŏn did not want to do businesses 
with those foreign countries, while Catholicism and other foreign religions were not 
welcomed, either. The memorial aimed to beg the “big country” for understandings over 
what the “small country” had done.26 
In addition, Han brought a personal letter written by the Korean official, Yi 
Hŭng-min, to Wan Qingli, a minister of the Ministry of Rituals. Yi tried to legitimize the 
Taewŏn’gun’s anti-Catholic policy and hoped Wan would take advantage of his position 
                                               
24 M. de Bellonet to Prince Kung, November 11, 1866, Inclosure No. 5 of Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, 
No. 122, December 12, 1866, in FRUS, 1867–’68, vol. I, 422-423; Prince Kung to Mr. de Bellonet, [no 
date], No. 6 of Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, No. 122, December 12, 1866, in FRUS, 1867–’68, vol. I, 
423-424. 
25 M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 117-119. 
26 The king to the emperor, in ZCSLXB, 344-349. 
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to discuss the issue with the emperor and the Zongli Yamen, so that they would persuade 
the foreign powers to not visit Chosŏn.27 Yi got to know Wan when he visited Beijing as 
a tributary emissary in 1865.28 Although the emissaries continued to communicate with 
Chinese officials and intellectuals via personal letters after they returned to Chosŏn, these 
did not concern political matters, as Chapter 2 has depicted. Yi’s letter to Wan, however, 
suddenly put an end to this convention. Realizing that the issues were beyond the 
jurisdiction of his ministry, Wan forwarded the letter to the emperor for instructions. Wan 
further explained that Yi sent him the letter because it was inconvenient for the king to 
discuss the issues in official memorials. Finally, the emperor’s decrees to the king, in a 
similar way, only instructed the latter to make a good plan to secure Chosŏn, without 
offering any specific strategy. For Wan, this omission also resulted from the inadvisability 
of discussing these issues in official decrees. In order to compensate for this institutional 
deficiency, Wan suggested that the court use this opportunity to give Chosŏn detailed 
suggestions on managing foreign affairs through his personal response to Yi.29 Wan’s 
offer was not endorsed by the court, but in 1875, Li Hongzhang put it into practice. 
While the Qing officials were discussing how to handle Yi’s letter, Chosŏn’s 
annual tributary mission arrived in Beijing on February 1, 1867, three days before the 
Chinese Spring Festival. The king described the conflict with the French forces in 1866 
in his memorials by firmly stating that it was impossible for Chosŏn to trade with the 
“foreign barbarians” or to allow them to spread the gospel in the country. He also 
reported that Yi Hŭng-min had been punished because of his personal letter to “high 
                                               
27 Wan’s memorial, November 21, 1866, in ZCSLXB, 355; Yi’s letter to Wan, September 21, 1866, in 
ZCSLXB, 355-358. 
28 Ilsŏngnok, vol. 66, 93. 
29 Wan’s memorial, November 26, 1866, in ZCSLXB, 358-359; The draft letter of Wan to Yi, November 26, 
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officials of the imperial dynasty.”30 When the conflict between Chosŏn and France came 
to an end, it left the Qing an awkward position between Chosŏn and foreign powers. 
4.2 The Shuguo between Zizhu and Independence: The Sino–American Negotiation in 
1871 
The Qing’s relations with the treaty powers quickly deteriorated as a result of the 
negotiations between the American minister and the Zongli Yamen over the killings of the 
crew of an American schooner in Pyongyang in 1866. The negotiations pushed the 
Yamen to deliver more detailed descriptions on Chosŏn’s status and China’s Zongfan 
relationship with Chosŏn, which also made the subject more complicated and perplexing 
for the powers. 
In July and September 1866, two American schooners, the Surprise and the 
General Sherman, were wrecked in Chosŏn. The crew of the Surprise was well treated 
and safely forwarded to Manchuria by Chosŏn, but those of the General Sherman were 
killed in Pyongyang. After learning of the General Sherman incident, the American 
minister at Beijing, Anson Burlingame, immediately brought the issue to the attention of 
Prince Gong since he argued that “Corea was formerly tributary to China.” Prince Gong 
“at once disavowed all responsibility for the Coreans, and stated that the only connection 
between the two countries was one of ceremonial.”31 In his letter of December 27 to 
Rear Admiral Henry H. Bell, Acting Commander of the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, 
Burlingame summarized that “I find the Chinese government disavows any responsibility 
for that of Corea, and all jurisdiction over its people. Consequently, the occurrences there 
                                               
30 The king to the emperor, in QJZRH, vol. 2, 39-47. 
31 Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, No. 124, December 15, 1866, in FRUS, 1867–’68, vol. I, 426. 
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relating to the General Sherman are beyond my jurisdiction.”32 Introducing the term of 
“jurisdiction” into the matter of Sino–Korean relationship, Burlingame indicated that 
Chosŏn was an independent country beyond China’s jurisdiction. 
The case was passed on to Admiral Bell, who in a confidential dispatch to the 
Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, suggested that the U.S. launch a punitive action 
against Chosŏn, which he believed “can be more honorably and efficiently done by the 
United States single-handed, than by any combined movement made with England or 
France.”33 Ten days before Bell made this proposal, William H. Seward had proposed to 
the French minister in Washington that the U.S. and France should initiate a combined 
action against Chosŏn, but France declined this offer.34 Bell’s proposed expedition did 
not occur, either. In early 1867, the navy dispatched the U.S.S. Wachusett to Chosŏn, 
under the command of Robert W. Shufeldt, to investigate the General Sherman incident. 
The action yielded nothing, however, as Shufeldt had to quit from Chosŏn due to the 
severe weather before Chosŏn’s response to his message could reach him. 
In early 1867, American diplomats found themselves once again involved in 
another shipwreck, this time the schooner Rover, in Taiwan (Formosa). In March 1867, 
the Rover was wrecked on the southern coast of Taiwan and the crew who came ashore 
were ambushed and killed by aborigines known as the Koaluts. Assuming that the 
incident was within his jurisdiction, Charles William Le Gendre (1830–1899), the U.S. 
consul at Amoy, immediately brought the incident to the attention of the 
Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang in Fuzhou, the local officials of Taiwan 
                                               
32 Mr. Burlingame to Admiral Bell, December 27, 1866, Inclosure C of Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, No. 
124, December 15, 1866, in FRUS, 1867-’68, vol. I, 428. 
33 Dispatch 65, Bell to Welles, December 27, 1866, Roll 251, in Jules Davids, ed., American Diplomatic 
and Public Papers: The United States and China, 1861–1893, vol. 9, 49. 
34 Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 418-419. 
 220 
prefecture, and the Zongli Yamen. The local officials of Fujian and Taiwan informed Le 
Gendre that the crew met with their death on the “savage lands” (Ch. shengfan jie) 
“beyond the civilization of the sovereign” (Ch. wanghua buji), instead of in the “inner sea 
of China” (Ch. Zhongguo suoxia neiyang), and the murders were “savages” (Ch. 
shengfan) rather than “Chinese civilians” (Ch. huamin). Therefore, Article 11 and Article 
13 of the Sino–American Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 could not be applied to this incident, 
so that the local government had no responsibility to take action against the Koaluts at the 
consul’s request. Le Gendre, confirming that the “savages” were indeed within China’s 
jurisdiction, warned the officials that such disavowal of responsibility could be used by 
other powers to occupy the “savage lands.”35 In the process, Admiral Bell made a 
punitive expedition against the aborigines in vain. 36  Finally, the Chinese local 
government dispatched forces to accompany Le Gendre to southern Taiwan in September, 
but it was Le Gendre himself who entered the area of the Koaluts to make an agreement 
with their chieftain, Tooke-tok.37 Le Gendre’s experience of negotiating with the Chinese 
government was not notable at the time and it seemed to have no relations with Chosŏn. 
Yet, Le Gendre, as it happens, was soon hired by Tokyo in the 1870s as an advisor to the 
Japanese government, and he played a major role in reframing Japan’s foreign policy 
toward Taiwan, Ryukyu, Chosŏn, and the Sino–Korean Zongfan relationship. 
Before Japan joined with the team of powers in challenging Chosŏn’s status as 
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China’s shuguo, Frederick F. Low, the American minister at Beijing, pushed the Qing 
government to clarify its position on Sino–Korean relations by organizing an expedition 
to Chosŏn in 1871 with the aim of negotiating a treaty for the protection of shipwrecked 
mariners. Low started to prepare for the expedition after he arrived in Beijing in 1870, 
and the top issue on his agenda was to clarify the nature of the Sino–Korean relationship. 
On July 16, 1870, Low made a report to Hamilton Fish to give his understanding of the 
relationship. Low argued that “Corea is substantially an independent nation” and the 
Korean tribute to China “is sent rather as a quid pro quo for the privilege of trading with 
the Chinese than a governmental tribute.” He concluded that “Beyond these arrangements, 
which have been in existence many years, there seems to be no connection between 
China and Corea. China claims or exercises no control in any way over Corea, nor do the 
Coreans regard the Chinese as having any right to interfere or exercise any control over 
their governmental polity.”38 
Low apparently failed to grasp the political meaning behind Chosŏn’s tribute to 
China. In light of his failure to obtain useful information about Chosŏn, Low tried to 
solicit aid from the Zongli Yamen on his communications with Chosŏn. In February 1871, 
Low delivered the Yamen a letter that he hoped would be forwarded to the king of 
Chosŏn. The Yamen replied: “according to the strict and established regulations on the 
communications between China and its outer fan, the Yamen should not intervene in 
affairs of Chosŏn that are under the management of the Ministry of Rituals.” Low, instead, 
kept visiting the Yamen for the same purpose. Realizing that the American visit to 
Chosŏn was unavoidable, the Yamen suggested that the Ministry of Rituals forward 
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Low’s letter to Chosŏn to undergird China’s “way of cherishing shuguo.”39 
The Ministry of Rituals forwarded the letter on March 22, but in a confidential 
memorial to the emperor, the ministry noted that, “Chosŏn has used China’s ruling titles 
and calendars for many years and proved the most loyal. All affairs regarding its 
government, religion, prohibitions, and laws are subject to its own management by the 
rule of zizhu, and none of these affairs had China hitherto interfered.” The ministry also 
pointed out that the act of forwarding Low’s letter to Chosŏn was only an expedient that 
should not be imitated by other countries on any account.40 These were the words cited 
by the Zongli Yamen in its dispatch to Low on March 28. 
Low reached two conclusions as a result of the Yamen’s response to his inquires. 
First, he decided to interpret China’s position as affirming Chosŏn’s sovereignty, stating 
that “although Corea is regarded as a country subordinate to China, yet she is wholly 
independent in everything that related to her government, her religion, her prohibitions, 
and her laws; in none of these things has China hitherto interfered.”41 He translated the 
term “zizhu” into “wholly independent” in accordance with what he had claimed in 1870. 
Second, by repeating China’s declaration that “while Corea is considered and treated as a 
tributary kingdom, entire independence is conceded in all that relates to its government, 
religion, and intercourse with foreign nations,” Low concluded that the declaration aimed 
to “guard against complications that may possibly grow out of an attempt by foreign 
nations to open intercourse with Corea, and relieve this Government of all responsibility 
for the acts of the Coreans, whether hostile or otherwise.”42  In effect, Low was 
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interpreting Beijing’s declaration as a disavowal of responsibility for Chosŏn’s behavior. 
It seemed that it was time for him to sail for Chosŏn, a place that was, for him, “more of a 
sealed book than Japan was before Commodore Perry’s visit.”43 
Low sailed to Chosŏn in May, but failed to open the “sealed book” as a result of 
its inability to establish any official contacts with its court or xenophobic local officials. 
The expedition was an updated edition of the French one in 1866 and made Chosŏn’s 
policy toward these countries more hostile. In fact, the basic assumption that Low had 
made about opening a diplomatic relationship with Chosŏn was unrealistic because 
Chosŏn identified itself as “a subject of China” (K. insin; Ch. renchen) that had no right 
to “communicate with foreign countries” (K. oegyo; Ch. waijiao)—that is, to conduct 
diplomacy. This point was re-emphasized by the king in his memorial to the emperor in 
June 1871 in response to Low’s letter that Beijing forwarded to the country.44 
After returning to Beijing, Low paid several visits to the Zongli Yamen in the 
hope of contacting Chosŏn through Beijing. The conversations with the Yamen provided 
Low with more opportunities to conceptualize the Sino–Korean relationship and 
concluded the relationship was nominal and insubstantial (Ch. youming wushi). He 
claimed to the Yamen that, “the relations between that country and yours established 
during the reign of the Ming Emperors, nominally continued unchanged, although, 
practically, they have little force.”45 This assertion encountered a sharp refutation from 
Prince Gong, but Low never yielded. From 1866 to 1871, the foreign ministers at Beijing 
gradually replaced their perception that Chosŏn was a “tributary” of China with the new 
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understanding that it was an independent country beyond the Chinese jurisdiction. 
Coincidentally, in 1871, the Qing signed its first Western-style treaty with Japan. In the 
next five years, Japan, in its dramatic Westernizing reforms became the vanguard of the 
challenge to the Sino–Korean relationship, aided by its position as an insider in the East 
Asian community. 
4.3 The Shuguo between the Chinese Legitimacy and International Law: The First 
Sino–Japanese Debate in 1873 
Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan established the Gaimushō, its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in 1869, to manage foreign relations in the newly adopted western terms. 
While its relationship with treaty powers developed steadily, Japan failed to find a way to 
do so with Chosŏn. For centuries, communications between the two countries were 
conducted through the Sō family on the domain of Tsushima of Japan. The Sō family was 
treated by Chosŏn as a virtual subordinate in a semi-Zongfan framework, in which the 
leader of the family received a special seal from the king of Chosŏn, just as the king did 
from the emperor of the Qing. The leader dispatched boats to Chosŏn for trade in 
accordance with Chosŏn’s regulations, and he presented himself as a subordinate in 
letters to the king. In return, when necessary, Chosŏn dispatched messengers to Japan to 
consolidate friendly relations and all messengers visited Kyoto and Edo (Tokyo) via 
Tsushima. Chosŏn called its policy of communicating with Japan Kyorin, which means 
communication with neighbors. 
After the Meiji Restoration, Japan sent Chosŏn sovereign letters with the aim of 
establishing communications. In the letters, the Japanese monarch referred to himself as 
“emperor,” putting Chosŏn in an awkward position, as the title had been the exclusive 
domain of the Chinese emperor and the Son of Heaven in the Zongfan world. This was 
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the same challenge that Chosŏn had encountered in 1636, when Hongtaiji invoked the 
title of emperor and sent sovereign letters to Chosŏn to extend his political influence. The 
nub of the question was nothing other than the concept of the orthodox legitimacy, which 
Japan itself had also seriously encountered in the late Tokugawa period.46 As a result, 
Chosŏn refused to accept Japan’s sovereign letters, even though the letters were sent 
through the Sō family, leaving the Japanese emissaries outside the country’s door. 
In the meanwhile, Japan was keenly contacting China to pursue an international 
status equal to it. After a negotiation, in September 1871, the Japanese minister 
plenipotentiary, Date Munenari (1818–1892), signed a treaty with the Chinese 
plenipotentiary, Li Hongzhang, at Tianjin. The first article of the treaty states that, 
“Relations of amity shall henceforth be maintained in redoubled force between China and 
Japan, in measure as boundless as the heaven and the earth. In all that regards the 
territorial possessions of either country the two Governments shall treat each the other 
with proper courtesy, without the slightest infringement or encroachment on either side, 
to the end that there may be for evermore peace between them undisturbed.”47 The 
phrase of “territorial possessions” in this article later became a disputable issue between 
the two countries that related to Chosŏn’s status. 
The phrase, in the treaty that was signed in Chinese and Japanese languages, is a 
rough English equivalent of the Chinese phrase of suoshu bangtu. Suoshu means “belong 
to,” but bangtu is too vague to be exactly defined and interpreted by international law. 
Literally, bang means “country” and tu means “land,” but bangtu could mean “country,” 
“land,” or “territorial possessions.” Later, both China and Japan realized that this phrase 
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failed to state whether the countries serving as China’s outer fan, in particular Chosŏn, 
were China’s “territorial possessions.” By the same token, the ambiguity of the phrase 
enabled both sides to use the term’s uncertain definition to their own advantage. This 
ambiguity resulted in fierce Sino–Japanese disputes on the international legal status of 
China’s outer fan when Japan annexed Ryukyu and began implementing an aggressive 
policy toward Chosŏn starting from 1872. 
In December 1871, a boat from Ryukyu was shipwrecked on the southern coast of 
Taiwan, where the aborigines killed 54 members of its crew. Since Japan was annexing 
Ryukyu by converting the kingdom into a Japanese domain (J. han), it regarded the 
incident as a perfect opportunity to finalize the Ryukyu issue by cutting off Ryukyu’s 
Zongfan relationship with China. In February 1873, Emperor Meiji appointed minister of 
foreign affairs, Soejima Taneomi (1828–1905), as ambassador extraordinary to China to 
ratify the Treaty of Tianjin of 1871. The emperor also instructed him to discuss the 
killings of the Ryukyu crew in Taiwan with Beijing to determine whether or not the 
whole of Taiwan Island was under China’s jurisdiction.48 Soejima’s primary mission did 
not relate to Chosŏn, but as a key proponent of the “expedition against Korea” (J. Seikan 
ron), he availed himself of this opportunity to glean information on China’s attitude 
toward Japanese–Korean contacts. 
The Soejima’s embassy arrived in Tianjin in April 1873. After ratifying the treaty, 
he briefly discussed the Japanese–Korean contacts with the Beiyang Superintendent, Li 
Hongzhang. Li suggested that Japan should be friendly to Chosŏn and any expedition 
against it would violate the Sino–Japanese treaty.49 Among the members of the Japanese 
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embassy was its adviser on foreign affairs, Charles William Le Gendre. Le Gendre was 
hired by the Gaimushō as an advisor on foreign policy toward Taiwan. He came at the 
recommendation of the American minister to Japan, Charles E. De Long. His rich 
experience on Taiwan after the Rover incident became extremely valuable for Tokyo’s 
efforts to formulate and exercise a new policy toward the Chinese Zongfan system.50 It 
was through Western advisers like Le Gendre that Meiji Japan transformed itself into an 
outsider to the East Asian community in terms of its foreign relations practices. 
After the embassy arrived in Beijing, Le Gendre distributed a long memorandum 
through the Russian minister, A. Vlangaly, the Doyen of the Corps Diplomatique in the 
capital, to suggest all Western ministers call upon the Japanese ambassador “who was a 
chief representative of progress in Japan.” The British minister, Thomas Francis Wade 
(1818–1895), commented that Le Gendre was “guiding his Japanese chief in a direction 
more pretentious than wise.”51 Le Gendre soon changed his mind by withdrawing the 
memorandum, followed by Soejima’s individual visits to the foreign legations. In his 
conversations with Wade and Low, Soejima expressed his concerns on Chosŏn, which 
made Wade conclude that “the Japanese are also suspected of a design on Corea.”52 
Wade said that Soejima “is evidently anxious for an assurance from the Chinese that 
Corea is an independent Kingdom, so independent of China, that is to say, as to make 
what may befall Corea no concern of the Chinese.” Wade further inferred that “it is plain 
that with Corea Japan is about to deal, much as China and Japan mostly have been dealt 
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with by Western nations.”53 The way that Wade suggested here was gunboat diplomacy, 
which Soejima expressed clearly in his meeting with Low. 
According to Low, Soejima had “only two questions of importance which he 
desires to discuss with the Chinese government.” First, he wanted to know “whether 
China is responsible for the acts of the aborigines on the island of Formosa.” He 
emphasized that “If the answer is in the negative, notice will then be given that Japan 
proposed to send a military force to Formosa to chastise the savage and semi-civilized 
tribes that practically hold undisputed possession of the large part of the island.” Second, 
he want to “ascertain the precise relations between China and Corea; whether the former 
claims to exercise such control over her tributary as to render China responsible for the 
acts of the Coreans, or whether other nations must look to Corea alone for redress for 
wrongs and outrages which her people may commit.”54 The logic behind Soejima’s 
thinking on the connection between the aborigines and Sino–Korean relations was based 
on a shared common ground with the Western powers regarding the extent of China’s 
jurisdiction. When Soejima solicited Low’s opinions on Chosŏn, Low showed him a 
Zongli Yamen’s dispatch issued in March 1871, arguing that Chosŏn was China’s shuguo 
with the right of zizhu. Following Low’s assertion that Chosŏn was “wholly independent,” 
Soejima made the judgment that Chosŏn was “beyond the Qing’s sovereignty.”55 In this 
way, the Japanese policy of challenging Chosŏn’s status as China’s shuguo started to 
converge with that of the U.S., France, Britain, and other powers in China. 
Soejima’s conclusion found support in a meeting at the Zongli Yamen on June 21, 
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which took place between the Japanese representatives, Yanagiwara Sakimitsu (1850–
1894) and Tei Einei (1829–1897) on one side, and the Chinese ministers, Mao Changxi 
(1817–1882), Dong Xun, and Sun Shida on the other. In their conversation, Yanagiwara 
asked how China could prove Chosŏn was a shuguo, since the Yamen claimed that 
“China never interfered with its interior politics, religion, prohibitions and laws” in its 
note to the American minister two years ago. Mao replied that “the so-called shuguo only 
referred to investiture and tribute submission. In addition, he also confirmed that China 
would not intervene in Chosŏn’s right of war and peace negotiation.56 
Mao’s response satisfied Soejima very much because it actually endorsed the 
argument of the American minister that the Sino–Korean relationship was ceremonial in 
practice.57 Soejima was granted an audience with Emperor Tongzhi (1856–1875, r. 
1861–1875) along with his Western counterparts on June 29, which was the first imperial 
audience in China for Western ministers since the 1840s. He soon had another short 
discussion with Li Hongzhang in Tianjin. During the conversation, Li warned Soejima 
that Japan should honor the first article of the treaty of 1871, by not encroaching on 
China’s bangtu.58 Li’s position set the tone for bilateral debates on the issue in 1876. 
Soejima’s visit to China made him more active in promoting the Seikan ron upon 
his return to Tokyo in the summer of 1873. The homecoming of Iwakura Tomomi’s 
mission to the United States and Europe, however, led to the halt of the proposed 
expedition to Korea by the caretaker government. Three key members of the mission, 
including Iwakura Tomomi (1825–1883), Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–1878), and Kido 
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Takayoshi (1833–1877), argued that Japan should focus on domestic reforms to 
“reorganize its national politics and make its people rich.”59 As this opinion prevailed, 
the proponents of the Seikan ron, such as Soejima, Saigō Takamori (1827–1877), Itagaki 
Taisuke (1837–1919), and Etō Shinpei (1834–1874), were pushed out of the cabinet, 
resulting in Saigō’s rebellion in 1877. In December 1873, the young king of Chosŏn 
assumed his own rule by ending the regency of his father, Taewŏn’gun, causing severe 
political conflicts between the two cliques of Princess Min and Taewŏn’gun. Tokyo tried 
to avail this opportunity to pursue a diplomatic relationship with Hansŏng, but this effort 
failed in the face of sharp resistance on the part of local officials in Pusan. Tokyo could 
not make any substantial progress on opening a channel of communication with Hansŏng. 
4.4 The Birth of the Sovereignty of the Shuguo: The Second Sino–Japanese Debate 
and the Japanese–Korean Treaty of 1876 
TAIWAN, KANGHWA, AND MORI ARINORI’S VISIT TO BEIJING 
In summer 1874, while Tokyo sent troops to Taiwan to deal with “the territory in question 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Chinese government,”60 it sent Yanagiwara Sakimitsu and 
Ōkubo Toshimichi to Beijing for negotiations. The Zongli Yamen articulated to the 
Japanese representatives that, “even if the aborigines are ‘barbarians,’ they are still 
China’s barbarians, and only China owns the right to punish them had they been guilt.”61 
The Yamen used relative rules of International Law and Chinese historical evidence, such 
as local gazetteers, to demonstrate its points. It turned out that the Japanese 
representatives, without close advice from Western advisors like Le Gendre, failed to 
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prove that the area of the aborigines in Taiwan was beyond China’s jurisdiction. The 
British minister at Tokyo, Harry Parkes, had actually been anticipated this failure in his 
dispatch to the minister of the Gaimushō, Terashima Munenori (1832–1893), in April, in 
which Parkes noted that, “during a residence of upwards of twenty years in China, I 
always heard that the whole of Formosa was claimed by China.”62 
Under the mediation of Thomas Wade, the new Doyen of the Corps Diplomatique 
in Beijing, the Chinese and Japanese governments reached a brief agreement on October 
31 after intensive debates.63 The third article of the agreement was intractable, as it 
stated that, “all correspondence that this question has occasioned between the two 
Governments shall be cancelled, and the discussions dropped for evermore.”64 In this 
way, Japan invalidated all correspondence that could expose its inferior position in the 
discussions and enabled its negotiations with China over the reach of China’s jurisdiction 
in the following years to shift back to international law-based arguments. This substantial 
change was quickly proved by their positions on Chosŏn’s status in 1876. 
The agreement was followed by a skirmish between Japan and Chosŏn near 
Kanghwa Island on September 20, 1875, resulting in the resurgence of the Seikan ron 
with vigor in Japan. This time Iwakura and his fellow premiers did not prevent the 
expedition because Japan’s diplomatic situation was very different from that in 1873. In 
addition to reaching an agreement with China about the Taiwan Incident, Tokyo had 
resolved the territorial disputes with Russia over Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands by 
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signing a treaty in St. Petersburg in May 1875, pursuing Russian acquiescence to Japan’s 
actions in Chosŏn.65 In order to check the southern advance of Russia,66 British designs 
to occupy Port Hamilton, a small island belonging to Chosŏn near the Tsushima Strait, 
also provided Japan with a good opportunity to initiate an expedition against Korea 
without causing interventions from these Western powers. In October 1875, Kido 
Takayoshi suggested to the government that Japan should deal with the Zongfan 
relationship between China and Chosŏn and after Beijing disavowed responsibility for 
Chosŏn’s foreign affairs, Japan could freely take action against Chosŏn.67 This opinion 
bore a striking resemblance to Le Gendre’s suggestion about Taiwan in 1873. 
The Japanese government soon appointed then 30-year-old Mori Arinori (1847–
1889) as the minister plenipotentiary to Beijing.68 Mori was educated in Britain and 
America, and was familiar with international law relating to such conflicts. He had 
consulted with E. Peshine Smith (1814–1882) regarding the incident, as Smith had been 
the American special advisor to the Gaimushō on international law. Sanjō Sanetomi 
(1837–1891), Chancellor of the Realm, gave Mori’s embassy instructions, among which 
the most important mission was to “identify Chosŏn as an independent country” and 
persuade China to help with the establishment of Japanese–Korean relations in order to 
promote the common interests of Japan and China. 69  Simultaneously, Terashima 
telegraphed the chargé d’affaires in Beijing, Tei Einei, instructing him to treat the Sino–
Korean relationship seriously in the days to come. Terashima noted that, “Although Mr. 
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Soejima discussed Sino–Korean relations when he visited the Qing several years ago, it 
has not been confirmed yet that Chosŏn is not a fan of the Qing. You should be aware that 
all contacts between Japan and Chosŏn have nothing related to the Qing.”70 Later, Mori 
summarized that his mission was “to cut off the Sino–Korean relationship.”71 
Shortly after the Mori embassy sailed from Shinagawa of Tokyo for China on 
November 24, 1875, Li Hongzhang learned of the coming of Mori’s embassy from his 
agents at Shanghai and Tianjin and forwarded it to the Zongli Yamen. William N. Pethick, 
then American vice-consul at Tianjin who was becoming Li’s private secretary and 
diplomatic advisor, informed Li that “Mori, a capable Japanese diplomat who has served 
at the United States, is going to negotiate the issue of Chosŏn with China and ask China 
to mediate between Japan and Chosŏn.” Li replied that “Chosŏn is China’s 
shubang—that is, subordinate country, but China never interferes with her national affairs. 
According to the first article of the Sino–Japanese Treaty of 1871, what China can do is 
to persuade Japan not to effect military actions against Chosŏn. It is inconvenient for 
China to order Chosŏn to negotiate with Japan.”72 Li’s statement was an echo of his 
claim to Soejima in 1873. Neither Li nor the Zongli Yamen would expect a really 
challenging debate with the young Japanese diplomat. 
On January 2, 1876, two days before Mori arrived in Beijing, the Qing court 
dispatched two Manchu envoys, Jihe (1823–1883) and Wulasiconga (1829–1894), to 
Chosŏn to invest the king’s son, Yi Ch’ŏk, as the crown prince.73 Interestingly enough, 
three Han Chinese Grand Secretaries, including Mao Changxi, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo 
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Zongtang, drafted the imperial edict of investiture on December 1, 1875 (Figure 4. 1). 
Ironically, Mao and Li would argue with the Japanese minister over Chosŏn’s status soon. 
Figure 4. 1. Draft Imperial Edict to King of Chosŏn on December 1, 1875 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The sixth colorful illustration, in ZCSLHB. 
 
In Beijing, Mori paid his first visit to Thomas Wade on January 5, in the hope that 
the Doyen could mediate between China and Japan. Wade was impressed by the new 
Japanese minister and he noted that Mori “speaks English remarkably well.”74 His 
situation, however, made it impossible to meet Mori’s expectations. Wade’s relations with 
the court was not pleasant as a result of the Margary Affairs happening in February 1875 
at Yunnan, in which a young British interpreter hand-picked by Wade, Augustus R. 
Margary, was killed in an expedition to Burma. The changes that Wade proposed to the 
Zongli Yamen, which were far beyond what could have been extracted from the case, 
indicated that he tried to convert Chinese foreign policy into what he had envisioned for 
years. With that purpose in mind, Wade kept telegraphing London to ask for more naval 
forces to pressure China and in September he even closed his office at Beijing and went 
to Shanghai.75 Although Wade played a key role as mediator between Japan and China in 
1874 regarding Taiwan and Ryukyu, he now had no desire to be involved in the Sino–
Japanese negotiations on Korea’s affairs. 
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After meeting with Mori, Wade reported to London that, “the minister’s manner, 
rather than his language, made me mistrustful. I inferred that an expedition of Corea is 
determined on and that the object of his confidential communications to me was to 
ascertain whether objection to the expedition would be taken by English, or any other 
foreign action.”76 Wade could not have been more correct than that. On the same day, the 
Japanese ambassador plenipotentiary to Chosŏn, Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840–1900), started 
preparing for his expedition to Chosŏn in Tokyo.77 On January 6, Kuroda sailed for 
Chosŏn by leading a fleet consisting of 2 gunboats, 4 schooners, and 754 members in 
total. At the same time, in Beijing, Mori visited the Zongli Yamen for a conversation with 
Prince Gong and other ministers. Mori wished to present two sovereign letters to 
Emperor Guangxu in an imperial audience, but Prince Gong immediately declined the 
request on the grounds that the emperor was too young to meet with foreign ministers. 
Finally, Mori submitted two copies of the sovereign letters to the Yamen.78 
On January 10, Mori led his interpreter, Tei Einei, and two secretaries, Takezoe 
Shinichirō (1842–1917) and Iegawa Shigerukan (1831–1891), on a visit to the Yamen to 
discuss Chosŏn’s status. Five Chinese ministers talked with him, including Shen Guifen 
(1818–1881), Mao Changxi, Dong Xun, Chonghou (1826–1893) and Guo Songtao 
(1818–1891). Zhou Jiamei (1835–1886) served as the secretary to the ministers. None of 
the six Chinese officials knew international law. Shen Guifen and Mao Changxi had 
worked at the Ministry of Rituals, where they must have gained some experience on 
Sino–Korean contacts. Mori, the youngest man on site, was the only person who knew 
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international law and had Western educational and diplomatic experience. Shortly after 
the discussion started, both sides with different worldviews were fully aware that they 
were on diametrically different tracks. 
The conversation mainly occurred between Mori and Shen. Mori asked that why 
China, identifying Chosŏn as a shuguo, claimed that Chosŏn’s “politics, religion, 
prohibitions, and laws are always zizhu.” Shen explained that, “The shuguo is actually 
not the territory of our country. But it pays tribute in time, receive our investiture, and 
take our country’s calendar, so it becomes our shuguo.” Shen further informed Mori that 
Vietnam, Ryukyu, and Burma were China’s shuguo that had different time for paying 
tribute. When Mori asked if it would fine for a shuguo to negotiate with foreign countries 
for trade without informing China, Shen replied that the country would manage the 
affairs on its own feet and China would not get involved. If disputes arose between the 
shuguo and China’s treaty nations, China would respond to them according to certain 
treaties. Finally, Shen warned Mori that “invading shuguo cannot be morally tolerated,” 
which the first article of the Sino–Japanese Treaty of 1871 clearly stated.79 
The two sides had different understandings of “shuguo.” For Mori, a shuguo 
could mean a colony, a dependency, or a nation with semi-sovereign right. He used the 
relationship between the Muhammad Ali dynasty of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, that 
between Hungary and Austro–Hungarian Empire, and that between Canada and the 
British Empire as three examples of shuguo in the western context. The three examples, 
unfortunately, were missing in Chinese translation due to the huge knowledge gap 
                                               
79 See Mori to Terashima, January 13, 1876, in NHGB, vol. 9, 142-162; “Shishin nikki (Diary of Mori 
Arinori’s embassy to the Qing),” vol. 2, 48a-65a, in Mori Arinori bunsho, archive No. R. 1-55-1. 
 237 
between the two parties.80 Rather, the Chinese ministers gave Mori noticeable and 
convincing examples in the Chinese context to prove Chosŏn’s status as China’s shuguo. 
As a result, their fierce debate ended without an agreement. 
Falling short of his expectations at the meeting, Mori was frustrated with Chinese 
officialdom. In a letter to his father, he complained that “it is really inconvenient to 
negotiate with the Qing government because it is really dim to see how it will move 
forward beyond the erstwhile conventions and customs.”81 Indeed, in a time following 
the so-called “Tongzhi Restoration,” the Qing was facing even more serious challenges 
from within and outside the country. On the same day when Mori argued with the Yamen, 
Empress Dowagers Cian (1837–1881) and Cixi (1835–1908), in the Forbidden City 
around two miles west of the Yamen, were beseeching in tears the officials Weng Tonghe 
(1830–1904) and Xia Tongshan (1830–1880) to serve as teachers for then 5-year-old 
Emperor Guangxu.82 The political heart of the empire was very vulnerable. It was not 
until 1898 that the emperor was able to launch a reform movement with the strong 
support of his teacher, Weng Tonghe, three years after his empire was humiliated by 
Japan in the war breaking out right in Chosŏn. The conflicts resulting in the Sino–
Japanese War of 1894–1895 could be traced to the Sino–Japanese debate on Chosŏn’s 
status in 1876. 
After the meeting, Mori asked the Yamen to issue a passport to a Japanese 
assistant whom he wanted to send to Chosŏn via Mukden, in order to inform the Japanese 
ambassador to Chosŏn about the Sino–Japanese meetings. He also expressed his desire 
                                               
80 Yuanchong Wang, “1876 nian Li Hongzhang yu Mori Arinori Baoding huitan jilu” (Records of the 
negotiations between Li Hongzhang and Mori Arinori at Baoding in 1876), 125-147. 
81 Mori’s letter to his father, January 13, 1876, “Mori Arinori shokan” (Mori Arinori’s letters), in Mori 
Arinori bunsho, archive No. R. 1-55-1. 
82 Chen Yijie, ed. Weng Tonghe riji (Weng Tonghe’s diary), vol. 3, 1176. 
 238 
for a visit to Li Hongzhang at Baoding to show his gratitude for Li’s greetings.83 The 
Yamen refused to issue the passport due to lack of precedent. It also tried to prevent Mori 
visiting Baoding in a note on January 13, in which the restatement of Chosŏn’s status as 
China’s shuguo ignited a hot verbal jousting with Mori through diplomatic notes.  
In his response, Mori argued that “Chosŏn is an independent country (Ch. duli zhi 
guo) and the so-called shuguo by your honorable country is only a nominal title (Ch. 
kongming)…All Japanese–Korean contacts have nothing to do with the Sino–Japanese 
Treaty.”84 The vehement statement was almost a Japanese edition of what the American 
minister produced in 1871, marking the completion of the convergence of Japanese and 
Western policies challenging China’s claim that Chosŏn was its shuguo. Perceiving this 
alignment, the Yamen memorialized the throne on January 17 to express severe concern 
over likely problems caused by Japan, a country that “has recently adopted the Western 
politics and customs and changed their own costumes and calendars.” The Yamen was 
also not sure if Mori would conform to the bilateral treaty.85 Japan now became a 
troublemaker on the Yamen’s list. 
In order to inform Chosŏn of the situation, the Yamen in its memorial requested 
the Ministry of Rituals to immediately dispatch a copy of Mori’s note at a speed of 500 li 
per day to Hansŏng, but it noted that “although Chosŏn is China’s shuguo, China does not 
intervene in its affairs…Chosŏn would decide by itself if it would reach the 
rapprochement with Japan.”86 The note was sent from Beijing on January 19, four days 
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after Japanese naval forces had arrived at Pusan in Chosŏn, where they were making 
preparations for an expedition to Kanghwa. However, both the Yamen and the Ministry of 
Rituals had no intention of asking the two imperial envoys en route to Chosŏn to bring to 
the king any suggestions or instructions on the Korean–Japanese contacts. 
The Yamen, without knowing the Japanese proceedings in Chosŏn, busied itself 
by arguing with Mori, utilizing the first article of the Sino–Japanese Treaty of 1871. Mori, 
sidestepping the treaty, kept requesting the Yamen to articulate whether or not China 
would be responsible for what Chosŏn had done to Japan. According to him, China’s 
disavowal of responsibility for Chosŏn’s activities meant the so-called shuguo was 
nominal.87 On January 20, when both sides were at each other’s throats and could not see 
any positive ending, two officers sent by Li Hongzhang arrived in Beijing and directly 
made contact with Mori. Both the Yamen and Mori were very happy to forward the case 
to Li, in hopes of winning a favorable ruling against each other at Baoding. Very soon 
Mori and his interpreter, Tei Einei, left Beijing to visit Li, the de facto foreigner minister 
of China. 
THE MYSTERY OF THE BAODING CONVERSATIONS IN 1876 
The shift of the dispute to Li Hongzhang was the beginning of Li’s deep involvement in 
Chosŏn’s affairs as a provincial official. On January 10, while the Yamen squabbled with 
Mori and the two Empress Dowagers were crying in the Forbidden City, Li replied to a 
letter sent to him by Yi Yu-wŏn (1814–1888), a prime minister of Chosŏn, who had 
visited Beijing in late 1875 as a tributary emissary tasked with asking China’s investiture 
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of Chosŏn’s crown prince.88 When he returned home, Yi sent Li a letter via You Zhikai, 
the magistrate of Yongping prefecture of Zhili province, showing his admiration to Li by 
following the convention of individual contacts between intellectuals of the two countries. 
Since the issue of Chosŏn was in the forefront of his thoughts, Li availed himself of the 
opportunity to “briefly explain some ideas about diplomacy” to Yi.89 Two weeks later, 
when his letter was on the way to Hansŏng, Li welcomed Mori and Tei at Baoding. 
The Baoding conversations between Li and Mori on January 24 and 25 were very 
tricky because the host and the guest talked neither in Chinese nor Japanese, but in 
English. Moreover, both sides later claimed to be prevailing over each other in their final 
reports to their governments,90 so that neither Beijing nor Tokyo knew the truth of the 
Mori–Li conversations. Examining what happened at Boding helps explain the escalation 
of the Sino–Japanese conflict over Chosŏn. The first conversation, on January 24, lasted 
for more than 6 hours over a banquet at Li’s office, where Li invited two officials, Huang 
Pengnian and Huang Huilian, as his assistants. While Huang Pengnian was a senior 
Confucian scholar, the Cantonese Huang Huilian was educated at an American 
missionary school in Shanghai, had visited British Guiana, and was drafted by Beijing to 
serve as an interpreter during the Second Opium War.91 Mori might have decided to 
speak in English with Li after he found out about Huang Huilian’s English proficiency 
because English, instead of Chinese or Japanese, could help Mori use the principles of 
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international law to articulate his points on Chosŏn’s status.92  
As a response to Mori’s argument that Chosŏn was an independent country 
instead of China’s shuguo, Li made a rebuttal similar to those made by the Zongli Yamen. 
He argued that, “Everyone knows that Chosŏn has been subordinate to China for 
thousands of years. In the phrase suoshu bangtu (the territorial possessions) of the [Sino–
Japanese] treaty, the tu means Chinese provinces, namely China’s inner land (Ch. neidi) 
and inner subordinate (Ch. neishu), on which the Chinese government levies taxes and 
manages their political affairs. The bang refers to those countries such as Chosŏn that are 
China’s outer fan (Ch. waifan) and outer subordinates (Ch. waishu), whose issues of taxes 
and political affairs are always of their own business. This is a convention and it does not 
start from our dynasty. Chosŏn is indeed China’s shuguo.”93 Without endorsing Li’s 
argument, Mori concluded that no agreement could be reached between the two sides.94 
At the end of the conversation, Mori asked Li what China would do if a war broke 
out between Japan and Chosŏn. Li replied that, “if a war happened, not only Russia but 
China would send troops to Chosŏn.” Li then wrote eight Chinese characters to Mori, 
which read “Only to hurt harmony, No benefits at all” (Ch. tushang heqi, haowu liyi), 
under the title “Sincere Advice” (Ch. zhonggao). In this way, Li made it extremely clear 
that China would send troops to Chosŏn if necessary, although China generally did not 
interfere with the affairs of its shuguo. Mori never mentioned Li’s warning in his report to 
Tokyo, so that Tokyo never knew the Chinese warning. Next day, January 25, the Chinese 
New Year’s Eve, Li visited Mori for a short and random conversation that did not really 
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involve the issue of Chosŏn. For some reason, Li did not provide the Zongli Yamen with 
any details of this conversation, while Mori’s English records indicate the gulf between 
the epistemology and worldviews of the two men.95 The Mori–Li Baoding conversations 
ended without any consensus, but they both claimed to prevail over each other in their 
final reports to their governments. On the same day, the Japanese fleet dropped anchor at 
the offing of Kanghwa Island and contacted the local official of Namyangbu, Kang Yun.96 
The debate between the Zongli Yamen and Mori resumed after Mori returned to 
Beijing. 97  Yet a conversation between Zhou Jiamei and Tei Einei on February 7 
contributed to the end of the discussion. Zhou said that China had told France and the U.S. 
that it would not intervene in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs, so it must tell Mori the same 
words in order to make its attitudes toward the issue consistent. Zhou also informed Tei 
that Beijing had sent a note to Chosŏn by following Li’s advice. Based on Zhou’s words, 
Mori inferred that China would persuade Chosŏn to make a treaty with Japan.98 
Both sides closed the debates after the last round of note exchanges. On February 
12, the Yamen sent Mori a note, enunciating again that, “Solving its difficulties (Ch. shu 
qi nan), resolving its disputes (Ch. jie qi fen), and expecting its safety and security (Ch. qi 
qi anquan) is China’s self-taken responsibility to Chosŏn and the truth how China treats 
its shuguo. It is the long-lasting policy for China to treat its shuguo by not forcing the 
latter to do what it feels reluctant and not standing by when it runs into trouble.”99 Mori, 
in his response on February 14, concluded that, “Chosŏn is indeed an independent 
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country, so Japan will not take Chosŏn’s relations with China into consideration when it 
comes to the affairs between Japan and Chosŏn. The so-called shuguo is no more than a 
nominal title. Nothing should be related to the treaty of 1871.”100 As a result, neither side 
prevailed against each other with the end of the 34-day-long intensive debate. 
A DEMONSTRATION OF THE SHUGUO STATUS IN 1876 
The Zongfan practices at that moment between China and Chosŏn in Hansŏng made 
Mori’s enthusiastic diplomatic rhetoric untenable. On February 16, two days after the end 
of the Sino–Japanese debate at Beijing, the king of Chosŏn held a grand ceremony in 
Hansŏng for the two imperial envoys, Jihe and Wulasiconga, to invest the crown prince. 
All procedures followed the precedents of investiture, while both the host and the guest 
performed the rituals according to certain codes. After the ceremony, the king held a short 
conversation with the envoys, in which he showed sincere thanks to the emperor and the 
Zongli Yamen for informing him the Japanese activities in Beijing. The envoys, praising 
Chosŏn’s firm position against the format of Japan’s sovereign letters, said that they 
heard that Japan’s forces had arrived in Kanghwa and wanted to establish a consulate 
there, so they felt uneasy about the situation.101 Yet both the envoys and the king did not 
go further to discuss the situation. 
Although the king had dispatched two officials to negotiate with the Japanese at 
Kanghwa before he received the Chinese note, he did not solicit any advice from the 
envoys on the negotiation. The envoys, until they left the capital on February 19, showed 
no intention of obtaining any details of the current situation, either. This phenomenon 
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was precisely like the one in November 1866, when the imperial envoys invested 
Princess Min at Hansŏng and Chosŏn was fighting with the French forces at Kanghwa. 
Some historians argue that in 1876, Beijing used imperial envoys, among other things, to 
persuade Chosŏn to make a treaty with Japan,102 yet the contacts between the king and 
the envoys run counter to this assertion. 
After a negotiation with the Japanese representative at Kanghwa, Chosŏn signed a 
treaty on February 27 with Japan that drew an end to the eight-year-long dispute that 
began from 1868. On the same day, the Ministry of Rituals in Beijing sent Chosŏn the 
second note and a copy of Mori–Li Baoding conversation at a speed of 500 li per day.103 
Handicapped by the conventional channels of communication, the ministry, the Zongli 
Yamen, and the Beiyang Superintendent, could not follow the proceedings of the 
Japanese–Korean negotiations. On March 4, when the Treaty of Kanghwa already having 
been signed a week earlier, the Manchu General at Mukden, Chongshi (1820–1876), 
asked the Zongli Yamen if it knew Chosŏn’s plans and if the Ministry of Rituals at 
Beijing had received Chosŏn’s response to the first note. Chongshi confessed that 
although Mukden bordered Chosŏn, he could not gather information on Chosŏn’s 
situation except for some rumors spread by some merchants in the area. Chongshi hoped 
the two envoys could be able to bring him some reliable updates.104 Needless to say, the 
general was very disappointed when he met with the envoys in Mukden. 
The Zongli Yamen, the Ministry of Rituals, and the Beiyang Superintendent 
constituted a chain of China–Chosŏn contacts, but no links in this chain seemed to work 
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efficiently enough to quench China’s thirst for information on the developing situation in 
Chosŏn. On March 12, the Zongli Yamen learned from Mori that Japan had signed a 
treaty with Chosŏn, but Mori had not received the contents yet. On April 17, when Mori 
submitted a copy of the treaty to the Yamen, the Chinese government was able to know 
the contents.105 China’s passive position in the Zongfan framework with Chosŏn and the 
treaty system with Japan was thoroughly exposed. By the same token, such passivity was 
the norm within the Zongfan framework. In the following two decades after 1876, this 
fact would manifest itself in many events. 
Beijing eventually received a note from the king of Chosŏn on April 21, in which 
the king briefly reviewed the treaty negotiations with Japan. The king summarized that 
the mistrust between Chosŏn and Japan disappeared because of the long-term friendship 
between them. In the future, the king said, “As the titles of the sovereign letters might be 
inappropriate, the bilateral contacts would be conducted by officials of the two countries 
on an equal footing. As it is not the first time that we have traded with Japan, we have 
allowed Japanese to trade at our ports, where they should follow our rules.”106Although 
the treaty endowed Japan with the right of consular jurisdiction and abolished all former 
trade conventions as well as “junk trade” (J. saikensen), Chosŏn perceived the treaty in its 
conventional Kyorin framework, rather than in any modern or international-law-based 
sense. For Chosŏn, the treaty was not much different from those trade conventions signed 
with the Sō family in history. Indeed, viewed from this standpoint, it is very difficult to 
define the treaty as a modern treaty.107 Although the king reported to Beijing that his 
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country had contracted a treaty with Japan, he never submitted a copy of the treaty to 
Beijing. Neither did Beijing ever make a request for the contents of the treaty. 
THE BIRTH OF CHOSŎN’S “SOVEREIGNTY” AS A DERIVATIVE 
At the same time, the Japanese government made the English translation of the Treaty of 
Kanghwa, in which it tried to define Chosŏn as an independent sovereign state. On March 
22, 1876, the Gaimushō released the contents of the treaty and distributed an English 
version among the foreign ministers at Tokyo. The English translation of Article I of the 
treaty reads, 
 
Chosen being an independent state enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan. 
In order to prove the sincerity of the friendship existing between the nations, their 
intercourse shall henceforward be carried on in terms of equality and courtesy, 
each avoiding the giving of offence by arrogance or manifestations of suspicion. 
In the first instance all rules and precedents that are apt to obstruct friendly 
intercourse shall be totally abrogated and, in their stead, rules, liberal and in 
general usage fit to secure a firm and perpetual peace, shall be established.108 
 
Since 1876, many diplomats and scholars have believed that the first article, in 
particular the first sentence, explicitly defines Chosŏn as “an independent state” with “the 
sovereign rights” under the terms of international law,109 although some scholars have 
realized that the English translation of the first sentence is not precise.110 Given that the 
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original text of the treaty only used Chinese and Japanese, a specific comparison between 
the first sentence of Article I of the Chinese and Japanese copies and that of the English 
version can help us find critical discrepancies in several key terms of the article.  
The sentence of the article in the Chinese copy reads, “Chosŏn kug chaju ji bang, 
boyu yŏ Ilbon kug p’yŏngdŭng ji kwŏn (Ch. Chaoxian guo zizhu zhi bang, baoyou yu 
Riben guo pingdeng zhi quan; lit. the country of Chosŏn is a nation with the right of zizhu, 
possessing the right equal to the country of Japan).” The Japanese version of the same 
sentence with the same meaning reads, “Chōsen koku wa jishu no kuni ni shite, Nihon 
koku to byōdō no ken o hoyū seri.”111 Comparing the Chinese and Japanese words with 
the English translations, it was clear that the Gaimushō purposely translated the Chinese 
term zizhu (K. chaju; J. jishu) into “independent” and the phrase zizhu zhi bang (K. chaju 
ji bang; J. jishu no kuni) into “independent state.” More importantly, it intentionally 
rendered the Chinese character quan (K. kwŏn; J. ken) into “sovereign right” by inserting 
the critical term “sovereign” into the context. Consequently, the second half of the 
sentence, baoyou yu Riben guo pingdeng zhi quan, which literally means Chosŏn 
“possesses the right equal to Japan,” became that Chosŏn “enjoys the same sovereign 
rights as does Japan.” Following the two primary changes, the Gaimushō further 
translated the phrase tongdeng zhi li (K. tongdŭng ji ye; J. dōtō no reigi) in Article I, 
which literally means “equal rituals” or “equal courtesy,” into “equality and courtesy,” by 
changing the term tongdeng from an adjective to a noun, so that it could coherently 
support the translation of the first sentence. 
With these three significant changes, the English translation of Article I misled 
people into believing that the treaty substantially defines Chosŏn as “an independent state” 
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that “enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan.” In Tokyo, the American minister, 
John Bingham, and the British minister, Harry Parkes, were two of the audience members 
that the Japanese hoped to mislead who in one way or another helped Japan promulgate 
the English translation of the treaty.112 
Nevertheless, the analyses made here do not suggest that Chosŏn’s sovereign right, 
or sovereignty, was created by Japan’s subtle English translation of the Treaty of 
Kanghwa. As interpreted in the previous chapters, Chosŏn always enjoyed its own 
sovereignty on its own territory. Rather, the comparison proves that the English version 
made by the Gaimushō was a diplomatic intrigue. It was not until in 1882 when Chosŏn 
signed a treaty with the United States that its “sovereign right” was clearly defined in 
Chinese and English for the first time in history. 
Both Beijing and Hansŏng, of course, did not foresee the problem behind the 
English translation of the treaty. Japan believed that it successfully resolved the issue of 
Chosŏn’s status through the treaty and prevailed over Beijing in the several-year-long 
debate on the topic. On May 10, 1876, Mori at Tokyo submitted a final report to the 
Gaimushō about his mission to Beijing, in which he claimed that: “suffice it to say that 
the Zongli Yamen has been convinced by my argument…The only objective of the a 
debate [with the Qing] is to cut off the Sino–Korean relationship, which we have finally 
achieved.”113 Yet Mori would soon realize that he was too optimistic.  
Japan, however, experienced great difficulty in making progress in its relationship 
with Chosŏn. The Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt of the U.S. would return to East Asia 
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in March 1880, in hope of making a treaty with Chosŏn. During the intervening four 
years, Chosŏn only dispatched an emissary as Envoy of Amity (K. susin sa) to Japan in 
1876 by historical conventions, while it kept sending tributary emissaries to Beijing and 
practicing formalities as a shuguo of China. Viewed through several lenses, for Chosŏn, 
as well as for China, nothing regarding the China-centric world order changed per se. 
Rather, Chosŏn believed that it restored the pre-1876 order that was maintained by its 
policy of “serving the great” in its relations with China and “communicating with the 
neighbors” in its relations with Japan. In 1882, the coming of Commodore Shufeldt 
would create a stir for the “hermit nation” and the episode became a test of trilateral 
relations between Chosŏn, Japan, and China. 
 250 
CHAPTER 5 
Defining the Shuguo: China’s Patriarchal Role in Chosŏn’s Crises, 1877–1883 
Chosŏn launched a self-strengthening reform under China’s vigorous encouragement via 
official and private channels of communication in the late 1870s and early 1880s, but the 
reform caused an anti-reform petition movement and a mutiny. After it sent troops to 
Chosŏn in 1882 by exercising its patriarchal role in the Zongfan family, China was 
deeply involved into Chosŏn’s domestic and foreign affairs. The involvement triggered 
another intense wave of political and diplomatic intrigues of powers on the peninsula. In 
this process, China saw the necessity of strengthening its Zongfan relationship with 
Chosŏn, but the latter requested China to modify such relationship in some specific ways. 
The two countries finally signed several regulations to modify and institutionalize their 
relationship by defining their statuses in the Zongfan framework and promote overland 
and maritime trade. 
China simultaneously availed itself of the superior position to introduced Chosŏn 
into the family of nations, while the two countries prudently maintained and adjusted 
their Zongfan relations from within. As a result, two co-existing dual diplomatic systems 
appeared between them. The first dual system comprised the long-term and ritual-based 
Zongfan system between China and its outer fan, on the one hand, and the newly 
imported and international law-based treaty port system among China, its fan, and the 
treaty powers, on the other. This dual system, which we term as “outer dual system,” 
existed between the East and the West, with which both China and Chosŏn had to 
respectively deal on their own feet. The second dual system encompassed the 
conventional court-to-court system between the imperial Manchu court in Beijing and the 
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royal court in Hansŏng, on the one hand, and the newly founded nation-to-nation system 
between China as a nation and Chosŏn as another one that was theoretically equal to 
China under international law, on the other. This dual system, which we term as “inner 
dual system,” existed only between China and Chosŏn, by which both countries kept 
modifying their policies toward each other. It was the two co-existing dual diplomatic 
systems that drew China and Chosŏn into a legal quagmire in the late nineteenth century, 
in which they could not articulate the nature of their relationship to other nations. 
5.1  “Cherishing the Small Country”: China’s Twofold Roles in Chosŏn’s 
Self-Strengthening Reform and the U.S.–Korean Negotiations in 1882 
THE SINO–AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON OPENING CHOSŎN’S DOOR IN 1880 
When Robert Shufeldt returned to Chosŏn in 1880, China was persuading Chosŏn to 
open its door by negotiating treaties with other powers. Since neither the Zongli Yamen 
nor the Ministry of Rituals could make such a request to the shuguo due to the Zongfan 
conventions, the work of exhortation was assumed by the Beiyang Superintendent, Li 
Hongzhang, who pinned his hope on his personal correspondence with Yi Yu-wŏn. Yet in 
his letter to Li in late 1879, Yi still showed reluctant attitude toward communicating with 
Western countries, though he noticed that Japan had abolished the Ryukyu han and 
converted it into Okinawa County in April that year.1 
When Li became disappointed by reading Yi’s letter on March 15, 1880, Shufeldt 
had arrived in Nagasaki by the American flagship U.S.S. Ticonderoga. He contacted the 
American minister at Tokyo, John Bingham, who swiftly approached the Japanese 
minister of foreign affairs, Inoue Kaoru (1835–1915), for Japan’s good offices in 
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introducing Shufeldt to Chosŏn via the Japanese consuls in that country.2 Although Inoue 
was worried that Japan’s role of go-between might harm its newly established and fragile 
relations with Chosŏn, he finally sent the letter to the minister of the Ministry of Rituals 
of Chosŏn through the Japanese consul at Pusan, Kondō Masuki (1840–1892), and chargé 
d’affaires at Hansŏng, Hanabusa Yoshimoto (1842–1917). Shufeldt visited Pusan in early 
May, expecting further contacts with the country, yet Hansŏng soon returned the letter 
unopened, in that it addressed the country as “Great Koryŏ,” rather than “Great Chosŏn.” 
The letter was delivered to the Gaimushō in person by Kim Hong-jip (1842–1896), 
Envoy of Amity to Japan as a response to Hanabusa’s visit to Chosŏn.3 This response 
incurred Bingham’s wrath,4 but Japan’s good offices ended in vain. 
While Shufeldt waited at Nagasaki, the Chinese consul in the city, Yu Qiong, 
inferred that it would be a good opportunity to introduce the U.S. into Chosŏn to check 
Russia. Russia was right on the edge of a war with China either at eastern coast or in 
western hinterlands of Xinjiang as a result of the escalation of the Yili Incident. Yu thus 
sent a copy of Shufeldt’s letter to Chosŏn to the Chinese minister at Tokyo, He Ruzhang 
(1838–1891). 5  Since one of his responsibilities was to monitor Japanese–Korean 
relations and other foreign contacts with Chosŏn, He promptly informed the Zongli 
Yamen with the news. Very soon Li Hongzhang decided to invite Shufeldt to Tianjin, and 
the latter was more than happy to visit the “Minister of Foreign Affairs for China.”6 In 
August, Shufeldt made an interview with Li in Tianjin, which “partook largely of a 
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personal and intimate character and lasted for nearly three hours.” Li promised that “he 
would use his influence with the Government of Corea to accede to the friendly request” 
made by Shufeldt “in behalf of the Government of the United States to open negotiations 
with a view to such a treaty.”7 In addition, Li solicited Shufeldt’s opinions on reinforcing 
Chinese navy forces, asking him to look for a specialist in torpedoes to teach at Tianjin, 
which would be a payback that China deserved “when peace was assured” between the 
United States and Chosŏn. 8  Shufeldt recommended Lieutenant D. P. Mannix, 
commander of the marines of the Ticonderoga, as the candidate.9 After reaching the 
agreement with Li, Shufeldt returned to the U.S. for more support from Department of 
State, while Li began to act as a mentor for Chosŏn to open its door to the West by 
making a treaty with the U.S. 
BECOMING A CLOAK: CHOSŎN’S TRAINING PROGRAM AT TIANJIN 
Chosŏn’s plan of sending some trainees to Tianjin to learn military and industrial skills 
provided a golden opportunity for Li. In 1879, the tributary emissary Yi Yong-suk 
discussed “an important issue” with You Zhikai at Yongping, which he learned from Yi 
Yu-wŏn and asked You to forward it to Li. Yi mentioned that Chosŏn hoped to dispatch 
trainees to Tianjin for advanced military and industrial skills by following the “precedents 
that foreign countries sent students to China for learning.” Yi particularly mentioned that 
Chosŏn wanted the students to learn making steamship, powder, and bullets, and so forth. 
Li heartily endorsed this self-strengthening plan. In a confidential letter to You, which 
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would be forwarded to Yi Yong-suk then to Yi Yu-wŏn and the king, Li suggested that 
Chosŏn should inform the Ministry of Rituals with a specific plan.10 The king was 
encouraged by Li’s and Beijing’s support, so he instructed the emissary to Beijing, Pyŏn 
Wŏn-kyu, to submit the plan to the “upper country.”11 
After he arrived at Beijing in October, Pyŏn submitted the king’s memorial to the 
court via the Ministry of Rituals, and the court immediately instructed Li Hongzhang to 
be in charge of the program.12 Assuming the responsibility, Li informed Beijing that he 
would encourage Chosŏn “to follow the mainstream of the world” to open its door.13 On 
October 19, Pyŏn arrived at Tianjin and made a conversation with Taotai of the Tianjin 
Customs, Zheng Zaoru (1824–1894), Taotai of the Yongding River, You Zhikai, and three 
Taotai Candidates from the Tianjin Arsenal, to discuss and make an outline of the training 
program. After that, Pyŏn visited Li, in which Li highlighted that the best strategy for 
Chosŏn was “to trade with the Westerners.”14  
Beijing then instructed Pyŏn to return to Chosŏn with the outline of the 
program.15 Four items of the outline broke many two-century-long Zongfan conventions. 
The first item set 87 as the limit of the number of trainees, soldiers, interpreters, and 
superintendents. China would provide them with living quarters, but they should be 
responsible for their own meals and other cost. The second item gave the trainees special 
right to visit Tianjin via maritime route, which had never happened in history and, 
according to the outline, should not be imitated by other cases in the future. The third 
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item stated that all trainees, interpreters, and their personal attendants would receive 
passes issued by the Yamen of the Beiyang Superintendent, which would be filed both at 
the Yamen in Tianjin and at the Ministry of Rituals in Beijing. It also prescribed that the 
trainees should obey the Chinese rules and should devote themselves to training courses. 
Anyone who broke the Chinese regulations would be sent by the Chinese officials to the 
Korean superintendents for punishment. It would be the first time for the Korean officials 
sent by their government to reside in a Chinese city outside Beijing. For the purpose of 
efficient management, China actually endowed the Korean superintendents with a right 
similar to the consular jurisdiction effecting between China and Western treaty powers. 
The fourth item stated that all official communications of Chosŏn regarding the solider 
training, military skill learning, weapon purchasing and other military affairs should be 
sent by the king both to the Ministry of Rituals and the Yamen of the Beiyang 
Superintendent.16 
The fourth item proved particularly significant in terms of the transformation of 
Sino–Korean Zongfan relations in the late nineteenth century. By endowing the Beiyang 
Superintendent with the right of directly receiving the note of the king, it made the 
Superintendent the Chinese mentor for Chosŏn’s self-strengthening program that would 
begin with the military training program at Tianjin. The Beiyang Superintendent, as a 
subordinate official under the Zongli Yamen, was a concurrent post of Governor-General 
of Zhili, who according to Zongfan conventions should not be involved in the Zongfan 
affairs with Chosŏn. Since Li’s debate with Mori at Baoding in 1876, this regulation was 
captive to the steady rise of Li’s power. The increase of Li’s power was also a result of 
the ambiguity of the Zongli Yamen’s policy swinging between shuguo and zizhu, and the 
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silence of the Ministry of Rituals on affairs beyond the conventional track. Four months 
later, on February 23, 1881, the Zongli Yamen in a confidential memorial to the throne 
requested the court to “make changes to old regulations” (Ch. biantong jiuzhi) again by 
endowing the Beiyang Superintendent with more privileges. The Yamen said that, “It is 
extremely urgent for Chosŏn to conduct diplomacy (Ch. waijiao) with other countries. 
According to the Zongfan regulations, it was the Ministry of Rituals that was responsible 
for communications with that country, yet it is slow and not safe. In the wake of this 
inconvenience, when any urgent foreign affair (Ch. yangwu) appears in the future, it shall 
be the Beiyang Superintendent and the minister to Japan who communicate with Chosŏn 
to give it advice and inform the Zongli Yamen with the results.”17 With the endorsement 
of the emperor, the Superintendent gained the right of directly communicating 
with—rather than only receiving notes from—the king in terms of issues not only 
regarding the military training program at Tianjin, but also all “foreign affairs.” In this 
way, the Beiyang Superintendent, a post almost all but occupied by Li before 1894, 
became the Chinese advisor for Chosŏn since then. Both China and Chosŏn now entered 
a time of Li Hongzhang, a Han Chinese official. 
When Li was informed by the Zongli Yamen about the extension of his power on 
February 26, 1881, he was busy making a pen conversation at Tianjin with the special 
commissioner of the king, Yi Yong-suk. Yi brought Li a letter of the king, a proposal of 
making treaties with other countries that was drafted by the Prime Minister, Yi Ch’oe-ŭng 
(1815–1882), and a private letter of Yi Yu-wŏn. On the surface, Yi Yong-suk’s mission 
was to discuss the training program with Li, but his true task was to serve as a liaison 
between the king and Li by informing Li that the king had strong intention of opening 
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Chosŏn’s door to Western countries and wanted to commission Li to make the first move 
in the direction of treaty negotiations. 18  Since then on, the Sino–Korean covert 
discussions on making treaties between Chosŏn and Western countries, in particular with 
the United States, were conducted under the cloak of the negotiations over Chosŏn’s 
military training program in China. 
CHINA’S PRESCRIPTIONS AND CHOSŎN’S RESISTANCE IN 1880 AND 1881 
The king made the decision of opening his country in political turbulence. From late 1880 
to early 1881, when the self-strengthening program unfolded, Chosŏn was mired in a 
series of dramatic and grim political events that had strong ripple effects. The wave was 
first stirred up by the Chinese diplomats in Japan who forwarded their advice on 
Chosŏn’s policy to the king through the Envoy of Amity to Japan, Kim Hong-jip, in late 
1880. In the hierarchical Sino–Korean arrangement, the advice from these Chinese 
diplomats would be regarded as what China wanted Chosŏn to do. 
When Kim visited Tokyo in 1880, the Chinese minister to Japan, He Ruzhang, 
and the counselor of the Chinese legation, Huang Zunxian (1848–1905), made intensive 
pen conversations with him.19 All the conversations occurred in the Zongfan context, in 
which they both identified each other as members of the “same family” (Ch. yijia) and 
Chosŏn was like “an inner subordinate” (Ch. neifu) of China.20 He Ruzhang and Huang 
tried to convince Kim that Chosŏn should abandon its parochialism and open its door by 
signing treaties with Western countries, in particular with the United States first, in order 
to prevent the possible onslaught of Russia, while the country should initiate 
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self-strengthening program as early as possible. Kim endorsed the idea of the Chinese 
officials, which won further support from his Japanese counterparts at the Gaimushō, 
such as Inoue Kaoru and Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909). By the same token, Kim would have 
no difficulty in finding a complicated situation that his country was facing: China and 
Japan were persuading it to open the door and advance the self-strengthening movement 
to check Russia, on the one hand, and China as the enthusiastic consultant of the country 
also tried to prevent the Japanese from taking more privileges, on the other. 
Before Kim left Tokyo, Huang gave him a treatise entitled “Strategies for Chosŏn” 
(Ch. Chaoxian celue), articulating his and He Ruzhang’s ideas.21 The main argument was 
that Chosŏn should check the Russian threat in three ways, namely “having intimate 
relations with China, associating with Japan, and allying with the United States” (Ch. qin 
Zhongguo, jie Riben, lian Meiguo).22 Prescribing a set of strategies to redeem the 
situation, the treatise became a blueprint for Chosŏn’s self-strengthening programs in the 
next years, including requesting China to allow its emissaries to reside in Beijing 
permanently, dispatching emissaries to reside in Tokyo and Washington, proposing to 
enlarge the scale of the trade at Fenghuang City in Manchuria, sending trainees and 
students to China for military industry training and Western languages training, and 
inviting Westerners to Chosŏn for educational reforms.23 In a word, according to the 
treatise, Chosŏn should immediately join the family of nations. 
Extremely shocked as well as encouraged by Huang’s passionate words, the 
young king dispatched a secret commissioner, Yi Tong-in, to Tokyo to visit Huang and 
He Ruzhang with his private letters. The letters were memorandums of the king’s 
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discussions with his prime ministers and officials over Huang’s treatise and Chosŏn’s 
next steps. The king wanted He Ruzhang to invite the American representative to return 
to Chosŏn for negotiations.24 As Chosŏn’s opening was now in sight, He quickly 
composed a new tripartite treatise, “The proposal for management of Chosŏn’s diplomacy” 
(Ch. Zhuchi Chaoxian waijiao yi), for the Zongli Yamen and the Beiyang Superintendent. 
In retrospect, He’s treatise considerably framed China’s policy toward Chosŏn in 
the coming years, until 1894, by laying out three policies that China should consider 
toward Chosŏn. The first-class and most ideal policy, which he thought difficult to be 
immediately carried out, was to follow the cases of Mongolia and Tibet to dispatch an 
imperial commissioner (Ch. banshi dachen) to permanently reside in Chosŏn to manage 
its domestic and foreign affairs. This policy aimed to convert Chosŏn from an outer fan 
into an inner fan of China, which on the surface closely resembled the European colonial 
concept, but it actually only represented He’s own understanding of one of the spectrums 
of the Zongfan system. Moreover, this idea shared striking similarities with the one that 
was put forward in 1619 during the Manchu–Ming war by the Ming official Xu Guangqi, 
who memorialized Emperor Wanli to dispatch a Ming official to Chosŏn to “supervise 
and protect” (Ch. jianhu) the country.25 As history unfolded, the residence of the Chinese 
official Yuan Shikai in Chosŏn since 1884 would make this policy more or less practiced. 
The second-class and most practical policy, according to him, was to dispatch a 
skilled Chinese official to Chosŏn to assist it with negotiating treaties with other 
countries. The goal was to confirm and maintain Chosŏn’s status as China’s shuguo, 
because he inferred that this status would be denied by other countries’ endorsement of 
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Chosŏn’s zizhu, if Chosŏn conducted treaty negotiations by itself. Later, Li Hongzhang 
and the Zongli Yamen chose this option by sending Ma Jianzhong (1845–1900), a 
French-educated savant and one of Li’s primary protégés, to Chosŏn to be in charge of 
the treaty negotiation with the U.S. The third-class and most comprehensive policy in the 
treatise, which would be accompanied by a self-strengthening program package as Huang 
Zunxian stated in his treatise, was that the Chinese imperial court could instruct the king 
to make treaties with other countries and articulate in the first article of each treaty that 
“Chosŏn made the treaty by the order of China.”26 This proposal was later adopted by 
Ma in the way of asking the king to dispatch independent notes to the sovereigns of 
certain treaty countries to claim that Chosŏn was China’s shuguo. In the early years of the 
hectic 1880s, He Ruzhang’s proposals played a key role in assisting Beijing with forming 
its general diplomatic policies toward Chosŏn. 
The king at his end was very sanguine about the Chinese conscientious proposals. 
For him, the Chinese enthralling prescription seemed to be the only way to redeem his 
country from crisis. After Pyŏn returned from China with the outline of training program, 
the king enthusiastically launched a self-strengthening reform. On January 19, 1881, 
Chosŏn established the T’ongnigimu Amun (the Yamen for the management of state 
affairs) by imitating the mechanism of China’s Zongli Yamen, laying the institutional 
cornerstone for the country’s modernity. The Amun comprised 12 departments, with the 
Department of Serving the Great (K. sadae sa) as the first and most important one, 
highlighting the importance of the Korean–Chinese relationship. As the political gambit 
in the self-strengthening movement, the Amun started to run from the second day of its 
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establishment.27 
Twenty days later, the king appointed 12 officials as Secret Inspectors of Dongnae 
Prefecture (K. Dongnaebu amhaeng ŏsa) to visit Japan to observe its politics, society, 
foreign relations, and trade. An inspection mission, later known as the “Inspection 
Mission of the Court Officials” (K. Chosa sich’aldan) or the “Sighting Group of the 
Gentlemen” (K. Sinsa yuramdan), was organized, totaling 64 members with the 12 
officials as its core, who belonged to the Min clan against Taewŏn’gun in the rigorous 
bureaucratic clique struggles. In Japan, the mission visited Nagasaki, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, 
Yokohama, and Tokyo from May to October, and was granted audiences with senior 
Japanese officials, such as Sanjō Sanetomi, Terashima Munenori, and Inoue Kaoru. In 
October, when another mission headed by Cho Pyŏng-ho (1847–1910) and Yi Cho-yŏn 
(1843–1884) as Envoys of Amity arrived in Japan for negotiations over tariff of duties, 
the Inspection Mission returned to Hansŏng, submitting to the king 64 official reports and 
17 additional memorandums. These officials firmly believed that the self-strengthening 
program was the best way for Chosŏn to survive from the increasing Japanese threats.28 
The domestic situation at the time, however, was not compatible with their 
strategic goals. Before the mission returned to Hansŏng, the king had arrested several 
officials headed by An Ki-yŏng (1819–1881) of the Taewŏn’gun clan who were charged 
with conspiring a coup.29 Simultaneously, a literati protest against the self-strengthening 
reform became more dramatic and provocative. In late 1880, some officials memorialized 
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the throne, requesting to rebut Huang Zunxian’s ideas and revere Confucianism.30 In 
March 1881, the Confucian student Yi Man-son from Kyŏngsang province submitted a 
petition cosigned by 10,000 fellow students, requesting the king to burn Huang’s treatise 
and revere great doctrines of Confucianism.31 The students’ radical words were further 
supported by two officials, Hwang Chae-hyŏn and Hong Si-chung. Hong argued that the 
king should publicly burn all books and newspapers regarding international law and 
foreign history and geography, together with Huang’s treatise, in order to “reject the 
heretical thought.”32 In order to advance the self-strengthening program by sidestepping 
moral charge from the literati, the king issued an edict (K. ch’ŏksa yunŭm) to endorse the 
literati’s idea of “learning more from Confucianism to reject the heretical.”33 Different 
from what the king had expected, his edict encouraged more students to Hansŏng from 
provinces to submit their enthusiastic petitions. 
In the turbulence, the king welcomed the two imperial envoys from Beijing on 
July 22, who brought the imperial edict about the death of Empress Dowager Cian. 
Following the Zongfan conventions, the king held a grand ceremony at the palace, where 
he and his officials performed certain rituals, after which he also paid a visit to the envoys 
at their hotel. On July 23, the king sent off the envoys in person. No discussions 
regarding Chosŏn’s domestic or foreign matters happened between the king and the 
envoys.34 The Zongfan mechanism functioned so smoothly that no questions about the 
Zongfan rituals, the right of the sovereign of Chosŏn, or the nature of the Zongfan 
relationship appeared. 
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On August 30, the literati protest reached its zenith with the petitions of two 
students, Hong Chae-hak and Sin Sŏp. Besides appealing to the king to abolish the 
T’ongnigimu Amun and restore old institutes, Hong further charged the king with taking 
no measures of “defending the right learning and rejecting the heterodoxy” (K. wijŏng 
ch’ŏksa), incurring the king’s wrath. Sin Sŏp depicted Li Hongzhang’s letters to Yi 
Yu-wŏn and Huang Zunxian’s treatise to Kim Hong-jip as the same intrigues against 
Chosŏn.35 Yi Yu-wŏn immediately made a public confession by submitting a memorial 
to rebut Li’s and Huang’s ideas,36 which embarrassed the king because Yi had actually 
followed the king’s instructions to contact Li. On September 13, Hong Chae-hak was 
beheaded due to “offending the sovereign” and his blood resulted in the sharp decline of 
the protest. The king and the Min clan, along with their self-strengthening program, 
survived from the turmoil. It was time for the king to send artisans and trainees to Tianjin. 
COMMISSIONING CHINA TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED STATES 
On November 18, 1881, Emissary of Superintending the Selected Trainees (K. yŏngsŏn 
sa), Kim Yun-sik (1835–1922), led 28 artisans and trainees to depart from Hansŏng for 
China through the overland tributary route, as the maritime route, which they had planned 
to take with Beijing’s special approval, was unavailable in winter. The mission was a new 
type in history, but due to the limited channels of communications between the two 
countries, it mostly acted as a conventional tributary mission to Beijing, insomuch that 
Kim was treated as a standard tributary emissary as to his travelling expenses.37 Four 
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days before the departure, Kim was in a rush to select the artisans and trainees for the 
first time. Among more than 30 young men he interviewed, only six volunteered to go to 
China for the training program.38 It was until in early December when Kim reached Ŭiju 
that he finally recruited 38 artisans and trainees as China suggested. The members of the 
mission totaled around 83, including 69 on the official list submitted to Beijing. When 
they arrived in Beijing on January 6, 1882, Kim submitted the king’s notes to the 
Ministry of Rituals after they were lodged at the Foreign Emissaries’ Common 
Accommodations.39 Up until the day, Kim had spent 50 days from Hansŏng reaching the 
imperial capital after trudging more than 950 miles along the overland route, as those 
Korean tributary missions to Beijing in the eighteenth century had done. 
Kim soon went to Baoding to visit Li Hongzhang with a confidential 
memorandum, where he zealously requested Li to be secretly in charge of Chosŏn’s 
treaty negotiation with the U.S. and make the treaty a prototype for treaties with other 
countries in the future.40 Li explained that what he did for Chosŏn, including his private 
contacts with Yi Yu-wŏn, was “legitimate and reasonable” (Ch. mingzheng yishun), a 
point Kim fully endorsed.41 In addition to giving Kim a pamphlet of Chosŏn’s treaty with 
Western countries that was drafted by Ma Jianzhong, Li discussed many key issues about 
Chosŏn’s reform with Kim, such as regulating tariff of duties, setting up customs and hire 
Western staff to manage it, improving Chosŏn’s ability of managing foreign trade, 
designing Chosŏn’s national flag for maritime identification, allowing the Japanese 
minister to enter Hansŏng, and continuing to use the king’s invested rank in his contacts 
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with the Japanese sovereign.42 It turned out that the most urgent mission for the two 
sides was to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the U.S., rather than to train the Korean 
artisans and trainees at Tianjin. 
Li, as a provincial official, was gaining more power from Beijing over the affairs 
regarding Chosŏn. On January 23, Beijing further endowed him with the right of being in 
charge of Chosŏn’s treaty negotiation with the U.S. in order to “maintain the fan and 
shuguo and consolidate China’s border.”43 At the same time, Li received a letter from 
Shufeldt, who had returned to China from the U.S. in June 1881 and waited at Tianjin for 
news from Chosŏn. During the sojourn, Shufeldt was appointed by Washington as the 
special envoy to Chosŏn for a treaty of amity aiming to solving issues of the American 
shipwrecks on Korean coast.44 Informing Li with his new position and the mission, 
Shufeldt hoped to meet with Li before he sailed to Chosŏn on May 1.45 Li immediately 
invited Shufeldt to Baoding for details, but Shufeldt decided to visit the American 
legation at Beijing first with the purpose of soliciting advice from the American chargé 
d’affaires, Chester Holcombe. 
Holcombe, being fully aware of the sharp devolution of Beijing’s negotiation 
power to Li, doubted if it would be possible for the U.S. and China to persuade Chosŏn to 
conclude a treaty without the involvement of the Ministry of Rituals in Beijing. For 
Holcombe, the Ministry of Rituals was “the highest, and most conservative, of the six 
bureaus or department of the Government and in past years has played the part of a most 
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effective obstruction to any intercourse, by means of the Government of China, between 
Western Powers and Corea. This was notably manifested in the attempts made here by 
minister Low to pave the way for his mission to Corea in 1871.” Considering that Li was 
“only a provincial officer and not a member of the Central Government,” Holcombe felt 
“it was desirable to learn how far his assurances of support and assistance would be borne 
out by the Imperial Authorities.”46  
With this question, Holcombe visited the Zongli Yamen, where the Chinese 
ministers informed him that Prince Gong had “effected the transfer of the charge of 
Corean matters from the Board of Rites to the Foreign Office” in 1881 and China had 
advised Chosŏn to conclude a treaty with the U.S. The ministers told him that Beijing’s 
action “was mainly influenced by the belief that sooner or later the autonomy of Corea 
would be threatened by the aggressions of Russia and/or Japan, and that this serious 
danger could be best met by bringing the peninsular Kingdom into the family of nations.” 
The Yamen reminded him that Beijing was ready “to aid the United States in any proper 
way to pen friendly and commercial relations with Corea.” Nevertheless, Holcombe was 
worried that Beijing might “see fit to assume an entirely different attitude and policy in 
this business.”47 His distrust might affect Shufeldt, as the latter replied to Li saying that 
he preferred to keep the negotiation secret by not visiting Baoding.48 
After his meetings with Li at Baoding, Kim visited Tianjin for a week, where he 
sent five students to the Navy School and Torpedo School for English language training. 
The meals and other cost of the students were generously covered by the Chinese side 
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under the strong support of Wu Zhongxiang, the director of the Navy School, who told 
Kim that “the students of your honorable country are also loyal subjects of the Heavenly 
Dynasty” (Ch. tianchao zhi chizi).49 Wu’s understanding was not solitary, illustrating that 
the idea of “all-under-Heaven” was still popular among some Chinese in the 1880s. It 
was in this conventional politico-cultural context of the Chinese empire that certain 
Chinese officials enthusiastically engaged in Chosŏn’s self-strengthening program and 
treaty negotiations. Before he could send more students to schools, Kim received a 
confidential instruction from the king, further instructing him to consult with Li over 
treaty negotiations with the U.S. Thus, Kim returned to Baoding, leaving all students idle 
at Tianjin, when the Chinese New Year was approaching. 
Before Shufeldt’s reply reached Baoding, Li had discussed with Kim about 
initiating the negotiation with Shufeldt by preventing him directly sailing for Chosŏn. 
This plan required an envoy plenipotentiary of Chosŏn with certain credential and power, 
whom Hansŏng did not dispatch. Li proposed that Kim could follow the king’s secret 
instruction of “adapting strategies for situations” to expediently serve as the 
plenipotentiary, but Kim firmly refused to do so. Finally, they decided to immediately 
send a messenger back to Hansŏng to ask the king to dispatch a plenipotentiary to Tianjin, 
while Kim would meet with Shufeldt to inform him with the king’s willingness first. Li 
particularly noted that the plenipotentiary should come under the name of supervising the 
Korean students with the aim of keeping his true mission secret.50 However, Chosŏn 
never sent any plenipotentiary to Tianjin for the treaty negotiation. In Tianjin, Kim did 
not hold any conversations with Shufeldt, nor could he participate in the Sino–American 
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negotiations about his own country. If he had followed Li’s proposal, he would have right 
started the negotiation with the assistance of Li and Li’s protégées. In practice, Kim left 
the right of treaty negotiation all but to the hands of Chinese who at that time did not 
hesitate to perform the duty on behalf of China’s shuguo. 
THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ENTRANCE OF CHOSŎN TO THE 
FAMILY OF NATIONS 
Upon Shufeldt’s response, Li discussed with Kim again about making a draft treaty 
primarily based on a draft made by Huang Zunxian. Two aspects of their discussion stood 
out as the most critical parts. First, Li proposed that the treaty should define the Sino–
Korean Zongfan relationship by stating that, “Chosŏn, being a shuguo of China, owns the 
right of zizhu as to its diplomatic and domestic affairs, which shall not be challenged by 
other nations.” Kim confirmed that it would be “legitimate and justifiable (Ch. mingzheng 
yanshun)” to articulate this point for other countries.51 Later, in a confidential report to 
the king, Kim revealed his true motivation for endorsing Li’s proposal by saying that,  
 
It was well known by all nations under the heaven that our country is a shubang 
(subordinate country, shuguo) of China. We are always worried that China has no 
true intention of assuming its responsibility, for our country is so isolated and 
weak that it is really difficult for it to stand on its own feet without the assurance 
from the Big Country. It is fortunate that Li, the prime minister of China who 
controls the Chinese military forces, has initiatively assumed the responsibility 
and shoulder the burden of our country. After the bilateral relationship is stated 
and clarified to all nations in the treaty, China would definitely try its best to save 
our country when we run into troubles. Otherwise, China would be jeered by all 
people of the world. Similarly, when the people of the world see China assumes 
its responsibility on us, any country that wants to depreciate us will be more or 
less frustrated. Following this statement is our right of zizhu, which does not 
damage the right of equality in our communications with other countries. 
Therefore, the term can kill two birds with one stone by ensuring our country not 
losing our rights and not violating the principle of serving the great. Our country 
can greatly benefit from Li’s proposal. I have showed my sincere appreciation to 
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him many times.52 
 
Undoubtedly, Kim found concluding a treaty including the statement on Chosŏn’s 
relationship with China to be a perfect way for Chosŏn to avail itself of such relationship 
to use China’s power for Chosŏn’s own good. 
The second aspect was about the right of consular jurisdiction of the U.S. in 
Chosŏn. Endorsing Huang’s proposal that Chosŏn could temporarily allow the American 
consuls to manage the American citizens in Chosŏn, Li explained that, “According to the 
international conventions, foreigners living in treaty ports and hinterlands of a country 
are subject to the management of the officials of their own countries who are residing at 
the places of the said country. The local officials of the host country are not able to 
manage people of other nations due to the different law, punish rules, customs, and 
proprieties between the East and the West. That is the reason why Japan has recently 
failed to revise its treaties with other countries.”53 For Li and Huang, the consular 
jurisdiction was no more than a method of cherishing foreigners, rather than an unequal 
clause damaging Chosŏn’s national sovereignty. Perceiving the case in the same context, 
Kim agreed that, “Our humble country is not familiar with foreign situations, so there 
will be many problems even if our country could manage foreigners by itself. If Japan 
and China change the former treaties, our humble country will follow change the content 
too. Now we had better accept what Mr. Huang put in his draft treaty.”54 Finally, the two 
sides decided to give the U.S. the right of consular jurisdiction, without any requirement 
or pressure from the American representative. Since the Korean–American Treaty was a 
prototype for the following treaties between Chosŏn and other nations, China soon gained 
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this right too through the Sino–Korean commercial regulations of 1882. In retrospect, this 
episode called into the question whether the Western powers always gained the right of 
consular jurisdiction in China or Korea by force or gunboat diplomacy, which further 
questioned if such right could be regarded as a hallmark of the Western imperialism as 
the nationalistic historical narratives of these countries have usually charged. 
After composing a draft treaty with Li, Kim returned to Tianjin, where the special 
envoy of the king, Yi Ŭng-chun, was waiting for him with a king’s letter stating that it 
was impossible to send a plenipotentiary to China and it would be better for the 
Americans to go to Chosŏn. When Kim asked Taotai of the Tianjin Customs, Zhou Fu 
(1837–1921), an assistant to Li, to forward the message to Li, Zhou suggested that Kim 
act as the plenipotentiary,55 but Kim refused again. For Kim, China’s negotiation on 
behalf of his country seemed to be a better choice. In this process, Zhou queried Kim why 
a phrase of “independence and half-autonomy” (Ch. duli banzhu) appeared in Chosŏn’s 
note to him, a phrase explaining the term “zizhu” in the Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876. 
Zhou warned that such statement was the “Japanese plot” and it would only damage 
Chosŏn’s interests in the long run. Kim explained that, 
 
Our humble country has been admiring the Chinese culture and morality since the 
ancient time, and we have relied on the Upper Country like curtains. Under the 
current situation when our country is extremely weak and all powers are planning 
to invade us, how can we declare to be independent and autonomy (K. chajon 
t’ŭngnip)? It is not only because we do not want to do it, but also because we 
cannot do it [by virtue of the morality]. When we negotiated with the Japanese 
several years ago, the Japanese warships were right at the port and we had no time 
to report the thing [to China]. Yet we immediately sent [Beijing] a dispatch after 
the negotiation. The negotiation with the United States this time is the first time 
for our humble country to contact Western countries. Although we cannot prevent 
Americans going to our country, we would not like to send plenipotentiary to 
initiatively invite them there. Since we have decided to establish the amity with 
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them, we will sincerely and fully follow the management of the Central Dynasty 
of all things regarding the negotiation, trade, and so forth…The phrase of the 
so-called ‘independence and half-autonomy’ is surely the Japanese plot by which 
we have never been agitated in mind.56 
 
The difference between the Zongfan and treaty systems manifested itself in Kim’s words. 
For Kim, the “independence and autonomy” that the Japanese had imposed on Chosŏn 
could not change the fact that the country was China’s shuguo. 
On April 4, 1882, when Li had started to negotiate with Shufeldt, he had a 
meeting with Kim and Yi Ŭng-chun to brief them on the negotiation. Kim asked Li to 
dispatch an official who knew diplomacy and foreign language to accompany Shufeldt to 
Chosŏn to be an assistant. Li agreed, and the official was exactly Ma Jianzhong who was 
also attending the meeting. With the absence of Korean plenipotentiary, the right of the 
negotiation with Shufeldt was completely in Li’s hands. Ironically, on the same day, the 
two Korean officials, Ŏ Yun-chung (1848–1896) and Yi Cho-yŏn, left Hansŏng for 
Tianjin as Officials of Examination and Selection (K. Kosŏn kwan),57 instead of the 
plenipotentiaries as Li and Kim desperately wished. 
In the negotiation between Li and Shufeldt, whether the treaty should include a 
clause defining Chosŏn as China’s shuguo became the most controversial issue. The first 
article of Li’s draft stated that “Chosŏn is China’s shubang and always enjoys the right of 
zizhu as to its domestic and foreign affairs.”58 Shufeldt, identifying that such statement 
would note define Chosŏn as an independent sovereign state, insisted that it should not be 
included. As a result, the two sides made a draft treaty on April 18, including 15 articles, 
and decided to put the first article empty. If it eventually could not define Chosŏn’s as 
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China’s shuguo in the treaty, Chosŏn would send a special note to the U.S. government to 
articulate its shuguo status.59 On April 21, Li gave Kim and Yi Ŭng-chun a copy of the 
draft treaty and instructed Yi to instantly return to Chosŏn by a Chinese steamer.60 Li 
also instructed Ma, who was “very skilled in international law,” to accompany Shufeldt 
go to Inchon to ensure that all things would go smoothly. During this process, what Kim 
did was to discuss with Ma about the formalities that Chosŏn should perform to welcome 
Ma and Shufeldt, as Ma would be treated as a Chinese commissioner, a position requiring 
Chosŏn to modify certain Zongfan rituals. 
Ma, along with Admiral Ding Ruchang (1836–1895), arrived at Inchon on May 8, 
where he made an English conversation with the Japanese minister, Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 
who had arrived on May 7. Hanabusa attempted to affect the negotiation, but it was too 
late for him to do so.61 Four days later, Shufeldt arrived by the U.S.S. Swatara and soon 
started negotiating with the Korean plenipotentiaries, Sin Hŏn (1810–1884) and Kim 
Hong-jip. Sin was also one of the plenipotentiaries who had signed the Treaty of 
Kanghwa in 1876. The negotiation ended on May 22 with a treaty of 14 articles, deleting 
the first article about Chosŏn’s shuguo status that Li proposed.62 Considering that 
Chosŏn needed its own national flag because it could not use China’s dragon flag, Ma 
suggested that Chosŏn take the Chinese Taichi and Eight Diagrams as the basic design.63 
After Shufeldt went to Shanghai with a copy of the treaty, Ma remained at Inchon to help 
Chosŏn negotiate with other powers.64 The “Hermit Nation” entered the family of 
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nations, as what China had done four decades ago. 
During the negotiation, Ma had drafted a special note for Chosŏn, which would be 
sent to the U.S. president through the king to proclaim that Chosŏn was China’s shuguo.65 
Following this middle course determined by Li, Ma, and Kim Yun-sik,66 the king sent a 
dispatch to the U.S. President on May 29, informing that “Corea is a tributary of China, 
but in regard to both internal administration and foreign intercourse it enjoys complete 
independence.”67 The king addressed dispatches with the same announcement to the 
sovereigns of Western countries with which Chosŏn signed treaties, including Britain 
(June 6, 1882), Germany (November 26, 1883), Italy (June 26, 1884), Russia (July 7, 
1884), and France (June 4, 1886). All of the treaty powers treated the sovereign’s words 
seriously. As a result, after 1882 Chosŏn’s de jure independent sovereignty in terms of 
international law, and its de facto as well as de jure dependent status as China’s shuguo 
according to the Zongfan principles, comprised one of the most controversial and 
perplexing issues for Western powers in East Asia to manage. In this situation, Chosŏn 
moved first toward the direction of modifying its relations with China. 
5.2 Protecting the Shuguo as the Patriarch: The Chinese Military Intervention in 1882 
A TURNING POINT: THE KING’S SIX REQUESTS IN 1882 
When the treaty with the U.S. was concluded, more than one third of the Korean trainees 
and artisans at Tianjin had returned to Chosŏn due to various reasons. As a cloak of treaty 
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negotiation with the U.S., the program never really occupied the eyes of Hansŏng and 
Beijing. Rather, its primary role lied in its existence in China beyond the entrenched 
channel of communication regulated by the Zongfan system. This point was made clearer 
by the visit of Ŏ Yun-chung and Yi Cho-yŏn, who, as Officials of Examination and 
Selection, were to review the trainees and artisans on the surface. Ŏ was one of the 12 
gentlemen to Japan in 1881, but he was the only one who visited China from Nagasaki to 
meet with Li. In his report to the king in February 1882, Ŏ noted that the world was “a 
bigger period of the Warring States,” quoting the “period of Warring States” in Chinese 
history, in which the only way for Chosŏn to avoid being subjugated by Western powers 
and Japan was to make the country wealthy and powerful.68 
After they arrived in Tianjin in May, Ŏ and Yi submitted the king’s two formal 
requests to the Chinese side, including allowing people of the two countries to trade at the 
treaty ports of each other and allowing Chosŏn to send emissaries to permanently reside 
in Beijing.69 In addition, they forwarded the king’s four additional requests to the Acting 
Beiyang Superintendent, Zhang Shusheng (1824–1884). Zhang, the Governor-General of 
Liangguang and one of the primary military protégées of Li Hongzhang’s Huai Army, had 
just assumed Li’s position in the same month, when Li returned to his hometown in 
Anhui province for a 100-day-long stay for his mother’s funeral. The first request 
suggested that the two countries negotiate a treaty. The second request aimed to cancel 
the markets on northeastern border between Hamgyŏng province of Chosŏn and Wula 
and Ningguta areas of China in order to prevent Russians from intervening, while the 
new trade way would be decided by the treaty. According to the third request, Chosŏn 
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would stop sending emissaries to Beijing as before and the emissaries who would 
permanently reside in Beijing would be receiving and forwarding the imperial edicts, 
which virtually meant to cancel the exchanges of emissaries. The fourth request proposed 
that the emissaries residing in Beijing would be responsible for their own travel expenses 
and meals, so China would not need to offer provisions to them.70 Suffice to say that the 
six requests aimed to substantially change the bilateral relational arrangement by 
adopting some common Western diplomatic rules practiced between sovereign states. Not 
surprisingly, they posed a dilemma for Beijing about whether it should continue to keep 
Chosŏn as an outer fan within the Zongfan framework, or it should recognize Chosŏn as a 
state that was theoretically equal to other treaty powers beyond the said framework. 
Ŏ soon discussed some key issues with Zhou Fu about the likely contents of the 
bilateral treaty, such as permanently residing Chosŏn’s emissaries in Beijing, endowing 
China with the most-favored-nation right, appropriately treating the Chinese commercial 
commissioner, and clarifying Chosŏn’s status as China’s shuguo. Their discussion set the 
tone for the bilateral treaty that would be signed several months later. In terms of the 
Chinese institutes involved in the bilateral contacts, they proposed that the foreign affairs 
regarding Chosŏn would be managed by the Zongli Yamen and the Beiyang 
Superintendent, on the one hand, and the tributary affairs would still be under the 
management of the Ministry of Rituals, on the other.71 On June 8, Ŏ arrived in Beijing, 
contacted the Ministry of Rituals, and was lodged in the Foreign Emissaries’ Common 
Accommodations, where the ministry followed the Zongfan conventions to bestow him 
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silvers, sheep, wine, and meals.72 When the ministry was shocked by the king’s two 
formal requests, Yi Ŭng-chun, another special emissary of the king, arrived in Beijing 
with a note reporting the treaty negotiation with the U.S., in which the king showed his 
sincere thanks to the emperor and the “Central Dynasty” for protecting the “small country” 
and the fan. Yi was also lodged in the Foreign Emissaries’ Common Accommodations 
and bestowed with silvers, sheep, wine, and meals.73 Ironically, if the king’s requests 
were granted by the emperor, such Zongfan conventions as Ŏ and Yi was experiencing in 
Beijing would be cancelled. 
Although granting the king’s requests would undoubtedly weaken the role of the 
Ministry of Rituals as the headquarters of the Zongfan affairs, after witnessing the recent 
cases of Ryukyu, Burma, and Vietnam, the ministry had been fully aware that many 
issues were beyond the Zongfan world. On June 14, the ministry memorialized the throne 
of the king’s two requests and suggested the emperor instruct all officials who were 
familiar with foreign affairs, in particular Li Hongzhang, to do a confidential discussion 
on the matter. Meanwhile, Baoting (1840–1890), a Manchu associate minister of the 
ministry, presented a memorial to detail the ministry’s preferences. According to Bao, 
Chosŏn, the first shuguo of “foreign barbarian” that subordinated to the Great Qing, was 
far more important than those countries of the South Sea (Ch. Nanyang), but after the 
invasions of Japanese on Ryukyu, British on Burma, and French on Vietnam that China 
failed to prevent, Chosŏn became not as respectful as before and it had not betrayed 
China because it was weak and still worshiped China’s proper conducts and moralities. 
On the other hand, it would be unfair for the shuguo if China refused to let it trade at 
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treaty ports and share commercial interests with other “barbarians from afar” (Ch. 
yuanyi). Otherwise, it might push Chosŏn to the Japanese side to become a shuguo of 
Japan. Similarly, if China permitted Chosŏn’s emissaries to permanently reside in Beijing, 
Chosŏn would be on an equal footing with other countries that had ministers in the city. 
Once it became rich and powerful, it would be arrogant and aggressive as the “British 
barbarians” had done. 
Upon this scenario, Bao argued that the right of managing affairs regarding 
Chosŏn should not be transferred to the Zongli Yamen in order not to blur Chosŏn’s 
shuguo status; the right should be possessed by the Ministry of Rituals as before, and the 
ministry would continue forward relative business to the Yamen. Bao also argued that 
China should not allow Chosŏn to build a legation in Beijing, even if the emissaries were 
permitted to permanently reside in the city; rather, they should continue to be lodged at 
the Foreign Emissaries’ Common Accommodations in order to highlight that the two 
countries were still in the same family.74 Moreover, Bao boldly suggested that Beijing 
should use Chosŏn’s intention of exploiting China’s power to check other countries’ 
encroachments as a good opportunity to dispatch thousands of soldiers to Chosŏn to 
garrison military forts and put the country under China’s control.75 This seemingly 
aggressive suggestion aimed to pinpoint the nature of the Sino–Korean Zongfan 
relationship, reflecting the similar provocative proposal made by Xu Guangqi in 1619. 
Bao’s opinions had a strong impact on the final decision of the policy-makers, for the 
court promptly made a decision and issued an edict to the Ministry of Rituals, the Zongli 
Yamen, and the Beiyang Superintendent, emphasizing that “Chosŏn has been a fan for a 
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long time and all rituals have regulations” and declining Chosŏn’s request of permanently 
residing emissaries in Beijing due to “various potential inconveniences.” Yet the court 
endorsed the king’s proposal of making changes to some conventions and for that 
purpose it instructed Zhang Shusheng to consult Li Hongzhang about negotiating a 
commercial treaty with Chosŏn.  
In addition, the court instructed the Zongli Yamen to be in charge of certain trade 
affairs with Chosŏn and the Ministry of Rituals to manage tributary affairs as before.76 In 
this way, the Beiyang Superintendent eventually became the nexus of making China’s 
foreign policy toward Chosŏn. The Zongli Yamen further devolved the power regarding 
Chosŏn’s foreign affairs to the superintendent, as a result of which the destination of most 
Korean emissaries became Tianjin, instead of Beijing. Accordingly, the obligation to 
accommodate the emissaries was transferred from the Ministry of Rituals to the 
superintendent. For example, after Ŏ returned to Tianjin, the superintendent gave Ŏ 
78.162 taels of silver, including 54 taels as routine imperial gifts and 24.162 taels as 
converted silver from sheep, wine, and meals that he was supposed to receive from the 
Ministry of Rituals in Beijing.77 Given that the superintendent had gained the right of 
directly contacting the king about foreign affairs in early 1881, and it was the 
superintendent who commanded the newly established Beiyang Navy—the exclusive 
maritime transporter between the two countries of the day, the superintendent became the 
most powerful institution supervising Sino–Korean contacts. This point was soon proved 
by the superintendent’s decision to send troops to Chosŏn to help suppress a mutiny. 
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PROTECTING THE SHUGUO AS THE PATRIARCH BY SENDING TROOPS IN 1882 
When Chosŏn succeeded in persuading China to sign a treaty with it, the country was 
teetering on the brink of a political upheaval. On July 23, 1882, as a result of the unfair 
distribution of rations of rice among troops that was suffering from a severe drought, a 
mutiny broke out at Hansŏng. Hundreds of soldiers of the Muwiyŏng gathered and 
attacked the Japanese legation to kill several Japanese, including Lieutenant Horimoto 
Reizō, who had been training the Special Skill Army (K. pyŏlgi gun) since May 1881. 
When the rebels occupied the palace and controlled the king after killing several 
high-ranking officials on July 24, Taewŏn’gun seized the opportunity to restore his 
regency and retaliated the Princess Min clan by announcing the death of the princess who 
had actually survived and escaped to Ch’ungju prefecture.78 In chaos, the Japanese 
charge d’affaires Hanabusa Yoshimoto fled in haste to Inchon and took an English 
steamer for Nagasaki, where he telegraphed the incident to Tokyo on July 30.79 
Both the Japanese and Chinese governments quickly responded by sending troops 
to Chosŏn. On July 31, Tokyo instructed Hanabusa to return to Inchon with navy forces 
to seek justice and compensation. The new Chinese minister in Tokyo, Li Shuchang 
(1837–1896), urgently telegraphed Zhang Shusheng, asking China to immediately send 
troops too.80 In Beijing, the German minister, Max August von Brandt (1835–1920), and 
the Inspector General of the Imperial Customs of China, Robert Hart (1835–1911), also 
informed the Zongli Yamen about the mutiny respectively on August 2 and 3, when the 
copies of the German–Chosŏn Treaty and British–Chosŏn Treaty were submitted to the 
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court, along with the king’s dispatches to German and British sovereigns about Chosŏn’s 
status as China’s shuguo.81 Within several days, Beijing was fully alarmed by the serious 
situation and it was time for it to demonstrate how Chosŏn’s title of China’s shuguo was 
not “nominal” after almost two-decade-long debates with Japan and other treaty powers. 
When Zhang Shusheng instructed General Wu Changqing (1829–1884) to prepare 
for sending troop overseas, Kim Yun-sik and Ŏ Yun-chung at Tianjin considerably 
influenced China’s final decision of sending troops to Chosŏn to quell the mutiny and 
detain Taewŏn’gun in China. As two fervent proponents of the king’s opening-up policy, 
Kim and Ŏ linked the mutiny with the abolished coup in 1881 and kept requesting China 
to send warships and soldiers to suppress the mutiny and check the Japanese.82 Accusing 
Taewŏn’gun of plotting the mutiny against the king and the new foreign policy, Kim even 
secretly proposed to kill Taewŏn’gun in order to “erase the bane for the country” when 
the Chinese troops occupied Hansŏng.83 Handicapped by the extremely limited channels 
of communication with Chosŏn, China was not familiar with Chosŏn’s domestic political 
situation, so both Zhang and his colleagues in Tianjin and Beijing had to heavily depend 
on Kim’s and Ŏ’s information, which gave them an impression that Taewŏn’gun would 
be abolishing the king soon if China failed to take action in time.84 What China should 
do, therefore, was to send troops to prevent the king from being dethroned. 
On August 7, proclaiming that “Chosŏn has been a fan of our country for a long 
time,” Emperor Guangxu instructed the Zongli Yamen and Zhang Shusheng to send Ma 
Jianzhong and Ding Ruchang to lead forces to Chosŏn to “cherish the small country,” 
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check the “Japanese plot,” and “protect the Japanese people along the same lines.”85 The 
military action thus acquired legitimacy from the rationales of the Zongfan arrangement. 
Zhang assembled 13 warships and merchantmen under Admiral Ding’s command and 
summoned 4,000 troopers under General Wu’s command. The superintendent also 
ordered Kim and Ŏ to return to Chosŏn together with the Chinese officers, for whom they 
would serve as “guides” (Ch. xiangdao). By order of Zhang, Ma Jianzhong accomplished 
a reconnaissance mission in Inchon on August 10 and 11, during which Ŏ’s personal 
opinions against Taewŏn’gun in his intensive conversations with Ma deeply influenced 
the latter’s final judgment on the situation in his report to Zhang on August 14.86 On 
August 15, General Wu left Tianjin for Yantai (Chefoo), where he would head for Chosŏn 
by commanding his fleet and officers, including the then 24-year-old officer Yuan Shikai, 
who during his trip to Chosŏn would discuss with Kim about his bold plan of leading 
hundreds of Chinese warriors to seize Hansŏng and control the situation.87 
At the same time, Japan also legitimized its action of sending troops to Chosŏn. 
On August 3, Inoue Kaoru, informed the foreign ministers in Tokyo that Japan’s 
operation was “completely based upon pacifism” and its warships and troops were to 
protect the Japanese embassy and citizens.88 The deputy foreign minister, Yoshida 
Kyonari (1845–1891), declined Li Shuchang’s suggestion of China’s “mediation.”89 On 
August 7, when Beijing decided to send troops to Chosŏn, Inoue gave Hanabusa detailed 
instructions on the military operations and terms of compensation that aimed to deal with 
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the situation by force and only by Japan itself, rather than through mediation of China or 
any other country.90  The ideological conflict on Chosŏn’s status between the two 
countries after 1873, in particular after 1876, seemed to evolve into military rivalries on 
the peninsula, but both sides believed that their responses were legal and legitimate. 
For China, it was completely reasonable to send troops to Chosŏn by putting into 
practice what it had been proclaiming to Japan and other powers about its Zongfan 
relations with the shuguo. As the Zongli Yamen had enunciated to Mori Arinori in 1876, 
it was China’s self-taken responsibility to help Chosŏn “solve its difficulties, resolve its 
disputes, and expect its safety and security.” Reviewing this point to Yoshida Kyonari on 
August 9 and 12 in his notes, Li Shuchang stated that China’s action followed “the rule of 
cherishing the small country” and aimed to “suppress the rebellion for the shubang and 
the Japanese legation at Hansŏng is exactly under the protection of China.” Li Shuchang 
used a metaphor for the rationale behind China’s operation, in which he described China 
as the “patriarch of the family” (Ch. jiazhang) who had the obligation to investigate why 
some stuff of “other people”—which referred to Japan—left at the “houses of his sons or 
brothers” (Ch. zidi jia)—namely, Chosŏn—were stolen.91 This metaphor crystallized 
China’s understanding of the mutiny and its patriarchal authority vis-à-vis Chosŏn within 
the Zongfan family. By the same token, it demonstrated that China’s point of departure 
was not based on any rules of international law. 
For Japan, the idea of the big Zongfan family that Li Shuchang described was free 
from its concerns, but the Gaimushō actually did not know how to efficiently rebuff 
China’s statement and it worried that the conflict at Chosŏn might draw Japan into the 
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abyss of a war with the powerful China. As it had consulted the Taiwan issue with Le 
Gendre in 1872, the Gaimushō now resorted to its foreign intellectual resources again by 
soliciting advice from the French jurist and a legal advisor to the Japanese government, 
Gustave Boissonade (1825–1910). Boissonade suggested that Japan insist that Chosŏn 
was “an independent country” (J. dokuritsu koku) and “only focus on negotiation with 
Chosŏn.”92 He mentioned the relationship between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire again 
as an analogy of that between Chosŏn and China, as Mori Arinori had done in Beijing in 
1876. According to this analogy, since Britain and France had directly intervened in the 
mutiny of Egypt in January 1882 regardless of Turkey’s attitude, Japan could follow the 
case by directly intervening in the munity of Chosŏn regardless of China’s response.93 
The Gaimushō thus quickly made a strategy for dealing with China and other powers, 
which allowed it to find its military intervention in the mutiny necessary and legitimate. 
Being aware that the crisis would not be peacefully solved, Li Shuchang 
suggested to the Zongli Yamen that, “after suppressing the mutiny, China should manage 
and supervise all affairs of the country in order to ensure its peaceful domestic and 
foreign situations.”94 Furthermore, he proposed that China should “abolish the king and 
convert the country into prefectures and counties [of China]” (Ch. fei qi wang er junxian 
zhi) by imitating the case between Britain and India to fundamentally resolve the thorny 
issue between China and other powers regarding Chosŏn.95 Yet, as Li himself realized, 
China was unable to do so because it would violate the rule of “humanity and virtue” (Ch. 
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rende). As history unfolded, until the outbreak of the Sino–Japanese War in 1894, China 
never initiated any plan of colonizing Chosŏn; rather, it tried to protect the country along 
the Zongfan lines. Its military intervention in 1882 was precisely based on this rationale. 
After arriving in Chosŏn on August 20, the Chinese troops under General Wu’s 
command found occupation of Hansŏng an easy matter. Compared with the Japanese who 
had entered Hansŏng, the Chinese officials availed themselves of China’s unique 
favorable position and authority in the Zongfan system to quickly terminate the political 
turmoil by entrapping Taewŏn’gun and sending him to Tianjin, restoring the king’s 
rulership, and assisting Chosŏn with signing two conventions with Japan.96 Prince Min 
was found safe and sound and was escorted back to Hansŏng by General Wu’s troops. 
The king dispatched missions respectively to Beijing and Tokyo to brief the whole 
incident along conventional lines among the three countries. On September 31, the Zongli 
Yamen distributed a note to seven foreign ministers at Beijing, briefing them about the 
Chinese intervention by reemphasizing that, “Chosŏn, being a shuguo of our Great Qing, 
has maintained its status of fan for generations, and the [imperial] court regards it as an 
inner subordinate (Ch. neifu) that shares solidarity with us.” It also announced that the 
Chinese troops would remain in Chosŏn to ensure its stability and security.97 
A thornier issue for Beijing was how to deal with the then 63-year-old 
Taewŏn’gun, who had been sent to Baoding by General Wu. Endorsing Zhang 
Shusheng’s proposal, Li Hongzhang, reassuming the position of the Beiyang 
Superintendent in early September, argued that Beijing should detain Taewŏn’gun in 
China forever and allow the king to regularly send officials to visit him. Li cited a similar 
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historical case in the early fourteenth century, when the Mongolian court of the Yuan 
dynasty exiled the king of Koryŏ Korea, Wang Chŏng (1315–1344, r. 1330–1332, 1339–
1343), to Guangdong province of China. 98  The analogies between the two cases 
suggested that at least in the early 1880s, such Chinese politicians as Li Hongzhang, 
Zhang Shusheng, Li Shuchang, Ma Jianzhong, Zhou Fu, Zhang Jian (1853–1926), and 
Yuan Shikai, who were also Han Chinese officials, understood Qing–Chosŏn relations as 
an inseparable part of the chain of the entire history of Sino–Korean Zongfan relations. 
From relative historical precedents, Qing China could thus seize legitimacy and rationale 
for its contemporary reactions to the political turmoil of its outer fan, insomuch that it 
remained the invisible but fully legal power of punishing any official of the fan, or even 
abolishing the king, if necessary. Qing China’s decision of dethroning the last king of the 
Lê dynasty of Annam in 1789 was a good case to illuminate this point. After detaining 
Taewŏn’gun in Baoding for three years, Beijing finally approved the king’s petition of 
releasing his father and finally sent him back to Chosŏn in October 1885. 
In retrospect, China’s military intervention in 1882 was an undoubted turning 
point of Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relations,99 which resulted in a series of changes in the 
bilateral relations as well as Chosŏn’s domestic reforms, but in a fundamental sense it 
was no more than a public presentation of the inconspicuous nature of the Qing’s 
supreme power over Chosŏn after 1637. When the Qing replaced the Ming in the Sino–
Korean Zongfan framework in 1637, it simultaneously assumed all responsibilities that 
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the Ming had taken for Chosŏn, including the one sending troops to save the country. The 
Qing’s military intervention in Annam in 1788 was another good example of its supreme 
power in the Zongfan family. This aspect is precisely what the politico-cultural Chinese 
empire meant for both China and its fan. In this sense, the assertion that China’s 
superiority was “titular” and China’s action of detaining Taewŏn’gun was 
“inconceivable”100 is a far cry from the truth. So is the argument that through the 
intervention the Qing became “a colonial power” or “imperialist power” that employed 
the Western-style “imperialism” on Chosŏn in the late nineteenth century.101 
5.3 Defining the Shuguo by Treaties: The Sino–Korean Regulations, 1882–1883 
THE BIRTH OF THE FIRST WESTERN-STYLE SINO–KOREAN REGULATION 
The inherent nature of the Zongfan arrangement determined that China could not stop 
moving forward along the way of “cherishing the small” after the turmoil. In order to 
help Chosŏn meet financial crisis, China made a loan of 0.5 million taels of silver to it 
upon the request of Cho Yŏng-ha and Kim Hong-jip, who negotiated a loan convention 
with Tang Tingshu (1832–1892) and Ma Jianzhong. China would loan 0.3 million from 
China Merchants Steamship Navigation Company (CMSNC, Ch. Lunchuan zhaoshang ju) 
and 0.2 million from the Kaiping Mining Administration (KMA, Ch. Kaiping kuangwu 
ju), for which Chosŏn agreed to have its tariffs and taxes on red ginseng as mortgages and 
pay off within 12 years by paying a very low 0.8% interest. In return, the two creditors, 
supervised by Li Hongzhang, reaped economic privileges in Chosŏn: the CMSNC gained 
the right of renting some lands at Chosŏn’s treaty ports to set up factories and offices and 
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the KMA was allowed to freely prospect for minerals in its hinterland.102 In this way, the 
Chinese commercial power aggressively expanded into Chosŏn. 
In addition, China provided Chosŏn with military materials to help it improve the 
quality of its poorly equipped troops. In October 1882, Li from the Tianjin Arsenals 
donated 10 equipped 12-pound cannons, 3,000 cannon balls, 4,500 pounds of cannon 
powder, 1,500 pounds of bullet powder, 1,000 British rifles, 10,000 pounds of rifle 
powder, and 1 million bullets to the country.103 A month later, Chosŏn’s program of 
training its own military and industrial experts at Tianjin ended with a total failure with 
the return of the rest of the artisans and apprentices at the Tianjin Arsenals as per the 
king’s order.104 Although both the king and the Chinese officials zealously wished that 
Chosŏn could modernize its troops, the country never achieved this goal before its tragic 
fall in 1910. As a result, Chosŏn had to invite foreign advisors to train its forces, leaving 
itself more vulnerable to foreign influences. 
The two countries also resumed the negotiation over a commercial treaty in 
Tianjin between Ŏ Yun-chung as one side and Zhou Fu and Ma Jianzhong as the other. 
From the beginning of their negotiation in May, the two sides had clarified that Chosŏn 
was China’s shuguo with the right of zizhu, rather than a nation of “independence” (Ch. 
duli).105 After reviewing Zhou and Ma’s draft entitled “Regulations for Maritime and 
Overland Trade between Chinese and Chosŏn Subjects” (RMOTCC, Ch. Zhongguo 
Chaoxian shangmin shuilu maoyi zhangcheng), Ŏ questioned some discrepancies 
between the eight articles of the draft and those in the treaties with other countries, such 
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as the unbalance of the right of consular jurisdiction between the two countries in Article 
2 and opening Hansŏng as a trade city for Chinese merchants and allowing the Chinese to 
trade in Chosŏn’s hinterlands in Article 4. Zhou and Ma confirmed that this treaty was 
different from those with “friendly nations” (Ch. yuguo), for Chosŏn was a fan and 
shuguo of China and the two countries should maintain their “veritable orthodox 
legitimacy” (Ch. shizai zhi mingfen). This explanation could also help explain why they 
purposely termed the text “regulations” (Ch. zhangcheng), rather than “treaty” (Ch. 
tiaoyue). Zhou and Ma agreed to revise certain terms, but suggested that a special term be 
added to articulate that the treaty was only applied to China’s shubang (shuguo) and it 
was free from the most-favored-nation rule.106 Ŏ, Cho Yŏng-ha, and Kim Hong-jip soon 
endorsed the revised text with the same title.107 
In a memorial to Emperor Guangxu in October, Li Hongzhang summarized the 
contents of the RMOTCC by saying that, 
 
The preamble articulates that this treaty is only applied to China’s shubang in 
order to show China’s preferential treatment to the country, so it should not be 
cited by any other nations by virtue of the most-favored-nation rule. This 
statement can “clarify and define the orthodox legitimacy” (Ch. zhengming 
dingfen). According to Article 1, the Beiyang Superintendent will appoint 
Commissioners of Trade (Ch. Shangwu weiyuan) of China to reside at the treaty 
ports of Chosŏn to exercise jurisdiction over Chinese merchants there, while 
Chosŏn will send their Commissioners of Trade to Tianjin and other treaty ports 
of China to manage their merchants. These Commissioners of Trade are different 
from routine imperial envoys and tributary emissaries. According to Article 2, the 
Chosŏn merchants at Chinese treaty ports are under local Chinese jurisdiction, 
which complies with the imperial code and slightly differs from rules of treaties 
with other nations. Article 3 allows fishermen from certain provinces of the two 
countries to fish in certain areas, but they are forbidden from trading with each 
other. Article 4 permits merchants of the two countries to purchase local products 
in hinterlands by paying duties. Article 5 allows people living on borders of the 
two countries to trade and pay taxes at Ŭiju and Zhamen along the Yalu River on 
                                               
106 Ŏ to Zhou and Ma, and Zhou and Ma to Ŏ, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 983-986. 
107 See Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States, vol. 2, 847-853. 
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the one hand, and at Hunchun and Hoeryŏng along the Tumen River, on the other, 
while the charges formerly made on account of board and lodging, supply of 
provisions, reception, and escort are to be entirely abolished in order to cherish 
the people of the fan. Article 6 lists forbidden goods, such as opium and munitions 
of war, and regulates that the red ginseng will be charged 15% customs duty. 
Article 7 shifts the post route between the two countries from overland to 
maritime, for which China will arrange a steamer from the CMSNC to make a trip 
to Chosŏn at a fixed date once per month. Article 8 states that any points that may 
have to be enlarged upon or cancelled in the future will be discussed and settled 
by correspondence between the Beiyang Superintendent and the king, whereupon 
the final decision will be subject to the emperor.108 
 
Li’s summary covered main points of the regulations, but it did not mention that 
Article 7 endowed the Chinese men-of-war with the right of cruising about in Chosŏn’s 
waters and anchoring at any of the ports in the interest of the country’s safety. Viewed 
from the point of international law, this term violently damaged Chosŏn’s sovereignty, yet 
Ŏ and his Korean colleagues who argued with Zhou and Ma over the unequal consular 
jurisdiction did not challenge this term because they regarded it as a part of the favorable 
protection provided by the Upper Country for its loyal shuguo. In a very practical sense, 
the RMOTCC became a tool for China to strengthen its control of Chosŏn in the 
post-mutiny period, but first and foremost, the treaty was a result of the king’s 
above-mentioned requests and it indeed fulfilled the majority of the requests by 
fundamentally changing or even permanently abolishing some conventions that had been 
lasting for 245 years after 1637 between the two countries. 
Beijing endorsed all these changes. Emperor Guangxu stated that, “Chosŏn, being 
a shuguo of our country, is the Eastern Barbarians (Ch. dongyi). It is so poor and weak 
that Japan and Russia have coveted it for a long time. It is a good way to protect the 
shuguo by allowing it to trade with such countries as Britain and the U.S., so that Russia 
                                               
108 Li’s memorial, October 10, 1882, in Guangxu chao zhupi zouzhe (The palace memorials with Emperor 
Guangxu’s imperial instructions), vol. 112, 243. 
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and Japan cannot annex it.”109 In terms of cherishing the shuguo, the court always went 
further than local officials did. For instance, on March 14, 1882, when the court learned 
from the Manchu General of Jilin, Ming’an (1828–1911), and his assistant, Wu Dacheng 
(1835–1902), that many poor Chosŏn peasants kept crossing the border to cultivate the 
wilderness in Jilin, Emperor Guangxu instructed that, “Regarding these poor Chosŏn 
peasants, in the eyes of the local officials, there is certainly a line between them and us 
(Ch. bici zhi fen); yet in the eyes of the court, there is originally no difference between the 
inside and the outside (Ch. neiwai zhi bie). Thus, they should be well managed and not be 
prevented by additional rules, as long as they have no intention of encroaching on our 
borders.”110 This policy was very similar to Emperor Yongzheng’s decision in 1727 on 
demarcating a new border line with Annam based on the idea that all lands of the outer 
fan were under the emperor’s rule. From 1727 to 1882, the ideology of “all-under-Heaven” 
of the court that was continuously informed by its perennial Zongfan contacts with its 
outer fan did not change much. Although China opened its door to Western nations after 
the 1840s, which might indicate the beginning of the collapse of the Heavenly 
Dynasty,111 it still firmly acted as the Central Kingdom, the Upper Country, and the 
Heavenly Dynasty in the Zongfan arrangement with its prototypical outer fan in the 
1880s. As long as Chosŏn existed as China’s shuguo, China’s politico-cultural 
self-identity as the Heavenly Dynasty would persist and its West-oriented diplomacy 
would be accordingly limited. 
Since the RMOTCC adopted the form of a Western-style treaty, it helped to 
                                               
109 Emperor Guangxu’s comments on Li’s memorial, in Guangxu chao zhupi zouzhe, vol. 112, 247. 
110 Ming’an’s memorial, March 14, 1882, in Guangxu chao zhupi zouzhe, vol. 112, 243. 
111 See, for example, Mao Haijian, Tianchao de bengkui: yapian zhanzheng zai yanjiu (The collapse of the 
Heavenly Dynasty: A restudy of the Opium War). 
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produce an inner dual system of the contacts between China and Chosŏn. Whereas they 
kept their court-to-court system between the imperial house at Beijing and the royal 
house at Hansŏng, they had to adjust to the newly created nation-to-nation system 
between Qing China as a nation, on the one hand, and Chosŏn as a nation equal to China 
in terms of international law, on the other. This inner dual system seemed to temporarily 
solve certain problems, but it in turn brought the two countries to more thorny issues in a 
new international setting, as the ritual crisis in China in late 1882 illuminated. 
THE RITUAL CRISIS AND DEFINING THE SHUGUO BY THE TREATIES IN 1883 
The ritual crisis arose from several questions of the Manchu General at Mukden, Chongqi 
(1830–1900), about the changes of certain Zongfan conventions in the RMOTCC. In 
December 1882, Chongqi submitted three memorials to express his concerns. In the first 
memorial, he anxiously queried Article 2, according to which the Chinese Commissioners 
of Trade at the treaty ports of Chosŏn “will in their dealings with Chosŏn’s officials be on 
the footing of perfect equality, and are to be treated with the consideration due to the 
observance of etiquette,” while the Chosŏn Commissioners at the Chinese ports “are 
likewise to be treated on a footing of equality in their dealings with the local authorities, 
namely the Taotai, the Prefect, and the Magistrates of the place.” Reviewing that Chosŏn 
became “a fan and subject” (Ch. fanchen) of the Great Qing in 1637 and that all Korean 
officials were “ministers of ministers” (Ch. peichen; K. paesin) whose status was 
different from that of Chinese local officials appointed by the court, Chongqi critically 
pointed out that the emperor would be on a footing of equality with the king when 
Chosŏn Commissioners were treated equally by China’s local authorities. It thus 
“fundamentally concerns the orthodox legitimacy and in no way should such treatment be 
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given to Chosŏn.” The general claimed that Mukden would treat Chosŏn Commissioners 
along conventional lines without any changes in order to defend the “decorum” (Ch. 
titong). Although he agreed that the Chosŏn Commissioners at the ports in the area of 
inner Shanhai Pass might be treated differently, Chongqi strongly suggested that the term 
“equality” (Ch. pingxing) in the article should be deleted for the sake of “moral principles” 
(Ch. lunji) and “national constitution” (Ch. guoti) of China.112 
Chongqi’s second memorial questioned Article 5 that cancelled the convention of 
the official-supervised trade on the frontier (Ch. hushi) and allowed local people to freely 
trade respectively at Zhamen and Ŭiju on the two sides of the Yalu River, and at Hunchun 
and Hoeryŏng on the two sides of the Tumen River. Chongqi agreed to cancel outdated 
rules, but emphasized that the overland border security should be strengthened by shifting 
the trade place from Zhamen to the checkpoint at Zhongjiang near the Yalu River and 
patrolling along the Chinese side as usual. This perception of unpredictable threats from 
Chosŏn itself and treaty powers at Chosŏn was corroborated by his third memorial, which 
underlined uniqueness and importance of Mukden and the province that were the Great 
Qing’s “fundamental areas” (Ch. genben zhongdi). He suggested that the affairs regarding 
Mukden and the province should be negotiated with the Manchu General and the Prefect 
at Mukden by the Beiyang Superintendent and the king.113 
Chongqi’s memorials exposed the anxiety of the Manchu officials in Manchuria 
over the security of the special area for the imperial house of the Great Qing and the 
ritual-oriented foundation of the Zongfan system, so that they triggered a hot debate 
among the Ministry of Rituals, the Zongli Yamen, and the Beiyang Superintendent. Since 
                                               
112 Chongqi’s memorial, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1063-1064. 
113 Chongqi’s memorial, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1065-1069. 
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the overland frontier trade regulations would be soon negotiated at Mukden after a 
joint-investigation of China and Chosŏn, the issue of performing equal rituals became the 
most disputable topic in the quite intense debate. Li found that the imperial code of the 
Great Qing did not regulate ritual performances between Chinese local officials and 
tributary emissaries, but he noted that the local officials treated the emissaries of Annam, 
Siam, and Ryukyu with “rituals of equality” (Ch. pingli), which could be applicable to 
Chosŏn. Moreover, Li solicited theoretical support from the classics of the Zhou dynasty 
and drew an analogy between the statuses of the authorities of the two countries. 
According to this analogy, the king, as an “outer vassal” (Ch. wai zhuhou) of the Son of 
Heaven, was equal to China’s governor-generals and governors who were “inner vassals” 
(Ch. nei zhuhou), on the one hand, and Chosŏn’s officials were equal to Chinese officials 
who were below governor-generals and governors, on the other. Therefore, in China, the 
Korean Commissioners should perform the “rituals of subordinate” (Ch. shuli) to the 
Chinese governor-generals, governors, and the officials with higher ranks, and perform 
the “rituals of equality” to such local officials as Taotai and Prefect. They should also 
perform the “rituals of equality” to Western ministers at Tianjin, where the 
commissioners would reside. In Chosŏn, on the other hand, the Chinese Commissioners 
should perform the “rituals of equality” to the Korean officials who were inferior to those 
of the cabinet, Ŭijŏngbu.114 
Li apparently tried to pursue the mean between the conventional Zongfan rituals 
embodying the “ancestral system” (Ch. zuzhi) and the new Western-style diplomatic 
etiquette between foreign ministers and the host country. Agreeing that the Korean 
Commissioners could get favorable treatment in that they were not tributary emissaries, 
                                               
114 Li to the Zongli Yamen, January 3, 1883, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1072-1075 
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the Ministry of Rituals proposed that when the Chinese Commissioners with the rank of 
or below Taotai visited the king, they should perform the “rituals of guest–host” (Ch. 
binzhu li) by slightly changing certain rules of the imperial code.115 In February 1883, 
the court, via the Zongli Yamen, endorsed Li’s and the ministry’s solutions to the ritual 
crisis by setting up a new framework of the ritual performances between the two 
countries (Figure 5. 1). As the Corps Diplomatique formed at Hansŏng, this new ritual 
arrangement would cause serious conflicts among China, Chosŏn, Japan, and Western 
powers in the following decade. 
Figure 5. 1. The Rule of Ritual Performances between China and Chosŏn after 
1883 
 
  
Notes: “S” refers to the rituals of subordinate (shuli), “E” refers to the rituals of equality (pingli), 
and “G–H” refers to the rituals of guest–host (binzhu li). The foreign ministers in China sometime used the 
rituals of equality in their dealings with Chinese Taotai, Prefects, Magistrates, and other local officials. 
 
Chongqi found the new ritual arrangement a good resolution to the potential 
problems, and he soon fulfilled his expectations of strengthening the frontier security and 
maintaining the “proper system” by signing a convention with Ŏ Yun-chung in March 
1883. The convention, entitled “The Rules for Trade on the Frontier between Mukden 
and Chosŏn” (RTFMC, Ch. Fengtian yu Chaoxian bianmin jiaoyi zhangcheng), included 
24 articles regulating the trade activities at the Zhongjiang area on the Chinese side of the 
Yalu River, among which several articles aimed to maintain the Zongfan conventions. 
                                               
115 The Ministry of Rituals to the Zongli Yamen, January 18, 1883, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1085-1088. 
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Following the style of the RMOTCC, the preamble of the RTFMC states that the 
trade on the frontier at Zhongjiang “is not on the same footing as the trade carried on at 
the treaty ports, inasmuch as it was originally established by the Heavenly Dynasty as a 
benefit to its shuguo with the distinct understanding that it should be a convenience to the 
population…and that other nations are not concerned in these rules.” Article 8 allows 
Chosŏn’s annual tributes and routine goods carried by emissaries and attendants to be 
exempt from taxes as usual. Article 19 states that China would send soldiers to escort the 
Korean tributary missions to Beijing from Fenghuang City as before. Article 23 dictates 
that the bilateral correspondence should be conducted in accordance with the “system” 
(Ch. tizhi), according to which Chosŏn should call China the “Heavenly Dynasty” or the 
“Upper Country” and such abbreviated characters as zhong (referring to Zhongguo) or 
dong (Ch. Dongguo, the eastern country, namely Chosŏn) should not be used. Similarly, 
the Chinese officials on the frontier would address Chosŏn as the “Country of Chosŏn” 
(Ch. Chaoxian guo) or “Your honorable country” (Ch. guiguo) to show China’s 
preferential treatment. 116  Several months later, the two countries signed another 
convention entitled “The Rules for Trade on the Frontier between Jilin and Chosŏn” 
(RTFJC, Ch. Jilin Chaoxian shangmin suishi maoyi zhangcheng) to regulate the frontier 
trade near the Tumen River. The convention with 16 rules imitated the contents of the 
RTFMC, in particular Article 15 that was a copy of Article 23 of the RTFMC dictating 
specific political discourse of the bilateral correspondence.117 
                                               
116 Fengtian yu Chaoxian bianmin jiaoyi zhangcheng (The rules for trade on the frontier between Mukden 
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Yŏ chungguk wiwŏn hoesang sangse changjŏng (Negotiations with Chinese representatives over the details 
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Foreign States, vol. 2, 854-863. 
117 Jilin Chaoxian shangmin suishi maoyi zhangcheng (The rules for trade on the frontier between Jilin and 
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As a result, from summer 1882 to late 1883, China and Chosŏn signed three 
regulations in the Zongfan context, which presented as a form of western-style treaty, in 
order to regulate their maritime and overland trade activities and create a new political 
and commercial network along borders. The three regulations could be seen as a domino 
effect of the king’s six requests in early 1882, with which the imperial court had to 
appropriately deal in the Zongfan setting primarily through two institutional agents, 
namely the Zongli Yamen and the Beiyang Superintendent, not the Ministry of Rituals. In 
practice, the adjustments to the Zongfan mechanism in the three conventions laid the 
legal foundation for the nation-to-nation or state-to-state contacts between the two 
countries in the following years. 
5.4 Among the Nations, Above the Nations: The Nub of the Issue of Shuguo for Qing 
China 
When Qing Chin adjusted to fit the treaty port system from the early 1860s to the early 
1880s, it encountered difficulty in articulating and managing its Zongfan relationship 
with its prototypical fan against the new historical background. This issue concerned the 
transformation Qing China’s self-identity at the time, when the traditional ideology of 
“all-under-Heaven” collapsed per se, but such transformation ran into impassible obstacle 
of its time-honored relationship with Chosŏn, Ryukyu, and Vietnam in that both sides of 
the Zongfan arrangement within the same family could not challenge their own 
legitimacy that was deeply bound with and informed by each other. Consequently, despite 
the dramatic changes of some parts of the entire framework of China’s foreign relations, 
the Zongfan mechanism found itself standing firmly between China and its outer fan, in 
particular Chosŏn, rather than declining or being replaced by the treaty port system. 
                                                                                                                                            
Chosŏn), in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1264-1269;  
 297 
For Qing China, although the “western barbarians” had rebelled and broken 
China’s southern gate into pieces and imposed unequal treaties upon the country since the 
1840s, the “eastern barbarians”—Chosŏn—remained unchanged and continuously 
consolidated the foundation of the Central Kingdom by following the time-honored 
Zongfan conventions crystalized by the perennial tributary emissaries to Beijing and 
certain hierarchical ritual performances. As long as it embraced the politico-cultural 
identity as the Central Kingdom, Zhongguo, and the Heavenly Dynasty, the Qing had to 
assume legal and moral obligations within the said framework to Chosŏn, rather than 
leaving the outer fan alone or forcing it to negotiate with other countries over diplomatic 
affairs. More importantly, it would also be inappropriate and morally wrong for Qing 
China to annex the country, inasmuch as such colonial option never appeared on the 
Qing’s agenda. In this sense, it would not be exaggerated to assert that Qing China was 
hijacked by its moral obligations by the Zongfan principles. 
For Chosŏn, albeit it understood in the late 1870s and early 1880s that Qing China 
had been drawn into a new Western-style diplomatic system and China’s Western 
counterparts had resided their ministers at Beijing, it still needed to pursue the orthodox 
legitimacy from Qing China and regard the Manchu emperor in Beijing as the shared 
supreme authority in the Chinese world, if not in the entire universe as before. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the military might of the Western powers could 
defeat China and force the Chinese empire to make changes to certain aspects, such as 
opening treaty ports that disintegrated a part of the tributary trade system, but it was 
unable to change China’s supreme and exclusive patriarchal position for Chosŏn. All in 
all, the legitimacy of the governance of Chosŏn was bound with its Zongfan relations 
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with the Ming after the 1390s and with the Qing after 1637. As it turned out, the western 
powers could not fundamentally change the rationale behind the Zongfan system that had 
been functioning between China and its outer fan for centuries.118 Even after the king of 
Chosŏn proclaimed to be emperor of the “Great Korea” (K. Taehan) in 1897, the absence 
of the orthodox legitimacy from China, the exclusive venue for an emperor to be living, 
still made some Korean intellectuals worried. Viewed from this point of view, Chosŏn 
was also a victim of the China-centric Zongfan mechanism. 
From the early 1860s to early 1880s, Western powers and international law 
succeeded in bringing China into the family of nations, whereas the robust Zongfan 
practices between the imperial court of China and the royal court of Chosŏn sustained the 
Qing’s self-identity as Zhongguo, which in the politico-cultural sense and in the Zongfan 
context stood above all other members of the family of nations. The above-mentioned 
Emperor Guangxu’s imperial comments on the frontier affairs of Jilin province in 1882 
illuminated this point. In other words, Qing China as the Chinese empire in the territorial 
sense was included into the family of nations and presented itself as a member of the 
world, but as the Chinese empire in the politico-cultural sense it did not change so 
dramatically. A divergence took place between the two dimensions of the Chinese empire 
under the Great Qing at the time. Qing China suffered from this divergence after the 
1860s, when the treaty port system permeated in East Asia on the one hand, and Japan 
and Western powers started to explore Chosŏn, on the other. China was pushed into a 
tight corner by those powers’ ardent request of articulating the nature of Chosŏn’s status 
as China’s shuguo and by Chosŏn’s zealous request to conduct diplomacy on its behalf. 
                                               
118 Chang Chi-hsiung, “Dongxi guoji zhixu yuanli de chayi: ‘zongfan tixi’ dui ‘zhimin tixi’” (A comparison 
of Eastern and Western principles of international order: suzerainty vs. colonization). 
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What China was facing was not only two different systems on the surface, namely, the 
conventional Zongfan system and the newly established treaty port system, but also an 
intrinsic challenge of reconfiguring the boundary between Zhongguo and its outer fan 
within the ideologically cosmopolitan Chinese empire. Simultaneously, the same 
challenge occurred to China’s policies toward Vietnam of the day, too. 
In retrospect, during this hectic period, the Chinese empire was experiencing an 
inward involution that was moving from its politico-cultural frontier toward its center. 
China decided to guide Chosŏn into the family of nations, but the two sides determined to 
maintain their bilateral Zongfan relations and legally defined and defended such 
relationship through Western-style regulations between themselves. After 1882 and 1883, 
the Chinese policy toward Chosŏn that was legitimate and informed by precedents within 
the Zongfan framework turned out to be more provocative for other powers, which, in the 
context of the rise of Chosŏn’s nationalism, gradually yielded more and more conflicts 
among China, Chosŏn, and the powers in the following decade. As a result, a yawning 
chasm between the outer dual system and the inner dual system thoroughly exposed itself, 
which eventually resulted in the sharp termination of the bilateral Zongfan relationship. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Losing Chosŏn: The Last Zongfan Decade of the Chinese Empire, 1884–1895 
In the hectic 1880s, Qing China had two primary options for its policy toward Chosŏn, 
including “provincializing” (Ch. junxian) it, which meant to convert Chosŏn into several 
prefectures and countries of China,1 and “supervising and protecting” (Ch. jianhu) it, 
which referred to China’s patriarchal role of supervising Chosŏn’s affairs. Being 
consistent with its policy of proclaiming that Chosŏn was China’s shuguo with the right 
of zizhu, China finally adopted an in-between policy by assisting Chosŏn with managing 
its diplomatic and commercial affairs. This policy made Western diplomats believe that 
Beijing was actually annexing Chosŏn in the name of conventional practices between the 
two countries. For China and Chosŏn, however, Beijing’s policy indeed had its rationale 
and fulfilled China’s commitment to its intrinsic responsibilities to protect and help its 
outer fan or shuguo. 
China never delivered an intelligible definition of Chosŏn’s status for Western 
powers, which was an actually impossible mission for Beijing to accomplish because it 
was unable to overcome the institutional discrepancies between the Zongfan mechanism 
and international law,2 but no treaty powers ever publicly denied the legitimacy of Sino–
Korean relations on the world stage. The acquiescence among the powers was that 
China’s authority over Chosŏn was real and true. On the other hand, in the wake of 
Japan’s challenges in the 1880s and early 1890s, China made more changes to routine 
                                               
1 The term “provincializing” used in this dissertation, therefore, has a different connotation from that in 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s book, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. 
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contacts with Chosŏn, while it tried to keep the fundamentals of the Zongfan order 
untouched. This policy contributed to the formation of exclusivism and isolationism of 
the Chinese diplomatic representatives in Chosŏn. This chapter discusses China’s 
translucent power toward Chosŏn through Yuan Shikai’s residence from 1884 to 1894, 
China’s awkward position in the country through China’s last imperial mission to Chosŏn 
in 1890, and the images of Chosŏn in the minds of Chinese intellectuals and officials 
during the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895. 
6.1 Tracing Legitimacy back to the First Days of the Zongfan Relations: The His 
Imperial Chinese Majesty’s Resident in Chosŏn 
YUAN SHIKAI IN CHOSŎN AND THE RITUAL CONUNDRUM FOR HIS POWER 
After the mutiny of 1882, Chosŏn asked China to send specialists on diplomatic 
negotiations, commercial supervision, and customs management to assist it with 
establishing a system of maritime customs. The request was made by the king, endorsed 
by China’s court, and executed by both countries within the Zongfan framework. 
Chosŏn’s maritime customs system, therefore, became a sub-branch of China’s imperial 
customs. In November 1882, Ma Jianchang, Ma Jianzhong’s brother, and Paul George 
von Möllendorff, a German national who worked as an assistant in the Chinese Maritime 
Customs office and later at the German legation in Beijing after 1874, were appointed by 
Li Hongzhang as foreign advisers to the king and to found customs house in Hansŏng.3 
Ma Jianchang and Möllendorff took their posts in early 1883, followed by the first group 
of diplomatic representatives of Western treaty powers and China. 
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Among the representatives, the first U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary, Lucius Foote, and the first Chinese Commissioners of Trade, Chen 
Shutang, were the two most important figures because of their competing approaches to 
defining Chosŏn’s status. In March 1883, before he departed for Chosŏn, Foote received 
instructions from Secretary of State Fredrick Frelinghuysen, which emphasized that the 
treaty negotiations with Chosŏn “were conducted as between two independent and 
sovereign nations…As far as we are concerned Corea is an independent sovereign power, 
with all the attendant rights,—privileges, duties and responsibilities: in her relations to 
China we have no desire to interfere unless action should be taken prejudicial to the 
rights of the United States.” The instructions articulated that “for all purpose of 
intercourse between the United States and Corea the King is a sovereign, and that with 
sovereign states only do the United States treat. Further the representatives of the United 
States in China will treat the Corean representatives there as in the position assigned them 
by the Chinese government.”4 This pragmatic policy was imitated by other Western 
powers, but their acquiescence on China’s superiority in Chosŏn did not give Chen 
Shutang a decent position in the Corps Diplomatique in Hansŏng. 
As a second-rank Taotai, Chen held a title of “Commissioner of Commercial 
Affairs in Chosŏn” (Ch. Weiban Chaoxian shangwu weiyuan), which for his diplomatic 
colleagues in Hansŏng meant he had no right of managing foreign affairs. Thus, the 
Japanese and Western ministers always directly negotiated diplomatic matters with 
Chosŏn’s Foreign Office, the T’ongni Amun (K. T’ongni kyosǒp t’ongsang samu amun), 
which was developed from the T’ongnigimu Amun after 1882. In September 1884, Chen 
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complained to Li Hongzhang that his awkward position even caused him to be jeered by 
Japanese and British ministers. Chen said he tried to define his authority by citing the 
RMOTCC, but other ministers responded that the treaty was only effective between China 
and Korea.5 
Due to this problem, in 1884, when Chen appointed Chinese officials to the three 
treaty ports, namely Inchon, Wŏnsan, and Pusan, to supervise Sino–Korean commercial 
activities, he purposely gave them the title of “Commissioner of Chinese Merchants’ 
Affairs” (Ch. Banli huashang shiwu lishi), endowing them with the right of negotiating 
foreign affairs with other countries. The “commissioner” (Ch. lishi), which means 
“manager” in Chinese context, would function as a consul (Ch. lingshi) in practice, but it 
was not a consul in nature.6 After consulting with Foote and Li, Chen himself also 
adopted a new title of “General Commissioner of Foreign and Commercial Affairs at 
Chosŏn’s Ports” (Ch. Zongban Chaoxian gekou jiaoshe tongshang shiwu) in November 
1884.7 According to Chen, this title perfectly fit the “system” (Ch. tizhi), in which he 
could discuss affairs of the shuguo with his counterparts as an official of the “Upper 
Country.” It was not surprising that Chen’s new title aroused fear among some Western 
ministers. When the British minister at Beijing, Harry Parkes, asked the Zongli Yamen to 
articulate Chen’s position, the Yamen replied that, “Chosŏn is China’s shuguo, so the 
commissioner should not be understood as a minister to the country; but since Chen has 
been appointed to be in charge of diplomatic affairs by the emperor and he holds a 
second-rank Taotai, his position is equal to Consuls-General of other countries.”8 
                                               
5 Li to the Zongli Yamen, September 19, 1884, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1477. 
6 Ibid., 1477. 
7 Li to the Zongli Yamen, November 10, 1884, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1490. 
8 The Zongli Yamen’s letter to Parkes, November 22, 1884, in QJZRH, vol. 3, 1494. 
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Chen could barely enjoy the extension of his power before the breakout of a coup 
launched by some Korean activists of the Kaehwadang (the enlightenment party). On 
December 4, 1884, under the support of the Japanese minister Takezoe Shinichirō, these 
activists, such as Hong Yŏng-sik (1855–1884), Kim Ok-kyun (1851–1894), and Bak 
Yŏng-hyo (1861–1939), occupied the palace, killed several pro-Chinese officials, and 
announced a reform aiming to terminate Zongfan relations with China. The coup, known 
as Kapsin jŏngbyŏn, resulted from the increasing struggles among China, Japan, and 
Western powers, and from the Korean nationalism cultivated by Japanese. It occurred at 
the time when China was fighting with France in Vietnam. The coup lasted for only two 
days before the Chinese general Wu Zhaoyou (1829–?) and his assistant generals Zhang 
Guangqian and Yuan Shikai led Chinese troops to put the king and royal family members 
under their protection and to defeat the Kaehwadang and the Japanese soldiers. 9 
Although all foreign ministers in the city were deeply involved, the Chinese and the 
Korean attacks on the Japanese legation and citizens in Hansŏng and other places left the 
resolution of the turmoil to the hands of China and Japan. 
The nub of the Sino–Japanese conflict was still Chosŏn’s status. In January 1885, 
Mori Arinori in Tokyo suggested Itō Hirobumi consult with his debates with the Zongli 
Yamen in 1876, especially the Yamen’s statement on China’s responsibilities of solving 
Chosŏn’s crises.10 Tokyo soon sent Inoue Kaoru as the plenipotentiary to Chosŏn to talk 
with Chinese envoys, Wu Dacheng and Xuchang. Wu was not a plenipotentiary, so the 
negotiation was finally transferred to Tianjin between Li Hongzhang and Itō Hirobumi. 
On April 18, the two countries signed a convention, agreeing to retreat their troops from 
                                               
9 Kojong sidaesa, vol. 2, 675-582. 
10 Mori’s private letter to Itō, January 15, 1885, in Mori Arinori zenshū, vol. 1, 195. 
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Chosŏn within four months, to allow the king to hire officers from other countries except 
China and Japan to train the Korean forces, and to notify each other of their troops 
sending to Chosŏn in any disturbance with a grave nature.11 
Li thus believed that China should strengthen the power of its representative in 
Hansŏng to check Japan and other powers. The result was the significant expansion of the 
power of Chen’s successor, Yuan Shikai, a then 26-year-old officer who had been serving 
in Chosŏn for three years since 1882. On November 2, 1885, under Li’s strong 
recommendation, Beijing appointed Yuan as “Imperial Resident in Chosŏn in charge of 
Diplomatic and Commercial Intercourse” (Ch. Qinming zhuzha Chaoxian zongli jiaoshe 
tongshang shiyi), holding a third-level official rank and the title of backup candidate for 
Taotai.12  The English translation of Yuan’s title soon became a big issue in Hansŏng 
because it concerned his real authority and Chosŏn’s sovereignty. At first, the American 
chargé d’affaires, George Foulk, offered a translation of “Charge of Diplomatic and 
Commercial Intercourse,” but it was rejected by a young American-educated assistant of 
Yuan, who offered the word “Resident” and the translation “His Imperial Chinese 
Majesty’s Resident, Seoul.” A following three-party talk among Foulk, the British Consul 
E. C. Baber, and the Japanese chargé d’affaires Takahira Kogorō rendered no unanimous 
translation.13 Finally, Yuan decided to address himself as “H. I. C. M. Resident.” Later, 
his fellow diplomats in Hansŏng tacitly defined him as “a Consul-General with 
diplomatic functions.”14 Yuan was not a minister, but he held more powers than a 
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minister did.  For instance, he made a several-hour-long and face-to-face conversation 
with the king on September 30, 1886, when the Port Hamilton event was unsettled yet 
among Chosŏn, Russia, Britain, and China.15 
Together with the problem of his title emerged a ritual crisis for Yuan in terms of 
how he should perform ceremonies to the king. In his telegram to Li to solicit the latter’s 
advice in February 1886, Yuan mentioned that in past years, when Chinese officials paid 
visits to the king, they entered the palace gate in a sedan chair, made a bow to the king 
with hands folded in front (Ch. zuoyi) three times, and then sat down at the side of the 
king. Yet, in 1884, the Chinese imperial envoys, Wu Dacheng and Xuchang, General 
Ding Ruchang, and Taotai Ma Jianzhong, sat down opposite to the king by following the 
host–guest ceremony. Yuan also mentioned that ministers of other countries had to get out 
of their sedan chairs at the palace gate, and paid visits to the king according to the 
etiquette that officials outside the capital (Ch. waichen) performed to the king.16 Li 
suggested that it would be courteous for Yuan to follow the rituals for Chinese 
provincial-level officials (Ch. sidao) to visit first-degree princes (Ch. qinjunwang). 
The normal procedure for such a visit proceeded according to the following steps: 
first, Yuan should get out of the sedan chair at the gate of the palace; second, he should 
bow three times with his hands folded in front to the king, and third, he should sit down 
by king’s side. For grand ceremonies, Yuan should bow three times with his hands folded 
in front to the king, instead of bowing (Ch. jugong) three times as his predecessor had 
done, in order to show China was “neither haughty nor humble” and to harmonize with 
                                               
15 Li to the Zongli Yamen, October 1, 1886, in LHZQJ (2008), vol. 22, 116; QJZRH, vol. 4, 2145-2159. 
16 Yuan to Li, February 1, 1886, in LHZQJ (2008), vol. 21, 654. 
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other ministers. 17 The newly created rituals endowed Yuan with ritual privileges that the 
ministers of other treaty powers could not gain, which continuously reminded these 
ministers that the H. I. C. M. Resident had a higher position than them. By the same 
token, it was exactly the ritual unbalance engendered many problems in the following 
years between Yuan and these ministers.18 The nub of all of their conflicts concerned 
Chosŏn’s status as China’s shuguo, an issue as perplexing as before. 
PERCEIVING CHOSŎN’S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE 
ZONGFAN FRAMEWORK IN THE LATE 1880S 
In the late 1880s, Chosŏn’s sovereignty became a hot topic among Chosŏn, China, and 
Western countries. When Chosŏn signed treaties with the U.S., Britain, Germany, Italy, 
Russia, and France from 1882 to 1886, the king always sent a note to the sovereign of 
each of these countries to claim that “Corea is a tributary of China, but in regard to both 
internal administration and foreign intercourse it enjoys complete independence.” In face 
of international intrigues, Beijing began to exploit conventional sources of the Sino–
Korean Zongfan relations to prevent Chosŏn from being invaded or annexed by other 
countries. China’s motivation embodied the conventional Zongfan policy of “cherishing 
the small country” (Ch. zixiao), but the revivification of this policy was misunderstood by 
other powers as China’s aggressive move. 
China’s actions caused a backlash in Chosŏn when the latter stepped onto the 
world stage and transformed from China’s shuguo into an independent sovereign state. In 
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order to meet various diplomatic challenges, Chosŏn established new institutes and 
developed a pattern of dual diplomacy in the 1880s, just as what had happened in China 
in the 1860s. By this pattern, the royal court of Chosŏn maintained its Zongfan relations 
with China’s imperial court, on the one hand; and the newly founded institutes, 
predominantly the Foreign Office, were in charge of state contacts with other countries, 
on the other. The problem was that the agencies of China’s state diplomacy, in particular 
the Beiyang Superintendent and the H. I. C. M. Resident, tended to influence Chosŏn’s 
state diplomacy by exploiting China’s unique authority that originated in the 
court-to-court contacts. For the Western advisors appointed by China to Chosŏn, this 
Chinese approach was impairing Chosŏn’s independent sovereignty. Consequently, a 
centrifugal force from the Zongfan order emerged from Chosŏn that was presented by the 
establishment of the maritime customs in the country. 
As the first Western advisor to the Korean government on affairs of maritime 
customers under Li’s recommendation, Möllendorff arrived in Hansŏng in early 1883, 
where he also assumed vice-president of the newly founded Foreign Office. 19 Yet 
Möllendorff’s activities deviated from Li’s wishes, when he became eager to develop 
Chosŏn’s military force to counterbalance the weakness of the country. In 1884, 
Möllendorff asked Li to send officers to train Chosŏn’s army and, after this request 
produced no response, he persuaded Chosŏn to negotiate a convention with Russia, 
whereby Russian officers would train Chosŏn’s army in exchange for the use of Chosŏn’s 
Port Lazarev, an ice-free port near the eastern treaty port of Wŏnsan. Under Li’s pressure, 
the king soon dismissed Möllendorff from duty in November 1885.20 
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In terms of such advisor positions to in Chosŏn, Li did not recommend Chinese 
officials because the Chinese Maritime Customs, to which the Korean Maritime Customs 
was subject, was managed by the foreign staff headed by the British citizen, Robert Hart, 
the Inspector General of Chinese Maritime Customs. Li wanted to exploit the traditional 
Chinese tactic of “using barbarian to resist one another” (Ch. yiyi zhiyi), too. Under 
Hart’s recommendation, Henry F. Merrill, an American national, replaced Möllendorff as 
chief commissioner of the Korean Maritime Customs, and Owen Nickerson Denny, a 
former American consul in Tianjin, assumed Möllendorff’s another post as vice-president 
of the Foreign Office. However, Denny soon proved to be more aggressive than 
Möllendorff. In February 1888, Denny published an emotional booklet, China and Korea, 
asserting that Korea was a totally independent state with independent sovereignty and 
China was destroying Korea “by absorbing the country.”21 In June 1888, Li secretly sent 
Möllendorff back to Hansŏng to “checkmate Denny who is urging the King to assert 
independence.”22  
Denny’s action was corroborated with other Western diplomats in Chosŏn who 
desperately hoped to grasp the nature of the Sino–Korean relationship. In summer 1887, 
an intense dispute occurred between Chosŏn’s Foreign Office and the American legation 
over the rumor that the American chargé d’affaires ad interim, Lieutenant George C. 
Foulk, tried to persuade the king to be independent from China. Yuan, Li, Foulk, the 
American chargé d’affaires William W. Rockhill, and the American minister at Hansŏng 
Hugh A. Dinsmore were deeply involved.23 Very quickly, in October 1887, another fierce 
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dispute took place between Yuan and the Korean government, when the latter decided to 
send representatives to the U.S. and other treaty nations.24 This dispute was caused by, 
and centered on, certain rituals, but it fully exposed to the world that the issue of 
Chosŏn’s independent sovereignty and its international status evolved into an inner clash 
within the Sino–Korean framework. Denny’s pamphlet was precisely published and 
circulated at that moment. Against the new historical background, all these episodes led 
to the deterioration of the Sino–Korean relationship. 
In the late 1880s, many treaty powers believed that Chosŏn was shifting out of the 
China-centric system by adopting Western political and diplomatic terms. In this milieu, 
China’s state-to-state contacts with Chosŏn became a catalyst for the centrifugal force of 
the country. This could explain why Yuan could not positively engage in Chosŏn’s affairs 
and was de facto marginalized by the Chosŏn government and foreign ministers in 
Hansŏng, as we will show in the following pages. Accordingly, the relationship between 
Yuan and the Chosŏn court and that between Beijing and Hansŏng became increasingly 
unpleasant and even hostile. As Dinsmore put in 1887, “The Koreans do not impress me 
as having any affection or strong attachment for the Chinese. On the contrary there is 
among the common people a well-defined dislike for them, but they fear them and it is 
under the influence of this fear that they are gradually yielding to Chinese supremacy.”25 
These perplexing episodes encouraged some Western diplomats to study the 
history of Sino–Korean relations with the aim of revealing the legitimacy of China’s 
authority in Chosŏn. Interestingly, the Samjŏndo Monument that was erected in 1639 
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appealed to them. After he saw the monument in 1884, George Foulk claimed that “a 
thorough examination may develop information on the status of Corea with regard to 
China of more directly practical use.”26 In 1887, William Rockhill obtained a copy of 
Foulk’s rubbing of the Chinese inscription of the monument and made a translation in his 
article, “Korea in Its Relations with China,” published in 1889. Rockhill tried to explore 
the “nature of Korea’s relations with China” and answer “a puzzle for Western nations” of 
whether Korea was “an integral part of the Chinese empire” or “a sovereign state 
enjoying absolute international rights.” After examining Sino–Korean relations since 
1392, Rockhill critically pointed out that the conclusion of Chosŏn’s treaties with Japan 
and the U.S. “has not materially altered the nature of the relations existing for the last 
four centuries at least between China and its so-called vassal.”27  This conclusion 
seriously challenged the popular perception among Japan and Western nations that 
Chosŏn was independent from China. The puzzle, therefore, remained unsolved. 
6.2 Between “Supervision and Protection” and “Provincialization”: China’s 
Translucent Power over Chosŏn in the Late 1880s 
China fully realized the complexity of the situation in Chosŏn, especially after it lost 
Burma to Britain in the 1850s, Ryukyu to Japan in the late 1870s, Vietnam to France in 
the early 1880s. In the late 1880s, Beijing stood at the historical crossing of whether it 
should “supervise and protect” or “provincialize” Chosŏn. The option of supervising and 
protecting the country meant to send high-ranking officials to supervise its affairs, while 
provincializing it meant to convert it into several prefectures and counties (Ch. junxian) 
of China, integrating it as one of China’s inner provinces. Both options could find 
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precedents in the Han and the Yuan dynasties in history. In the turbulent 1880s, when 
Beijing reconsidered its border policy in northwestern China by converting Xinjiang into 
a province, the issues on the China’s northeastern frontier posed a huge challenge to 
Beijing too. Although the option of “supervising and protecting” Chosŏn would be more 
moderate than that of “provincializing” it, viewed from the modern perspective they both 
presented a colonial approach that was not different from Japan’s territory annexation of 
the country in 1910. Yet it was on this point that China faced serious challenges from 
within, which determined its final choice. 
Although Qing China always regarded Chosŏn as an “inner subordinate,” it never 
tried to directly control the country or incorporate it into China’s territory. The long-lived 
Chinese appraisal that Chosŏn was “like prefectures and counties” (Ch. youru junxian) 
merely presented the superiority of Chinese culture and Sinocentrism, rather than a real 
political approach to annexing it. For centuries, China, Chosŏn, and other China’s outer 
fan shared the same worldview of “all-under-Heaven,” according to which all their lands 
belonged to the Son of Heaven, thus making the annexation of outer fan out of China’s 
mind. That was why Emperor Yongzheng generously gave some border lands to Annam 
in 1727, an action that would not be understood or tolerated by Chinese in the 
nation-state framework. Within the Zongfan system, it was a bottom line for China not to 
annex its outer fan, a rule at least was drawn by the first emperor of the Ming in the 
mid-fourteenth century.28 This principle, however, encountered grave challenges from 
the Chinese officials in the 1880s, when they found China in a huge quagmire between 
“supervising and protecting” Chosŏn and “provincializing” Chosŏn. 
In November 1880, the Chinese minister to Japan, He Ruzhang, in his report to 
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the Zongli Yamen, “The proposal for management of Chosŏn’s diplomacy” (Ch. Zhuchi 
Chaoxian waijiao yi), argued that it could be the best policy for China to send an imperial 
commissioner to Chosŏn to manage its domestic and foreign affairs by following the 
cases of Mongolia and Tibet.29 This proposal was almost the same as that of the late 
Ming official Xu Guangqi in 1619.30 Realizing that it was impossible to do so at the time, 
He argued that Chosŏn should sign treaties with other countries under China’s 
supervision in order to pursue balance of power. In August 1882, in the wake of Chosŏn’s 
mutiny and Japan’s provocative response, the Chinese minister to Japan, Li Shuchang, 
passionately suggested to the Yamen that China should “abolish the king and convert the 
country into prefectures and counties of China” (Ch. fei qi wang er junxian zhi) by 
imitating the relationship between Britain and India in order to fundamentally resolve all 
thorny issues regarding Chosŏn.31 Li Shuchang was fully aware that such action would 
challenge China’s moral standard, but he regarded it as the most suitable policy for China 
to take. This was the first time that Chinese officials clearly argued that China should 
provincialize Chosŏn in the late nineteenth century, but this idea was strictly confined to 
a small group of the highest Chinese policy-makers. 
In September 1882, Zhang Jian (1853–1926), an assistant to General Wu in 
Hansŏng, in a treatise called “Six strategies for managing the consequences of Chosŏn’s 
mutiny” (Ch. Chaoxian shanhou liuce), called for China to provincialize Chosŏn.32 This 
treatise widely spread in Beijing in an informal way and encouraged some officials of the 
so-called “Pure Stream” (Ch. Qingliu) group to pursue a solution to the Chosŏn problem. 
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In October 1882, Zhang Peilun (1848–1903), a pillar of the “Pure Stream,” in a memorial 
expressing his opinions about Chosŏn, fervently suggested Beijing dispatch a commercial 
commissioner to manage Chosŏn’s foreign and domestic affairs. For Zhang’s proposal, Li 
emphasized that it was difficult to realize because otherwise China would be drawn into a 
quagmire and could not efficiently manage the country. On the other hand, Li noted that 
if Beijing decided to take Zhang’s proposal, he would recommend He Ruzhang for the 
position. 33 
At the same time, Li received a note from the king, inviting Chinese specialists on 
foreign affairs to be assistants to the country. Li saw this invitation as the best opportunity 
for China to pursue a good opportunity to steer a middle course between the options of 
“supervising and protecting” and “provincializing” Chosŏn. According to Li, these 
specialists would be under the king’s command, rather than equal to the king or even 
replace the king, which would maintain Chosŏn’s right of zizhu and underline its status as 
China’s shuguo. Beijing promptly endorsed Li’s proposal and commissioned him to select 
the specialists. These specialists turned out to be Ma Jianchang and Möllendorff, who 
arrived in Hansŏng in early 1883, followed by the commercial commissioner Chen 
Shutang, triggering the political struggles that have been discussed in the previous pages. 
It was also in this historical background that Yuan Shikai was appointed as imperial 
resident in Chosŏn. All these measures seemingly aimed to “supervise and protect” 
Chosŏn, but they were a far cry from this approach. 
In summer 1890, when he heard the rumor that Russia would invade Chosŏn, 
Kang Youwei (1858–1927) drafted a treatise entitled “Strategies for protecting Chosŏn” 
(Ch. Bao Chaoxian ce), proposing the “middle, upper, and lower strategies.” According 
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to his middle strategy, China should “incorporate Chosŏn into Chinese inner land and 
manage its administration” (Ch. shouwei neidi er zhi qizheng). Kang argued that when 
China sent troops to Chosŏn in 1882, it should reside officials and officers in the country 
to manage politics, select talented persons, control taxes, train soldiers, and convert it into 
China’s inner land. If China could not take the middle strategy, it should follow the upper 
strategy by converting Chosŏn into an international protectorate like Belgium. By 
contrast, the lower strategy was to maintain its “nominal title as China’s fan and shuguo” 
(Ch. fanshu zhi xuming) inward and allow it to “freely conduct foreign affairs under zizhu” 
(Ch. tongshang zhi zizhu) outward, which amounted to “no policy per se.” 34 
Undoubtedly, Kang was castigating China’s on-going policy for being incapable in 
solving the problems on the peninsula. Eight years later, in 1898, Kang would serve as a 
mentor for Emperor Guangxu to launch a dramatic reform movement after China’s 
humiliating fiasco in the war with Japan that broke out right in Chosŏn. 
From He Ruzhang in 1880 to Li Shuchang, Zhang Jian, and Zhang Peilun in 1882, 
then to Kang Youwei in 1890, Beijing had been on the horns of a dilemma caused by the 
zealous proposals of “supervising and protecting” Chosŏn and “provincializing” Chosŏn. 
Compared with China’s comparatively low-key approach to maintaining its relations with 
the outer fan principally through exchanges of emissaries before the 1880s, the provoking 
strategies proposed by the ardent officials and intellectuals after the 1880s made China’s 
policy look more aggressive. However, annexing Chosŏn was never on the Qing’s 
political agenda from 1637, or even from 1627. Meanwhile, these leading proponents of 
the proposals at the time built their understanding of the Qing–Chosŏn relations on the 
entire lineage of China’s Zongfan relations with Korea and other countries in history. In 
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other words, they brought the point of departure of China’s contemporary policy toward 
Chosŏn back to the early Qing and even earlier times of Chinese history for soliciting the 
legitimacy of the policy. Therefore, Qing China must take its responsibilities for assisting 
Chosŏn with solving crises, as its predecessors, like Ming China, had done in the 1590s. 
In this sense, China’s policy in Chosŏn after the 1880s was no more than a resurgence of 
its intrinsic power as the patriarch of the Zongfan family over its outer fan. 
The Chinese activities, of course, had new contents and manifestations, such as 
signing treaties to regulate bilateral commercial activities, opening treaty ports to each 
other, residing the Chinese resident in Hansŏng, and allowing a Korean representative to 
reside in Tianjin. In addition, some Korean intellectuals had begun to pursue an 
independent national status since the early 1880s, encouraging Chosŏn to re-envision its 
position on the world stage and strengthened its intention to break free from the 
conventional Zongfan framework. As a result, Chosŏn cautiously maintained its 
court-to-court communications with China as before, on the one hand, and it started to 
keep its state diplomacy distant from China and began bargaining with China on some 
issues, on the other. In 1890, such bargain shocked Beijing as it violently shook the 
fundamentals of the Zongfan arrangement. 
6.3 The Grand Performance of the Zongfan Relationship: China’s Last Imperial 
Mission to Chosŏn in 1890 
RITUALS, POWERS, AND YUAN’S ISOLATIONISM IN CHOSŎN 
On June 4, 1890, Queen Dowager Cho of Chosŏn passed away. Yuan immediately 
reported the news by telegram to Li Hongzhang, who forwarded it to the Zongli Yamen 
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for instructions. 35  The event would not constitute a grave matter for other countries, 
but it was indeed for China, because it entailed a series of contacts and ritual practices 
between Hansŏng and Beijing to be carried out in accordance with Zongfan tenets. Since 
the ritual etiquette was managed by the Ministry of Rituals, Yuan did not know what he 
should do in Hansŏng, in addition to responding with a note to the Foreign Office to 
express his condolences.36 As a Han Chinese official, Yuan was fully aware that the 
ritual matters regarding the royal house were under management of the Manchu court in 
Beijing, which was also beyond the influence of his political backer, Li. Since the first 
Western ministers arrived in Hansŏng in 1883, China had not dispatched envoys to 
Chosŏn for tributary affairs, leaving Yuan a situation without recent precedents to consult. 
While he was waiting for instructions from China, Yuan made it very clear to his 
diplomatic colleagues in Hansŏng that China would have different response to the event. 
When Augustine Heard, the American Minister Resident and Consul-General, invited 
Yuan to his legation on June 5 to discuss with ministers of other countries over the 
appropriate expression of their joint condolences to the court,37 Yuan declined and 
explained that “China and Chosŏn have longtime established regulations on rituals of 
exchanges that are different from other countries. I have to abide by the rules and cannot 
attend the meeting.”38 Yuan was actually in a predicament: if he attended the joint 
meeting, it would not highlight China’s superior position in the shuguo; if he did not 
show up, the United States and other countries might form an alliance on this matter and 
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develop closer relations with the court of Chosŏn through this opportunity, which would 
arguably undermine China’s superiority.  
From the early 1880s, when various intrigues and rivalries began to occupy the 
peninsula, the court-to-court communications of rituals and emissary exchanges seemed 
to be significantly dwarfed by the state-to-state contacts regarding political intrigues, but 
nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, the court diplomacy was still playing a 
key role in regulating their bilateral relations. The dual diplomatic systems and multiple 
channels of communications at the time (Figure 6. 1) suggested that although the 
legitimacy and the power of the imperial resident were entirely dependent on China’s 
superiority within the Zongfan kinship, the imperial resident was not a part of China’s 
court diplomacy. Neither was the Beiyang Superintendency. 
Figure 6. 1. The Network of Sino–Korean Official Communications after the 
1880s 
 
 
Notes: This table is based on the author’s own research. 
 
Yuan realized that his dilemma was between “personal” or “individual” and 
“public” ritual practices at the particular moment. In a report to Li, in which he identified 
Chosŏn as “a friendly nation” (Ch. youbang) of other treaty powers, Yuan said that 
according to the common diplomatic etiquette, the ministers of other countries would 
express condolences to the Korean government when Chosŏn had “a national funeral” 
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(Ch. guosang), but they would not send special representatives for the purpose. Yet 
Chosŏn was China’s shuguo and had always received China’s special favors, so when it 
had “a grand mourning” (Ch. dasang), China should send an imperial mission in 
accordance with the established “system” (Ch. tizhi). In terms of himself, Yuan proposed 
to show his condolences based on “personal friendship” (Ch. siqing), rather than the 
“national public condolences” (Ch. guojia gongdiao) of China. In the post-1637 era, Yuan 
was the first Han Chinese official on Chosŏn’s territory who struggled to maintain 
China’s superiority through appropriate rituals. Finally, he proposed a new ritual 
procedure for himself: 
 
The ceremony of western diplomats to express their condolences is to visit and 
bow to the king, or visit regent official and shake hands with him to show 
sympathy. In China’s shubang, Chinese officials should set up a memorial table to 
show their condolences based on friendship among colleagues (Ch. liaoyin 
jiaoqing), which is different from case to case… After the five days during which 
Chosŏn puts the body of dowager into the coffin and the Korean people wear 
appropriate mourning apparel, I will make an appointment with the court to show 
my condolences based on personal friendship, bringing condolence banner, 
sacrificial pigs and sheep, and other things... This will also illuminate China’s 
difference from other countries.39 
 
Li endorsed this proposal as he saw it as a decent way to solve the ritual problem.40 Yet 
their efforts to undergird China’s superiority through unique ritual practices only led 
China to diverge from international rules. For instance, in early June, when other 
countries flied the flag at half-mast for three days to express condolences, Yuan and Li 
instructed Chinese warships and institutes in Chosŏn’s treaty ports to do so for only two 
days.41 As a result, what they really reaped was China’s isolation from other countries. 
Yuan’s activities would provide more evidence for this point. On June 5, Yuan 
                                               
39 Yuan to Li, June 6, 1890, in QSCJ. 
40 Li to the Zongli Yamen, June 13, 1890, in QJZRH, vol. 5, 2785. 
41 Li to Yuan, and Yuan to Chinese commercial commissioners in Chosŏn, June 6, 1890, in QSCJ. 
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notified the Foreign Office that he would like to visit the funeral hall in the inner palace 
to express his condolences during the five days for which the Korean wore their 
mourning clothes. President of the Office, Min Chong-muk (1835–1916), declined the 
offer because only royal family members could do so.42 Two months later, Yuan received 
another rejection from the Korean government on this matter. On September 29, Heard 
wanted to discuss the rituals that foreign ministers should perform when Chosŏn held the 
funeral procession with Yuan. Heard had consulted the issue with Min Chong-muk and 
learned that it would be inappropriate for the Korean side to invite ministers to attend the 
procession, but Min suggested that the government would provide a place near the East 
Gate of the city for the ministers to perform ceremonies when the hearse passed through 
the gate.43 Heard preferred Min’s offer, but Yuan did not; rather, he emphasized the point 
to Heard again: other countries could freely do what they preferred, but China had 
established ritual rules with Chosŏn, so he could not join them. 44  Again, Yuan 
automatically isolated himself from the Corps Diplomatique; again, he created new 
rituals for himself. 
As an alternative only to the ceremony he would perform, on October 4, Yuan 
notified the Home Office and the Foreign Office that when the funeral procession was 
held, he would accompany the funeral team from the palace gate to the suburbs and hold 
the cord guiding the hearse.45 This proposal was based on traditional Chinese funeral 
customs and was intended to show his sincere respect for the late person. The Home 
Office, however, simply suggested Yuan go directly to the East Gate where the foreign 
                                               
42 Min to Yuan, June 10, 1890, in QSCJ. 
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ministers would convene, and when the hearse passed through the gate, the procession 
would stop for a moment, during which Yuan could perform a farewell ceremony.46 The 
office seemed to suggest that the Chinese imperial resident was not different from other 
ministers. This response disappointed Yuan, so he decided to take his own way to prepare 
incense and sacrificial paper, choose a broad and convenient street by himself to set up 
the incense burner table, and hold a memorial ceremony for the late dowager at the side 
of the road on the procession day.47 The Korean officials stopped arguing with him, 
acquiescing to his plan to bid farewell on the street.48 In this way, Yuan isolated himself 
from the Korean government, as well. 
Meanwhile, another occurrence worried Yuan when he learned on October 11 that 
seven American officers had led 50 armed marines on a march from Inchon toward 
Hansŏng. Yuan immediately asked Heard, who replied that the U.S., as a friend of 
Chosŏn, had sent naval troops to accompany the funeral procession “as a mark of respect 
and sympathy.”49 Yuan did not believe, but Heard stopped arguing with him.50 Yuan also 
learned that the Korean government had summoned three companies of soldiers from 
Pyŏng’an province to Hansŏng.51 The situation seemingly became serious overnight and 
the funeral procession would trigger a Sino–American conflict. 
Yuan was cautious because it was the second time that Heard summoned troops to 
Hansŏng. The first time occurred right after the death of the dowager, when a “gentleman 
of the family of the Queen” visited Heard on behalf of the king and asked him to send 
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American forces to the palace at once to provide protection. Heard hesitated, but 
considering the potential possibility for disturbance and the jeopardy it might place on the 
American citizens in Hansŏng, Heard eventually decided to order soldiers from the USS 
Swatara that had arrived in Inchon to march into Hansŏng. Heard emphasized that the 
mission of the troops was to protect the American legation, but the king “would benefit 
by the moral effect which their presence would produce.”52 When the marines arrived in 
the legation next day, Heard deployed them around the legation and informed the king of 
their arrival. The king instantly sent an official to the legation to show his thanks, 
followed by another visit by a Korean general of the Royal Forces with a larger retinue. 
The king offered to pay the expenses of the expedition, but Heard declined by clarifying 
that the troops were to protect the legation, rather than the Korean palace. 
The arrival of the American forces touched a nerve in Beijing. On June 10, the 
Zongli Yamen asked Li to instruct Yuan to secretly investigate the situation. Beijing was 
particularly interested in knowing whether Chosŏn would rent Port Hamilton to the U.S. 
as a coaling station.53 The port in southern Chosŏn was occupied by Britain in April 
1885 during the Britain–Russian rivalry, triggering intensive disputes among Britain, 
Russia, Chosŏn, China, and Japan. Under China’s intervention, the British fleet had 
finally withdrawn in February 1887 on the grounds that in the future no powers would 
occupy any territory of Chosŏn. Yet the presence of American forces in Hansŏng caused a 
rumor to circulate that Chosŏn would rent the port to the U.S. in exchange for its 
protection. The Zongli Yamen also instructed the Chinese counselor to the U.S. to 
investigate the American motivation, who confirmed that Washington was not interested 
                                               
52 Heard to Blaine, No. 13, Seoul, Corea, June 7, 1890, KARD II, 124-126. 
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in renting the port.54 Four days later, the American troops returned to Inchon, bringing an 
end to these rumor-driven disturbances. 
Under the circumstances, the reappearance of the American troops in Hansŏng on 
October 11 made Yuan suspicious again. He quickly changed his original plan and went 
to the East Gate to monitor the Americans on October 12, when the funeral procession 
was held. Heard and the American soldiers stood in line on the side of the road within the 
East Gate, next to Yuan’s Chinese incense burner table. The king, the queen, and the 
crown prince were absent from the procession. The hearse did not stop when it passed 
Yuan, but Yuan still bowed three times with his hands folded in front. After the 
procession, Yuan still concerned the American troops in the city, but he did not get any 
extra information. His doubt attracted Beijing’s notice again. The Zongli Yamen 
instructed the Chinese minister to the U.S., Cui Guoyin, to discuss this matter with the 
Department of State, but received the same response that the soldiers were there for the 
funeral ceremony. 55  On October 15, the soldiers returned to Inchon, defusing the 
diplomatic tension and allaying Yuan’s suspicions.56 
Yuan might believe that he could manipulate Chosŏn’s situation and check his 
opponents, just as scholars have tended to characterize him as an arrogant, overbearing, 
peremptory, and even rude person, who acted as a “Chinese proconsul” and aggressively 
dominated the Chosŏn government for a decade that almost ruined the country.57 Yet 
when the moment requesting him to present the origins of his power came after the death 
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of the dowager, the impossibility for him to surmount his post of the imperial resident to 
represent the Manchu court thoroughly exposed itself. Consequently, when other 
ministers offered their condolences on their governments’ behalf to the royal family of 
Chosŏn, Yuan chose to steer a middle course between the state-to-state and the 
court-to-court systems by creating some new rituals, during which he had to cautiously 
maintain the dividing line by not presenting himself as a minister. As a result, Yuan found 
himself stuck in a quite passive situation. So did the Beijing government. 
THE KOREAN–CHINESE BARGAIN ON THE IMPERIAL MISSION 
When Yuan busied himself with tackling his ritual crises, the court of Chosŏn was 
negotiating some Zongfan ritual matters with Beijing. Chosŏn contacted China through 
the Zongfan routine right after the death of the dowager. On June 5, the king instructed 
Prefect of Ŭiju to inform Garrison Major of the Manchu Bannerman (Ch. Cheng shouwei) 
at the Fenghuang City with the news, and appointed Hong Chong-yŏng as envoy and Cho 
Pyŏng-sŏng as attendant secretary of a mission to Beijing. Two weeks later, through Li 
and Yuan, the king asked Beijing not to send an imperial mission to Chosŏn; rather, he 
asked Beijing to allow the Korean emissaries to bring back the imperial condolence 
messages. The king explained that if China sent a mission, America, Britain, Germany, 
France, and Japan would send theirs too, creating a situation that Chosŏn could not 
afford.58 
The king’s petition could have been approved by Beijing because it was a part of 
the Zongfan practices, known as “handing over for convenience” (Ch. shunfu). Li was not 
sure if this rule had ever been applied to the imperial condolence mission, so he 
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instructed Yuan to secretly examine if any precedents existed in history. Li also warned 
Yuan not to be rash because he thought that Hansŏng was forcing Beijing to do its 
bidding, although the petition used a beseeching tone.59 Yuan carefully examined all 
Qing China’s imperial missions of condolence to Chosŏn upon queen dowagers’ deaths 
since the Qianlong period. Enumerating six cases in 1757, 1805, 1821, 1844, 1858, and 
1878, Yuan concluded that in the case of investiture (Ch. cefeng) and conferring noble 
rank on the late king or royal members (Ch. fengshi), Beijing always dispatched imperial 
envoys and never used “handing over for convenience.” 
Moreover, Yuan asserted that Queen Min was dominating the king through her 
fears that the Zongfan ceremonies performed to the Chinese envoys in front of 
Westerners would damage Chosŏn’s image as a country of zizhu.60 Similarly, Yuan had 
reported to Li that Owen Denny was also inciting the king to urge Beijing not to send an 
imperial mission because the Zongfan rituals would damage Chosŏn’s “national polity” 
(Ch. guoti).61 When the king discussed the issue with Yuan, Yuan firmly responded that 
the procedure should be conducted in conformity with Zongfan precedents.62 In many 
senses, it seemed that the king’s request aimed to blur the Zongfan arrangement, so his 
request evolved into a matter about China’s superiority at its shuguo. On the other hand, 
other foreign ministers believed that nothing would prevent Beijing from sending 
imperial emissaries, as it would be a golden opportunity to strengthen China’s control 
over the country. Yet, according to the Zongfan principles, had any precedent like what 
the king requested ever occurred in history, Beijing would have not sent a mission. 
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However, such precedent did not exist. This proved that the imperial mission to Chosŏn 
in 1890 was only a routine mission in the Zongfan world, rather than a political 
conspiracy as people have widely understood. 
The main negotiations soon happened in Beijing between the Korean emissaries 
and the Ministry of Rituals. On September 21, the Chosŏn mission headed by Hong and 
Cho arrived in Beijing after trudging about 930 miles over 74 days via the overland 
tributary route. Next day, Hong and Cho presented the king’s memorial to the emperor 
through the Ministry of Rituals, in which the king stated, 
 
Your servant, Yi Hŭi, King of Chosŏn, respectfully reports the demise of his 
Mother Queen Chao on the seventeenth day of the fourth moon of the sixteenth 
year of Guangxu. 
 
He now kneels before Your Majesty in great perturbation and awe. Your servant 
considers his small country indeed most unfortunate by reason of this calamity, at 
which he feels very sad at heart. As mourning has now befallen your servant, he 
respectfully reports the fact to Your Majesty. He, moreover, has no alternative but 
to ask that Your Majesty be considerate to him. Your servant is now extremely 
restless. He respectfully submits this report for Your Majesty’s information. 
 
This report is submitted by the King of Chosŏn, Yi Hŭi, on the twenty-fourth day 
of the fifth moon of the sixteenth year of Guangxu.63 
 
In the memorial, the king strictly followed the textual format, such as using China’s 
reign-title to calculate the date and addressing himself as “subordinate” and Chosŏn as 
“small country.” These formalities displayed perfect conformity with the Zongfan tenets, 
precisely like those manifested in the memorials to Emperor Qianlong in 1790. Now in 
1890, the king, who had been treated by Western treaty powers as a sovereign, was still a 
subordinate of the Son of Heaven of China. The royal court in Hansŏng and the Manchu 
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court in Beijing were still bound together by the Zongfan mechanism as before. As a 
response, Beijing immediately started to select the Manchu imperial envoys to Hansŏng 
to confer a notable rank upon the late queen dowager. 
In a note to the Ministry of Rituals, Hong emphasized that Chosŏn was facing a 
difficult situation resulting from political troubles, famine, and financial crisis. Finally, he 
expressed that he would like to convey the imperial message of condolence back to 
Chosŏn, so that Beijing did not need to send commissioners there.64 Unsurprisingly, 
neither the ministry nor the emperor granted Hong’s request. On October 8, the Grand 
Council forwarded a long imperial decree to Hong, which articulated that, 
 
The despatch of Commissioners to Chosŏn to offer condolence, when such an 
occasion as this demands, is prescribed for in our Records of Usage and should 
always be carried out. It is to show that the Heavenly Dynasty cherish sympathy 
for its shuguo and fan (Ch. shufan) on such occasions, and has a special 
significance as exhibiting the nature of our relations (Ch. tizhi youguan). For this 
reason how can a modification of our usage in the despatch of Commissioners be 
made with consistency? 
 
Bearing, however, the fact in mind, that Chosŏn during recent years has had to 
meet heavy financial engagements which have reduced her to financial 
embarrassment, we are obliged to depart from some of the old established 
practices in the sending of a Mission of Condolence. This we do to show that we 
cherish extraordinary compassion for Chosŏn. Hitherto our Missions to Chosŏn 
have travelled overland by way of the Eastern frontier. After entering Chosŏn, the 
Mission had to pass more than ten stations before reaching Seoul, which involved 
trouble and expense. Our Mission to Chosŏn this time should adopt a different 
route. It should proceed from Tianjin to Inchon by war vessels of the Northern 
Squadron. When it has discharged its duties in Chosŏn, it shall return to Beijing 
by the same way. By this route, which is temporarily sanctioned in this instance, 
the distance between Beijing and Seoul is shortened, and therefore the share of the 
expenses of the Mission falling on Chosŏn is not much. She is thus saved much of 
the trouble and expense which she was put to in former years by the Missions 
travelling overland. 
 
When our Mission shall have reached Chosŏn, such ceremonies as should be 
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observed on the part of Chosŏn shall be carried out―if, in doing so, it does not 
incur great expense―in accordance with established usage, and these should not 
in the least be curtailed. For the Emperor’s ever increasing graciousness and 
regard for the welfare of our loyal fan (Ch. suifan) by using virtue, the King of 
Chosŏn should feel doubly grateful. Let this decree be sent to the Ministry of 
Rituals and the Beiyang Superintendent, and let it be communicated by the 
Ministry of Rituals to the King of Chosŏn.65 
 
Since the issue concerned the “system,” Beijing demonstrated its reluctance to make 
rudimentary changes, but it showed flexibility by instructing the imperial mission to visit 
Chosŏn by the maritime route, which had never happened after 1637. On October 15, the 
emperor appointed Xuchang (1838–1892) and Chongli (1834–1907), two high-ranking 
ethnic Manchu officials of the Ministry of Revenue, as envoy and associate envoy of the 
mission of condolence to Chosŏn.66 
Following Hong’s request, on October 18, Chosŏn’s commercial resident in 
Tianjin, Kim Sang-tŏk, presented another petition to Li Hongzhang, asking the imperial 
mission to land in Masanpu, instead of Inchon. Kim said that although Inchon was 25 
miles away from Hansŏng, the road between them was new and the station on this road 
was not good enough. By contrast, Masanpu, another port around 30 miles away from 
Hansŏng, where the Chinese army had landed in 1882, had better conditions. Kim also 
noted that it would be inconvenient for Chosŏn to perform welcoming ceremonies in 
Inchon because it was now a treaty port.67 Li forwarded the petition via the Zongli 
Yamen to Xuchang and Chongli for a decision. Xuchang and Chongli, being confused by 
Kim, replied that Masanpu seemed to be more than 60 miles away from Hansŏng. Li 
immediately instructed Yuan to make the point clear.68 
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As a military officer, Yuan was very familiar with these positions. He quickly 
replied that Inchon was 25 miles and Masanpu was 50 miles away from Hansŏng. The 
road between Inchon and Hansŏng was flat and had electric power, while that between 
Masanpu and Hansŏng was far and narrow. Yuan concluded that the king’s petition 
through Kim resulted from his reluctance to perform ceremonies in Inchon, where 
Japanese and Western foreigners lived in their settlements, because the king worried that 
the humble ceremonies performed to the imperial mission would cause Chosŏn to lose 
face (Ch. timian).69 Li confirmed that the imperial mission should land in Inchon as 
scheduled, which was further endorsed by the Zongli Yamen and the Ministry of 
Rituals.70  Chosŏn’s second petition was thus rejected by Beijing, as well. 
In addition, the dispute between the two countries over Chosŏn’s envoys to the 
U.S. and other countries at that time might have also prompted Beijing to maintain the 
established Zongfan mechanism. Under these circumstances, the king’s request was 
tantamount to a challenge to China’s patriarchal authority embodied in Zongfan rituals. 
As a result, the king and all foreign ministers were nervously waiting for the arrival of the 
Chinese imperial commissioners. It would be the first time for these ministers to watch in 
person the “Oriental” Zongfan rituals performed by the monarch of Chosŏn after the 
country opened its door and joined the family of nations in 1882. 
THE GRAND PERFORMANCE: THE QING IMPERIAL MISSION TO CHOSŎN 
AND THE RITUAL PRACTICE IN HANSŎNG 
The imperial mission was soon organized in Beijing according to prescribed regulations. 
On October 15, Emperor Guangxu appointed Xuchang and Chongli as envoys of the 
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mission from the 39 Manchu candidates recommended by the Ministry of Rituals.71 The 
ministry also presented a memorial enumerating the items for the mission to bring to 
Chosŏn (Table 2. 8). The emperor instructed that all members of the mission must not 
receive any gifts from Chosŏn, aiming to avoid letting other countries gain a negative 
impression that China’s imperial commissioners were corrupt. 
Given the situation in Chosŏn, the envoys wanted to get some new information 
from Yuan via Li.72 Yuan reported that the king was still hesitating about whether he 
should go out of Hansŏng to welcome the envoys and perform ceremonies in person in 
the suburbs. According to Yuan, Owen Denny was urging the king to receive the envoys 
in the palace, instead of outside the city. Xuchang and Chongli emphasized that all 
ceremonies must be performed, as recorded in ritual codes, and they would not meet with 
Westerners in Hansŏng.73 On October 28, the two envoys picked up imperial items from 
the Ministry of Rituals and started their journey, with two low-ranking interpreters and 
several servants. Two days later, they arrived in Tianjin, the headquarters of the Northern 
Squadron headed by the Beiyang Superintendent, Li Hongzhang, who had summoned 
three warships—Jiyuan, Laiyuan, and Jingyuan—to Tianjin for the mission. Li sent 
Jiyuan to send a note to Chosŏn first, in which the envoys emphasized that when they 
arrived in Chosŏn, “such ceremonies as should be observed are to be strictly carried out 
according to old regulations and must not, in the least, be curtailed. Presents from the 
King to us or to our interpreters in money or articles, are not to be accepted, so that it 
may be understood that His Majesty is considerate to his shuguo and fan (Ch. shufan).”74 
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Chosŏn, on the other hand, was busy preparing to welcome the mission by virtue 
of ritual codes and precedents.75 On October 29, the king appointed as Receiver of the 
Imperial Mission Sim I-t’aek, president of the Home Office and judge of Hansŏng; as 
Accommodation Attendant to the Mission Yi Sŭng-wo, president of the Ministry of 
Rituals (Yi suddenly died and his position was replaced by president of the Ministry of 
Punishment Nam Chŏng-ch’ŏl); as Director-General of Reception Min Yŏng-sang, a 
vice-president of the Home Office and president of the Ministry of Revenue; as 
Welcoming Attendant Sŏng Ki-wun, a grand chamberlain and Superintendent of Trade of 
the Inchon District; and as Leader of Ceremonies Yi Sŏk-chong, sub-prefect of Sagnyŏng 
district. More than 100 officials were sent to Inchon to welcome the mission.76 Nam and 
Sŏng had served as Commercial Commissioners in Tianjin (K. sangmu wiwŏn), who 
arrived in Tianjin in 1884,77 where they were Chosŏn’s diplomats, rather than tributary 
emissaries, possessing a status equal to Western minister. Yet, now, in 1890, when they 
assumed domestic posts in Chosŏn, they were fully integrated into the Zongfan system as 
two subordinates of both the king and the Chinese emperor. 
In Chosŏn, the government was refurnishing a pavilion between Inchon and 
Hansŏng as the envoys’ accommodation and deployed 130 soldiers to the area for 
protection. In Hansŏng, around 590 soldiers would be deployed to maintain the local 
order.78 Yet the king hesitated for a few days over if he should go out of the city to 
welcome the envoys in such a time when he claimed to be sick. He was actually worried 
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that the Zongfan rituals, in particular kowtowing to the Chinese envoys that would be 
seen by Japanese and Western diplomats and citizens, might damage his dignity as a 
supreme sovereign. Yet, after a serious consideration, the king eventually decided to 
follow the ritual codes to welcome the envoys near the West Gate.79 All in all, he was 
invested by the Chinese emperor and it was this legitimacy that endowed him with the 
power of managing the country as an agent of the Son of Heaven in China. 
The two envoys sailed from Tianjin for Inchon by Jingyuan and Laiyuan on 
November 4,80 and the cruisers reached the outer harbor of Inchon at 2:00 p.m. on 
November 6. Two high-ranking Korean officials boarded ships to welcome them. An hour 
later, the imperial items, including the Silence Board (Ch. sujing pai; the “board” here 
refers to a piece of wood used as certain official symbols), the Keep-out-of-the-way 
Board (Ch. huibi pai), the Imperial Envoy Titular Board (Ch. qinchai xianpai), the 
Imperial Dragon Flag (Ch. longqi), and symbols of authority (Ch. yizhang), were 
dispatched from the ships. The envoys landed by a small steam ship with the imperial 
decree. All Korean officials, headed by the Receiver of the Mission, in their official dress, 
bowed to the envoys and items in accordance with relevant rituals. 
After the envoys placed the imperial decree in the Dragon Shrine (Ch. longting), 
the procession headed for the envoys’ accommodation in Inchon. It was a long and 
magnificent procession. First came the Korean Receiver and the officials in columns, one 
on each side of the road, with the Hansŏng Magnate and the Metropolitan Governor on 
the east side and the Prefects and the Magistrates on the west side. Next were the Korean 
escorts, flags, symbols of authority, yellow umbrellas, drums, gongs, and bands of music. 
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Then were the Incense Shrine (Ch. xiangting) and the Dragon Shrine, followed by the 
Chinese attendants, all of whom were mounted. The two envoys followed in their sedan 
chairs side by side, and behind them marched the high and low deputies with the 
supervisors and their attendants.81 This procession order was quite similar to the imperial 
condolence mission to Chosŏn headed by Akdun in 1725 (Figure 6. 2). 
Figure 6. 2. The Qing’s Imperial Condolence Mission to Chosŏn in 1725 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Yin Mengxia and Yu Hao, eds., Shi Chaoxian lu (Records of imperial missions to 
Chosŏn), vol. 2, 508-509.  
Notes: No. 1: the Qing envoy; no. 2: the King of Chosŏn; no. 3: the Dragon Shrine; no. 4: the 
Incense Shrine. 
 
The long procession was full of various banners in different colors and the 
Chinese and Korean officials in official dress. According to Chongli, when the procession 
went through the Chinese Settlement and the General Foreign Settlement (Ch. huayang 
zujie), the Chinese merchants jubilantly welcomed the mission by decorating their stores 
with Chinese lanterns and streamers, and numerous “foreigners from many countries” 
(Ch. geguo yangren) and Korean people gathered to see the extraordinary procession. 
Chongli was extremely proud of the superiority of the Great Qing.82 It was the first time 
for both the Chinese and non-Chinese merchants and people living in the settlements to 
appreciate the remarkable ceremony. Undoubtedly, the magnificent scene made the 
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Chinese merchants feel superior to their counterparts. 
When the envoys arrived in the residence at the Yamen of the Superintendent of 
Trade (K. Kamni amun), the Korean officials kowtowed toward the imperial decree and 
the envoys, while the envoys replied by bowing with their hands folded in front. The 
Korean ritual officials presented four programs of ceremonies that would be performed 
next day in Hansŏng, including: 1) ceremonies forwarding the imperial decree to the king; 
2) ceremonies expressing the imperial condolences upon the late dowager; 3) ceremonies 
receiving visit of the Korean officials; and 4) ceremonies giving envoys a banquet at their 
accommodation.83 All programs precisely followed the time-honored ritual codes. The 
envoys also declined to receive any gifts by strictly following the emperor’s instructions. 
The most important ceremony was performed in the palace on November 8. The 
king had promised the Western ministers that he would invite them to attend the 
ceremony, but he did not deliver on this promise. Without knowing what really occurred 
inside the palace, these ministers assumed that the envoys might persuade the king act in 
accordance with Beijing’s interests in the name of certain rituals. What these diplomats 
had learned about the Sino–Korean relationship before 1890 could not help them grasp 
the long-lived ritual contacts between the courts in Beijing and Hansŏng, so such contacts 
were unavoidably understood in the modern diplomatic circumstances as a tool for China 
to influence or even manipulate Chosŏn. This doubt was prevalent before 1892, when 
Yuan distributed copies of Shihan jilue, a Chinese diary of an imperial mission member, 
and its English translation, Notes on the Imperial Chinese Mission to Corea, 1890, to the 
ministers in Hansŏng.  
In fact, all actions that occurred in the palace between the envoys and the king 
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were ritual matters. The essential part was the ceremonies expressing the emperor’s 
condolences, which, according to the Shihan jilue, went as follows: 
 
The Master of Ceremonies of Chosŏn cried out ‘Wail.’ Then the Senior Usher will 
request the King to wail and the King will wail. The members of the Royal 
Household and the civil and military officials at a signal from their prompters, 
will also wail. With the view of receiving the Imperial Commissioners, the Senior 
and Junior Ushers shall lead the King out of the Hall by the central entrance. The 
Senior Usher will then request the King to stop wailing, and the King will cease 
wailing. The members of the Royal Household and the civil and military officials 
shall do the same at the signal from their prompters. 
 
The official charged with the reading of the Message of Condolence, is to walk up 
to the table containing the Message, and in a standing position, with his face 
towards the west, take up the Message and read it aloud. After reading it, he is to 
replace it on the table. The Senior Usher shall request the King to wail. The King 
will then wail. The Ushers of Ceremonies shall request the Commissioners to wail. 
The Commissioners will wail. The members of the Royal Household and the civil 
and military officials at the request of their prompters, will also wail. The Ushers 
of Ceremonies shall request the Commissioners to stop wailing. The 
Commissioners will stop wailing. The Senior Usher shall request the King to stop 
wailing, and the King will cease wailing. The members of the Royal Household 
and the civil and military officials will also stop wailing at the request of their 
prompters. The King shall then accompany the Commissioners out as far as the 
central entrance. Thence the Royal Ushers shall conduct the Commissioners back 
to their original resting place east of the Fasting Hall. 
 
The Senior Usher shall request the King to put on his mourning appendages and 
to take up his mourning stuff and wail. The King shall then put on his mourning 
stuff and wail. The King shall then put on his mourning appendages, take up his 
mourning staff and wail, while the members of the Royal Household and the civil 
and military officials, prompted by their own prompters, shall also wail. The 
Senior and Junior Ushers shall lead the King into the central entrance of the Hall 
and there the Senior Usher shall request the King to stop wailing. The King shall 
then stop wailing and at the same time the members of the Royal Household and 
the civil and military officials, shall also stop wailing.84 
 
These elaborate ceremonies had been minutely performed by both sides for nearly 250 
years up to 1890. In the procedures, both the envoys and the king had no time for 
spontaneous face-to-face communications. When they finished the ceremonies and took 
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tea at the king’s hall, they still had no freedom to talk. As a matter of fact, the contents of 
the king’s conversations with the envoys had been scheduled by the Korean ministers on 
October 22, two weeks before the envoys arrived.85 When the above ceremonies were 
accomplished, the king tried to pay a ceremony of obeisance to the envoys by bowing 
twice with his hands folded in front (Ch. zaibai). The envoys immediately said that there 
was no need for the king to pay such a high-level ceremony. As an alternative, they 
suggested the king just bow with his hands folded in front once. The king followed the 
suggestion, and the envoys paid the same rituals back. When this was done, they made a 
short conversation: 
 
King: Is everything fine with the emperor? 
Envoys: His Majesty is fine. 
King: Is everything fine with the dowager empress? 
Envoys: Her Majesty is fine. 
King: It is cold now in fall and you came from the maritime route. Do you feel 
good? 
Envoys: Thanks to the benefaction of the emperor, we are free from illnesses. 
King: Our Small Country suffers the loss of the dowager queen. The emperor is so 
kind to show his deep solicitude by sending Your Superiors to come here for 
conferring the noble rank upon the late queen. What a great honor it is. 
Envoys: Your grief is really conceivable. 
King: Your Superiors came here with the emperor’s great kindness and virtue and 
you sympathize with our Small Country’s poor situation by cancelling many 
routines [about the gifts]. But our etiquettes for welcoming you are so simple 
that they have made me uncomfortable. 
Envoys: We had received the imperial instructions before we departed, so we 
must obey the emperor’s will.86 
 
After drinking some tea, the host and the guests finished the conversation by bowing 
toward each other with hand folded in front. The conversation was full of formulas, 
insomuch that nothing related to practical political or diplomatic issues, just like the 
conversation between imperial envoys and the king at the same palace in 1876. The 
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trivial rituals formalized activities of all participants, who were expected to be highly 
meticulous and not do anything to threaten the seriousness of the rituals. Rituals, in this 
reciprocal arrangement between the Korean monarch and the agents of the Chinese 
emperor, amounted to the manifestation of the dignity of, and the hierarchy between, the 
two courts and the two countries. Through these rituals, their Zongfan relationship was 
materially demonstrated and ideologically consolidated. 
On November 10, the king visited the envoys at their residence to treat them to a 
tea ceremony. This was supposed to be the time that the Korean side gave the envoys 
gifts. Yet, following the imperial instructions, the envoys emphasized again that they 
“could not even accept a piece of paper as present.”87 The next day, the king paid a 
ceremony of sending off the envoys at the West Gate of the city. After taking a rest in 
Inchon, the envoys sailed to Tianjin on November 14. Their departure marked the end of 
Qing China’s imperial missions to Chosŏn within the Zongfan framework in history. 
The short sojourn of the envoys in Hansŏng left in question the role that Yuan 
Shikai played at this time. As the H. I. C. M. Resident, Yuan did not go to Inchon, did not 
enter the palace when the grand ceremony was held, and did not meet and talk with the 
envoys in Hansŏng. Under Li’s requests, he only contacted some Korean officials who 
were in charge of welcoming the mission about whether the mission extorted gifts from 
Chosŏn.88 The envoys did not contact Yuan either, aside from sending him some notes 
about performances of ceremonies before they left Hansŏng.89 Whether or not Yuan had 
hoped to seize and use the visit of the imperial mission to his advantage, as the 
conspiracy approach that his Japanese and Western counterparts would have it, the event 
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suggested that Yuan was an outsider to the court-to-court contacts. 
China’s imperial mission, bringing with it the first grand ritual performance after 
Western powers opened Chosŏn’s door in 1882, demonstrated and subordinated the 
Zongfan order for the powers that had been taking such relationship as a conundrum for 
years. As M. Frederick Nelson puts it, this event “imparted, for the Western observers, a 
de jure status to China’s de facto position in Korea…the Western powers were beginning 
to attribute more force to the familial relationship which for two decades they had 
rejected as purely ceremonial.”90 In other words, the imperial mission proved that the 
Chinese rituals were not purely formalistic ceremonies, but rather potent symbols of 
power. This observation can explain why “the Chinese image of world order was 
stubbornly maintained right up until the 1890s.”91 Existing together with the image of 
the day was the politico-cultural Chinese empire. 
WAS THE IMPERIAL MISSION A CHINESE CONSPIRACY? 
Since 1890, a leading interpretation of the imperial mission has regarded it as a Chinese 
conspiracy conducted under the foil of tributary routines, aiming to strengthen China’s 
control over Chosŏn at the cost of the latter’s independent sovereignty.92 This approach 
understands this event in a context of power politics by reading the Sino–Korean Zongfan 
relationship as a suzerain–vassal relationship. 93  Juxtaposing the issue of Chosŏn’s 
vassalage with that of its independent sovereignty, scholars prefer to interpret the mission 
as an important application of China’s new policy to Chosŏn that could be called the “Li–
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Yuan policy,” after Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai.94 This new policy was said to 
combine China’s supremacy as the suzerain over Korea in the old tributary framework 
with China’s hegemonic position in the new treaty port system in Chosŏn. 
This conspiracy approach was popular among western diplomats in Beijing and 
Hansŏng since the late 1880s, who believed that China was in the crisis of its suzerainty 
at Chosŏn and the mission in 1890 was an intrigue at the cost of Chosŏn’s sovereignty. 
On November 2, 1890, after learning that Beijing dispatched two envoys to Hansŏng, 
Robert Hart in Beijing wrote to his confidant in London, James Duncan Campbell, that, 
 
China has sent two Imperial Commissioners to Corea…to convey Emperor’s 
condolences to King on mother’s death. The meeting of these officials and King is 
looked forward to with interest: the American or want-Corea-independent party 
urge the King to either not receive the officials or if he does, not to go through the 
ancient ceremonial which involves kneeling, ko-towing, and other forms showing 
Corea’s tributary and China’s suzerain relations; if the King follows their advice 
these sympathisers will force China to take stronger action than hitherto—if he 
doesn’t, his public recognition of tributaryness (for the meeting will be in public) 
will force sympathisers to withdraw from their attempt to demonstrate that Corea 
is independent. I hope this event will ease matters for me in the ‘Hermit 
Kingdom.’95 
 
The potential dilemma for both China and Chosŏn that Hart had foreseen was soon 
corroborated by Augustine Heard in Hansŏng. On November 17, when the envoys had 
returned to China, Heard reported to Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, that, 
No foreigner witnessed any part of what took place in the Palace or at this 
interview, and two Versions are current. The Chinese and their friends represent 
that everything was done in accordance with ancient usage, and was to them 
perfectly Satisfactory;—that is to say, that the King went to the extreme of 
deference and homage and yielded to every demand. On the other hand, it is 
asserted that, while showing himself courteous & considerate, he provoked 
irritation by his reserve, by his firmness in declining to commit himself to 
accepting the Suggestions of the Envoy with regard to his conduct in policy, 
without consideration and without deliberation and consultation with his 
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Ministers. It is too soon yet to know the truth.96 
 
Heard and his fellow diplomats in the city did not know what had happened between the 
king and the envoys, so they took their guesses based on the assumption of China’s 
ambition. In a confidential report, Heard asserted that “China was not willing to forgo 
this golden opportunity to affirm to the world her Superiority,” but he simultaneously 
noted that “it should not be forgotten that the Act was Oriental between Orientals, and 
must not be judged by the Western standard.” 97  This twofold statement actually 
acknowledged the legitimacy and uniqueness of the Sino–Korean relationship. 
Indeed, Beijing demonstrated its superiority through the mission, but the mission 
would have not been dispatched, if any precedents had existed. More importantly, what 
the king petitioned was understood by Beijing as a strong political desire to challenge 
Chosŏn’s status as China’s shuguo. This point could be seen from the envoys’ report in 
Beijing after the mission. In their joint memorial, the two envoys concluded that, “The 
ceremony was solemn and majestic. All foreigners have seen it and learned that Chosŏn 
is subordinate to the Heavenly Dynasty. Chosŏn could not deny it. If we can take the 
advantage to pacify the country in an appropriate way, it would be serving as our fence 
(Ch. pingmeng) and enjoying our great benevolence forever.”98  
Moreover, the envoys suggested that in the future the expenses of imperial envoys 
to Chosŏn be covered by the outlay for ministers to other countries, in order to prevent 
Chosŏn imposing exorbitant taxes and levies on its people in the name of welcoming 
imperial envoys. The proposal was very significant because it showed an intention of 
blurring the line between the imperial envoys of the Manchu court to China’s outer fan, 
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who were managed by the Ministry of Rituals for centuries, and the Chinese ministers to 
other countries, who were under the Zongli Yamen for more than a decade. 
For this proposal, the Ministry of Rituals consulted with Emperor Yongzheng’s 
imperial edict in 1735, in which the emperor reduced half of the amount of the silver that 
the king gave to envoys as gifts for supporting their long trip, and agreed to make 
changes to this aspect by permanently cancelling the routine, which meant the envoys 
would never receive any silver from Chosŏn. As an alternative, the ministry and the 
Zongli Yamen decided that, in the future, each imperial envoy would receive 2,000 taels 
of silver from the Yamen to support his trip to Chosŏn and each interpreter would receive 
500 taels for the same purpose. These sums of money were parts of the outlay for Chinese 
ministers to other countries. On January 20, 1891, Emperor Guangxu endorsed the 
proposal. This new rule was forwarded to the Beiyang Superintendent, the Manchu 
General in Mukden, the Ministry of Rituals in Mukden, and the king.99 Yuan was also 
informed by the Beiyang Superintendent. No imperial envoys, however, would ever gain 
chance to claim the financial support from the Zongli Yamen. 
6.4 “Maintaining the East Fence”: Chosŏn in the Minds of Chinese Intellectuals during 
the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895 
In May 1894, the Chinese general Nie Shicheng (1836–1900) returned to Tianjin from his 
ten-month trip to Northern Manchuria, Russian Far East, and Chosŏn, along with students 
of the Military College at Tianjin, under Li Hongzhang’s support. In Chosŏn, General Nie 
met with the king and visited treaty ports. In his report to Li about Chosŏn, Nie 
concluded that: “the king is weak, the officials are addicted to alcohol and women, and no 
one is considering self-strengthening programs...No talent generals on the top and no able 
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worriers on the bottom. When the country encounters troubles, it would need China to 
send troops to protect it. The situation is really dangerous.” The general analyzed that, 
“compared with Russia that is powerful but no more than a superficial threat, Japan is a 
really fatal danger.” Therefore, he argued that China should prepare to resist potential 
Japanese invasion in order to “consolidate the fan and shuguo and protect China’s 
frontier.”100 What General Nie predicted was quickly proved by the deterioration of 
Chosŏn’s situation as a result of the Tonghak Rebellion, and Nie himself was sent to 
Chosŏn in June to assist the country. In the following months, the general would witness 
how China lost the shuguo to Japanese on battlegrounds. 
Nie’s concerns were also shared by many Chinese officials. In July, when China 
was fiercely disputing with Japan over the issue of sending troops to Chosŏn, many 
officials in Beijing presented their memorials or position papers to the emperor to offer 
their ideal policies of strengthening Chinese forces, protecting Chosŏn, and defeating 
Japan. For example, on July 20, Zeng Guangjun, an official of the Imperial Academy, 
presented a paper via the Ministry of Personnel, suggesting that China publicize its 
rationale for an expedition against Japan. Defining Chosŏn, which he called “Koryŏ” (Ch. 
Gaoli), as the country that “has first subordinated to our dynasty and cautiously paid 
tributary visits for hundreds of years without interruption,” Zeng proclaimed that “all 
foreign countries know this, but Japan has fabricated some excuses and tried to make the 
country subordinate to two countries.”101 
Pang Hongshu, an official at the Grand Censorate (Ch. Ducha yuan), presented a 
confidential memorial on July 21, arguing that China should not abandon Chosŏn and 
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should attack the Japanese forces on the peninsula. Pang listed four reasons after making 
a comparison between the case of Ryukyu and the ongoing situation in Chosŏn: 
 
It was a misstep that we abandoned Ryukyu and it damaged our national authority 
and stimulated the ambitions of the enemy. Yet we should not abandon Chosŏn 
because it deeply concerns the overall situation. First, Chosŏn has been a fan of 
our dynasty for a long time, insomuch that it is not different from the Mongols 
and the tribes in the western areas (Ch. xiyu). If we allowed others to cast 
covetous eyes on Chosŏn, would there be anywhere else that we would not allow 
them to do so? Second, Chosŏn borders the three provinces in Manchuria (Ch. 
Dongsansheng), serving as a fence for that area. If others occupied Chosŏn, we 
should not only strengthen the defenses in Lüshun [a.k.a. Port Arthur], but also 
deploy forces to many places in the northeast. Third, Chosŏn is a natural barricade 
against Russia’s vaulting ambition to expand toward the south. Had Japan 
occupied Chosŏn, Russia would compete with Japan for manipulating the area. 
Fourth, the ports of Dengzhou and Lüshun are doors to the northern area, forming 
a line of defense together with the port of Inchon. If we lost Chosŏn, we would 
face the enemy right outside of our door and the maritime transports would be in 
grave danger.102 
 
By underlining the coherent legitimacy between China and its outer fan, Pang 
emphasized that Chosŏn was as important as Mongolia, Tibet, and other political entities 
in Western China. He argued that China should protect Chosŏn by defeating Japan, so 
that it could resolve its ongoing disputes with Russia over the borderline at the Pamir 
Mountains and those with Britain over the trade negotiations at Tibet. 
The approach to reviewing the time-honored Zongfan relationship with the aim of 
showing China’s necessity and righteousness to protect Chosŏn was popular among 
Chinese officials and intellectuals. In his memorial on July 25, Duanfang (1861–1911), 
who later died at his post in Sichuan province during the Revolution of 1911, reviewed 
Hongtaiji’s conquest of Chosŏn in 1637 and the erection of the Samjŏndo Monument. As 
an erudite antiques collector, Duanfang must have reviewed some documents about the 
inscriptions of the monument, from which he believed he found the reason “Chosŏn 
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loyally served the Great Qing for more than 200 years without any acts of treachery.”103 
Duanfang’s analyses revealed that China’s involvement in the war with Japan in 1894 
was a result of the inner logic of its Zongfan commitment to Chosŏn since 1637. On the 
same day when Duanfang submitted his position paper, the Chinese navy was attacked by 
the Japanese navy at P’ungdo of Chosŏn. The war broke out. 
On August 1, Emperor Guangxu issued an edict to declare war on Japan. The 
emperor legitimated the Chinese actions by stating that, 
 
Chosŏn has been a fan and shuguo of our Great Qing and it sends tribute to us 
every year for more than 200 years, which is known to the world. During the past 
dozen years or so, the country has been suffering from domestic troubles and our 
court, in order to cherish the small country (Ch. zixiao), have repeatedly sent 
forces to help stabilize the situations and eventually placed a Resident in her 
capital to protect it at any time. In the fourth moon of this year, Chosŏn begged 
our court to help put down a rebellion, upon which we have instructed Li 
Hongzhang to dispatch forces there. The rebels ran away when our forces arrived 
at Asan, while the Japanese suddenly sent their troops to Hansŏng without any 
cause, reinforcing them until they have exceeded more than 10,000 soldiers, and 
forced the king to change the system of government. The Japanese minatory 
activities of bullying Chosŏn are totally unreasonable. Our dynasty support and 
cherish fan and subordinate in a way of letting the country manage its own 
political affairs under the rule of zizhu. Japan is a friendly country (Ch. yuguo) of 
Chosŏn since it has signed a treaty with Chosŏn, so it is really unreasonable for 
Japan to send troops and force it to make reforms…Japan has violated the treaties 
and the international law and waged the war. Let people under the Heaven know 
that our court has tried our bets to do what by humanity and duty (Ch. renzhi yijin) 
throughout the whole complications, and we could not be tolerant of the Japanese 
misdeeds anymore. Let Li Hongzhang dispatch formidable troops to swiftly go to 
Chosŏn to salvage the Korean people from great suffering.104 
 
The edict justified China’s action by following the rule of “cherishing the small country” 
within the Zongfan system and that of defending the fairness of international law within 
the treaty port system. Many officials heartily identified China’s action of protecting its 
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shuguo as “cherishing men from afar.”105 This point of view further prompted officials to 
take all China’s outer and inner fan and other frontier areas, including Vietnam, Burma, 
Ryukyu, Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria, and Taiwan, into consideration, 
strongly arguing that China should not lose Chosŏn. 
On August 3, a Manchu official Changlin stated in his memorial that Japan’s goal 
was to annex Chosŏn and, if it became true, “all the fan of our dynasty would be 
subordinate to foreign barbarians (Ch. waiyi), so other countries would encroach on 
Chinese inner land, as a result of which Xinjiang, Taiwan, Tibet, and Manchuria would be 
in grave danger too.”106 Simultaneously, Ding Lijun, an official of the Imperial Academy, 
emphasized that, “Chosŏn, as a fan that subordinated to Emperor Taizong [Hongtaiji], has 
been loyally serving us for almost 300 years without interruption…If the fence collapsed, 
Mukden would be in great danger. Chosŏn, different from Vietnam and Burma that are 
thousands of miles far from China, is closely related and mutually dependent with China 
like the lips and teeth and like bones and flesh.” Ding argued that Beijing should firmly 
refused the British and Russian mediation between China and Japan, for he believed if 
China ceded Chosŏn or Taiwan to Japan as the Western mediators were indicating, 
Britain would soon encroach upon Tibet and Russia would on Outer Mongolia.107 
Changlin’s and Ding’s concerns on China’s territorial integrity were widely shared 
by their colleagues, who also ardently presented their memorials or petitions, such as Yu 
Lianyuan on August 4, Long Zhanlin on August 5, Ye Qingzeng on August 8, An Weijun 
on August 9, Hong Liangpin on August 10, Zhou Chengguang and Zhong Dexiang on 
August 17, Zhang Zhongxin on August 18, Fan Gongxu on August 21, Yufu on August 26, 
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Kuai Guangdian and Lu Xueyuan on August 29, Yu Zhaofan on August 30, and Yan 
Youzhang on September 6.108 These officials regarded Chosŏn as an indispensable part 
for China to remain China’s territorial integrity. In addition, they regarded Chosŏn as the 
fence to Manchuria, the Great Qing’s “fundamental area” (Ch. genben zhongdi), on the 
one hand, and connected the fate of Chosŏn with that of China’s other frontier areas that 
were already in the covetous eyes of Western powers, on the other. As Kuai questioned, 
“after we abandon Chosŏn, Russia intrudes Mongolia, and Britain does the same to Tibet, 
shall we let them alone or argue with them? If we opt to argue with them, we had better 
keep Chosŏn safe now.”109  
These officials enthusiastically made their prescriptions for Beijing, among which 
exploiting China’s patriarchal authority stood out as the most significant. Ding Lijun, 
assuming that the king was controlled by Japan, argued that China should invest the 
crown prince as new king and keep him in the Chinese army for his safety.110 Hong 
Liangpin similarly suggested that China should select a royal member of Chosŏn to be 
the guide for the Chinese forces and invest him as new king when the crisis was 
resolved.111 Yu Lianyuan (1844–1901) also agreed that China should invest a royal 
member of Chosŏn as new king at Pyongyang.112 This idea of investing a new king was 
developed by a candidate official, Yan Youzhang, who clearly argued that China should 
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convert Chosŏn into a province and appoint officials and officers to govern it.113 All 
these officials observed the situation within the conventional Zongfan framework, 
believing that it was time Beijing exercised its patriarchal authority. While Ding regarded 
this policy as a way of “publicizing the great justice to all people under Heaven,” Yan 
saw it “legitimate and justifiable” (Ch. mingzheng yanshun), in that Chosŏn was China’s 
fan and its land was once under control of two Chinese counties in history. Their 
proposals shared the striking similarities with those of Li Shuchang, Zhang Jian, Zhang 
Peilun, and Kang Youwei in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Beijing, however, would 
never move toward that direction of annexing Chosŏn, even in such a dramatic war time, 
a moral and political principle for China to maintain. 
This storm of the officials’ opinions resulted from the declaration of war against 
Japan on August 1, but it was also a result of the political struggles among bureaucratic 
fractions. The majority of these officials held low ranks as members of the “Pure Stream.” 
Different from the vanguards of the “Pure Stream” before the Sino–French War in 1883–
1885 that centered the minister of the Grand Council, Li Hongzao (1820–1897), the 
leading figures of the “Pure Stream” in 1894 took Emperor Guangxu’s instructor, Weng 
Tonghe, as their mentor and backer. Weng took a pro-war approach toward Japan, shared 
by Li Hongzao, while the two men saw Li Hongzhang as their adversary and charged the 
latter and his protégés, such as Ma Jianzhong, Liu Mingchuan, and Ding Ruchang, with 
being fearful with fighting Japanese. With the rise of the political influence of Weng and 
Li Hongzao in October and November, their protégés became more active and put 
forward more opinions during the second half of the war from late 1894 to early 1895. 
The core point made by these officials was that China could not lose Chosŏn 
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because otherwise it would mean the disintegration of the Great Qing. In such a context, 
the Great Qing needed to be fighting for its dignity and its legitimacy as the Central 
Kingdom and the Heaven Dynasty. The ideology of “all-under-Heave” had virtually 
collapsed at the 1890s, but at this particular moment it still manifested itself in a very 
strong and splendid way. So did the Chinese empire in the politico-cultural sense. 
Almost all these officials had no practical experience on industrial practices, 
military campaigns, or diplomatic negotiations as Li Hongzhang did. In the eyes of 
pragmatists fighting the Japanese or dealing with Russian or British on China’s frontier, 
these officials were no more than armchair strategists with fervent but unpractical and 
unrealistic plans. The label of the “Pure Stream” in political struggles undermined their 
credibility too. However, their capacity to assess the situation shall not be ignored. 
Viewed from the problems of Chosŏn, these officials became quite worried about China’s 
frontier security. As history unfolded, the nightmare scenario they sketched out in 1894 
that China would encounter serious challenges in Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, Manchuria, 
and Outer Mongolia from such powers as Britain and Russia turned out to be true in the 
six decades following the war, until the People’s Republic of China firmly claimed its 
territorial domain in 1949. 
When the war was escalating on the eastern frontier of China, people on the 
western frontier in Tibet were also seriously concerning the situation. On February 22, 
1895, the Imperial Commissioner to Tibet, Kuihuan, memorialized to Emperor Guangxu, 
reporting that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876–1933) had led lamas and followers of 
Tibetan Buddhism to read Sutras at primary lama temples after the Dalai Lama heard that 
Japan had baldly broken international law to invade Chosŏn. The Dalai Lama wished 
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their genuine pray before Buddha Sakyamuni could bring blessing for the “great emperor” 
(Ch. da huangdi) and his “great forces” (Ch. dabing), by which China could defeat the 
Japanese “clowns” in Chosŏn. Not until April 7 could the emperor read Kuihuan’s 
memorial to learn the Dalai Lama’s activities.114 Ten days later, however, China signed 
the treaty of peace with Japan at Shimonoseki. 
As a result of a series of Chinese fiascos of both maritime battles on Shandong 
peninsula and overland battles in Manchuria, Beijing started to negotiate with Japan 
under the American mediation from November 1894. On April 17, 1895, the Chinese 
representative Li Hongzhang, after a painful negotiation with his Japanese counterparts, 
Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu (1844–1897), signed the treaty of peace at 
Shimonoseki. The treaty was written in three languages, including Chinese, Japanese, and 
English. The first article states that, “China recognizes definitively the full and complete 
independence and autonomy of Corea, and in consequence, the payment of tribute and 
the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Corea to China in derogation of such 
independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.”115 Compared with the 
first article of the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 that has only Chinese and Japanese 
versions, the first article of the English version of the Treaty of Shimonoseki explicitly 
defines Chosŏn as a country of “full and complete independence and autonomy” (Ch. 
wanquan wuque zhi duli zizhu), erasing any ambiguity of Chosŏn’s status in Chinese or 
Japanese languages. 
After they received the first article drafted by Japan on April 1,116 Li and his 
assistants suggested the article should state that, “China and Japan recognize definitely 
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the full and complete independence and autonomy and guarantee the complete neutrality 
of Corea, and it is agreed that the interference by either in the internal affairs of Corea in 
derogation of such autonomy, or the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Corea 
inconsistent with such independence, shall wholly cease for the future.”117 They tried to 
draw Japan into these terms in order to make sure that Chosŏn would not be occupied by 
Japan after China recognized its “full and complete independence and autonomy.” The 
Japanese representatives firmly refused to accept the modifications, so the final version 
was exactly what the Japanese proposed, as quoted above. This article terminated the 
Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship and, different from China’s hope, it did not state that 
Japan would ensure Chosŏn’s neutrality. 
For the purpose of our analyses in this dissertation, it is worth pointing out that, in 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the “Great Qing” was fully equal to “China” or “Zhongguo.” 
Although the Japanese version of the treaty called the Qing the “Country of the Qing” (J. 
shinkoku), the Chinese version termed it “Zhongguo” and the English version called it 
“China.” It was thus China, rather than the Great Qing, that recognized Chosŏn’s “full 
and complete independence and autonomy.” In this sense, what the treaty terminated was 
not only the Zongfan relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn that was established in 
1637, but also the general Zongfan arrangement between China and Korea. 
When the news that Li signed the treaty reached Beijing, thousands of Chinese 
intellectuals, who were attending the triennial imperial civil service examination in the 
capital, were stirred up by the humiliating terms. They started to submit long and 
passionate petitions to the emperor via the Grand Censorate. The majority of these 
petitions were countersigned by many intellectuals from different provinces, such as 
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Liang Qichao (1873–1929) from Guangdong, calling for cancelling the treaty and 
continuously fighting with Japan. These intellectuals expressed their understandings of 
Chosŏn by emphasizing its important strategic position as China’s “eastern fence” and its 
historical significance for the rise of the Great Qing. This point could be well observed 
from the petitions submitted on April 30, respectively by Liang Qichao, Tan Shaotang, 
Ren Xichun, Gu Dunyi, Lin Chaoqi, and others.118 On May 1, three candidate officials 
from the Ministry of Personnel, Wang Rongxian, Hong Jiayu, and Bao Xinzeng, 
submitted a long petition via Weng Tonghe and other high-rank officials, in which they 
underlined the grave dangers that each article of the treaty would bring to China. In terms 
of the first article, they analyzed that, 
 
China recognizes the full and complete independence and autonomy of Chosŏn, 
Japan has made political reforms in Chosŏn and built railways there to extend its 
business. This situation is just as a thief, who has broken into a civilian’s house, 
destroyed the properties in the house, and stolen capitals and materials, forces the 
prosecutor to issue a guaranty that he is innocent. How humiliating it is. The 
article defines Chosŏn as a country of ‘independence and autonomy,’ but it should 
simultaneously proclaim that Japan cannot send troops to the country and 
intervene in its internal affairs. Why are there no words about this point? Chosŏn 
actually becomes a country equal to China but subordinate to Japan. In addition, 
the article states that the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies by 
Chosŏn shall wholly cease for the future. According to conventions, if a shuguo 
fails to pay tribute and perform certain ceremonies, China should not issue an 
imperial edict allowing it to abolish tribute payment and formalities, even if China 
cannot punish it. Moreover, Chosŏn has been China’s fan for almost 300 years 
that has embodied the great achievements of Emperor Taizu and Emperor Taizong 
and has received kindness from other emperors for generations. Now a simple 
sentence of a treaty abolishes the entire thing, which runs opposite to the rationale 
of the system.119 
 
All of such petitions suggested that their authors were concerning China’s dignity. 
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In a petition submitted on May 3, ten low-rank officials bitterly reviewed the recent 
history of China’s losing Burma to Britain, Vietnam to France, northern Manchuria to 
Russia, and Ryukyu and Chosŏn to Japan, concluding that “we once had many fan on the 
four quarters of the world, but we have lost all of them within the past decades.”120 More 
importantly, they argued that the cessions of Taiwan and Liaodong to Japan would be the 
prologue to more cessions of China’s territory to foreign powers, which would be much 
worse than losing outer fan on China’s periphery. For them, the Great Qing, as well as the 
great Chinese empire, was collapsing on its frontier. 
When the movement of submitting petitions was still developing in a dramatic 
scale in Beijing, on May 8, 1895, the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki was accomplished at Yantai (Chefoo) in Shandong province. The Great 
Qing lost its first and prototypical outer fan as well as shuguo, forever. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Re-envisioning Chosŏn: An Empire, A Friendly Nation, and A Colony, 1896–1919 
The Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895 terminated Sino–Korean Zongfan relations and 
offered Chosŏn an opportunity to transform from China’s shuguo into a state enjoying 
“independence and autonomy,” as claimed in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The most 
significant consequence of the war was not that Chosŏn became independent, as some 
have maintained. Chosŏn had always enjoyed de facto independence—zizhu—within the 
Zongfan framework, which lasted from 1637 to 1895. The core level of the inner dual 
system between China and Chosŏn was terminated, which led to the collapse of the 
Zongfan framework of the outer dual system. As a result, the other two aspects of the 
inner and the outer dual systems remained unchanged and were formalized by the Sino–
Korean Treaty of 1899. The post-1895 political framework between China and Korea was 
thus not a new arrangement, but a part of the former one that had been functioning for 
more than two decades before the outbreak of the war. Japan terminated the conventional 
political framework between China and Chosŏn, but barely inserted new terms into the 
post-war order between the two countries. 
In the face of the epical change, China had to re-envision Chosŏn and treat the 
latter as an equal “friendly nation” (Ch. youbang). Following this transformation was a 
mixture of China’s policy toward Korea between the time-honored Zongfan conventions 
and newly established state-to-state diplomatic norms between the two countries, which 
presented itself in different ways in South China and Manchuria. On the one hand, in 
South China, China’s policy toward the Sino–Koran contacts still held the Zongfan 
momentum of “cherishing the small country” and cherishing the “foreign barbarians.” On 
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the other hand, along the Sino–Korean border in Manchuria, China’s policy manifested 
itself in continuous violent conflicts between Chinese communities and Korean 
immigrants. These conflicts resulted from the collapse of the Zongfan arrangement at the 
top level of the traditional political framework between China and Chosŏn. Following a 
decade rife with treaties, transformations, and tragedies, Chosŏn was colonized by Japan 
in 1910 and the Great Qing was overthrown by a nationalist revolution in 1911. In the 
hectic 1910s, both China and Korea struggled to survive encroaching colonialism and 
imperialism in East Asia. 
7.1 The New Ritual Crisis for Beijing: Chosŏn’s Proposal of Treaty Negotiation with 
China 
On January 7, 1895, as Japan approached mastery over Chosŏn in the then ongoing Sino–
Japanese war, the king performed ceremonies at the royal Chongmyo Shrine and 
announced 14 items under the title of “Great Laws” (K. hongbŏm; Ch. hongfan), in which 
he termed himself “I, the emperor” (K. chim; Ch. zhen) and decided “to cut off the 
thought of being dependent upon the Qing country in order to lay the foundation for 
autonomy and independence.”1 The items also aimed to initiate a new self-strengthening 
reform that was designed by Japan and would be conducted under Japanese supervision. 
Japan’s domination fundamentally damaged the country’s right to “autonomy and 
independence” and contributed to the political tension between the king and the Japanese 
representatives in Hansŏng. 
Ten months later, the king’s wife and closest adviser for decades, Queen Min, was 
assassinated by a mob of Japanese rioters at her palace. The king was extremely 
frightened and escaped to the Russian legation for asylum in February 1896, together 
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with the Crown Prince, leaving the competition between Russia and Japan in the country 
more intense. The king took refuge only a month later, after his country began to use 
solar calendar on January 1, 1896, and the new reign-title of “Kŏnyang,” the first 
reign-title in the history of the Chosŏn dynasty since it was founded in 1392. Yet the 
monarch knew well that such an unprecedented transformation could not ensure his 
personal safety. He stayed in the Russian legation for a year until he returned to his 
palace in February 1897. During these twelve months, he initiated negotiations for a new 
treaty with China, the former “Upper Country” as well as the “Heavenly Dynasty.” 
On June 18, 1896, Tang Shaoyi (1862–1938), the Manager of Chinese 
Commercial Affairs and the de facto Chinese representative in Hansŏng, received a 
Korean interpreter named Pak T’ae-yŏng, who forwarded the king’s wish to negotiate a 
new treaty with China. According to Tang’s report to the new Beiyang Superintendent, 
Wang Wenshao (1830–1908), Pak said that, 
 
Korea was China’s shuguo in history, but it becomes autonomous and independent 
because of the coercion of a powerful neighbor. We had no other options, and we 
have believed that China would not blame us for this. Considering that we have 
abolished the old treaties [with China], it is necessary to negotiate a new one. We 
have received deep benefits from the Central Dynasty and it is embarrassing for 
us to mention this. If we do not negotiate the new treaty, other countries might 
question us. We are more than happy to know the opinions of the Central Dynasty. 
 
Tang did not refuse the proposal, but he suggested the negotiation should be conducted 
later because Chosŏn could not be regarded as an autonomous and independent country 
as the king was still in the Russian legation.2 After learning about the news, the Zongli 
Yamen worried that China might appear too passive if Chosŏn sent representatives to 
Beijing for the treaty negotiation, or forwarded a similar requirement via the Russian 
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minister in Beijing. Considering that “Chosŏn, as our dynasty’s fan for a long time, 
should not be equally regarded as those Western countries,” the Yamen concluded that it 
was necessary to draft a short-range plan.  
The Yamen proposed in a memorial to the emperor that, “We agree to negotiate a 
new trade regulation [with Chosŏn] and to allow it set up consuls [in China], but we will 
not allow it to sign treaties [with China], send ministers [to China], or present letters of 
credence [to the emperor]. China will send a consul general to Hansŏng to be in charge of 
the Chinese affairs that are supposed to be done by a minister. In this way, the system of 
shuguo could be preserved (Ch. cun shuguo zhi ti).” Meanwhile, the Yamen telegraphed 
Li Hongzhang, who was on his post-war global trip to Europe and North America, to 
solicit his advice. Li endorsed the plan of appointing a consul general at Hansŏng, as 
Britain, France, and Germany had done so, and he pointed out that the Yamen should 
send a letter directly to the Foreign Office of Chosŏn. Li also said that the Chinese consul 
general in Hansŏng did not need to present a letter of credence to the king. In addition, Li 
recommended Tang Shaoyi himself as the best candidate to fill the post.3 Although China 
had claimed Chosŏn’s full autonomy and independence in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
both the Zongli Yamen and Li Hongzhang were still trying to preserve the pre-war 
hierarchical “system” (Ch. tizhi) between the two countries. This was Beijing’s new 
policy toward Chosŏn in the first post-war days. 
Chosŏn felt that the first article of the Treaty of Shimonoseki had put the kingdom 
in an awkward position. Instead of being proud of the “full autonomy and 
independence”—which Chosŏn had no chance to enjoy under the aggressive policies of 
the Japanese predator, the policy-makers of Chosŏn still followed the conventional 
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Zongfan manner of conducting its relations with China. In July 1896, the senior official 
Cho Pyŏng-chik (1833–1901) visited Tang Shaoyi to discuss the potential treaty 
negotiations. Several parts of their conversation are worth quoting as follows: 
 
Cho: Our country was the fan and shuguo of the Central Dynasty for a long time. 
The Treaty of Shimonoseki terms our country “autonomous,” but it is not our 
Sovereign’s original willingness at all. We hope that the Central Dynasty does 
not blame us for this. 
Tang: Our dynasty has no intention of blaming your country for it. 
Cho: Our country was coerced by the powerful neighbor into claiming not to be 
China’s shuguo, but our Sovereign has appreciated the deep favors of the 
Imperial Dynasty and would like to negotiate a new treaty to resume our 
concord. Yet how dare our Small Country straightly propose this to the Big 
Country. 
Tang: I have heard that the king has this motivation and he sent the interpreter Pak 
T’ae-yŏng to come here to discuss the matter. 
Cho: Our Sovereign has learned about the conversation between you and Pak, but 
he is not sure what China thinks about the proposal. He is pretty worried about 
this…The Treaty of Shimonoseki proclaims Chosŏn’s autonomy. If we do not 
negotiate a new treaty, wouldn’t the Central Dynasty be displeased with our 
country? 
Tang: The Treaty of Shimonoseki indeed mentions the status of Chosŏn, but it 
does not state that we should contract a treaty. 
Cho: Without negotiating a treaty, wouldn’t it mean that [China] does not 
recognize Chosŏn’s autonomy? 
Tang: I regard negotiating a treaty and recognizing Chosŏn’s autonomy as two 
different matters. They should not be mentioned in the same breath. 
Cho: How so? 
Tang: The recognition of autonomy only means not following the old regulations, 
but the exchange of a treaty would mean the two countries are equal to each 
other. Thus, the two issues should not be discussed in the same breath. 
Cho: Our Sovereign has not yet thought about this point.4 
 
This conversation is the key to understanding the post-war Qing–Chosŏn 
relationship from an inside perspective. The conversation suggests that both countries 
were still moving along the pre-war Zongfan lines in their contacts. The format of the 
conversation was not different from that between the king and the imperial envoys in 
1890. Such hierarchical terms as the “Small Country,” the “Big Country,” the “Central 
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Dynasty,” and the “Imperial Dynasty” were still used. Furthermore, the conversation 
suggested that the king did not regard the “autonomy” as a divide for bilateral relations. 
More important, according to Cho, the king’s motivation of negotiating a new treaty was 
to avoid being blamed by China because the king regarded it as his responsibility to make 
the proposal first to the Big Country since the Treaty of Shimonoseki identified his 
country’s autonomy. This is precisely the Zongfan logic behind such cases in the pre-war 
period, as in 1882, when Chosŏn signed the treaty with the U.S. the king felt it was 
necessary to negotiate a treaty with China. Tang, on the other hand, did not regard 
Chosŏn as a country equal to China. Although China had lost Chosŏn as a fan, the 
bilateral Zongfan rationale firmly remained ipso facto. In terms of the two dual systems 
as it pertained to the bilateral Zongfan framework, the nature of the state-to-state 
relationship could be clearly delineated by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This did not, 
however, extend to relations between the Qing and Chosŏn’s courts. 
In this context, what concerned the Chinese side was ritual procedure. If the 
emperor of Chosŏn dispatched a representative to Beijing to submit a letter of credence to 
the emperor of China asking for the treaty negotiation, unlike the pre-war tributary 
emissaries, the representative would no longer perform the kowtow to the Chinese 
emperor. This scenario created a huge ritual crisis for the court in Beijing, as in the minds 
of Chinese officials it concerned the dignity of the Heavenly Dynasty in front of the 
former shuguo. Thus, China’s policy was to prevent Chosŏn from sending representatives 
to Beijing, while the Zongli Yamen began putting the short-range plan into practice. The 
first man who promoted this policy was Tang Shaoyi himself. 
On November 5, 1896, Tang informed the Zongli Yamen that the king—it seemed 
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that Tang never acknowledged the Korean monarch’s emperorship—would send 
representatives to Beijing for treaty negotiations sooner or later. Considering the possible 
ritual crisis in Beijing, it was prudent to appoint a consul general to Hansŏng to negotiate 
a treaty with Chosŏn. Tang noted that “although the system is now different, it is 
inconvenient for us to sign an equal treaty with Chosŏn as it was a fan of our dynasty for 
centuries.” Tang also pointed out that the consul general could protect the Chinese 
merchants and civilians in Chosŏn’s treaty ports, whose affairs were temporarily 
managed by the British consul general, John N. Jordan, on Beijing’s commission.5 On 
November 20, Tang was officially appointed by Emperor Guangxu as “Chinese Consul 
General Residing in Chosŏn” (Ch. Zhongguo zhuzha Chaoxian zonglingshi). 6  His 
financial budget would be 30,000 taels of silver per year provided by the Customs at 
Shanghai, sharing the same amount for his predecessors Chen Shutang and Yuan Shikai. 
Tang was one of the young Chinese students sent to the U.S. by Li Hongzhang in 
the 1870s, where he studied at Columbia University. He was recalled from the U.S. in 
1881 after the overseas program was terminated by the Chinese government and 
eventually was sent to Chosŏn as an assistant to Möllendorff in early 1883, from which 
point he started his career in Chosŏn until he left the country in 1898. Tang’s longtime 
service in Chosŏn before 1895 deeply influenced his perception of the Sino–Korean 
relationship and brought him tremendous difficulty in adjusting to the new arrangement 
after 1895. In the post-war years, Tang was still a man living in the pre-war Zongfan 
framework in his mind and trying different ways to preserve the hierarchical “system” 
between the two countries. 
                                               
5 Tang to the Zongli Yamen, November 5, 1896, in QJZRH, vol. 8, 4958-4959. 
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7.2 Preserving the “System”: The Appointment of the First Chinese Minister to Korea 
After he returned to Hansŏng from Beijing in January 1897 with the new title, Tang 
learned that the king had appointed Sŏng Ki-un (1847–1924) as the representative to 
Beijing for treaty negotiations but cancelled the plan because of Tang’s return. Tang 
visited Sŏng and clarified that China would not receive him if he directly went to Beijing. 
In his conversation with Jordan, Tang expressed that he would try his best to prevent the 
Chosŏn representative from visiting Beijing and in order to concentrate on this mission 
he commissioned Jordan to be continuously in charge of Chinese commercial affairs for 
some time.7 From then on, the primary task of the Chinese consul general was to hinder 
Chosŏn’s plan to send representatives to Beijing, rather than to protect Chinese merchants 
and commercial interests as he was supposed to do. 
The dramatic changes in Chosŏn’s political situation in 1897 stimulated the 
Foreign Office of Chosŏn to be more active in negotiating a treaty with China. After he 
returned to his palace from the Russian legation in February 1897, the king initiated a 
plan of claiming to be “emperor” or “Son of Heaven.” During the two years after the war, 
although it had difficulty in adjusting its relations with China, Chosŏn had made 
substantial efforts to construct its image as an independent country by gradually 
removing icons of the Zongfan times, including rebuilding the Gate of Receiving 
Imperial Favors into the Gate of Independence (K. Tongnim mun), burying the Samjŏndo 
Monument, changing the South Palace Annex into the Temple of Heaven (K. Ch’ŏndan), 
and replacing the Chinese managers in Chosŏn’s customs with Russians. From August 16, 
1897, Chosŏn started to use the new reign-title of “Kwangmu,” and on October 12, the 
king claimed his country the “Great Korea” (K. Taehan) after he performed ceremonies 
                                               
7 Tang to the Zongli Yamen, March 13, 1897, in QJZRH, vol. 8, 4989. 
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toward the Heaven and the Earth.8 The Country of Great Korea thus came into being, 
which was later treated as an empire by historians. All of Western diplomats soon 
formally recognized the new title of the country.9 For Tang, however, the change meant 
the king arrogated to himself an emperorship that that was wholly illegitimate. As a 
consequence, Tang’s attitude toward Chosŏn’s motivations for wanting treaty 
negotiations became more conservative and he almost suspended the negotiation. 
The Chosŏn government did not pin its hopes on Tang; rather, they started to 
forward their requests to Beijing via Russia. In March 1898, the Russian minister at 
Beijing, Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlov, forwarded to the Zongli Yamen Chosŏn’s 
willingness to send its representative to Beijing and to receive Chinese representative to 
Hansŏng.10 The Yamen immediately instructed Tang to inhibit Chosŏn from sending 
representatives to Beijing,11 that is, the Yamen decided to move first. Tang suggested that 
China should send an official with a fourth-level rank, compared to the representatives of 
other countries holding a third-level rank, in order to show the “difference between the 
owner and the servant in the past days” and to ensure the “system” would not be 
violated.12 The Japanese minister in Beijing, Yano Fumio, also contacted the Yamen as a 
mediator between China and Chosŏn.13 Yano learned from the Yamen that Chosŏn could 
negotiate with Tang in Hansŏng for a “trade regulation” (Ch. tongshang zhangcheng) and 
China did not want to receive representatives of its former shuguo.14 Both Tang and the 
Zongli Yamen were not really worried about negotiating a treaty with Chosŏn; rather, 
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9 George Alexander Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, vol. 2, 644-646. 
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14 The Zongli Yamen to Tang, June 12, 1898, in ZRJSSL, vol. 51, 36b. 
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they were trying to avoid reconfiguring their hierarchical relationship with Hansŏng and 
losing face as the Great Qing. 
With this in mind, Tang asked the Foreign Office of Korea to draft a trade 
regulation, which encountered the latter’s firm refusal in that a “regulation” (Ch. 
zhangcheng) was different from a “treaty” (Ch. tiaoyue).15 This response could be 
regarded as an ironic reflection of the “Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade 
between Chinese and Chosŏn Subjects” (RMOTCC) of 1882, which was a “regulation” 
not a “treaty.” In July, Tang reported to the Zongli Yamen that the Foreign Office had 
asked the Jordan to contact the British minister at Beijing, Claude M. MacDonald, to be a 
broker.16 Realizing that the situation was slipping out of Beijing’s hands, the Zongli 
Yamen instructed Tang that if Chosŏn insisted on sending a representative to Beijing, the 
representative should be a fourth-rank minister, whose letter of credence should be 
forwarded by the Yamen to the Chinese emperor, and he would have no need to be 
granted an audience with the emperor, while the Yamen would negotiate with him over 
the trade regulation.17 These terms suggested that the Yamen’s goal was to avoid a 
face-to-face meeting between the Korean minister and the Chinese emperor in the wake 
of the former Zongfan arrangement. Compared with Qing China’s sore adjustment to the 
fact that the Western “barbarians” like Britain and France became equal to the Central 
Kingdom in the 1840s and 1860s, such a change relative to Chosŏn was more painful. 
Tang shared the same concern with the Zongli Yamen, but he went further. In his 
telegrams to the Yamen on July 29 and August 4, Tang argued that allowing Chosŏn to 
send a minister to Beijing first would “fundamentally concern the system” (Ch. tizhi 
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16 Tang to the Zongli Yamen, July 5, 1898, in ZRJSSL, vol. 51, 39a. 
17 The Zongli Yamen to Tang, July 8, 1898, in ZRJSSL, vol. 51, 40a-40b. 
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youguan) because China was “a big country.” Tang gave two examples of how a big 
country managed such cases, including Britain and Spain who respectively sent their 
ministers first to the U.S. and those countries in South America after the latter became 
“autonomous”— zizhu. He proposed that Beijing could send a fourth-rank minister to 
Hansŏng first in order to show China’s ultimate goodness of “cherishing the former 
fan.”18 It seemed that Tang did not notify the Foreign Office in Hansŏng of Beijing’s 
plan to allow Chosŏn to send its minister to Beijing first.19 
When Tang discussed the case with the Zongli Yamen, the ambitious Reform 
Movement of 1898 initiated by Emperor Guangxu on June 11 was reaching its acme. 
Stimulated by the humiliating fiasco in the war with Japanese, the movement was to 
make considerable changes to old conventions, some of which concerned the “system.” 
The young emperor believed that China’s relations with Chosŏn should also change. On 
August 5, the emperor instructed the Grand Council to telegraph to Tang that “the coming 
of a minister of Korea to Beijing, presenting the letter of credence, and granting the 
minister with an audience are all granted.”20 In his edict, the emperor termed Chosŏn as 
“Han” (Korea), instead of “Chosŏn” as before. This was a sharp turn of Beijing’s attitude. 
The Zongli Yamen immediately instructed Tang to inform Hansŏng that Korea could send 
its minister to China first, whom China would treat with ceremonies of “friendly nations,” 
after which China would dispatch a minister to Korea for reciprocity.21 The emperor also 
instructed the high-rank official Zhang Yinhuan (1837–1900) to draft a letter of credence 
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to Korea.22 The Yamen soon presented the throne a list of 17 candidates for the minister, 
including Huang Zunxian, Zhirui, and Zeng Guangjun, who had presented their treatises 
on salvaging Chosŏn from its predicament, among whom Zhang Hengjia (1847–1911) as 
selected. As Zhang was compelled to stay in China to take care of his mother, Xu 
Shoupeng (?–1901) was appointed as the minister with a third-level official rank under 
the title of “Imperial Commissioner Residing in the Country of Chosŏn” (Ch. Zhuzha 
Chaoxian guo qinchai dachen).23 
The title of Xu brought foreign ministers in Hansŏng serious concern because the 
terms “residing” and “imperial commissioner” strongly suggested the former Zongfan 
relationship. In a conversation with Tang on August 18, the British Inspector General of 
Korean Customs, J. M. Brown, doubted that China still regarded Korea as its shuguo 
because Beijing’s imperial commissioners to Tibet and Mongolia held the similar title of 
imperial resident. Brown also pointed out that China was applying the conventional 
policy of “cherishing the small country” to Korea.24 In addition, the Russian minister to 
Korea, Nikolai Matyunin, regarded Xu’s post as that of a second-rank minister, which 
was the highest rank among his counterparts in the Corp Diplomatique in Hansŏng. The 
Japanese, French, and German ministers also expressed trepidation over Xu’s title and the 
format of the Chinese letter of credence, including the usage of the term “Chosŏn.”25 For 
these diplomats, the Chinese representative might challenge the new post-war political 
arrangement in the country. 
In Beijing, however, things changed dramatically, in particular the way China 
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addressed Korea in its letter of credence. In the original version of the letter drafted by 
Zhang Yinhuan on August 8, the starting sentence reads: “The Great Emperor of the 
Country of the Great Qing respectfully gives his greetings to the Great Monarch of the 
Country of the Great Korea.”26 This version also arranged the honorific elevation of the 
format of the letter in the manner shown in the following figure (Figure 7. 1). 
Figure 7. 1. The Original Format of the Chinese Letter of Credence to Korea, 
August 8, 1898 
 
 Great Korean Monarch  Great Qing Emperor Great Qing 1 
  Great Korea   2 
X X X X X 3 
X X X X X 4 
X X X X X 5 
e d c b a  
 
Sources: Archive catalogue no. 207/3-50-3/1922, in FHAC, cited from Mao Haijian, “Wuxu bianfa 
qijian guangxu di duiwai guannian de tiaoshi,” 48. 
 
The term the “Great Monarch” (Ch. da junzhu) in the Chinese language context at 
the time primarily referred to a king, rather than an emperor, so it could indicate the 
king’s inferior position to the Great Emperor of China (Ch. da huangdi). The 
arrangement of honorific elevation also indicated hierarchy between the two countries. 
Realizing these problems, Emperor Guangxu on September 2 instructed Tang to 
investigate which term between the “Great Monarch” and the “Great Emperor” that 
Britain, Japan, and Russia used in their letters of credence to Korea in order to make the 
Chinese copy accordant with the common rule.27 Finally, the final version of the Chinese 
letter drafted on October 6 addressed the Korean monarch as the “Great Emperor,” equal 
to its Chinese counterpart, and it put the “Great Qing” and the “Great Korea” to the same 
line. The Korean letter of credence to China adopted the same format in 1902, when the 
                                               
26 Mao Haijian, “Wuxu bianfa qijian guangxu di duiwai guannian de tiaoshi,” 48. 
27 The Grand Council to Tang, September 1, 1898, in ZRJSSL, vol. 52, 7a; Mao Haijian, ibid., 49. 
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first Korean minister reported to Beijing. The honorific elevation of format of their letters 
presented an epic change in Qing–Chosŏn relations history (Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7. 2. The Format of the Chinese and Korean Letters of Credence to Each 
Other in 1898 and 1902. 
 
 Great Korean Emperor  Great Qing Emperor  1 
  Great Korea  Great Qing 2 
X X X X X 3 
X X X X X 4 
X X X X X 5 
e d c b a  
 
 Sources: China’s letter of credence to Korea, October 6, 1898, in Chorok kuksŏko (Copies of 
letters of credence), archive catalogue no. M/F 80-103-318-O, in Kyujanggak han’guk’ak yŏn’guwŏn, 
1a-2a; Korea’s letter of credence to China, September 22, 1902, in Guangxu chao zhupi zouzhe (The palace 
memorials with Emperor Guangxu’s imperial instructions, hereafter cited as GXZP), vol. 112, 342-343. 
 
Xu was inauspiciously granted an audience with Emperor Guangxu on September 
21, 1898, the same day that the Emperor Dowager placed Emperor Guangxu under house 
arrest and terminated the ambitious Reform Movement that had surfaced that year.28 
Xu’s mission remained unchanged, but on October 15 his official title was changed from 
“imperial commissioner” into “envoy plenipotentiary” (Ch. quanquan dachen), whose 
mission was to negotiate a “treaty” with the Korean Foreign Office.29 This appointment 
erased the ambiguity of Xu’s former title and the worry of his Japanese and Western 
counterparts in Hansŏng. 
On October 19, Xu left Beijing for Tianjin, where he drafted a treaty consisting of 
14 articles. Writing on the rationale behind the treaty, Xu commented that China had 
suffered from unequal articles in its former treaties with other countries, in particular the 
items regarding extraterritoriality and customs duties, so China should change the 
situation in new treaties. Xu’s words proved that he would pursue an equal treaty with 
Korea to protect China’s interests, but he simultaneously claimed that, “Korea was 
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29 The imperial edict, October 15, 1898, in QJZRH, vol. 8, 5160. 
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China’s fan and shuguo in the past and it is not Korea’s original wish to be equal and 
autonomous. It is small and surrounded by powerful neighbors. We should do our best to 
cherish it, rather than gain extra advantages from it.” Along this line, Xu’s primary goal 
was to make sure that both countries could enjoy the right of most-favored-nation status 
in trade.30 It was clear that the Chinese envoy plenipotentiary positioned himself among 
those Chinese officials who were viewing the post-war Sino–Korean relationship from 
the pre-war Zongfan perspective. 
7.3 From Shuguo to Friendly Nation: The Sino–Korean Treaty of 1899 and thereafter 
With the intention of “extending the benevolence of cherishing the small country,”31 Xu 
arrived in Hansŏng on January 25, 1899, and was granted an audience with the Korean 
emperor on February 1. The procedures of the audience were conducted according to 
Western-style regulations practiced between the monarch and Western ministers. On the 
day of the audience, Xu was picked up by a sedan chair to the palace. When he entered 
the audience hall, he bowed once toward the emperor, and he bowed again when he was 
approaching the emperor. The emperor, wearing Western-style clothes, stood up to shake 
hands with Xu and receive Xu’s letter of credence. Xu then read some words aloud to 
extol the virtues of the emperor, who in return showed his sincere thanks to the Chinese 
minister. After his, they shook hands again and Xu bowed for the third time to the 
emperor. When this was accomplished, Xu was escorted back to the Chinese legation by 
the sedan chair.32 The ceremony, conducted along the lines of “Western common rules” 
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at a state-to-state level, was the first ritual performance between the Korean Chief of 
State and the Chinese state representative in the post-1895 period and in the entire history 
of Sino–Korean relations, marking the termination of centuries-long Zongfan rituals 
between the two countries in a very substantial sense. 
From February 15, Xu started the treaty negotiations based on his draft version 
with Pak Che-sun (1858–1916), the minister of the Foreign Office. After a 
seven-month-long tug-of-war, the two sides signed a treaty on September 11. The treaty 
consisted of 15 articles, among which Article 1 states that the Great Qing and the Great 
Korea should keep perpetual peace and friendship, Article 2 states they should dispatch 
diplomatic representatives to reside at capital and treaty ports of each other and both 
countries would enjoy the most-favored-nation treatment, Article 5 endows each other 
with the right of consular jurisdiction, and Article 12 states the two countries would 
negotiate new regulations for border demarcation and trade on frontier in Manchuria.33 
The most significant part for Korea was that China would allow a permanent 
representative of Korea to reside in Beijing. More importantly, compared with the 
Chinese exclusive consular jurisdiction in Korea regulated by the RMOTCC of 1882, 
Korea now gained the right of consular jurisdiction in China, just as was permitted of the 
Western powers and Japan. 
The treaty seemed to be an equivalent replacement for the RMOTCC, but it was 
not really equal for China. A typical case was the second item of Article 9, which states 
that China was forbidden to export opium to Korea, but similar restrictions did not apply 
to Korean exports to China. For items like these, Xu explained to Emperor Guangxu that 
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the treaty had some unique contents because he found “the monarch and subordinates of 
Korea still worship China in their minds, which contributed to the success of the 
negotiation.”34 Indeed, Xu conducted negotiations in this self-assumed setting. After the 
sign of the treaty, he commented that “Korea was China’s fan and shuguo and it now 
becomes a friendly nation of China. Nothing can change the situation. Recalling the past, 
what a pity it is.”35 On December 14, the ratification of the treaty was exchanged in 
Hansŏng and Xu was simultaneously appointed by Beijing as the first Chinese minister to 
Korea. In contrast to Tang Shaoyi, who struggled with China’s lost glories of the Zongfan 
system and ritual crises in the post-war years, Xu merely presented as a Western-style 
Chinese minister and quickly busied himself with reestablishing the Chinese diplomatic 
system in Hansŏng and other treaty ports to protect Chinese citizens and interests. 
According to the treaty, Korea was supposed to send its minister to Beijing as 
well, yet this plan was postponed by China’s deteriorating situation. The Boxer Uprising 
was sweeping across northwestern Shandong province and was beginning to spread 
toward Tianjin and Beijing. As history unfolded, the xenophobic uprising eventually 
resulted in diplomatic and political disaster for China in August 1900, when the 
Eight-Nation Alliance occupied Beijing and Emperor Guangxu and Empress Dowager 
Cixi fled to Xi’an. Starting in October, Li Hongzhang began to negotiate with the powers 
in Beijing as the Chinese representative plenipotentiary. In view of the changes in China, 
on October 5, the Korean emperor wrote a letter to the Japanese emperor, asking Japan to 
protect Korean interests in China during the negotiation. 36  In January 1901, Xu 
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Shoupeng was recalled from Hansŏng to Beijing to assist Li with the negotiation and he 
assigned Xu Taishen, one of his counselors, as the acting minister in Korea. On July 24, 
1901, the Zongli Yamen changed its Chinese name to Waiwu bu—the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, legitimating itself as China’s foreign office, of which Xu Shoupeng was 
appointed as one of its ministers. On September 7, Li signed the final protocol with the 
powers which made the Chinese empire totter on the edge of collapse. With the return of 
Emperor Guangxu and Empress Dowager Cixi to the Forbidden City in early January 
1902, Korea was ready to send its minister to Beijing. 
On January 30, 1902, Pak Che-sun, Xu’s Korean treaty negotiator and the former 
commercial commissioner in Tianjin from 1884 to 1887, was appointed as the first 
minister plenipotentiary of Korea to China.37 On September 30, 1902, Pak presented the 
Korean letter of credence to Emperor Guangxu in the Forbidden City by following the 
Chinese tailored Western-style procedures.38 The ceremony of kowtow that had been 
performed by Korean emissaries in front of the Chinese emperor for centuries 
disappeared forever. It is probable that the imperial court of China was put in an awkward 
situation when it participated in ritual practices face-to-face with the representatives of its 
former and most loyal fan and shuguo, for all Chinese official records on the audience 
were very simple and short, exactly like those on the first meeting between Emperor 
Tongzhi and foreign ministers in 1873. Behind the rituals were the glorious memories of 
the great Chinese empire. After the audience, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed 
Xu to send two interpreters of Korean language to Beijing for further communications 
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with Pak.39 This was the first time that Chinese foreign ministry recruited Korean 
language translators. The new relationship between China and Chosŏn thus started, but it 
only lasted for three years, as Korea became Japan’s protectorate in November 1905. 
The transformation of the Sino–Korean relationship in China’s provinces was not 
as significant as that in Beijing. In the coastal areas of South China, local officials still 
followed the pre-war routines to manage affairs with Korea. An example of this 
continuity can be found in Zhejiang’s policy of assisting Korean people who suffered 
shipwrecks. In December 1895, Liao Shoufeng (1836–1901), Governor of Zhejiang, sent 
a memorial to Emperor Guangxu, informing that the official in charge of Wenzhou had 
salvaged 28 Koreans from a shipwreck in early October and cared the victims with 
clothes and food by “following conventions” (Ch. xunli). According to the longtime 
conventions regulated by the Zongfan codes, these victims should be sent to the capital of 
Zhejiang first, then to Beijing, where they would be sent back to Chosŏn through the 
overland route. Considering some of them were too young to go through the long and 
exhausting trip, the Zhejiang officials decided to send them to Shanghai, where they were 
sent back to Chosŏn by a ship on October 31. In his memorial, Liao called these Chosŏn 
victims “barbarians who suffered from troubles” (Ch. nanfan),40 highlighting the same 
Zongfan rationale as that in the pre-war period. The governor made some changes to the 
“system” and “conventions” in Zhejiang, so he felt necessary to clarify to the emperor 
and the Ministry of Rituals. With the emperor’s endorsement on the adjustment, the 
Wenzhou case became a model for Chinese local officials to deal with similar cases in the 
next years. 
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In May 1901, Yu Lianyuan, Governor of Zhejiang, reported in his memorial that 
15 Korean fishermen wrecked their ship on China’s coast and he had “followed the 
conventions to take care of them” (Ch. xunli fuxu) by sending them to Shanghai, where 
they could be sent back to Korea. Yu emphasized that he consulted the Wenzhou case in 
1895.41 Yu was once one of the pillars of the Pure Stream in the 1890s, and was among 
those who desperately hoped that Beijing could protect Chosŏn for the sake of the 
integrity of the Great Qing, and for that purpose he even proposed to the emperor that 
Beijing should invest a royal member of Chosŏn in Pyongyang. By this juncture, China 
had signed a new treaty with Korea and Yu had been promoted to governor, yet in his 
mind Chosŏn—as he literally used the term, instead of “Han” (Korea)—was still a fan of 
the Great Qing and the Korean fishermen were still “barbarians” according to the 
politico-cultural arrangement of the Chinese empire. His memorial in the early twentieth 
century shared striking similarities with those in the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong 
periods in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. More importantly, Yu was not an 
exception, as his successors from 1902 to 1908 embraced the same approach.42 In almost 
all cases, the Korean victims were termed as “barbarians” that were the human agents of 
China’s policy of “cherishing the small country” or “cherishing the men from afar.”43 
Compared with the moderate presentation of the post-war transformation of the 
Sino–Korean relationship in South China, the one at the border areas in Manchuria was 
full of blood, fire, and death. According to the reports of Chinese officials in Manchuria 
in 1907, the Koreans started to attack and loot Chinese villages along the border of Jilin 
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and Mukden in the late 1890s, and the situation sharply deteriorated after 1901 when 
Beijing was occupied by the Eight-Nation Alliance, and Manchuria by Russia.44 For 
example, a local official in Yanji, Chen Zuoyan, reported that a Korean attack against a 
Chinese area in March 1901 caused the death of 11 Chinese people and a loss of 4337.81 
taels of silver.45 At the same time, some Chinese bandits also crossed the rivers to pillage 
Korean villages, and on the China’s side of the border areas the Chinese pawns always 
tried to extract money from Korean immigrants. 
Many historical and geopolitical factors contributed to such violent conflicts on 
the border. On the one hand, the absence of demarcation in the convergence zone of the 
Yalu River and the Tumen River had been a problem between the two countries since in 
the Kangxi period in the eighteenth century. Under the conventional ideal ideology of 
“all-under-Heaven” shared by China and Chosŏn within the Zongfan framework, the 
borderline between the two countries existed, but not as clearly delineated and defined as 
in modern times between two independent sovereign states. In the first half of the 
twentieth century, this problem evolved into a most disputed boundary issue known as the 
“Kando Problem” among China, Korea, and Japan.46 
Additionally, the intensive border dispute could be directly related to the opening 
of Manchuria in the 1870s, when Qing China abolished the two-century-long policy of 
segregating Manchuria from inner China by encouraging people to immigrate there for 
cultivation. The policy attracted thousands of poor Korean peasants, who crossed the 
                                               
44 Wen Luzhan’s report, June 2, 1907, in Zhao Erxun quanzong dang’an (The complete archives of Zhao 
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Tumen River to cultivate the wilderness in the convergence zone, forcing China to 
consider how to manage the border-crossing farmers when more and more migrants 
settled down on the Chinese side of the borderline.47 In 1882, Emperor Guangxu 
instructed local officials to manage the Korean immigrants “as long as they have no 
intention of encroaching on our borders.”48 With the coming of impressive numbers of 
Koreans to the area, China in 1890 ordered them to get Chinese-style haircuts and wear 
Chinese clothes, which aimed to assimilate these Korean immigrants into the Chinese 
populace. This policy precipitated a strong remonstrance of Hansŏng.49 
After 1901, the Chinese local officials believed that Korea was aggressively 
expanding to Manchuria and the Korean immigrants comprised the vanguard of Korea’s 
colonization of China’s territory in Manchuria. These migrants significantly outnumbered 
the Chinese population in this region. In 1907, Wu Luzhen, the Chinese investigator in 
charge of the Sino–Korean border affairs, reported that the Koreans on the Chinese side 
of the Tumen River were numbered more than 50,000 people, compared to less than 
10,000 Chinese in the same area. According to Wu’s investigation of 39 villages in an 
area called Helongyu, the Korean settlers had established 5,990 households, an amount 
that dwarfed the 264 Chinese households in the same region. Wu commented that, “the 
fundamental area of our dynasty has almost become Chosŏn’s colony (Ch. zhimin zhi 
di).”50 Although in time Korea itself would become a victim of Japanese colonial and 
imperial designs, the Chinese side of the Tumen River faced colonization at the hands of 
Korean settlers from the 1880s to the 1900s. This, ironically, served as a convenient 
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vehicle for the expansion of Japanese colonization of Manchuria after Korea was annexed 
by Japan in 1910. 
The sharp rise of border conflicts between China and Korea in the early 1900s 
captures the disorder of the local contacts after the Zongfan political arrangement 
collapsed. For local and non-official forces on both sides of the border, in particular 
impoverished peasants, the practical considerations and big pressure from daily life—the 
fertile land, food, livestock, and energy resources—prevailed over state interests. With 
the sudden absence of Chinese authority as a result of international political intrigue 
among China, Japan, Russia, and Britain, the border area in Manchuria became a perfect 
place for both Chinese and Korean bandits and other non-official armed forces to 
violently extract sources from the local farmers or settlers. From early 1901 to early 1905, 
Mukden and Jilin respectively reported 12 and 16 cases of border-crossed crimes 
committed by Korean soldiers or bandits, including armed robberies, burglaries, 
shootings, homicides, rapes, kidnappings, arson, and illegal logging. During the same 
period, at least four cases of illegal logging and kidnappings on Korean side were 
reported as committed by Chinese bandits.51 
The situation deteriorated rapidly as more Korean immigrants poured into the 
Chinese side of the border crossing. In July 1903, Chen Zuoyan reported a series of 
misdeeds by Koreans on the Chinese side of the Tumen River and called for Beijing to 
take urgent measures to protect the Chinese interests.52 According to a Chinese local 
report, the Korean armed attack against four villages in Yanjin in the fall of 1903 harmed 
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211 Chinese and Korean households and caused a loss of more than 19,546.46 taels of 
silver.53 In August 1903, by emphasizing that “Korea is different from the past,” the 
Chinese minister in Hansŏng, Xu Taishen, suggested to Beijing that China should 
implement countermeasures to check the Korean expansion into the Kando area. Britain 
and Japan, incidentally, had informed Xu that Russian machinations were behind the 
attempt to settle Koreans in Kando.54 In the following two years, the Chinese and Korean 
foreign ministries busied themselves with settling the border disputes in Manchuria, but 
yielded nothing practical. 
The accumulated conflicts eventually resulted in a skirmish in the spring of 1904, 
when the Chinese officer Hu Dianjia led his forces to victory against Korean soldiers who 
crossed the Tumen River with the purpose of occupying more lands and to encourage the 
local Korean immigrants to break away from the Chinese governance. This was the first 
time that China used its force to resolve disputes with Korea in the post-1895 period. As a 
result, China resumed its control over the area and forced Korea to return to peace talks. 
On June 15, 1904, two Chinese officials, Hu Dianjia and Chen Zuoyan, and three Korean 
officials, Kim Myŏng-hwan, Ch’oe Nam-nyung, and Ch’oe Byŏng-yak, signed a 
regulation on border affairs, which included 12 articles aiming to resolve some specific 
problems arising from the incident in spring.55 Nevertheless, as it was negotiated and 
signed by the local officials of both countries, the regulation was primarily an agreement 
on managing the unresolved affairs after the skirmish, instead of a state-to-state treaty 
with a long-term strategic goal of settling the border disputes. 
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In this period, both Beijing and Hansŏng had no more time or opportunities to 
review and transform their several-century-long Zongfan relations. From Zhejiang in 
South China to Beijing, to Yanji in Manchuria, then to Hansŏng, the Sino–Korean 
relationship presented itself in several different, disconnected, and dismal facets. The two 
countries could have established a normal relationship based on the international law in 
the twentieth century, yet the advent of Japanese colonialism rendered this scenario 
impossible. 
7.4 For the Sake of China: The Chinese Perceptions of the Colonial Korea in the 
1910s 
When the above-mentioned Sino–Korean regulation was signed in Manchuria, Japan was 
fighting with Russia for control of the area and finally prevailed in October 1905. 
Following the end of the war, Japan publicly converted Korea into a protectorate, and as a 
result the Korean minister to Beijing was recalled to Hansŏng and all foreign contacts 
between Korea and China were taken over by the Japanese legation in Beijing. In 
February 1906, with the closing of British, American, and French legations in Hansŏng 
and the coming of the Japanese Residential General, China recalled its third minister to 
Korea, Zeng Guangquan. In order to protect the interests of the Chinese merchants in 
Korea, Beijing appointed Ma Tingliang as the consular general to reside in Hansŏng from 
1909, a year after Emperor Guangxu and Empress Dowager Cixi died and the new 
emperor was inaugurated with the reign-title of Xuantong. At this moment, China was 
being shaken violently from within by various reforms, rebellions, and revolutions, so 
that its relationship with the Japanese-controlled Korea was not its priority. In August 
1910, after being controlled by Japan for more than five years, Korea was annexed by 
Japan as a part of the Japanese empire. 
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For the Beijing government, the Japanese annexation of Korea was not surprising, 
although for many Chinese officials the Japanese control over Korea after 1905 had been 
“heartbreaking” due to a sharp contrast to the pre-war Sino–Korean relationship.56 In 
Manchuria, however, the General-Governor of Three Northeastern Provinces (Ch. 
Dongsansheng zongdu), Xiliang (1853–1917), was alarmed by Japan’s likely “policy of 
colonization” (Ch. zhimin zhengce) of Manchuria through the Korean subjects who had 
been living in the China’s side along the Sino–Korean border areas. In his reports in 
September and October 1910, Xiliang reported to Beijing that more than 30,000 Korean 
immigrants were living together with Chinese people on China’s side along the border, 
which Xiliang identified as “China’s inner land” (Ch. neidi), a term primarily referring to 
the lands south of the Shanhai Pass. According to Xiliang, after these Korean immigrants 
became Japanese citizens due to the Japanese annexation, they would not be subject to 
Chinese law and local governments, but to Japanese consular jurisdiction. Xiliang 
emphasized that this change would “harm our sovereignty” (Ch. sun wo zhuquan) and 
“the thousands of Korean immigrants would play the lead in Japan’s annexation of 
Manchuria.” Thus, he suggested to Beijing that China should use the newly issued 
Nationality Regulations of the Great Qing (Ch. Daqing guoji tiaoli) to convert the 
Korean immigrants into Chinese citizens in order to make the territorial borderline 
distinct and secure.57 
In August 1911, the new General-Governor of Three Northeaster Provinces, Zhao 
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Erxun (1844–1927), urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing to endorse 
Xinliang’s strategy of converting the thousands of Korean immigrants along the border 
areas into Chinese citizens. By stressing that “all the more than ten local counties along 
the Yalu River belong to China’s inner land,” Zhao suggested that China should instruct 
the Korean migrants to “become civilized” (Ch. guihua) by gaining Chinese citizenship.58 
Zhao, like his predecessors, was fully aware that the issue of the nationality of the Korean 
immigrants deeply concerned China’s independent “sovereignty” (Ch. zhuquan), which 
reflexed that in the early 1910s the Chinese officials, at least those in Manchuria, 
perceived Chinese–Korean relations purely from the state-to-state level. Yet before 
Beijing responded to the proposal of the governor, the nationalist revolution broke out in 
Wuhan in October 1911, resulting in the quick collapse of the Great Qing. 
On February 7, 1912, when the revolution of 1911 had prevailed in China and the 
new Republic of China (Ch. Zhonghua minguo) had been founded in Nanjing on January 
1, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing in Beijing received Ma Tingliang’s report 
on the expiration of his three-year-long service in Korea.59 Yet Beijing would never have 
any opportunity to appoint an official to succeed Ma as the consular general in colonized 
Korea. Five days later, on February 12, 1912, the Manchu court issued the abdication 
edict, declaring the end of the Qing. The primary part of the edict reads that, 
 
So long as the form of government remains undecided, so long will the disturbed 
condition of the country continue. It is clear that the minds of majority of the 
people are favorable to the establishment of a republican form of government, the 
Southern and Central provinces first holding this view, and the officers in the 
North lately adopting the same sentiments. The universal desire clearly expresses 
the will of Heaven (Ch. tianming), and it is not for us to oppose the desires and 
incur the disapproval of the millions of the People merely for the sake of the 
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privileges and powers of a single House. It is right that this general situation 
should be considered and due deference given to the opinion of the People. I, the 
Empress Dowager, therefore, together with the Emperor, hereby hand over the 
sovereignty (Ch. tongzhi quan) to be the possession of the whole people, and 
declare that the constitution shall henceforth to be Republican, in order to satisfy 
the demands of those within the confines of the nation, hating disorder and 
desiring peace, and anxious to follow the teaching of the sages, according to 
which the country is the possession of the People (Ch. tianxia weigong). 
 
The royal family acknowledged that the Great Qing was losing its mandate of 
heaven, namely, the “will of Heaven,” which the founder of the dynasty, Nurhaci, 
claimed to possess in 1616. Different from what had occurred in Chinese history, 
however, the Great Qing decided to hand over the “sovereignty” to the “whole people,” 
instead of another group of people that would found another dynasty and form a new 
imperial court. In retrospect, although the last emperor of the Great Qing, Emperor 
Xuantong (1906–1967, r. 1908–1911), would stay in the Forbidden City for another 12 
years until 1924 when he was forced to leave, the history of royal court in China and the 
ideology of “all-under-Heaven” officially came to an end.  
In the abdication edict, the Qing court also envisioned the post-Qing political 
construction of China by emphasizing the unification of the multiethnic and multicultural 
country. It articulates that, 
 
Yuan Shikai, having been elected some time ago president of the National 
Assembly at Peking, is therefore able at this time of change to unite the North and 
the South, let him then, with full powers so to do, organize a provisional 
Republican Government, conferring thereon with the representatives of the Army 
of the People, that peace may be assured to the People whilst the complete 
integrity of the territories of the five races, Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, 
Muhammadans, and Tibetans, is at the same time maintained, making together a 
great state under the title the Republic of China.60 
 
According to this blueprint, new China would integrate the outer subordinates or 
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outer fan that were under the management of the Mongolian Superintendency during the 
Qing dynasty into its territory, but it would not encompass the outer fan under the 
Ministry of Rituals, most of which were actually under colonial rule of powers at the time, 
including the prototypical fan Chosŏn.  
From then on, China, or Zhongguo, has been principally defining itself by its state 
sovereignty and borderline, making the connotations of the Chinese empire considerably 
shrink. As a consequence, the Chinese historical narratives in the post-Qing era 
indiscriminately treat all outer fan that were under the Ministry of Rituals as figures 
outside of the Chinese empire. Therefore, both China’s and these countries’ history have 
been individually conducted in a nation-state historical framework by blurring the shared 
Zongfan memory in late imperial and modern times. 
The edict made Yuan Shikai the heart of the Beijing government after the end of 
Qing China’s governance. Yuan, who started his political career in Chosŏn in the 1880s 
and served as the Chinese Imperial Resident in Hansŏng for a decade, now became the 
most powerful man in China and would soon become the first president of Republic of 
China following the provisional president Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). His short 
governance from 1912 to 1916 proved essential for the new Chinese state to maintain 
unity in the hectic times after the Manchu dynasty fell to pieces, which in the long run 
laid the foundation for a multiethnic and multicultural People’s Republic of China that 
arose in 1949. 
In 1912, Yuan’s Korean friends also witnessed the fall of the Great Qing in the 
colonial Korea. On February 17, 1912, five days after the Qing court declared to 
terminate its own rule, China celebrated its first Chinese New Year’s Eve in the post-Qing 
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period. In Kyŏngsŏng—the new name of Hansŏng under the Japanese colonial rule, the 
78-year-old official Kim Yun-sik heard that the Chinese merchants and residents in the 
south village of the city played firecrackers for the whole night and they played much 
more than before. In his diary, Kim commented that, 
 
They are celebrating the abolishment of the country of the Qing and the 
establishment of the new Republic of China with its new national flag. In 
retrospect, the royal court of the Qing lasted for more than 260 years and had able 
and virtuous monarchs for generations. The Qing had deep benevolence and 
profound kindness. Now it is gone, and the [Chinese] people are celebrating for 
that. The reason lies in the fact that they belong to different races. This makes me 
feel really sad.61 
 
Exactly 30 years before, on February 16, 1882, the Chinese New Year’s Eve, Kim was on 
his way from Baoding to Tianjin in China after his second conversation with Li 
Hongzhang over Chosŏn’s plan to negotiate a treaty with the United States. During the 
three proceeding decades, Kim witnessed violent coups, Yuan’s residence in Hansŏng, the 
termination of Sino–Korean Zongfan relations, the rise of the Great Korean Empire, 
Korea’s new treaty with China and the coming of new Chinese ministers, the bloody 
border conflicts in Manchuria, the Japanese annexation of Korea, and the fall of the Great 
Qing. Since he was knighted by the Japanese colonial rulers after Japan annexed Korea, 
Kim primarily stayed at home without participating in public activities until he presented 
a fervent petition to the Japanese government for his country’s independence in the 
March First Independence Movement in 1919, two months before the May Fourth 
Movement broke out in China. 
In retrospect, Chosŏn Korea was colonized by Meiji Japan in 1910, followed by 
the fall of the Great Qing in 1911. From 1912, Japan entered the period of Daishō, China 
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entered the period of the Republic, while Chosŏn became a victim of Japanese 
colonialism. The dramatic changes in the political framework between China and Korea, 
and the rapid proliferation of the ideas of national independence in the Chinese world in 
the 1910s, changed Chinese perception of Korea. In the 1910s, official visitors from the 
Republic of China to Korea treated the colonized country either as a positive example of 
Japanese modernization or a negative example of Japanese colonialism, and a warning to 
China about the dangers of being subjugated under colonial rule. 
In October 1915, when President Yuan Shikai was considering restoring a 
dynastic system with himself as the first emperor of the Chinese Empire (Ch. Zhonghua 
diguo), two officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce of the Beijing 
government, Wang Yangbin and Wan Baoyuan, were invited by the Japanese government 
to participate in the Competitive Exhibition of Korean Agricultural and Industrial Goods 
(J. chōsen kyōshinkai). In their records, Wang and Wan depicted the outstanding 
achievements of Korea under the Japanese colonial rule and the efficiency of the local 
administrative apparatuses, leaving the centuries long Zongfan relations between China 
and Korea unconsidered. Ironically, during their sojourn Wang and Wan lived in the 
Korean Hotel, the place of the former South Palace Annex that accommodated the Ming 
and Qing imperial envoys for centuries, yet for them this place seemed to hold no 
historical significance.62 After all, the Qing was a late and unredeemable dynasty in the 
minds of two citizens of the first modern Chinese republic, although the last emperor of 
the Qing was still living in the Forbidden City. On October 23, they took rickshaws to 
visit the Gate of Independence, where they saw the debris of the former Gate of 
Receiving Imperial Favors that originally built in the Ming period and existed until 1895. 
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Again, for them, the location was only presented only as a tourist site that did not reflect 
the history of Sino–Korean relations.63 Their visit, however, could very well have been 
historically meaningful, as their president, who had been the H. I. C. M. Resident of Qing 
China, was preparing to restore the emperorship in Beijing. 
In December 1917, when China was roiling in civil wars among warlords in the 
post-Yuan Shikai period, the Chinese official Chen Linzhi, dean of the Department of 
Industry of Zhili Province, visited Korea to learn ways of stimulating industry. During his 
trip, Chen lamented the sharp and dramatic decline of the Chinese business in Korea, 
reflecting overseas influences of the demise of the Qing empire. Yet Chen gave much 
credit to Japanese colonial rule after he investigated their local agriculture, industry, 
irrigation, finance, education, and so forth. Viewing Korea as a successful case, Chen 
suggested that China learn the Japanese model of combining several methods in order to 
promote Chinese national industry and economic growth.64  
By contrast, an anonymous Chinese visitor who visited Korea in 1918 on his way 
to Japan revealed the Korean tragedies under the Japanese colonial rule. The visitor 
ascribed such impressive developments in Korea, such as those Chen Linzhi praised in 
1917, to draconian colonialism. The anonymous author claimed that it was the blood of 
the Korean people that nourished the remarkable achievements, which forced him to 
assert that in several decades the whole country and the ethnic Korean peoples would 
become extinct.65 By underscoring the danger of colonialism, the author tried to mobilize 
his Chinese countrymen to save China from being subjugated by foreign powers like 
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Japan. The passionate and patriotic author might have been more or less relieved when 
the May Fourth Movement erupted in Beijing next year, when the March First 
Independence Movement coincidently took place in Seoul. Both movements opened a 
new chapter in history of the two countries. More importantly, the Korean nationalists 
who survived the Japanese suppression of the March First Independence Movement 
escaped to China and swiftly established a government in exile—the Provisional 
Government of the Republic of Korea—in Shanghai, making China a safe harbor for the 
overseas Korean nationalist movement, and thus triggering another transformation of the 
Sino–Korean relationship in the twentieth century. 
In the late 1910s, with the establishment of the Korean government in exile in 
Shanghai, the pre-1895 inner dual system between China and Korea was resuscitated. It 
linked the Korean nationalist party with the Chinese nationalist party, on the one hand, 
and it linked the Korean state—which only existed as an imagined state as a consequence 
of Japan’s annexation of Korea—with the Chinese state, on the other. The dual system 
remained the basic political arrangement for China and Korea. This was also true of the 
Korean nationalist party in its relations with the Kuomintang and the Communists of 
China, and it remained so throughout the era of the Republic in mainland China, from 
1912 to 1949, and since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, and through 
the division of Korea between north and south since 1948. Once this inner order resumed, 
both countries followed their own agendas in order to manage their relations and other 
issues and barely play the game within the family of nations. 
This phenomenon shares common characteristics with the trajectory of Sino–
Vietnamese relations in the twentieth century, which is not a historical coincidence. The 
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conundrum of Sino–Korean relations and Sino–Vietnamese relations in the China-centric 
Zongfan system in the late nineteenth century is that the system found itself 
reincarnations in the new historical setting in the twentieth century with the rise of 
nationalist revolutions in these countries. The current fact that many people outside the 
sphere of the Chinese world have difficulty in understanding Chinese–North Korean, 
Chinese–Vietnamese relations, or the territorial disputes between China, Korea, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, and Japan illustrates this point. In a sense, what inner changes 
Western-style treaties, wars, colonialism, and imperialism had brought into the Chinese 
world still remains a critical question. A key to this question and understanding of 
relations between China and those countries that had served as its fan in the Qing period 
is to investigate what happened between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea—the 
prototypical fan of the Chinese empire under the Qing—over the span of the three 
centuries from the 1610s to the 1910s. 
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CONCLUSION 
Embracing Zongfan Legacies: The Persistence of the Chinese Empire in Post-Qing 
China 
In the span of four centuries, from the early seventeenth to the present, China has 
considerably remade itself, just as the rest of the world has fundamentally altered China. 
There is irony in that in the early seventeenth century China was the world to emperor 
and his tributaries or subordinate countries. In the early twenty-first century, China is 
now a part of the world, yet in the imperial consciousness and the presentation of the 
Chinese empire, China still remains at the center. The “Westernization” of China has been 
a historical process of “modernization” that vibrantly began in the early nineteenth 
century and presented itself as “globalization” in the late twentieth century. The 
modernization of Chinese society on Western lines has proved an essential tool for its 
survival against fierce competitors in the last two centuries. This was accomplished 
without homogenizing Chinese society, both within and in its China-centric periphery. 
The late twentieth century saw China’s global standing surge, a phenomenon labeled the 
“rise of China.” This supposedly new development is actually a combination of the 
observable changes in modern Chinese society, on the surface, and some misleading 
myths about late imperial China underneath the acclaim. Taking this observation into 
account, we will find that China remains an influential insider, as well as a powerful 
outsider to the family of nations, an international system that is regulated by Western 
political and diplomatic norms. For observers both inside and outside the Chinese state 
today, China’s relations with the countries on its periphery are the most perplexing and 
even inflammatory challenges to China itself. 
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It is a basic tenet of China’s self-image that “China,” or Zhongguo, a dynamic and 
abstract politico-cultural concept of a regime dominating certain territory as the Central 
Kingdom, has always been mutually defined by its relations with other countries on its 
periphery—that is, by a combination of the country’s own perception and the devotion of 
its neighbors to Chinese civilization. In its time-honored history, China has been 
constituted by different dynasties or regimes that were invested with a pedigree of 
orthodox legitimacy. Yet these rulers had to cope with the divide between themselves and 
the country’s China-centric cosmopolitanism, leading to frequent challenges from both 
inside and outside China’s borders.  
This nebulous twofold nature of China’s identification helps explain why some 
Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Huang 
Zunxian in 1894 and Liang Qichao in 1900, in the context of exploring China’s future by 
comparing China with European states, were struggling with the definition of China, or 
Zhongguo, for they could not find a consistent name for the Central Kingdom in Chinese 
history.1 It can also explain why, as Liang Qichao critically pointed out in his treatise 
exploring the reasons for China’s weakness, the Chinese for a long time could not tell the 
difference between “state” (Ch. guojia) and “all-under-Heaven” (Ch. tianxia) and that 
between “state” and “court” (Ch. chaoting).2 
China has fundamentally transformed since its late imperial times, which has 
bequeathed rich historical legacies to the country that are playing a crucial and powerful 
role in defining, nourishing, and maintaining its identity, unity, historical memories, and 
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worldview. A brief review of Chinese history in the past four centuries illuminates 
China’s transformation during the prolonged duet between itself and its cosmopolitanism, 
a process that allow us to grasp the significance of the historical legacy of late imperial 
China. 
In the early seventeenth century, the Qing launched the transformation of China, 
and this would deeply affect China’s territory, ethnicity, politics, society, culture, 
economy, diplomacy, and so forth. By the 1790s, the Qing had replaced the Ming as the 
Central Kingdom. The dynasty expanded China’s territory into today’s Southwestern 
China and Central Asia, in the process building a vast Eurasian Chinese empire under the 
China-centric Zongfan world order. Under the Zongfan framework, the Qing, identifying 
itself as the Central Kingdom and the Heavenly Dynasty, continued to provide legitimacy 
to political entities on China’s periphery, such as Chosŏn, Ryukyu, Vietnam, and Burma. 
Qing China in the eighteenth century turned out to be the flowering of the Chinese 
empire. From 1839 to 1912, Qing China experienced a turbulent chapter, in which it 
became a victim of great power rivalry. Yet, as a single state with clear territory and 
sovereignty in the European sense, China also survived as a multicultural and multiethnic 
empire, manifested in the new picture of the Chinese state that was drawn by the imperial 
edict of abdication in 1912.  
Following the fall of the Qing dynasty, the political and social turmoil continued 
for another four decades until the early 1950s, when the newly founded People’s 
Republic of China recovered the general domain of Qing China from the hands of 
Chinese nationalist and other non-communist forces, and started to govern the vast 
territory with a new form of regime and a set of new political, cultural, and social norms 
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imported from the West. Since the 1950s, the People’s Republic has witnessed the rise of 
the revolutionary cosmopolitanism during the Cold War, which reached Korean peninsula 
and Indochina, the two venues of China’s outer fan, and seen the irredeemable fall of this 
order in the post-Cold War period. China under the People’s Republic has become a 
interests-driven Chinese state. It continues to exploit historical sources from late imperial 
China to ensure and maintain its unity and running as a sovereign state. It also tries to 
reinforce and enhance its legitimacy both in China’s inner land and on China’s borders. 
In the wake of national independence and decolonization after WWII, almost all 
countries that were subordinate to Qing China as its outer fan under the management of 
the Ministry of Rituals became independent from the China-centric Zongfan family. As 
the People’s Republic of China identified itself as a state clearly defined by international 
law, it made sedulous efforts to integrate certain areas, from Manchuria to Inner Asia to 
Indochina, and then to Taiwan and the small islands of South China Sea, into the 
inseparable territory of the Chinese state. Tibet, which was under the management of the 
Mongolian Superintendency of the Great Qing and treated as a nation equal to China by 
the first international law published in China in 1864,3 became territory of the People’s 
Republic in the early 1950s, which is one of the best cases illuminating this point.4 In 
this sense, the People’s Republic has fulfilled what the Republic of China wanted but 
failed to realize during the latter’s continental period from 1912 to 1949. This was, of 
course, because China was in deep national crises and de facto disunion as a result of the 
collapse of the Qing and the comprehensive penetration and intrusion of imperialist and 
                                               
3 Ding Weiliang (W. A. P. Martin) trans., Wanguo gongfa (Elements of International Law), vol. 1, 1. 
4 See, for example, Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951, 638-813; Sam van 
Schaik, Tibet: A History, 207-269; Pingti Ho, “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s 
‘Reenvisioning the Qing’,” 149. 
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colonial forces. It was also during this hectic period before the triumph of the communist 
revolution that China eventually failed to reclaim Outer Mongolia as its territory, 
although in 1916 the Republican government under President Yuan Shikai successfully 
restored the Zongfan order with Outer Mongolia by following the convention of imperial 
investiture during the Qing period.5 
China has remade its borders (Ch. bianjiang), just as it has been reinvented at its 
core. Since 1949, almost all border areas that had been either tightly or loosely governed 
by the Qing dynasty have become China’s territory, as Beijing installed a centralized 
hierarchical political system between the central government and the local political 
organs in these areas. Viewed from the perspective of statecraft, this extensive policy of 
provincializing these areas has completely erased any ambiguity that could otherwise 
have been caused by patriarchal relationships or kinship between central political forces 
and their local agents, such as those practiced in the Zongfan era. What has been 
facilitating this policy is a series of political movements from the top down, such as the 
Great Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Aside from their specific political 
motivations and diverse manifestations in local milieus, these movements have converted 
the people of these areas into Chinese citizens. It has introduced them to concepts such as 
the sovereignty of the Chinese state and the integrity of the Chinese nation and its 
territory. Throughout the last few decades, these movements have successfully conveyed 
the consciousness of being “Chinese” (Ch. Zhongguo ren) to almost every ethnic 
community at every corner of the lands of “China” (Ch. Zhongguo) under the red flag. 
By the same token, a united China that has been created, regulated, informed, and 
                                               
5 See, for example, Chang Chi-hsiung, Waimeng zhuquan guishu jiaoshe, 1911–1916 (Disputes and 
negotiations over Outer Mongolia’s national identity, unification, or independence, and sovereignty, 1911–
1916), 269-303. 
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maintained in this manner forces the highly centralized Beijing regime to face serious 
challenges from its border areas, most of which were once under the management of the 
Mongolian Superintendency during the Qing period. The oversimplification of late 
imperial Chinese history, as dictated by the Chinese state since 1949, has failed to 
appropriately grasp the legacy of the cosmopolitan Chinese empire under the Qing. In the 
post-revolutionary context, the historical narratives of China’s borders after the 1600s, 
especially those narratives concerning certain political forces’ autonomous positions 
within Qing China’s Zongfan framework, have challenged the Chinese official historical 
narratives in a way that echoes the voice of multiethnic Qing China.6 In this sense, what 
the authoritarian regime in Beijing has been really facing since 1949 is the post-Qing 
problems that have been unleashed by China’s transformations in its late imperial period. 
Nevertheless, it would be too much to claim that China has abandoned its 
self-image as the center of the world. Rather, China’s role as the center of the communist 
revolution in Asia and its ambition of becoming the revolutionary center of the world 
during the Cold War reflected its deep belief that it was the Central Kingdom. In the 
post-Cold War period, this illustrious identification has been substantiated by China’s 
delicate policies toward North Korea, Vietnam, and those countries that have been 
identified by Beijing as members of the “Third World.” This phenomenon could explain 
why China’s diplomacy toward the countries that had been powers in 
nineteenth-century-China is clear and tangible, but its diplomacy toward the countries 
that had prostrated themselves to Qing China is vague and equivocal. In many senses, the 
                                               
6 See, for example, R. Bin Wong, “China’s Agrarian Empire: A Different Kind of Empire, A Different Kind 
of Lesson,” 195-198; Magnus Fiskesjö, “Rescuing the Empire: Chinese Nation-Building in the Twentieth 
Century,” 15-44; Allen Carlson, “Reimaging the Frontier: Patterns of Sinicization and the emergence of 
new thinking about China’s territorial periphery,” 41-64; Sam van Schaik, Tibet: A History, 238-269. 
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former policy distinguishes China as a member of the international community, whereas 
the latter suggests that China plays the role as a civilizational center beyond the norms 
regulated by the family of nations. The thorniest question for China as it grows in power 
in the early twenty-first century, therefore, is not its possible clashes with Western 
countries, but with those neighboring countries that have a shared historical memory of 
the Chinese empire inherited through the Zongfan system. 
The Periphery and the Center of the Chinese Empire: Korea and China in Late 
Imperial and Modern Times 
The story of China’s transformation in this dissertation starts on the periphery of the 
Chinese empire under the Ming in the 1610s. From the late 1610s to the early 1640s, the 
Manchu regime progressively changed its relations with Chosŏn and finally established a 
Zongfan relationship with it. By further subordinating Mongolian political entities and 
converting them into its outer fan, as it had done with Chosŏn, the Manchu regime 
established a multilevel hierarchical Zongfan framework, within which the regime served 
as the exclusive center. In this process, it appropriated the vested institutional norms of 
Zongfan mechanism to transform its identity from a country of “northeastern barbarians” 
into the Central Kingdom and expressed a strategic goal of transforming into Zhongguo 
in the 1630s. These Zongfan norms that culminated in the intensive Qing–Chosŏn 
contacts from 1637 to 1643 were manifested through highly-programmed and reciprocal 
exchanges of emissaries, strict and hierarchical formats for sovereign letters, and 
elaborate and minute rituals performed to one another. In addition to its internal 
institutional construction,7 the prolonged Sinicization of the Manchus and the Manchu 
                                               
7 See Zhang Jinfan and Guo Chengkang, Qing ruguan qian guojia falü zhidu shi (The law and institutional 
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regime was significantly advanced by the resources outside the regime’s borders. 
More importantly, this process of Sinicization was concurrent with the 
Barbarianization of other political entities, a process that was initiated by the Manchu 
regime. After the Qing established its self-identity as China/Zhongguo in 1644, the 
Manchu ruling house deliberately transformed Chosŏn into a prototypical fan of the Qing 
and maximized its ritual role to an unprecedented degree during the construction of the 
Qing’s Chinese imperial order. After 1644, Chosŏn’s role was essential for demonstrating 
the Qing’s new political identity as the center of the world. To a large degree, Chosŏn was 
also the only country that was able to perennially serve as the other to lend the Chinese 
empire under the Qing political and cultural resources to highlight its new 
politico-cultural identity. 
Students of Sino–Korean relations have shown that Chosŏn continued to keep its 
cultural identity as “Little China” after 1644 and the intellectuals of the country firmly 
held their pro-Ming and anti-Manchu attitude in their minds by labeling the Qing 
“barbarians.” This observation is true, as discussed in Chapter 3. The very pronounced 
and sharp contradiction between this inward perception of the Qing and Chosŏn’s 
outward submissive actions toward the Qing, however, is so attractive to people that it 
has caused them to neglect the other side of the coin, namely what occurred to Chosŏn 
within Qing China. Moreover, acceptance the fact that the Qing was founded by Manchu 
“barbarians,” which would require Emperor Yongzheng’s confession in the eighteenth 
century and the pressure of Han Chinese racialism in the nineteenth century (such as the 
racial rhetoric of the Taiping Rebellion and Sun Yat-sen’s revolution) as its perfect 
                                                                                                                                            
history of the Qing before 1644); Liu Xiaomeng, Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan (The 
development of the Manchus from tribe to country). 
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corroboration, has also contributed to this neglect among modern scholars. 
The Qing was constructing its Chineseness within China’s borders, which 
occurred concurrently with Chosŏn’s own attempts to do the same within Korea. The two 
processes were actually competing with each other for the right to call themselves the 
exclusive “civilized” China, although such competition was not public. In their shared 
Chinese world, the Qing’s rhetoric quickly triumphed over that of Chosŏn, as the imperial 
discourse at the institutional level identified Chosŏn as a country of “barbarians” on the 
periphery of the Central Kingdom. 
In practice, the highly-programmed, elaborate, and reciprocal Zongfan rituals 
perennially practiced between the Qing and Chosŏn after 1637 represented, and helped 
consolidate their bilateral Zongfan order. These rituals constantly informed the two 
countries with their mutually constitutive legitimacy, since then to 1895. When segments 
of China’s cosmopolitanism broke down after the 1840s, the ritual-based inner parts of 
the Zongfan system remained unchanged because they concerned the fundamentals and 
political legitimacy of both China and its outer fan, or shuguo. Starting in the late 1870s 
and early 1880s, Chosŏn was defined by Japan and Western treaty powers as an 
independent sovereign state enjoying sovereignty on a par with them, thus being 
theoretically equal to Qing China under international law. Yet this change to its 
international status was unable to change its politico-cultural position under the Chinese 
empire. As a consequence, two dual systems appeared and functioned between China and 
Chosŏn, in which the ritual-based conventional Zongfan mechanism was still efficiently 
maintaining their bilateral relations within the same Zongfan family, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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By the same token, the conflicts between China and Chosŏn and between China 
and other powers over Chosŏn, in one way or another, resulted from an inability to 
recognize the inconspicuous nature of the Zongfan system in the late nineteenth century. 
For example, the period between the early 1860s to the late 1870s was the first time since 
the Qing established its Zongfan relationship with Chosŏn in 1637 that the Western 
powers and Japan were able to understand the significance of the Zongfan relationship. 
The Sino–Korean Zongfan relations were largely different from that between Qing China 
and its other fan, such as Ryukyu, Annam, Siam, and Burma. In other words, the crisis 
brought about by foreign encroachment in the middle to late nineteenth century was the 
first time since 1637 that the Qing was required to perform its duty as patriarch as well as 
monarch of its cosmopolitan system and ensure Chosŏn’s security through the 
conventional policy of “cherishing the small country.” Just as the Ming had devoted itself 
to Chosŏn against the Japanese invasion in the 1590s, the Qing, as the sole legitimate 
heirs to the Ming and thus the Central Kingdom, had to fulfill its duty toward Chosŏn in 
the 1880s and 1890s. 
From this point of view, the macro-history of the Chinese empire from the 1390s, 
when the Ming officially established the Zongfan relationship with Chosŏn, to the 1890s, 
when the Qing was forced to terminate its Zongfan relationship with Chosŏn, can thus be 
traced through the micro-history of constant Sino–Korean Zongfan relations. All of the 
historical events that happened between Qing China and Chosŏn in the late nineteenth 
century were not contingent on events of the day. Behind them was the Zongfan rationale 
that crystalized in the period between the 1390s and the 1630s. This historical continuity 
can be seen clearly in China’s diplomacy toward Chosŏn in the late nineteenth century. 
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The Chinese officials, such as Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai, who steered the course of 
China’s diplomacy during those years, preferred to use such terms as hua (i.e. Zhonghua, 
China) to refer to Qing China and to frame the Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship within 
the entire linage of the time-honored Sino–Korean Zongfan relations since the Western 
Zhou period. By drawing from this intellectual background, these Chinese policy-makers 
could use very traditional Zongfan tenets to pursue, strengthen, and demonstrate the 
legitimacy of their contemporary policies toward Chosŏn. 
Although I have put substantial emphasis on Chosŏn Korea’s important role in 
nourishing the contours of the Qing-centric Zongfan world, my ultimate goal is to discuss 
the center of this world, China/Zhongguo, from a perspective that takes measure of both 
its politico-cultural and geographical composition. China borders many countries and 
political entities, but almost every fundamental change during the last four centuries 
arose from its eastern border, predominantly from Korea. Far more than a historical 
coincidence, China’s fate has been closely bound with that of Korea. From the 1590s to 
the 1950s, China was deeply involved in, and heavily suffered from, three great wars in 
Korea, in which Chinese leaders tried to preserve certain regimes in Korea. The first war 
between China and Japan in the 1590s, in defense of China’s Korean ally, Chosŏn, left 
the Ming in a serious financial quagmire, which in turn led to the fall of the dynasty. The 
second war between China and Japan over Korea three centuries later in the 1890s, again 
over Chosŏn Korea, contributed significantly to the demise of yet another Chinese 
dynasty. Although not against Japan, China found a third war in defense of a Korean ally 
in the 1950s, this time against the United Nations, and this action isolated China from the 
mainstream of the international community for four decades until 1992, when China itself 
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seriously challenged the legacies of the Korean War of the 1950s by establishing foreign 
relations with South Korea. 
Despite the long periods separating them, these three wars have striking 
similarities. In all three cases, the Chinese governing regimes—Ming China in the 1590s, 
Qing China in the 1890s, and communist China in the 1950s—were thoroughly saturated 
in the cosmopolitan ideology of the China-centric world—that is, that of 
“all-under-Heaven,” or, as this ideology manifested itself in the case of the communists, 
that of communist international revolution. Furthermore, Chosŏn Korea in the 1590s and 
the 1890s, and North Korea in the 1950s, shared ideologies with their contemporary 
Chinese counterparts. The point lies in the fact that the interdependence nature of Sino–
Korean relations in the construction and consolidation of their political legitimacy, then 
as now, undergirds the historical continuities in these conflicts. The history of the 
transformation of China’s relationship with Korea in the Qing period provides the best 
passage for grasping this point, as this dissertation has demonstrated. This long-term 
observation can help to explain why the Qing–Chosŏn relationship stood out among the 
Zongfan parallels between Qing China and other countries, and why it played a pivotal 
rule in prompting China’s transformation after the early seventeenth century.  
Tributary Trade and the Diversity of the Zongfan System: The Chinese Empire beyond 
Qing–Chosŏn Relations 
The Qing–Chosŏn Zongfan relationship did possess some particularities, insomuch that it 
did not manifest all aspects of the multidimensional Zongfan system. Although the 
Chosŏn Model was efficiently applied by Qing China to other countries in the process of 
reinventing the Chinese empire, no ceteris paribus running between China and its outer 
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fan existed in this system. Vietnam, for example, embraced a very practical path, and 
attempted to establish itself as the Central Kingdom in Indochina. While Vietnam 
constantly sent tributary missions to Beijing for political legitimacy, it had no difficulty in 
declaring its king “emperor,” naming the main gate of the royal palace the “Meridian 
Gate,” like the one in the Forbidden City in Beijing, and addressing its royal annuals as 
“veritable imperial records” (Ch. shilu). None of these ever happened in Chosŏn from 
1392 to 1895, as it would have meant a challenge to “proper conduct” (Ch. li) and 
delegitimized the very regime. 
It is true that, as Takeshi Hamashita has pointed out, the tributary system was not 
as unitary a system as it might have seemed from China’s perspective. It was a diverse in 
its operation, at least in the eyes of the countries in its periphery that had a motivation to 
cultivate different notions of their relations with China within their own social and 
cultural niche.8 Studies on Sino–Siamese relations in the Qianlong period, in particular 
those on the terminology of the “tribute” or “Chim Kong” (Ch. jingong, paying tribute) 
made by Chuang Chi-fa and Masuda Erika, have corroborated the diverse and 
multilayered characters of the Zongfan system and challenged the term “tribute system” 
in a fundamental way.9 Framing the issue in a Chinese–Western context, the research of 
John E. Wills, Jr., on Dutch and Portuguese envoys to China in the Kangxi period has 
also depicted “the clash between the basic values and world-views of the tribute system 
and those of Western formal diplomacy.”10 These scholars have embodied a common 
                                               
8 Takeshi Hamashita, Chōkō shisutemu to kindai ajia (The tributary system and modern Asia), 3-21. 
9 Chuang Chi-fa, “Xianluo guowang Zhengzhao rugong qingting kao”; Masuda Erika, “Siam’s ‘Chim 
Kong,’ Sending Tributary Missions to China, A Study of the Diplomatic Aspect of Sino–Siamese Relations 
during the Thonburi and Early Rattanakosin Periods (1767–1854)”, and “The Fall of Ayutthaya and Siam’s 
Disrupted Order of Tribute to China (1767–1782).” 
10 John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies and Illusions, 172. 
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approach to observing the Chinese “tribute system” or the Sinocentric order through 
tribute trade, from which they have tried to pursue pluralism in this system.11  
As the trade activities varied from one place to another in late imperial times, this 
system presented itself in diverse ways. Hamashita’s research on the tribute system 
illustrates an intensively connected inter-regional network in East Asia, in which he 
focuses on economic relations between the countries involved in the system that showed 
strong interests in promoting commercial activities on their borders and beyond, in 
particular the East Asian maritime commercial networks. By further linking Chinese trade 
with the European maritime business in the Ming and Qing periods, John E. Wills, Jr., has 
asserted that: “the years from about 1425 to 1550 were the only time in all of Chinese 
history when a unified tribute system embodying these tendencies was the matrix for 
policy decisions concerning all foreigners.” Wills made this conclusion based on his 
observations on the process in which the regime in China started to strengthen the 
bureaucratic control over its relations and commercial contacts with foreigners in order to 
enhance China’s supreme position through certain hierarchal and elaborate ceremonies.12  
Wills’ conclusions are supported by Shigeki Iwai, who has argued that the activity 
of paying homage to China by foreigners (J. chōkō; Ch. chaogong) began to be 
incorporated into the Sino–foreign trade system (J. goshi; Ch. hushi) after 1380, when the 
Ming government abolished the Maritime Trade Superintendency (Ch. Shibo si), a 
long-living institute of managing maritime trade, and this policy endured until 1684, 
when Emperor Kangxi of the Qing resumed maritime trade.13 Beyond specific trade 
                                               
11 Shangsheng Chen, “Zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi yanjiu chuyi” (A general discussion on China’s 
traditional foreign relations), 16. 
12 John E. Wills, Jr., China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800, 3. 
13 Shigeki Iwai, “Chōkō to goshi” (Tribute and trade), 142. 
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issues, this argument underlines the process of centralizing China during the Ming and 
Qing periods by suggesting that the Chinese tribute trade system reached a new stage of 
homogenization, losing the vibrancy it possessed before 1380. 
Examining the Chinese Zongfan system in late imperial times from a maritime 
trade perspective, however, raises issues of bias, for both the Ming and the Qing did not 
fundamentally rely on their maritime counterparts to define their political identities and 
worldviews. Rather, the overland tribute trade and Zongfan regulations were more 
significant and never lacked vitality and variability in practice. This issue is more closely 
related to China’s policy of “giving more to the visitors and benefiting less from them” 
(Ch. houwang bolai) in contacts with its tributary guests. Among many similar cases, a 
close comparison between the value of Chosŏn’s tributes and that of China’s imperial 
gifts and extra gifts in 1790, and an intensive discussion on China’s policy toward the 
Zunghar Mongols’ philanthropic and political activity of “boiling tea” (Ch. aocha) in 
Tibet in the Qianlong period have shown that China did not economically benefit from its 
contacts with Chosŏn and the Zunghar Mongols at different levels of the Zongfan 
system.14 As the Korean historian Hae-Jong Chun has pointed out, “the nature of the 
Sino–Korean tributary system can best be explained from the point of view of politics.”15 
This was also true in other cases related to China’s contacts with other nations that 
participated in the Zongfan system under the Chinese empire. 
The diversity and vibrancy of tributary trade activity in the Zongfan system also 
                                               
14 See, Yuanchong Wang, “Rouhui yuanbang, yi shi bu yi wen: qingchao dui Chaoxian fuqing shituan de 
huici yu jiashang” (Cherishing country from afar: The rewards granted by the Qing court to the Korean 
envoys for their tributes to the Qing Dynasty); Wenli Lü, “Cong qianlong nianjian zhungaer ruzang aocha 
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Zunghar, and Xizang [Tibet] through Zunghar’s “boiling tea” in Xizang in the Qianlong period). About a 
general examination on the Sino–Korean tributary trade in the Qing period, see Chang Tsun-wu, Qing Han 
zongfan maoyi, 1637–1894 (Sino–Korean Tributary Trade, 1637–1894). 
15 Hae-jong Chun, “Sino–Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” 110. 
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proves that Qing China, Chosŏn Korea, and other members in the Sinocentric family 
were not secluded or immobile before Western powers clashed with East Asia in the early 
nineteenth century. The mainstream of modern Chinese historical narrative, both inside 
and outside China, has been overwhelmingly focused on the disintegration of the Canton 
trade system, or the Cohong system—the intermediaries between Beijing and Western 
countries in Canton, which is believed to have trigged conflicts between China and 
Britain, and resulted in the forcible opening of China’s door to Western powers. By 
identifying westernization or modernization as the unavoidable and necessary road for 
China to take, this paradigm epitomizes the oft-criticized West-centric approach to 
analyzing modern China that regard Chinese institutions as stagnant systems. Yet, at least 
since the Han dynasty, China has been consistently saturated with the global currents and 
it never lacked communication with the rest of the world.16 In the Qing period, the 
institutional flexibility manifested by the creation of the Mongolian Superintendency in 
1638, the Grand Council in 1729, and the Zongli Yamen in 1861 strongly highlighted the 
malleability of Qing China.17 Therefore, an approach that fails to give appropriate 
considerations to co-existing trade systems on China’s borders and in its capital has 
trimmed the entire multilayered Zongfan trade framework down to Sino–Western part of 
Southern China. It has led some historians to conclude that the period from 1860 to 1882 
was “the last phase of the East Asian world order.”18 In the previous chapters, I have 
demonstrated why this is not true.  
What has prevented people from grasping this dynamic picture is modern Chinese 
                                               
16 Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History. 
17 See, for example, Beatrice S. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch’ing 
China, 1723–1820; Jennifer Rudolph, Negotiated Power in Late Imperial China: The Zongli Yamen and the 
Politics of Reform. 
18 Key-hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 1-38, 328-351. 
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nationalism. It makes use of the late Qing period as a reservoir of cultural resources, and 
from this it nourishes a strong victim mentality among the Chinese in order to maintain 
and enhance the historical and political legitimacy of the post-Qing Chinese nationalist 
and communist revolutions and regimes. Therefore, restoring a vivacious Qing to the 
historical narration of China, including the dismal chapter after the 1840s, poses a 
tremendous challenge to Chinese nationalism and even the process of modern Chinese 
state building. Among all the questions that could be raised by this scenario, whether or 
not the China-centric order indeed disintegrated in the late nineteenth century stands out. 
The Persistence of the Chinese Empire: Dimensions of the Disintegration of the 
China-Centric Order in the Late Nineteenth Century 
Against the new historical background of the “rise of China” narrative in the current 
wave of globalization in the twenty-first century, some observers in the West have 
correctly noted that China under authoritarian rule is not, and will not become, a member 
of the “club,” although it has become the largest economic power in the world.19 These 
Westerners have tried to understand contemporary China through Chinese civilization 
and its conventional foreign relations framework.20  A critical question behind this 
approach asks in what dimensions that the China-centric order really disintegrated in the 
late nineteenth century, a time when China seemed to be subjugated to the Western 
technologies, ideas, and institutions. This question is related to our understanding of the 
transformations of post-Qing China, the Chinese state, and China’s foreign relations with 
its neighbors and the West. The legacy of the reluctant transformation of the Chinese 
                                               
19 See, for example, Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in Our Times; 
David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia.  
20 See, for example, Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the 
Birth of A New Global Order.  
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Zongfan order as a result of the penetration of the European international law-based 
political and diplomatic order in the late nineteenth century provides a good path for 
pursuing the answer by conducting more systematic research on the China-centric order.21 
In his analysis of the relationship between the Western “barbarians” and Qing 
China in the late nineteenth century, John King Fairbank describes a framework he terms 
as the Chinese “power structure,” which was “synarchic,” and “culture,” which was 
“Sinocentric.” For Fairbank, the Chinese world order embodied by the Sinocentric 
tributary system was incompatible with the Western world order represented by the treaty 
system, and it was only at this level of the synarchic power structure that China used the 
Western elements to move toward “incipient modernization.” “The ‘Western conquest’ 
proved abortive,” says Fairbank, “Instead of being taken over by the new invaders, the 
Chinese world order finally disintegrated.”22 The unfolding of Chinese history since the 
late nineteenth century seems to support Fairbank’s assertion, insomuch that China has 
been pursuing Western-oriented modernization and integrated itself into the successive 
waves of globalization. In addition to large-scale imports and applications of Western 
political ideas and systems by Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries, the 
transformation of the Chinese consumer culture in modern times can provide more cases 
concerning the localization of the homogenizing impact of westernization and 
globalization in China.23 
Viewed from this perspective, Fairbank’s observation that China’s “incipient 
modernization” at the power structural level, rather than the Sinocentric cultural level, is 
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22 John K. Fairbank, “The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order,” 273-275. 
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not different from Zhang Zhidong’s theory of “using Chinese learning for fundamentals 
and Western learning as tools” (Ch. zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong) in the 1890s, nor is 
it from Wei Yuan’s policy of “learning the superior techniques of the barbarians in order 
to control the barbarians” (Ch. shi yi changji yi zhiyi) in the 1840s. Whereas Wei and 
Zhang refused to change the basic structure of China and Fairbank saw it was impossible 
for the Western factors to fundamentally change or to be integrated into Chinese culture, 
they all dealt with the same question: how should Qing China meet the huge challenges 
posed by Western powers? All of them framed their answers within a China–West duality, 
rather than in the plurality of the Chinese world. For Wei, the duality equated to the 
notion that China was civilized and that the Western countries were “barbarians.” For 
Zhang, it meant that Qing China had to become equivalent to the Western powers. And 
finally, for Fairbank, the Sinocentric order was a parallel system to the Western world 
order. The difference among the three manifestations of the duality lay in China’s path to 
modernity from the late imperial period to the present. 
This duality, however, neglects the rich dimensions of the China-centric order by 
treating the order as a monolithic, rather than multileveled, system. Building upon this 
monolithic view of China, some scholars have argued that China’s perception of the 
world in the revolutionary context after 1949 actually amounted to the resurgence of its 
conventional ideology of “all-under-Heaven,” which endowed China with the identity as 
the Central Kingdom again, providing broader Chinese historical and cultural 
backgrounds in which the Mao-style cosmopolitan revolutionary ideology found its 
legitimacy.24 Yet by the same token, taking an institutionally well-established People’s 
                                               
24 Benjamin I. Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present,” in The Chinese 
World Order, 284; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean Warn: The Making of the Sino–American 
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Republic as a requisite for the argument, this observation falls short in explaining how 
Sinocentrism in post-1949 China was restored, if such an order had disintegrated in the 
first place, as some have claimed. It is thus necessary for one to examine the Sinocentric 
order from a multileveled perspective, in particular the inner dual system within the 
dynamic Zongfan framework, as demonstrated by the history of Qing–Chosŏn relations 
examined in this dissertation. 
In 1872, Li Hongzhang suggested to the Qing’s meritocracy that China should not 
cancel a new project that sought to manufacture modern warships, as the country was 
continually in “an unprecedentedly great transformation during thousands of years.”25 In 
the early twenty-first century, China has taken on an aura of “national revival” (Ch. minzu 
fuxing), yet it is still struggling toward modernity, employing its statecraft to strive for 
efficient management of its vast territory, multiethnic nations, and diverse foreign 
relations. The Central Kingdom, Zhongguo, is still on the path of a great transformation 
that began in the early seventeenth century. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Confrontation, 214; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 8, 122. 
25 See LHZQJ (2008), vol. 5, 107. 
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CHINESE CHARACTER GLOSSARY  
aocha  熬茶 
Banli huashang shiwu lishi 辦理華商事務理事 
banshi dachen 辦事大臣 
Bao Chaoxian ce 保朝鮮策 
Beiyang tongshang dachen 北洋通商大臣 
beiyi  北夷 
beizhi  卑職 
benchao  本朝 
beng  崩 
bianjiang 邊疆 
bianjing maoyi 邊境貿易 
biantong jiuzhi 變通舊制 
bianwai zhi guo 邊外之國 
biao  表 
biaozheng wanbang 表正萬邦 
bi Chaoxian shili, qing feng wangwei, cong 
zhengshuo 
比朝鮮事例, 請封王位, 從正朔 
bici zhi fen 彼此之分 
Bingbu 兵部 
binli  賓禮 
binzhu li  賓主禮 
binzhu zhi li 賓主之禮 
bitan  筆談 
bubei bukang 不卑不亢 
Bujun tongling yamen 步軍統領衙門 
buluo  部落 
caifu  采服 
cefeng  冊封 
chaejo  再造 
chajon t’ŭngnip 自尊特立 
chakan chishi 查勘敕使 
ch’amho / jianhao 僭號 
chaogong  朝貢 
Chaogong tongli 朝貢通例 
Chaoxian celue 朝鮮策略 
Chaoxian gongshi yantu 朝鮮貢使燕圖 
Chaoxian guo yiguan 朝鮮國夷官 
Chaoxian guo zizhu zhi bang, baoyou yu 
Riben guo pingdeng zhi quan 
朝鮮國自主之邦，保有與日本國平
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等之權 
Chaoxian nai waiyi zhi ren 朝鮮乃外夷之人 
Chaoxian shanhou liuce 朝鮮善後六策 
Chaoxian shili 朝鮮事例 
chaso  字小 
chehu  諸侯 
chen / sin 臣 
chengchen rugong 稱臣入貢 
Cheng shouwei 城守尉 
ch’i  致 
chikbun  職分 
chim / zhen 朕 
ch’ŏksa yunŭm 斥邪綸音 
ch’ŏnbyŏng ch’ŏnjang 天兵天將 
ch’ŏncho  天朝 
Ch’ŏndan  天壇 
ch’ŏnha taeǔi 天下大義 
ch’ŏp  貼 
chōkō 朝貢 
Chōsen kyōshinkai 朝鮮共進會 
chŏkch’u  賊酋 
chŏngmyo horan 丁卯胡亂 
chŏngmyo roran 丁卯虜亂 
chon Chungguk, yang yi chŏk 尊中國, 攘夷狄 
chongsa  中士 
chonju ǔiri  尊周義理 
Chosa sich’aldan 朝士視察團 
Chosŏn kugwang pongsŏ Kŭmguk han 朝鮮國王奉書金國汗 
ch’u sinsa 秋信使 
ch’un sinsa 春信使 
chuandan 傳單 
Chungcho / Zhongchao 中朝 
Chungguk / Zhongguo 中國 
Chungguk ho ya / Zhongguo hu ye 中國胡也 
ci  賜 
cun shuguo zhi ti 存屬國之體 
dabang  大邦 
dabing  大兵 
Dae ch’ŏngguk kwan mun in song hwangje 大清國寬溫仁聖皇帝 
Daechŏng hwangje gongdŏk bi 大清皇帝功德碑 
daguo  大國 
 449 
da huangdi  大皇帝 
daihe lishan  帶河礪山 
daili shanhe  帶礪山河 
Dai nippon teikoku 大日本帝國 
da junzhu 大君主 
Daming guo 大明國 
Daming huidian 大明會典 
dan  石 
Daqing diguo 大清帝國 
Daqing guo 大清國 
Daqing guo huangdi 大清國皇帝 
Daqing guoji tiaoli 大清國籍條例 
Daqing huangdi gongde bei 大清皇帝功德碑 
dasang  大喪 
Datang kaiyuan li 大唐開元禮 
Dayi juemi lu 大義覺迷錄 
de  德 
dehua zhi wai 德化之外 
di  弟 
dianfu  甸服 
diaoji  弔祭 
didu 帝都 
diguo zhuyi 帝國主義 
dokuritsu koku 獨立國 
dongbei yi  東北夷 
Dongguo  東國 
Dongnaebu amhaeng ŏsa 東萊府暗行御史 
Dongsansheng 東三省 
dongyi  東夷 
dou  斗 
duannan zuoshi 斷難坐視 
Ducha yuan 都察院 
duli  獨立 
duli banzhu 獨立半主 
duli zhi guo 獨立之國 
enwei bingzhu 恩威并著 
er’pin xian 二品銜 
erguo  爾國 
fan  藩 
fanchen wu waijiao 藩臣無外交 
fanfeng  藩封 
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fanfu  藩服 
fanguo  藩國 
fangwu  方物 
fanping  藩屏 
fanshu zhi xuming 藩屬之虛名 
fanwang  藩王 
fanzhong  番眾 
fei qi wang er junxian zhi 廢其王而郡縣之 
fengjian shizhong 豐儉適中 
fengshi  封諡 
feng siyi 風四夷 
Fengtian yu Chaoxian bianmin jiaoyi 
zhangcheng 
奉天與朝鮮邊民交易章程 
fu  福 
gaitu guiliu 改土歸流 
Gaoli 高麗 
gech’ŏp  揭帖 
geguo gongshi fangci 各國貢使仿此 
geguo yangren 各國洋人 
genben zhongdi 根本重地 
Gongbu  工部 
gongdan  貢單 
gongshi  貢使 
gongwu  貢物 
goshi  互市 
gu  孤 
Guanglusi  光祿寺 
guanshe  館舍 
guiguo  貴國 
guihua  歸化 
guochao 國朝 
guojia  國家 
guojia gongdiao 國家公弔 
guosang  國喪 
guoshu  國書 
guoti  國體 
haguk / xiaguo 下國 
Haiguan jiandu 海關監督 
hama yŏn 下馬宴 
Han 韓 
hanghu  行戶 
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hanhua  漢化 
Hanlin yuan 翰林院 
hanyi  漢夷 
hasa  下士 
he wo tianchao tizhi 合我天朝體制 
hoetap sa 回答使 
hong  薨 
hongbŏm / hongfan 洪範 
hosŏ  胡書 
houbu dao 候補道 
houfu  侯服 
Houjin  後金 
houwang bolai 厚往薄來 
hu 胡 
hua 化; 華 
huahua 華化 
huamin 華民 
huangdi zhi xiu 皇帝之休 
huangfu xian bin 荒服咸賓 
Huangqing zhigong tu 皇清職貢圖 
huangshang 皇上 
huangtian wu qin, wei de shi fu 皇天無親, 惟德是輔 
Huaxia 華夏 
huayang zujie 華洋租界 
huayi zhi bian 華夷之辨 
huayi zhi bian shenyan 華夷之辨甚嚴 
Hubu 戶部 
huairou dongtu 懷柔東土 
huairou yuanren 懷柔遠人 
huayang zujie 華洋租界 
Hugŭm ch’ŏnmyŏng hwangje 後金天命皇帝 
Hugŭmguk kahan 後金國可汗 
huibi pai 迴避牌 
huidian 會典 
Huitong siyi guan 會同四譯館 
hushi 互市 
hwa-i ŭi chai 華夷差異 
hwangbok hambin / huangfu xianbin 荒服咸賓 
hwangcho 皇朝 
hwangje 皇帝 
hwangje chi hyu 皇帝之休 
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hwangmyŏng / huangming 皇明 
ich’u 夷酋 
insin mu oegyo / renchen wu waijiao 人臣無外交 
iyang sŏn 異樣船 
iyong husaeng 利用厚生 
jimi 羈縻 
jianhu 監護 
jianjiu Zhongguo zhi zhi 漸就中國之制 
Jianzhouwei 建州衛 
jiaoshe 交涉 
jiazhang 家長 
jietie 揭帖 
Jilin Chaoxian shangmin suishi maoyi 
zhangcheng 
吉林朝鮮商民隨時貿易章程 
Jindian 金典 
jingong 進貢 
Jingshan qinglisi 精膳清吏司 
jingshi 京師 
Jinguohan zhishu yu Chaoxian guowang 金國汗致書于朝鮮國王 
Jinguo waifan menggu 金國外藩蒙古 
jisi lubian  己巳虜變 
jisi zhi yi  己巳之役 
jiufu  九服 
jugong  鞠躬 
Junji chu 軍機處 
junji dachen 軍機大臣 
junxian qi di 郡縣其地 
junxian zhi 郡縣之 
junzi 君子 
Kado  椵島 
Kaiping kuangwu ju 開平礦務局 
Kamni amun 監理衙門 
kapsin jŏngbyŏn 甲申政變 
ke’erqin guo 科爾沁國 
ki’mi  羈縻 
Kŏnjuwi  建州衛 
Kŏnjuwi buha mabŏp gaet’ak 建州衛部下馬法開拆 
kongdan  貢單 
kongming  空名 
kongmul  貢物 
kongsa  貢使 
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Kŏnyang  建陽 
Koryŏ / gaoli 高麗 
Kosŏn kwan 考選官 
kouxie  叩謝 
Kŭmguk han  金國汗 
Kuan wen ren sheng huangdi 寬溫仁聖皇帝 
kuksŏ  國書 
Kwangmu  光武 
kwiguk  貴國 
kwŏn / ken 權 
Kyŏngsa / Jingshi 京師 
laichao  來朝 
laigui  來歸 
laihua  來化 
liaoyin jiaoqing 僚寅交情 
li  禮 
li  里 
Liangyi shuiwu jiandu 兩翼稅務監督 
Libu  禮部 
lidan  禮單 
Lifan yuan  理藩院 
lingshi  領事 
lishi  理事 
liubu  六部 
liwu  禮物 
longting  龍亭 
Luhuan huijing tu 臚歡薈景圖 
Lunchuan zhaoshang ju 輪船招商局 
lunji  倫紀 
Lunyu  論語 
mabŏp / mafa 馬法 
manfu  蠻服 
manpo ch’ŏmsa  滿浦僉使 
manzi  蠻子 
maoyi  貿易 
Menggu yamen 蒙古衙門 
Mingchao  明朝 
mingfen  名分 
Mingguo jiuli  明國舊例 
mingzheng yishun 名正義順 
Mohwa gwan / Muhua guan 慕華館 
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muwŏn pulbok / wuyuan bufu 無遠不服 
Nambyǒl gung 南別宮 
Namhan sansŏng 南漢山城 
Nanchao 南朝 
nanfan  難番 
nanfu  男服 
nanyang 南洋 
neidi  內地 
neifan  內藩 
neifu  內服 
neishu  內屬 
neiwai miaoyi 內外苗夷 
neiwai zhi bie 內外之別 
neiwufu  內務府 
nei zhuhou  內諸侯 
nianhao  年號 
noch’u 奴酋 
nucai  奴才 
oguk  我國 
paijie  排解 
peichen / paesin / baishin 陪臣 
pianrang  偏壤 
pibyŏng sa 備邊司 
pijik  卑職 
p’iltam  筆談 
pingfan  屏藩 
pingfu  屏輔 
pinghan tianchao  屏翰天朝 
pingli  平禮 
pingmeng  帡幪 
pingxing  平行 
pŏnbang  藩邦 
pong  封 
puk’ak p’ae  北學派 
pulgok  不榖 
p’yeguk  別國 
p’yeha  陛下 
p’yo  表 
p’yŏnbi 褊裨 
py’ ŏnyang  偏壤 
pyŏlgi gun  別技軍 
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qian  錢 
qianshi rugong 遣使入貢 
qi dahen 七大恨 
Qinchai bianyi xingshi quanquan dachen 欽差便宜行事全權大臣 
qinchai xian pai 欽差憲牌 
Qinding daqing huidian 欽定大清會典 
Qinding libu zeli 欽定禮部則例 
Qingliu 清流 
Qing shilu 清實錄 
Qinming zhuzha Chaoxian zongli jiaoshe 
tongshang shiyi 
欽命駐紥朝鮮總理交涉通商事宜 
qinjunwang 親郡王 
qinshi  欽使 
qinwang / ch’inwang 親王 
qin Zhongguo, jie Riben, lian Meiguo 親中國, 結日本, 聯美國 
quanquan dachen 全權大臣 
rende  仁德 
renzhi yijin 仁至義盡 
rin’guk  鄰國 
roch’u  老酋 
rouhui yuanren, yi shi bu yi wen 柔惠遠人，以實不以文 
rouyuan  柔遠 
sadae  事大 
sahak  邪學 
saikensen  歳遣船 
Samjŏndo bi  三田渡碑 
sangmu wiwŏn 商務委員 
san gui jiu koutou 三跪九叩頭 
sangguk / shangguo 上國 
sangma yŏn 上馬宴 
sangsa  上士 
se’pye  歲幣 
Seikan ron 征韓論 
shang  賞 
Shangshu  尚書 
Shangwu weiyuan 商務委員 
shaoshu minzu 少數民族 
sheng/ xingsheng 省/ 行省 
shengchao  聖朝 
shengfan jie 生蕃界 
shenyuan  申冤 
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Shibo si 市舶司 
shida zixiao 事大字小 
Shihan jilue 使韓紀略 
shilu  實錄 
shin koku 清國 
shi yi changji yi zhiyi 師夷長技以制夷 
shizai zhi mingfen 實在之名分 
shouru bantu 收入版圖 
shouwei neidi er zhi qizheng 收為內地而執其政 
shubang (shu-pang) 屬邦 
shufan  屬藩 
shuguo  屬國 
shuli  屬禮 
shunfu  順付 
Shuntian fu  順天府 
shuoli  朔曆 
shu qi nan, jie qi fen, qi qi anquan 紓其難, 解其紛, 期其安全 
shu yu tizhi youguan 殊與體制有關 
Shuiwu si  稅務司 
sidao  司道 
siguo  四國 
sihai yi er wanguo laiwang 四海一而萬國來王 
Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao 四庫全書總目提要 
sin  臣 
sinsa  信使 
Sinsa yuramdan 紳士遊覽團 
siqing  私情 
sirhak  實學 
sisim  洗心 
siyi 四夷/ 四裔 
siyi xianfu 四夷咸服 
sobang  小邦 
so Junghwa / xiao Zhonghua 小中華 
songsŏ  上書 
suifan  綏藩 
sui Zhongguo 綏中國 
sujing pai 肅靜牌 
sun wo zhuquan 損我主權 
susin sa 修信使 
taebang  大邦 
taebodan  大報壇 
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taeguk  大國 
Taehan  大韓 
taejo  大朝 
Taixue guan 太學館 
tal  韃 
tianchao   天朝 
tianchao tizhi 天朝體制 
tianchao zhi chizi 天朝之赤子 
tianfo zhi zi 天佛之子 
tianming  天命 
Tianren fuyu lieguo yingming han 天任覆育列國英明汗 
tianshi  天使 
tianxia  天下 
tianxia guan  天下觀 
tianxia guojia zhi zhu 天下國家之主 
tianxia weigong 天下為公 
tianyi  天意 
tianzi  天子 
tiaoyue  條約 
timian  體面 
titong youguan 體統攸關 
tizhi   體制 
tizhi youguan 體制攸關 
tongdŭng ji ye / dōtō no reigi 同等之禮 
T’ongni kyosǒp t’ongsang samu amun 統理交涉通商事務衙門 
Tongnim mun 獨立門 
tongshang zhi zizhu 通商之自主 
tongzhi quan 統治權 
tuguan  土官 
tuoshan 妥善 
tushang heqi, haowu liyi 徒傷和氣，毫無利益 
tusi  土司 
ŭibun  義分 
waichen  外臣 
waifan  外藩 
waijiao  外交 
waisheng difang guan 外省地方官 
waishu  外屬 
waiyi  外夷 
wai zhuhou 外諸侯 
wanghua buji 王化不及 
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wangji  王畿 
wangsil  王室 
wanguo gongfa 萬國公法 
wanguo laichao 萬國來朝 
wanguo zhi shang 萬國之上 
wanguo zhi zhong 萬國之中 
wanquan wuque zhi duli zizhu 完全無缺之獨立自主 
Weiban Chaoxian shangwu weiyuan 委辦朝鮮商務委員 
weifu  衛服 
Wenshushili huangdi 文殊師利皇帝 
wijŏng ch’ŏksa 衛正斥邪 
wochao  我朝 
wo guojia 我國家 
wufu  五服 
Wukou tongshang dachen 五口通商大臣 
Wumen  午門 
wuyuan bufu 無遠不服 
xiahuang  遐荒 
xiang’an  香案 
xiangdao  嚮導 
xianghua zhi cheng 向化之誠 
xiangting  香亭 
xianru bantu 咸入版圖 
xiaobang  小邦 
xiao hansu 效漢俗 
xiaoqixiao  驍騎校 
xifan shengseng 西蕃聖僧 
Xingbu 刑部 
xingshi  星使 
xinshi  信使 
xiong  兄 
xiyang  西洋 
xiyu  西域 
xunfu  巡撫 
xunli fuxu 循例撫恤 
yangban  兩班 
yang’i poguk 攘夷保國 
yangwu  洋務 
yaofu  要服 
ye  禮 
yecho  禮曹 
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yedan  禮單 
yemul  禮物 
yi  夷 
yida zixiao 以大字小 
yifu  夷服 
yi gui san koutou 一跪三叩頭 
yiguo  異國 
yiguo junzhu 異國君主 
yihua  夷化 
yijia  一家 
yimu  夷目 
Yingguo zizhu zhi bang, yu Zhongguo 
pingdeng 
英國自主之邦, 與中國平等 
Yingjili guo 英吉利國 
yiyi zhiyi 以夷制夷 
yŏjin soch’u 女真小丑 
yŏngsŏn sa 領選使 
Yŏngŭn mun 迎恩門 
youbang  友邦 
youming wushi 有名無實 
youru junxian 有如郡縣 
you yidai junchen, biyou yidai zhizuo 有一代君臣, 必有一代制作 
yuanguo  遠國 
yuanren  遠人 
yuanren laigui 遠人來歸 
yuanyi  遠夷 
yu Chaoxian yiti youdai 與朝鮮一體優待 
yuguo  與國 
yu tizhi dayou guanxi 於體制大有關係 
zaibai 再拜 
zaizao 再造 
zaju 雜劇 
zaofeng nanyi 遭風難夷 
Zhamen 柵門 
zhangjing 章京 
zhao tianchao rouyuan shenren 昭天朝柔遠深仁 
zhenfu 鎮服 
Zhengdong xingzhongshusheng 征東行中書省 
zhengming dingfen 正名定分 
zhengshi  正史 
zhengtong 正統 
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Zhengtong lun 正統論 
zhengzhi zhi dao 正直之道 
zhimin zhi di 殖民之地 
zhimin zhuyi 殖民主義 
zhimin zhengce 殖民政策 
Zhongchao  中朝 
zhonggao  忠告 
Zhongguo / Zhongyuan zhi dao 中國 / 中原之道 
Zhongguo Chaoxian shangmin shuilu 
maoyi zhangcheng 
中國朝鮮商民水陸貿易章程 
Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 
Zhongguo lun 中國論 
Zhongguo suoxia neiyang 中國所轄內洋 
Zhongguo zhuzha Chaoxian zonglingshi 中國駐紮朝鮮總領事 
Zhonghua 中華 
Zhonghua diguo 中華帝國 
Zhonghua minguo 中華民國 
Zhonghua zhi tu 中華之土 
Zhonghua zhi zhi 中華之制 
Zhongtu 中土 
Zhongxia 中夏 
Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong 中學為體，西學為用 
Zhongyong  中庸 
Zhongyuan  中原 
zhongzu  種族 
Zhuchi Chaoxian waijiao yi 主持朝鮮外交議 
Zhuke qinglisi 主客清吏司 
Zhuzha Chaoxian guo qinchai dachen 駐紮朝鮮國欽差大臣 
zhu Zhongguo 主中國 
ziben zhuyi 資本主義 
zidi jia 子弟家 
ziwen 咨文 
zizhu / chaju / jishu 自主 
zizhu zhi guo 自主之國 
zizhu zhi quan 自主之權 
Zongban Chaoxian gekou jiaoshe 
tongshang shiwu 
總辦朝鮮各口交涉通商事務 
zongdu  總督 
zongfa fengjian 宗法封建 
zoushi  奏事 
zuzhi  祖制 
zun Zhongguo, rang yidi 尊中國,攘夷狄 
 461 
zunzhou rangyi 尊周攘夷 
zunzhou yili 尊周義理 
zuoyi  作揖 
zuzhong  族眾 
 
